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PREFACE 
(Abstract) 
What was the significance of February Six, 1934 in French history? 
The answer to this question has never been adequately provided by an 
American scholar in the field, although the French and the English 
historians have devoted several monographs to the subject. The present 
sSudy is an attempt to bridge this gap. Beyond the inquiry into the 
events that brought on the Sixth of February and their impact on French 
civilization, this study aims at an analysis of the governments set up 
by the Cartel des Gauches from 1932 through 1934, of the Stavisky Af-
fair, and of the riots of January and February, 1934. 
The source material extant in the United States proved to be in-
adequate, and it became imperative for the author to do much of his 
research in France. Of the many available records that were scrutinized, 
the most aaluable were the Chamber of Deputies' debates, annexes, and 
documents. The newspaper and periodical archives of Paris, the varied 
resources of the Biblioth~que Nationale, and the records of the French 
police also were useful. 
The majority of the French and English historians who have at-
tempted an interpretation of the Sixth of February, 1934, have seen 
in these dramatic events an attempted fascist coup d'~tat. This in-
terpretation was adopted by most American authorities interested in 
French internal affairs, who appear to have followed the line of argu-
ix 
mentation presented in the books of Alexander Werth, Which Way France? 
and France in Ferment. , . The fascist coup d'etat theory was based prL-
marily on three assumptions: (1) France had a strong fascist minority 
in Paris by January, 1934; (2) a political league named the Croix de 
Feu under the masterful leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel Francois de 
.s 
La Rocque dominated the rioters on the evening of February Six; and 
(3) the Daladier Government then in power successfully checked a fascist 
coup d 1 ~tat through decisive action. 
The primary sources revealed that the fascist interpretation was 
extremely inaccurate. Even though, in fact, the Third Republic was 
faced on that day by one of the most serious threats to French democ-
racy in its annals, the historical records show that France had no 
strong fascist minority in Paris by January, 1934, that the Croix de 
Feu was only one of many political leagues active on February Six, 
that the largest and the dominating political league on February Six 
was the non-fascist Union Nationale des Combattants (U.N.c.), and that 
the theory of an alleged fascist coup d'~tat was the interpretation 
propagated by the French Socialist Party and Premier Daladier. 
February Six was the climax of a democratic crisis which had 
begun as early as the elections of 1932. During the ~!chronic' phase, 11 
the democratic structure of France was criticized by men who kept 
their arguments on a high intellectual plane. These criticisms by 
themselves were not potent enough to bring about the overthrow of 
French democracy, for many of these had. been under discussion for years 
in intellectual circles. This "chronic phase," therefore, was one of 
X 
increased intellectual exercise against the weaknesses of French pol-
itical democracy and involved such·prosaic matters as the interpella-
tions, the parliamentary questions, the ministerial instability, the 
parliamentary committee system, the multiparty system, the value of a 
limited suffrage, and the disappointing results of the. elections of 1932. 
Especially vigorous was Andr~ Tardieu, a Rightist deputy and a former 
premier, who felt that·French democracy was too brittle to hold up 
before the international dangers that came with the collapse of col-
lective security. 
In 1933 the Great Depression struck France and the democratic 
crisis entered its "acute phase. 11 As unemployment figures increased, 
as the farmers found the markets closed, and as the Government seemed 
unable to keep its treasury in good order, the 11capitalist offensive" 
began. This offensive, led by outstanding big businessmen, distinguished 
itself by the viciousness with which French parliamentary institutions 
were attacked. The royalist press, seeing the opportunity to re-establish 
the monarchy, released a devastating series of articles against French 
democracy. 'Moreover, the French became apprehensive over the threat 
to s~curitl made by Nazi Germany and also joined the royalists and 
capitalists in blaming the Cartel for the country 1 s troubles. This 
antiparliamentary attitude gradually became overshadowed by a general 
atmosphere of antipathy \f.blP.1 things as they were. This repugnance be-
came associated with anyone working for the Third Republic. 
When the Stavisky Affair exploded over France on December 23, 1933, 
the democratic crisis entered the "violent phase. 11 Alexandre Stavisky 
xi 
was a naturalized Jew who had built up a criminal career as early as 
1909. By 1926 Stavisky was finally imprisoned but soon he was ''pro-
visionally released 11 to receive medical treatment. From 1927 to 1934 
Stavisky made good use of shysters, questionable medical authorities, 
police connections, and bribed parliamentarians to secure nineteen 
postponements of his case. During this period he swindled 500 million 
, 
francs from the Orleans and Bayonne Municipal Pawnshops. In January, 
1934, when these facts were publicly revealed, it was also announced 
that Stavisky had committed 11suiciderr in a villa somewhere in the Alps. 
·The French public, agitated by the French press, now began demand-
ing the names of those responsible for the Stavisky Scandals. Thousands 
of Frenchmen, led by the political royalist league, joined actively 
the antidemocratic forces when the names of the French judges, deputy-
lawyers, police, and Cabinet.members implicated with Stavisky were re-
vealed in January, 1934. On January 7 the royalist league, the Action 
Francaise, gave the first ''call to action 11 which was answered by nine 
serious January Riots in Paris. TheChautemps Cabinet was forced to 
resign by the 11 forces in the street. 11 
, . 
Edouard Dalad1er became Premier. His mishandling of the Chiappe 
Affair (the dismissal of the popular Prefect of Police) and other ad-
ministrative changes brought the opponents of French democracy back 
on the streets. This time the crowd was noticeably much more numerous 
and aggressive. 
This "violent phase11 reached its climax on the evening of February 6, 
1934. All the major political leagues had.called out their adherents to 
xii 
demonstrate against the Government and to seize the Palais-Bourbon--
the symbol of French parliamentary life. During a tumultuous Chamber 
sitting, a vast mob invaded the Place de la Concorde. By night time 
this crowd had become dominated by political leaguers who tried to 
seize the Concorde Bridge on their way to the Palais-Bourbon. A cor-
don of police kept the rioters in check. Early in the evening the 
Municipal Councillors in Paris actually entered the Palais-Bourbon, 
but they failed to convince Daladier that he should resiggw. By 7:30 
P.M. the police opened fire on the Concorde crowd to prevent the en-
raged political leaguers from seizing the barricaded Concorde Bridge. 
Throughout the night two leagues were especially violent in.their 
assaults against the police; namely, the Rightist organization called 
the Solidarite Francaise and the large veteran group of the U.N.C. 
The much-discussed Croix de Feu was disorganized; it paraded up and 
down the streets near the Chamber; and it later took credit for lead-
ing the leaguers that evening. The Great February Six Riot ended 
after several serious attempts to seize the Concorde Bridge had failed 
and after 4,000 people had been wounded ork killed. 
·The 11men on the streets'' on February Six had no clear and co-
herent program to follow; they had lost faith in democracy; in their 
government leaders, and in themselves. Their long, pent-up emotions 
broke out into full expression during the Great February Riot, and the 
result was an unusual amount of blood spilt needlessly. Almost as soon 
as the riot was over, the rioters realized what a threat to their de-
mocracy the event had been and this fact led the leaguers to be ashamed 
xiii 
of their conduct and to blame the fascists for their misbehavior. 
This change in attitude brought an end to the "violent phase'! of the 
democratic crisis. 
·A bit horrified of what they might have done to their democracy 
if circumstances had taken only a slightly different turn, the rioters 
wanted to make amends. Except for a few die-hards, all of France now 
entered the "recuperative phase" of the crisis. This period saw a 
whole day of repentance given to "pledging oneself to the ideas of 
liberty and French democracy." The French Connnunists tried unsuccess-
fully on February Ninth to change this return-to-democracy movement. 
On February 12, 1934, France celebrated its return to the democratic 
faith by staging a Great General Strike. 
Thus February Six was a real antidemocratic crisis for on that 
day a mob of 100,000, united by a desire to overthrow the Third Repub-
lic, made three major unsuccessful assaults against the police cordon 
guarding the Palais-Bourbon. Earlier this mob had been organized into 
numerous antiparliamentary political leagues which declared themselves 
"against those who rule." These leagues, forgoing the use of the peace-
ful means provided by democracy, accepted the reliance on force to 
bring about the removal of the Daladier Cabinet--the executive power 
selected only a few days previously. Even many of the country's duly 
elected deputies, during a very tumultuous Chamber sitting, and the 
Municipal Councillors of Paris assisted the leaguers on the Sixth of 
February in this serious attempt to overthrow French democracy. Only 
the poor coordination among the leagues, the lack of strong leaders 
xiv 
on the rioters' side, the determined and loyal police guarding the 
approaches to the Chamber, and the use of gunfire against the Con-
corde mob during the Great February Riot saved the Third Repumlic 
from falling on that historic day. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTl0N 
The Elections of 1932 
Background.-- After World War I, it would appear to a superficial 
observer that France, from a governmental viewpoint, could be classi-
fied as a strong democracy. Yet there were doubts to be encountered 
if one took the time to probe deeper. There was a cancer slowly eat-
ing towards the vitals of la belle France. This malady had many 
ramifications, but it remained subacute as cabinet after cabinet was 
replaced in the early 1920's. The parliamentary side of French democ-
racy was especially revealing. During the years 1926 to 1929 under 
the decided control of Raymond Poincarl, the parliamentary democracy 
could be seen slowly dying. But, true to the remarkable French 
ability to surprise its most acute observers, French democracy in the 
early thirties seemed to have resisted malignancy in its structure. 
In this atmosphere, we approach the elections of May, 1932. 
Results of the elections of 1932.-- The elections of 1932 had, as 
was usual in the French post-World War I politics, returned a Left 
majority. The Radical-Socialist Party emerged as the largest single 
party having captured 26 per cent of the seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies. The Right had gathered five seats for the Conservative 
Party, seventy-six seats for the U.R.D. (Republican-Democrats), twenty-
eight seats for the Independent Republicans, and sixteen seats for the 
2 
Popular Democrats--a total of 125 Rightists. The Center shared 134 
seats about equally between the Left Republicans and the Independent 
Radicals, while the Radical-Socialists and the Socialists took 323 
seats in the Chamber. This left some twenty-three seats for the Extreme 
1 
Left--twelve going to the Communists. 
A deeper analysis of the election returns brings out the fact 
that 303 votes out of 605 were needed for a majority within the hemi-
cycle--a name used to refer to the room where the deputies met when in 
official session. With this point in mind, it will be noted that the 
Radical-Socialists, alone, could never muster a majority vote. This 
could only be done if they could count the Socialists on their side. 
Events were to show that a Socialist-Radical coalition in the 1932 
Chamber never became a reality. 
Importance of the Socialist Party.-- The Radical-Socialists had 
won a victory in 1932 only because the Socialists and their party had 
united their forces during.the campaign. Taking advantage of there-
quirement that a second poll must be held whenever no candidate re-
ceived 50 per cent of the votes cast, the Radical-Socialists and the 
Socialists had agreed to pool their vo.tes on the second ballot. Thus 
was the Right defeated. Almost as soon as the balloting was completed, 
the rupture between the two erstwhile allies occurred. The division 
2 
was basically a deep one, as we shall see. 
1 Alexander Werth, France in Ferment (London, 1935), pp. 64-65; 
also Le Temps, July 14, 1932. 
2Alexander Werth, Which Way France? (London, 1937), p. 40. 
3 
The Socialists had met at the Salle Huyghens on May 28, 1932, and 
in the ''spirit of 1789" had drawn up a minimum government program called 
the Cahiers Huyghens, which they offered as the solution to France's ills. 
It was an ambitious list of proposals which included a reduction of 
French military expenditures to the 1928 level, the forty-hour week 
without decrease in wages, unemployment insurance, nationalization of 
railroads and insurance companies, and control of French banking. The 
Socialists especially emphasized disarmament and military budget cuts. 3 
I 
The focus of attention was Edouard Herriot at this point. He was 
the Radical-Socialist leader, and he was assigned the task of deciding 
whether he could accept the Socialists' proposals. The stakes were 
high for they involved future Socialist-aadical cooperation, the pos-
sibility of giving France a stable government, and the feasibility of 
introducing "socialist and untried measuresn into the French democratic 
structure. Herriot, the Premier-elect, was a conservative on the issues 
mentioned in the Cahiers Ruyghens~ The Socialists' demands, especially 
those on disarming unilaterally to the 1928 level, were distasteful to 
him. In consequence, soon after the elections of 1932, the breach was 
reached.4 There was to be no alliance between the Radical-Socialists 
and the Socialists in the Chamber! 
A glance at the four cabinets which succeeded one another from 
May, 1932, to January, 1934, shows that none of them was able to hold 
3werth, Which Way, p. 40. 
4L 1Europe Nouvelle, June 11, 1932. 
4 
together a majority. This was mainly because, on the personal level, 
Herriot's views were incompatible with those of Leon Blum, leader of 
the Socialists, who with 21 per cent of the seats constituted the next 
largest group in the Chamber. 
The Radical-Socialist Party theoretically stood committed to a 
social reform program, but, in reality, its political maneuvers after 
World War I proved that it was hostile to socialistic measures. The 
Radical-Socialists, therefore, being unable to agree with the Socialists 
on the political plane, resorted to the formation of a loosely-knit 
, 
Cabinet in 1932 under Edouard Herriot. The new Premier refused to 
consider a union with the Center parties becaus.e he felt that such a 
5 
move would alienate too much support on the Left. 
It became obvious that the Radical-Socialist leaders would have 
to spend much energy in trying to consolidate antagonistic political 
elements. In the next few years, they were forever trying to satisfy 
the contradictory forces on both the Right and the.Left as well as 
within their own party. The latter point should not be overlooked. 
The Left-Wing of the Radical-Socialist Party included many young men 
of the type like Pierre Cot and Gaston Bergery who felt that Herriot 
6 
was too slow. These many political vectors resulted in the impossi-
bility of bringing about a consistent government policy. It created a 
"weak Left'' which became known as the Cartel des Gauches. 
5John c. DeWilde, "Political Ferment in France," Foreign Policy 
Reports, X (July 18, 1934), 123. 
6 Werth, Which Way, pp. 41-42. 
5 
The Social Atmosphere and Foreign Affairs 
Monarchy versus parliamentary rule.-- The French political phil-
osophies, as they existed in 1932, could be said to revolve around the 
two poles of "monarchism" and parliamentary rule. Now the term "mon-
archism" not only connotes the return of a monarch, but also of a 
government ruled by monarchical principles. As to what these principles 
were in France in the period after World War I, there existed but neb-
ulous agreements. Since the early days of the Third Republic, "mon-
archism" had been the main contending idea used to oppose the Republic; 
but by 1919 and throughout the twenties, it became considerably weak. 7 
In the twenties such proroyalists as Charles Maurras and L:on 
Daudet decided to bring renewed vigor to the ''royalist movement" in 
France. Both men desired to channel their efforts so as to make 
"monarchism" again the leading challenge for French democracy. There 
was no doubt that Maurras was a brilliant writer and could be success-
ful in any propaganda campaign he undertook. He detested democnacy, 
and he gave vent to his feelings on this matter--as well as on many 
others--in the royalist newspaper organ, L 1Action Franjaise. I Leon 
Daudet, working with Maurras, was then the foremost user of invectives 
in France. Both men had employed their remarkable intellectual talents 
in writing a series of books dealing with the philosophical sides of 
8 
monarchy. 
7 Werth, Which Way, pp. 8-9. 
8Lowell Joseph Ragatz, Background of the February Riots in Paris 
(London, 1934), pp. 3-5. 
6 
It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of Maurras 
and Daudet when considering the royalist cause in post-World War I 
France, For a while they were the mainspring of the movement. In 1924, 
a little more flesh and blood was added when Maurras and Daudet began a 
propaganda campaign for the 11lting"--Jean, Duke of Guise. The Duke's 
very existence had been unknown to most Frenchmen before then. In 1926, 
a coronation was arranged. Soon Maurras and Daudet were making the 
happenings in the new court in Palermo, Sicily, "top news . 11 Their 
majesties, "King Jean III 11 and "Queen Isabelle 11 became the subject of 
daily comment throughout France. Henri of Orleans became the "Dauphin." 
The marriage of the latter to Isabelle, Princess of Orleans-Braganza 
was celebrated widely in the royal circles in France. 9 
Besides the creation of a "royal housen in exile, Maurras and 
Daudet brought further attention to the royal cause by the publicity 
they received. Maurras, for instance, was arrested for the illegal 
possession of arms. Maurras did not praise the "democratic arresting 
officials" when the dangerous weapons turned out to be rusty dueliRg 
pistols. The event made him a national hero for a while. Again, in 
1926, Maurras made the headlines, for he had threatened the life of 
the Minister of the Interior Schrameck. A court of appeal released 
Maurras of a two-year sentence given for this act. Daudet, on the 
other hand, had lost his son Philippe in 1925. Much mystery surrounded 
the latter affair. The story circulated that radicals had incited the 
9Ragatz, Background, pp. 3-5. 
7 
younger Daudet to commit suicide. Daudet charged that he had been 
slain by enemies of his among the police. Such sensational events in-
volving these two guiding spirits of "monarchism11 in France added to 
. 10 
their following. 
To the 11royal house" and "colorful personalities" rungs were added 
more steps in the monarchical ladder by the causes that L.'Action Fran-
caise supported. Maurras and Dauaet's newspaper was antisocialist, 
$-
anticommunist, antisemitic, and antimason. Others, who found France 
to have been too cautious in the field of policy-making since Versailles, 
made up the majority of the discordant elements who supported the 
strongly nationalist views expounded by the monarchists. Especially 
popular on the royalist bandwagon were the unmerciful attacks made on 
the members of the Chamber of Deputies. 11 Thus the labors of Daudet 
and Maurras could be considered as revealing the "monarchical prin-
ciples" of the times. 
In spite of what has been said so far, it must be recorded that 
12 
the royalists in France since World War I were small in numbers. 
However, among these, were the strongest antidemocratic intellectual 
forces. With Ma.urras and Daudet, "monarchism" was not only a royalist 
movement, it was an attitude of intense opposition to whatever could 
be labeled ~rench democracy. Serving as a focus for the discontented 
elements, their constant lashing at the Republic made the royalist 
10 . Ragatz, Background, pp. 4-6. 
11Ibid. 
12 Walter Rice Sharp, Government of the French Republic (New York, 
1938), p. 44. 
8 
leaders a menace to the Third Republic. By 1932, the "monarchist atti-
tude" was gaining momentum. 
The Third Republic was not unaccustomed to such opponents and 
critics. It bears repetition that French Democracy had had strong mon-
archical opposition in its early days, but after the Boulanger and 
Dreyfus Affairs and the anticlericalism of Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes, 
the Republic had been stabilized. Its prestige, furthermore, had been 
enhanced by the laurels it received during World War I. 
Postwar France more and more connected the Third Republic with 
parliamentary rule of the Chamber of Deputies. This was considered 
the center of French democracy, and parliamentary rule was accepted by 
the overwhelming majority of the French people as the best form of 
government. The great majority of the Rightists and the Socialists 
were not antiparliamentarians in 1932, and the average Frenchman took 
13 democratic government for granted. 
Distrust of the Republic 1 s machinery.-- In this period, two demo-
cratic.con"Stitutional schools were distinguishable in France. We will 
label them the 11 traditional school" and the "radical school. 11 These 
two groups were to be observed throughout France; they cut right through 
the bonds of political party make-up. The "traditional school~' defended 
the existing form of government. It was willing to work within the 
limits of the loi constitutionnelle de 1875. It approved, if not in-
tellectually at least outwardly, by its political activities, the con-
centration of French political power within the Chamber of Deputies, 
13 Werth, France in Ferment, pp. 12-13. 
9 
f 
and the weakened position of the French executive. Edouard Herriot and 
; 
Edouard Daladier were outstanding members among those upholding this 
category in the period under focus. Anyone acquainted with the general 
history of modern France knows this school too well for us to linger 
any longer on it. 
The spotlight should be turned rather on the "radical school"--
. ; 
especially as exemplified by M. Andre Tardieu. Tardieu had been in 
Clemenceau 1 s "war cabinet,'' and, in the early 1930's, had been Premier 
for a short while. During our period of interest, he was to leave 
Parliament arid undertake a crusade for a drastic change in the French 
Constitution. Tardieu was in many ways a follower of the Clemenceau 
and Poincare legend. His departure from the political arena led him, 
at first, on what appeared tobe a one-man campaign whose objective 
was to point out the decadence of the French political institutions. 
His experience as a parliamentarian bad given him a distaste for the 
intrigues carried on by the French political parties. He questioned 
the techniques used in the running of the French government and he 
felt that the parliamentary ~ystem was not so democratic as was sup-
14 posed. 
Tardieu was to gather a numerous following who saw in.the former 
premier the symbol for the scepticism which many Frenchmen entertained 
regarding Parliament. Tardieu.painted to the apathy of the French 
electorate towards their institutions. The crusading dep.uty became 
14Jacques Debu-Bridel, L'Agonie de la troisieme repub1ique 1929-
1939 (Paris, 1948), p. XI. 
10 
the powerful voice of experience which warned that the "Revolution had 
b 1 d" f. h . 15 d b . h d h d to e reeva uate to ~t t e t~mes. Tar ieu pu l~s e is evastat-
ing attacks, first in a series of articles printed by the French period-
ical, L'Illustration. In January, 1934, his thoughts and ''program" for 
reform appeared in an explosive and exceedingly important work entitled: 
16 
L'Heure de la decision (Hour of Decision). 
In the introduction to L'Heure de la dicision, Tardieu succinctly 
presented his basic demands as follows: 
It involves the restoration in France of a minimum of 
executive authority; a minimum of parliamentary liberty, a 
minimum financial order, a minimum of electoral dignity, a 
minimum of civic morality--the reason why the democracies can 
so easily become controlled by anonymous dictators or by those 
using government offices for personal benefit. It is the Hour 
of Decisi0n! If the regime is allowed to go on as it is now 
it will not last very long.l7 
Tardieu died still fighting for what he believed to be right and 
best for France. While developing his thesis, not only did Tardieu re-
veal the corruption and the reasons why, but he offers solutions. He 
asserted that the body politic reacted unfavorably in shouldering and 
solving modern problems. He pointed with emphasis to the social lag 
existing between the bureaucratic institutions of the Third Republic 
and the tackling of major perplexing questions. As the press and the 
French people later made use of Tardieu's ideas in our work, they will 
15
nebu-Bridel, L'Agonie de la troisi~me r~publique, p. 201. 
16 ' #' ' Andre Tardieu, La revolution a refaire: volume II: la profession 
parlementaire (Paris, 1937), pp. 192-194. 
17Andr~ Tardieu, L'Heure de la dEfcision (Paris, 1934), pp. VII-
VIII. 
18 be developed below. 
11 
The first parliamentary evil attacked by Tardieu was that of the 
ttinterpellation. '' The "right of interpeihlation" was given to every 
French deputy; that is, he has the privilege of asking the government 
to clarify its position on any issue considered paramount at the moment. 
Here, Tardieu avers, can be seen in all its evil spectral divisions, how 
the particular and individual political interests can dominate over the 
general interests of the Chamber. One deputy's desire can smash the 
whole government machinery by using the "interpellation," for the pre-
mier and the cabinet are required to give replies to the inquisitors. 19 
Besides this "holding of the interpellation club over the govern-
ment 1 s head, 11 in the same breath can be brought out the deputy's use of 
the "question." "The question" was a parliamentary trick, whereby any 
deputy could pose any question to the French administration and which 
was answered orally or in writing. Thus by the 11 interpellation 11 and 
the 11question, '·' one man could keep the French executive very busy and 
could cut its time needed to face some pressing problems. Tardieu pre-
sented a revealing and shocking picture when he divulged: 
If I am permitted to cite an example that I am well ac-
quainted with, I would recall that, in 1930, I had within thirteen 
months' time, of which eight months saw the Chamber in session, 
to be present for 329 sittings, undergo the presentation of 327 
interpellations and of sixty-two questions; to debate at the 
tribunal the acceptance or the refusal of 101 of these; to fight 
to the finish on 155 others; t0 speak, at great length, 172 
times; to ask for a "vote of confidence" sixty times; to appear 
18T d. R I 1 . ~ f . 192 194 ar ~eu, evo ut~on a re a~re, pp. - • 
19
rbid., pp. 193-194. 
fourteen times, during whole afternoons, before committees 
of' the two chambers--all this taking place in a period when 
I had to negotiate either inside France, or outside France, 
in La Hague, in London, in Geneva, the problem of world dis-
armament, the problem of naval limitations, the reparation 
problems, and those of the defenses for the East and South-
east l~f Franc~/.20 
12 
Lingering longer on the "interpellation," Tardieu directed atten-
tion to the fact that the "interpellation" was used selfishly by 
ttdespotic parliamentarians 11 who hoped to feather their political nests. 
This unlimited power as used by the deputies, asserted Tardieu, should 
be determined within certain limits; otherwise, the French executive 
was weakened to such an extent as to hamper the normal government ma-
chinery from operating--and could only result in further cabinet in-
stability. 21 
This very articulate critic then struck at the very essence of 
French democracy; namely, the electoral system. Tardieu declared that 
the electoral system in its effectiveness actually represented less 
than 10 per cent of the French population. He was puzzled by a system 
under which women were not allowed the suffrage, because they rendered 
no military service, whereas the soldiers were prevented from voting, 
because they did give this service. Tardieu explained further that 
the many political parties, under a multiparty system, often made it 
impossible for many voters finally to vote for the representatives 
actually reflecting their political thoughts. Under the 11scrutin 
uninomal, '' continued the former premier, a candidate needed an absolute 
20 . ,. ' 4 Ta~dieu, Revolution a refaire, pp. 19 -195. 
21Tardieu, L'Reure, Ch. V. 
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majority on the first ballot or a run-of£ election was held. Many 
voters thus could not vote for the nominee who best represented them 
and, Tardieu concluded, the net result was that only about 10 per cent 
f d . 1' 22 o France were represente 1n Par 1ament. 
Tardieu's remedies to improve the condition of French parliamentary 
life were: (1) the Government should be allowed to dissolve Parliament 
without the intervention of the Senate; (2) the people should resolve, 
through the ballot box, any conflict existing between the executive and 
legislative branches of the Third Republic; (3) the Chamber of Deputies 
should lose the right to initiate the French budget~o be discussed 
below), or to pass "pork barrel legislation11 ; and (4) the civil servants 
should be prevented from bringing unjust pressures on the government and 
the parliamentarians. As a climax to this "minimum program," Tardieu 
proposed a radical change: the institution of a "national referendum," 
which would pe established so that French citizens could express their 
opinions on French laws. ·As a part of the last proposal, the right of 
23 
woman suffrage was included. It should be noted by the reader that 
all these suggestions aimed at creating a strong executive power in 
France. 
The diagnosis made by Tardieu of the role of the parliamentarian, 
and especially the significance of t'hat role, in French democracy made . · -
a resounding impact.in every French canton. Tardieu typified the crit-
ica1 Frenchman at his best, for he was accustomed to attacking his 
22T di "' 1 . ' £ . 212 ar eu, Revo ut1on a re a1re, p. . 
2
.
3Tard1'eu, L'H Ch V X eure, s. - . 
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problem directly and with an assured manner. In our period, he headed 
an intellectual movement which made it a duty to point out the defects 
in the French democratic machinery. In this crusade, Tardieu himself 
was an intriguing figure. His voice was a sharp one, his gestures were 
brief, and after he had expounded his ideas with all their imagery, 
24 
much discussion was engendered. 
It would be unjust to Tardieu and his followers to consider them 
enemies of French democracy because of their sharp criticisms of the 
parliamentary behavior patterns. This "democratic radical school" was 
constructive in viewpoint and sincerely believed France needed a strong 
executive and a minimum revision of the constitution. It would be un-
just and inaccurate to read into this any suggestion for a fascist 
25 
type of control. 
It would similarly be unfair not to grant the same reservations 
to Joseph Barthflemy. In a muchmilder tone than Tardieu's, this 
scholar presented materials for the building up of the "radical con-
stitutional school'' of thought. t . Barthelemy had much experience when 
it came to the internal mechanics within the Chamber of Deputies, for 
26 he was for a considerable period a Committee Chairman in that body. 
In the early thirties, he was the leading authority of the French Com-
mittee System. His arguments and opinions were to crystallize a 
24Georges Suarez, Les heures hlroiques du Cartel (~aris, 1934), 
p. 133. 
25
some authors believe that this "authoritarianism" has influenced 
the thinking of Charles de Gaulle in the formation of the Fourth Republic. 
26 I Joseph Barthelemy, Essai sur le travail parlementaire et le 
.. 
systeme des commissions (Paris, 1934), Introduction. 
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certain intellectual core around him in 1933, and the latter, mostly 
27 
scholars, soon were repeating digested versions to fellow Frenchmen. 
Defined briefly,' a parliamentary connnittee in France under the 
Third Republic was composed of a definite number of parliamentarians 
chosen because of some competence in the subject at hand. Its composi-
tion reflected the political appearance of the Chamber, and it usually 
ended the question before it, by presenting a rapport to the Chamber. 
This rapport was usually.written by one of the connnittee's youngest 
members (the rapporteur) to help him make a name for himself. The com-
mittee, in principle, could make no final decision~; it could only pre-
pare the systematic analysis of a problem. Technically speaking, the 
committee's role was only to prepare the decision for the Chamber on a 
particular issue; the Chamber alone could make the final decision. The 
rapport usually gave heed to the opinions of the majority of the com-
mittee members, and the minority did not give a rapport but could make 
28 its opinion known on the floor of the Chamber. · 
In reality, the committee power was the source of much of the 
parliamentarian strength. Poincar~ had brought out that the twenty or 
so permanent cotmn.ittees in the Chamber of Deputies really were "executive 
. ,,29 
comm1ttees. Barth~lemy underscored the fact, and he noted that no 
text could be brought up for discussion before the Chamber and the French 
27 See Le Temps, 1934 series; also Revue Politique et Parlementaire, 
1933-1934 series. 
28 ' . Barthelemy, Essa1, p. 14. 
29Tardieu, L'Heure, p. 124. 
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Senate either by one member of Parliament or even the Government. The 
basis for deliberations in the Chamber was the rapport presented by a 
committee. This report·could, but did not necessarily have to, agree 
with the demands of the executive. A deputy who saw his proposition 
rejected by the committee could propose amendments or offer a counter-
measure. Thus a deputy devoted to the administration in power could 
30 propose the Government's project. 
However, it can be seen from the above that if the Chamber opposed 
a premier, unless he carried the votes on the ·important committee under 
discussion, he might as well take the exit. Sometimes the committee 
itself could.become deadlocked on an important issue, and could retard 
the vote on such a subject indefinitely. Most important was the Fin,ance 
Committee--the agency for preparing the French budget--for without its 
support, no government could stay in power for long. Furthermore the 
deputies felt no responsibility or need for accounting before their 
constituents for their behavior while "in committee11 --no stenographic 
recordswere kept, and the discussions were not opened to the public. 31 
The ''radical constitutional school,n moreover, pointed out that 
the traditional French 11 individualism" could bring little but chaos 
when released on the political plane. French individualism has made 
tremendous contributions to French culture, but, in the field of pol-
itics, it has often led to disaster, to disunity, to failure to cooper-
ate, and to a shaky adhesion to a political point of view. To the 
30Barth~lemy, Essai, p. 15. 
31rbid., pp. 177-178. 
• 
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caustic critic, a French parliamentary session often became confusion 
. 32 
at ~ts worst. 
The responsibility for governing France was vested in the Cabinet. 
The Cabinet could do fairly well, usually, if it had the support of the 
Chamber, or if the Chamber granted it "extraordinary powers 11 --the so-
called d~crets-lois. More often than not, however, a Ministry had to 
give in to the whims of the French politicians, who in turn were ruled 
by the much too well-publicized French individualism. If a deputy 
brought the government tumbling down, he felt irresponsible and had no 
remorse. He knew that he was only one out of six hundred, and his in-
dividualismwas given expression in the fact that the Chamber ~hich 
33 
should control was itself uncontrolled. 
I Thus, intellectuals such as Tardieu and Barthelemy harped on the 
need for stronger controls within their democracy. Attention was es-
pecially centered on the desire for strong national leadership. Many 
Frenchmen were ready to agree with Georges Viance, in this period, when 
he declared: ''It is exactly such leadership that France desires deeply; 
all one has to do to become convinced is to listen to the sincere voices 
f h . . f. h . d . h h tt34 o t e c~t~es, o t e countrys~ e, ~n t e ames, •..• 
It can be seen that the proponents of the t1 traditional constitu-
tional school 11 and the nradical constitutional schooln kept French 
democracy in a state of flux. This was true even when these ideas were 
32sharp, French Republic, p. 46. 
33 d. ~ 1 . .. f . 260 261 Tar ~eu, Revo ut~on a re a~re, pp. - . 
34Georges Viance, La France veut un chef (Paris, 1934), p. 239 . 
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unexpressed vividly from the Election of 1932 to December, 1933. The 
social atmosphere was receptive to French democracy only as long as 
it did not reveal its faults in a dramatic light at the improper time. 
Within the democratic body, there was active disagreement as to where 
power should reside but) as a whole, democratic institutions were not 
in any greater danger than they had been after World war I. But in 
less than twenty months, the events that transpired within France were 
to change this optimistic attitude towards democratic institutions to 
one charged with pessimism. It is now our assignment to see how doubts 
entered many Frenchmen's minds and shook their "deep faith'' in French 
democratic institutions. 11 
French parliamentary life: May, 1932-December, 1933.-- It will 
be recalled that immediately after the Election of 1932, the Socialists 
refused to join the Radical-Socialists in keeping the wheels of govern-
ment turning in a positive direction. This greatly haridicapped the 
"Cartel des Gauches" governments in their attempts to command a stable 
majority in Parliament. From June, 1932 to November, 1933, four 
Radical-Socialist cabinets were overthrown after a brief tenure of 
office. These were: 
, 
Edouard Herriot .•........ 
Joseph Paul-Boncour ..•... , 
Edouard Daladier ••....... 
Albert Sarraut .• ~ ...•.... 
June 4, 1932-December 14, 1932 
December 18, 1932-January 28, 1933 
January 31, 1933-0ctober 23, 1933 
October 26, 1933-November 23, 1933 
During this period, the struggle pursued by the various Radical-
Socialist ministries to adhere to any clear-cut policy amounted to 
little being accomplished. Parliamentary life from June, 1932 to 
December, 1933 was indeed gasping for breath. The government) more 
19 
often than not, appeared completely confused and hesitant. Parliament, 
on the other hand, was extremely mobile and unable to steer along a 
• d 35 cons~stent roa . 
, 
Edouard Herriot, the head of the Radical-Socialist Party, was the 
first to take up the reins on June 4, 1932. From the beginning, the 
Herriot Ministry found declining tax receipts, higher governmental ex-
penditures, and a deficit which had seen yearly markers of 6,707 and 
5,611 million francs respectively in the past two fiscal years. As 
the Treasury recorded more and more expenditures, the chance of bal-
ancing the budget became more and more remote. Ill omens appeared 
along this course with the additional requirement that the Treasury 
had to cover the deficits of. the French railways, which reached a 
36 
total sum of 12,567 millio~ francs in the red from 1929 to 1933. 
Herriot was in a quandary. 
For suggestions on how to solve this perplexing puzzle of declin-
ing revenues and mounting deficit, Herriot turned to his financial ad-
visors. These were conservative men and gladly revealed their opinion 
on the matter. When all the contributions were chalked up, they 
amounted to the suggestion that the budget must be balanced. This, the 
consulting experts felt, could be done by a reduction in governmental 
expenditures. They realized that this was no easy undertaking, for 
France by 1932 had reached a disproportion between expenses, which had 
35
neWilde, Political Ferment, pp. 123-124. 
36
rbid.,' p. 123; also Le Temps, April 30, 1934. 
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more than doubled since 1913, and national income, which was scarcely 
37 greater than before World War I. 
The conservative financiers argued that by balancing the budget a 
certain chain reaction would take place: (1) business confidence would 
be restored; (2) the taxpayers would be more satisfied; (3) export trade 
would go up; and (4) the tourist trade would be revived. Pressure was 
brought to bear by commercial and industrial lobbies for their point of 
view to dominate. These groups desired drastic cuts in the cost of 
government; and, like the majority of the Radical-Socialists they pre-
£erred this deflationary policy as preferable to one devaluating the 
franc. In the p~st, this last solution had always hurt many businesses. 38 
The Socialists and their sympathizers felt that a "balanced budget" 
was a 11 fetish. 11 They asserted that this could only be achieved at the 
expense of government personnel and war veterans, and that such a move 
would lead to decline in purchasing power by these two well-regimented 
groups. Furthermore, they offere.d a tonic of their own: A "new deal"; 
that is, a program that would stimulate economic activities by the 
government supporting extensive public works. This point of view, of 
course, was in direct opposition to that proposed by the Radical-
. 1 39 Socia ists. This basic variance in opinion within the Left was to be 
the main reason why the Radical~Socialist cabinets to the end of 1933 
37Alibert Raphael, "La de'flation et le budget," Revue Politique 
et Parlementaire, 40th Year (June, 1933). 
38
neWilde, Political Ferment, p. 123. 
39 Ibid., p. 124. 
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fell asunder. 
Besides this lack of cooperation within Parliament, the Radical-
Socialists found strong and capable opposition coming from the Civil 
Servants. The latter made up a considerable vote bloc, for the Civil 
Service had constantly mounted from 619,000 in 1914 to 857,000 in 
40 
1933. Their total yearly compensation of 12 billion francs was, in 
the same vein, double that paid before the war. These government em-
ployees, the majority of whom were organized into powerful syndicates, 
did their own lobbying and applied pressures such as occasional strikes, 
to prevent any reduction in.their salaries and pensions. The impact of 
these facts took on more weight when it is realized that the Socialist 
41 
Party was above all the party of the "fonctionnaire." 
The wedge of opposition was driven deeper by the diffused, but the 
very constan~pressures being engendered by the united war veterans. 
The monetary side here showed that civil and military pensions required 
over four billion francs annually. This was a considerable disburse-
ment, when it is brought up for analysis that this had doubled since 
1913. In particular, the expenditure for war veterans amounted to 
42 
2,511 million francs in 1932, as compared with 910 million in 1929. 
The Herriot Government was unable to make any sense out of t~is "Socialist~ 
40Le Temps, April 6, 1934. 
41J. F. Compeyrot, 11Les conditions de l'assainissement budgetaire, 11 
Revue Politmque et Parlementaire, 40th Year (October, 1933). 
42chambre des deputes, Journal Officiel de 1933, 15 ieme L~gis­
lature, Rapport sur le Budget General (Paris, 1933), pp. XV-XVI. 
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Civil Service-Veteran" maze, and the Cabinet fell on its attempt to 
"balance the budget." 
The succeeding Paul-Boncour Cabinet was in existence only a little 
more than a month. In his memoirs, Jean Paul-Boncour blamed the budget 
for the impotence of his Ministry. He felt that the budgetary deficit 
was slowly "choking the Government's throat and that few were willing 
to loosen their grips." The Chamber's Financial Committee slashed 
Paul-Boncour's budget beyond recognition. This had been presented on 
January 28, 1933, and on the same day, the Premier led the Cabinet to 
see the President of the Republic--they resigned! The reason for his 
fall was clear: the Socialists and the conservatives had combined 
43 their forces to get rid of him. 
For a few days afterwards, President Albert Lebrun went hunting 
' for a Cabinet. The search ended on January 31, 1933, when M. Edouard 
Daladier headed the reshuffled Radical-Socialist group selected to re-
solve the financial problem. The question: "Could Daladier succeed 
where others had failed?" could not be answered because Monsieur 
Daladier was an unknown quantity politically. 
Daladier was born on June 18, 1884, in Carpentras in Provence. 
, 
Young Edouard attended the local schools and his scholarship brought 
, 
him a stipend to study in Lyons where he met Professor Edouard Herriot, 
the future Radical-Socialist leader. After a brief interruption to 
give a year's military service, Daladier returned to his books to major 
43Jean Paul-Boncour, Entre deux guerres, Vol. II (Par-is, 1945), 
pp. 273-274. 
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in history and politics--often the first step in a brilliant political 
career. His formal education came to an end in 1908-1909, when Daladier 
received the much-coveted "agrege a 'histoire''--an honor then granted to 
less than twenty individuals in France annually. 44 
Daladier's educational efforts brought him an appointment to a 
history teaching post in Nfmes. Here he carried on historical research, 
ta1.:1.ght, and developed his leanings towards politics. In 1912 he under-
took his first political role as mayor of his home town, Carpentras. 
He served, with distinction, in the French army during World war I, 
until in 1919 his military career came to an end. The year of his dis-
charge he married a Parisienne of great wealth who became quite an in-
45 
spiration in his life. 
In 1919, in Vaucluse, Daladier 1s friends encouraged him to enter 
the national political ring and, by December, we find him a deputy in 
the Bleu horizon Chamber. In a very talkative assembly he soon became 
noted as the man who said little. This silence was interpreted as a 
sign of wisdom and became a trait associated with his personality. 
From 1919 to 1933 he held many cabinet posts, but he was kept from the 
main political office--the premiership. Then, suddenly, he found him-
46 
self the Premier. 
By 1933 Daladier had given journalists and politicians alike the 
44Yvon Lapaquel1erie, Edouard Da1adier (Paris, 1940), pp. 13-31. 
45
rbid., pp. 32-133. 
46Lapaquel1erie, Daladier, pp. 133-134. 
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impression that his taciturnity was a cover for his cornucopia of 
ideas. His background, furthermore, was a humble one and set him up 
47 
as a man of the people, A leading historian of the Cartel des Gauches 
said Daladier's·silence was the key to the understanding of the impact 
he made in politics in 1933, and later gave these acute comments on 
the subject: 
His realization that he was an inferior orator had made 
him mad at himself, during critical periods when he could have 
untangled the issues with ease. At times he became so irri-
tated that he lost his self-control. Nevertheless, his brief 
but biting words, the sharpness of his mannerisms had slowly 
built for him a reputation of being a strong type in this 
special world that attended the salons, in the Chamber's halls 
which claim to make it a business to give one man of genius to 
France per week.48 
Thus Daladier 1 s "strength of character" and his "silence" were to 
make of him a myth. The legend was that his silence was that of a 
"man of action." Daladier managed to keep this vision dangling before 
the French public during his first premiership. 
When Daladier assumed leadership of the Ninety-Second Cabinet of 
the Third French Republic, hopes were high that he could wrestle sue-
cessfully with the pl~guing budgetary problem. This First Daladier 
Cabinet offered the semblance of being one of the best governments 
France had had for quite a while, and this attitude was largely due to 
the favorable impression Daladier made in France as well as in French 
political circles. 
47Andr~ Simone, J'Accuse (New York, 1940), pp. 32-33. 
48suarez, Les heures h/roiques, p. 137. 
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"The strong man mystique" baffled and divided the Socialists and, 
against even the approval of their National Congress, the Socialists 
in the Chamber decided to cooperate with the Premier. But this coop-
eration soon ended when, in July, 1933, the Socialist Party Congress, 
voted to stop dealing with Daladier. The orthodox majority preferred 
to follow the Party, but the so-called Right-Wingers refused to be 
bound by the decision and formed the Neo-Socialists. The former, 
' 
nevertheless, included some nine~y-odd deputies who returned to the 
Chamber in October, 1933 with the main purpose of challenging the 
49 Daladier Government. 
The budget impasse had been circumvented on May 31, 1933 only 
because the Daladier Government yielded to the Chamber and gave up the 
Radical-Socialist ideal of balancing the budget. In the fall, the 
Radical-Socialists renewed their offensive against the budgetary def-
icit and suggested a bill called Article 37 to remove the irksome 
condition existing in the French Treasury. Article 37 demanded a re-
duction of the fonctionnaires' salaries by approximately 6 per cent. 
Mond51-y, October 23, proved to be selected for the encounter on the 
issue by the Radical-Socialists and the Socialists. The Daladier Gov-
ernment had given orders for the Chamber to be encircled by a protective 
cordon, so as to avert any help or demonstration that the teachers, 
civil servants, and taxi drivers might decide upon. It was a well-
known fact that the first two groups had aligned themselves against 
49werth, France in Ferment, p. 64; also DeWilde, Political 
Ferment, pp. 124-125. 
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the pay cuts; while the taxi drivers did not relish idea of the extra 
gasoline tax inserted in the government's bill. 50 
Discussion inside the Chamber became more heated as the session 
lengthened. Around midnight, the public galleries were still bulging, 
and the air was a portentous one as Premier Daladier asked for a vote. 
He spoke for the adoption of the measure written by Georges Bonnet, 
his Finance Minister; and the Premier threw out a call for parliamentary 
unity on the matter. Paul Reynaud, the leading spokesman for the Center, 
had been alienated and announced he would vote against the.measure. In 
spite of this setback, Daladier was hopeful, for during his nine months 
in office, the Socialists had not seriously opposed the "bull of Vau-
cluse"--as Daladier was now called secretly. Besides, the Lasalle 
Amendment had considerably toned down the Government's demands for a 
straight 6 per cent cut, by accepting a substitute cut on a sliding 
scale. But this hope was shattered when the Socialists decided to 
51 
vote against the bill. Daladier was dumbfounded. 
The crowd watched with great interest the beginning of the polit-
ical execution. The first major swing came when Leon Blum, the So-
cialist leader, stood up and announced that his followers would vote 
"no." He then called the nbalancing of the budget" idea a fraud, and 
refused to allow a salary cut which would place the Socialist Party in 
opposition to its ideals. Daladier had enough! He tore into Blum's 
50 Werth, France in Ferment, pp. 67-68. 
51chambre des de'pute's, Journal Officiel d'octobre 24, 1933, 15 
ieme Legislature, Debats Parlementaires (Paris, 1933); also Le Temps, 
October, 1933. 
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arguments and demandedwhy Blum had been so friendly up to now. The 
Premier, living up to his "man of action" legend, allowed just enough 
time for M. Renaudel to try to bring calmness by appealing to "parlia-
mentary government and democracy • 11 A futile series of exchanges be-
tween Blum and the "bull of Vaucluse" followed and ended with the 
Daladier Government being defeated by 329 votes to 241. The ninety 
Blum Socialists had voted against the Ministry. The Daladier Govern-
52 
ment passed into history at 3:00 A.M. 
The fall of the First Daladier Government was the last of a chain 
of events that led to a complete rift between the members of the Cartel. 
The parliamentary r'gime seemed incapable of solving the budgetary prob-
lem and brought on Daladier's fall. With the latter came an amazing 
destruction of confidence in democracy as a sound technique to rule 
France. This change in the socio-political atmosphere can, even by a 
dursory reading of the materials, be felt by browsing through the French 
newspapers and periodicals of the period. The Third French Republic 
53 
now had really entered ·"the period of tumults." 
Another group of political marionettes led by Albert Sarraut 
followed Daladier. Within a month this Sarraut Government had fallen 
on the same issue as its predecessor. Thus once more ministerial in-
stability had become chronic in France. The deadlock produced by the 
prolonged parliamentary wrangling over .the budget was critical in 
52Journal Officiel d'octobre 24, 1933; also Werth, France in 
Ferment, pp, 67-68. 
53Jean Pierre Maxence, Histoire de dix ans (Paris, 1939), pp. 227-
231. 
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bringing about the public's disgust and distrust. It accelerated the 
popular distaste with parliamentary government as then practiced in 
France. Especially disheartening to many was the fact that the Gov-
ernment was not even considering "pump priming11 of the economic system. 
By the end of 1933, the weakness of the Cartel des Gauches promised 
54 
but a dark future for French democratic life. 
Foreign affairs and dominance of the German Question.-- This dismal 
social atmosphere was increasingly darkened by the results obtained in 
handling fore~gn affairs. The rapid decline of government authority 
in France corresponded with a similar low point in international af-
fairs. For our purpose, which is to understand the causes of the.Dem-
ocratic crisis in this period, it will suffice only to give this sub-
ject the briefest analysis. 
It is usually agreed by the experts on the subject that after 
World War I Germany was saddled with an impossible war debt. Through-
out the twenties,-Germany concentrated on chopping down the payments. 
In 1931, bankruptcy had arrived in Germany, and by June, the Hoover 
Moratorium. France, unable to face the fact that Germany would not 
pay the debts, was shocked by the Lausanne Agreement (July, 1932) 
which brought the end of reparations. As a last hope, Germany's 
creditors declared that they would be satisfied with the final token 
of 714 million dollars--but even this was never paid. In December, 
1932, Premier Herriot became very unpopular in France when, overlooking 
the German War Debt matter, he insisted on paying the December install-
54te Temps, November, 1933 issues. 
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ment of $19 million on the American war deht. 
Many Frenchmen felt that their country had been struck out by 
their former Allies on the question of war debts, and they felt the 
same treatment was being given on the uppermost French desire for 
sicuritt. The French after World War I hoped to achieve a lasting 
peace by following three policies: (1) by seeing that Germany was 
kept disarmed; (2) by keeping France militarily stronger than its 
29 
neighbors; and (3) by using the League of Nations as an instrument to 
preserve the status quo. This approach had been identified as satis-
56 fying what France called its "minimum security." 
" "' Then, as if a bomb had shattered the securite dream, by the end 
of December, 1933, France discovered to her chagrin that she was iso-
lated from her former friends. In October, while Daladier was struggling 
with the budgetary problem, Germany removed itself from the League. 
French public opinion had been conditioned to the idea that securitt 
was anchored to upholding the League's principles, and it was given 
quite a Jolt, as the weaknesses of collective security became apparent. 
During the final months of 1933; French public opinion was starting to 
echo the Right in pouring ridicule on the efforts still being made to 
57 believe in the League. 
The energy spent in trying to check the growth of armament also 
55Tardieu, L'Heure, pp. 20-32. 
56Elizabeth Cameron, Prologue to ApP!!ement (Washington, 1942). 
57 Ibid. 
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proved in vain. The General Disarmament Conference which met in Geneva 
in 1932 bad ended in obvious failure by 1933. France was especially 
worried lest Germany rearm. In the early period of the Cartel des 
Gauches, the French watched with tragic interest not only the continued 
rise of Italian prestige, but also the spectacular rebirth of Germany 
as a Nazi state. On January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler became Chancellor 
of the Third Reich, and the growth of the German menace brought a cer-
tain English coolness towards France, which gave French opinion inter-
58 
national jitters. 
As the Christmas vacation arrived for the Chamber in 1933, power 
politics thus had turned against the Third Republic in the areas of 
German reparations, in the upholding of treaties with the League's sup-
port, and in the attempts to bring disarmament. These external fail-
ures, when joined to the internal developments, added up to much be-
wilderment, confusion, and irritation. This charged atmosphere could 
become very dangerous if it were directed into the wrong channels. 59 
A long, involved delineation of the French position in world pol-
itics is not necessary for our purpose. The realization that she was 
isolated in international politics resulted in a depressed mood of the 
nation. As the Chamber appeared incapable of following a consisten~ 
line of policy, the dynamism of such movements as Nazism in Germany, 
Fascism in Italy, and the New Deal in America strengthened the belief 
that France also needed modernization. One thing was sure: French 
democracy had better provide some answers--and prompt ones if the 
public was to calm down and renew their faith in those who ruled! 
58Le Temps, 1932-1933 series. 
59Ibid; also Tardieu, :L"Heure, p. 47. 
CHAPTER II 
THE DEEPER CAUSES 
The Economic Crisis 
The many economic crises.-- French economists do not use the same 
guiding posts as does the Anglo-American world in the division of their 
study of "French economics" in this period. The French subdivide the 
economic problems in the early thirties into a study of the "financial 
crisis, 11 the 11monetary crisis, 11 the "budgetary crisis," and the ''bank-
ing crisis." Of all these problems, it will appear, the budgetary was 
predominant. 
In France, what was termed "the financial crisis" really had its 
roots in the twenties. As was true in the United States, the 11roaring 
Twenties" saw France going through an outstanding period of speculation 
and conspicuous accumulation of wealth. The financial experts declared 
French finances in excellent condition, especially after M. Poincare 
had succeeded in balancing the government budget in the mid-twenties. 
The economic depression which struck the world in 1929 left France un-
touched, and many Frenchmen were proud to be living in such a blessed 
1 land. 
The financial situation, however, was not so rosy as it appeared. 
France had, for instance; almost become self-sufficient in wheat; hut 
1Paul Einzig, France's Crisis (London, 1934), pp. 2-3. 
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this was brought about only by establishing a high tariff wall and by 
. introducing a set of complicated milling regulations. By such artifi-
cial means, the French fa.rmer had been assured a high price for his 
labors. Thus in truth he had become independent of world prices of-
fered for his crops. He traded in a protected domestic market and for 
2 
a while he reaped benefits by such arrangements. Then a huge wheat 
surplus was thrown onto the French market, and the farmer found that 
he had either to sell his wheat at a ridiculously low price or keep 
his grain. Whatever alternative the farmer decided upon, he was un-
happy. He looked for someone to blame for his troubles, and he soon 
3 
made the government the scapegoat. 
Statistics on the income of urban workers in this period reveal 
that the hourly earnings of skilled industrial labor in towns were 
the first to decline--3.99 francs in 1932 per hour to 3.89 francs per 
hour in 1934. This was especially bad because this condition occurred 
when the standard of living reached its highest peak. Although the 
same statistical tables beamed out that Paris workers kept the same 
pay--6.34 francs per hour--the latter were also dissatisfied with the 
rise in prices of necessary commodities. These workers, furthermore, 
felt that the government did not care about their precarious status 
4 
and began taking their wrath against the public officials they knew. 
2Louis Pichat, 11La question du bl~, 11 Revue Politique et Parle-
mentaire, 39th Year (December, 1932). 
3Joseph de Pesquidoux, nLa crise du bl~, 11 Revue Des Deux Mondes, 
Vol. CIV (April 15, 1934), pp. 904-912. 
4Einzig, Crisis, pp. 3-4; also United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 
1948 ed. 
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The tottering economic frame received yet another jolt when the 
disgruntled consumers began to complain more vigorously than usual. 
The consumer argued that his cost of living was slowly dipping downward, 
while his spending income was slipping faster. In contemplating the 
world situation in the early thirties, the Frenchman was well aware 
that he was better off than in some other countries, but he was appre-
hensive that trouble was ahead. The following figures show that trouble 
was not too far in the future: 
Cost of Living Indices 
(In towns over 10,000) 
1932 .............. " ... 94 
1934 ............... " " 83 
National Income at Market Prices 
(In 100 million francs) 
1930 243 
1932 
......... "' ••••• II' 206 
1934 • 10 4jj .; ......... . 184 
Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1948 ed. 
That France was living under a false prosperity was obvious when 
such matters as the artificially bolstered wheat prices and the declin-
ing wage scales were studied. Besides these indications, there was an 
unhealthy state existing in the expert industry. A declining trade 
began suffering from a lack of demand for luxury goods--a key export 
in France. The world tended to stay away from such luxuries as per-
fumes, model clothes, and wines during a period of depression--especially 
when they were offered at excessively high prices. Moreover, the pro-
tected French market with its overvalued franc did not attract the 
5 tourist trade. 
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By 1933, the general economic picture in France (or the ''financial 
crisis" as the French called it) looked bad. All the artificial controls 
such as the high tariff, the go~ernment control of wheat prices, the 
quota restrictions on imports, the taxes on import licenses, and the 
high franc which seemed to have "economically isolated France" from 
1929 to 1933, became useless. French deb~ors were grumbling about the 
high wheat prices, which by 1934 were four times as high as those in 
the United States, the high cost of living, and the overvaluated franc. 
The debtors wanted something done about the latter problem but quick. 
This last thought was enough to get the creditors all frustrated about 
the "financial crisis. 11 All these discordant elements blamed the gov-
6 
ernment for their economic plight. 
Actually, by the time the Great Depression hit France in 1933, 
the so-called "banking crisis'1 had run its course; but it should not 
be neglected if we are to have a clear understanding of why the govern-
ment was to get into financial straights during this period of economic 
decline. At all times French banking was in an unusual position because 
of the French habit of hoarding gold. If rumcirs circulated that banks 
were unsafe, the average Frenchman would rush to the bank to take out 
his gold. When such "bank runs" occurred, the banks with little gold 
on hand sometimes were embarrassed. This peculiar behavior pattern, 
which saw haphazard mass withdrawals by bank depositors, sent many 
5 . . . . 4 E~nz~g, Cr~s~s, p. . 
6
rbid., pp. 63-65. 
7 bankers scurrying to the French Treasury for government help. 
When the Great Depression came in 1929, many worried Frenchmen 
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made frequent runs on the banks. This chaotic condition made it impos~ 
sible to accumulate bank deposits, and many banks, therefore, sought 
government succor. Government gold was given to many banks, which made 
it possible for the banks to weather the "banking crisis" by 1933~1934. 
But this government·disbursement was to cost the French Treasury dearly, 
for it depleted its gold reserve to a very low point. Yet the govern-
ment had given the banks such help many times in the past and had not 
8 been the worse for doing so. 
This ''bank-Treasury relationship" just described above was a re-
ciprocal one. The banks repaid the government for its help during a 
"banking crisis'' by buying and floating many of the Treasury bonds rep-
resenting the national debt. Especially.during difficult periods when 
the market was slow in picking up government bonds was this help from 
the banks appreciated. Many times in the past, a disconcerted Treasury 
had replenished its dwindling gold reserve by receiving the bankers' 
help. Thus the "banking-:Treasury tie" worked for the benefit of both 
9 
sides. 
This banking-Treasury relationship, in our period of interest, is 
presented to be as follows by the British economist, Paul Einzig: 
7Germain Martin, La politique economiqu~et financiere de la 
France (Paris, 1946), pp. 4-8. 
8
rbid., pp. 5-8. 
9Einzig, Crisis, pp. 40-41. 
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At the end of 1933 the total deposits and current accounts 
of the nine leading banks amounted to 41 milliard francs, while 
the total savings-bank deposits were 59~ milliard francs, 
making a total of a little over 100 milliard francs. The 
greater part of the savings-bank deposits are invested in 
government securities, while a large but fluctuating part 
of the commercial bank deposits are invested in Treasury bills.lO 
Thus the actual situation in 1933-1934 in France confirms the ob-
servations that the typical Frenchman hoarded his gold, that he in-
vested very little in the government floating debt, and that by constant 
withdrawals he kept banking conditions in a precarious state. The French 
bankers and financiers usually were asked by the government to revital-
ize or replace the weak French investors by themselves absorbing govern-
ment securities. In 1932 and 1933, as the French Treasury became empty, 
the government asked the banks for the "usual help.'' The bankers were 
unable to give aid, because even the gold given to them during the 
"banking crisis" had dwindled. So the French Treasury did the inevit-
able--it reluctantly borrowed from ab~oad on foreign bankers' terms. 
The result was an "unbalanced budgetn and a "monetary or Treasury 
11 
Crisisn--as well as a tremendous increase of the foreign debt. 
The growth of the Treasury Crisis brought on the "budgetary issue" 
which kept plaguing the Radical-Socialist governments more and more 
after the Election of 1932. This 11budgetary crisis" soon became the 
bete noire of not only the finance ministers, but of French politicians 
as well. 
lOEinzig, Crisis, p. 41. 
11Martin, Politique economique, pp. 6-10; also Emnzig, Crisis, 
pp. 41-42. 
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Our attention must be given for a moment to the understanding of 
the peculiar French governmental money market. Government spending 
depended on two factors: (1) the amount of taxes collected, and (2) 
the French politician's attitude towards spending. Frenchmen resisted 
paying taxes and, after World War I, tax evasion became a chronic mal-
ady throughout France. On the other hand, French politicians kept 
spending the public 1 s funds at a rate not commensurate with the rev-
enues coming into the Treasury. Again Einzig spoke searchingly when 
he declared: 
Because the French are not prepared to submit to crush-
ing direct taxation to the same degree as the Englishman, they 
are accused of lacking patriotism. · To anyone who knows how 
ultra-nationalistic are Frenchmen of all shades of opinion, 
from Royalists to Communists and Anarchists, the suggestion 
that they lack patriotism seems absurd. 
The reluctance of Frenchmen to pay taxes is largely due 
to their general reluctance to spend. The French are prob-
ably the most thrifty of all nations, much more so than the 
Scots. 
Another reason why direct taxation is unpopular in 
France lies in the essentially individualistic character of 
the nation. Frenchmen strongly resent every form of govern-
ment interference with their affairs, but most of all the 
attempt on the part of the authorities to ascertain their 
incomes.l2 
This French opposition to tax paying made the spectacular increase 
of public expenditures in the thirties a dangerous move. Therefore, 
deficits only became larger deficits, and the only hopes for balancing 
the budget, according to the conservative Frenchministers of finance, 
seemed to be more economies in governmental expenditures or the clinging 
12Einz ig, Crisis, pp. 14-15. 
13 
to the belief that German reparation payments would be collected. 
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No Government economist presented the Keynes'solutions to solve such 
problems. 
Ever since Poincare had devaluated the franc in 1926, the French 
budget had been in a healthy state. In the early 1930's, as Andre 
Tardieu and Pierre Laval led their respective cabinets in running French 
affairs'· depletion of Treasury funds and an increase budget disbursement 
brought on the "budgetary crisis." By 1932, the Rerriot Government was 
.faced with a serious decline in tax receipts and even more lavish Treas-
ury outpourings. With every new Radical-Socialist Ministry, the budget 
deficit grew larger and larger, and any economies or salary cuts met 
Socialist opposition. As early as May, 1932, in retrospect also, it 
appears that measures proposed were not audacious and rapid enough to 
check this crisis. The Frenchman was kept unaware of the seriousness 
of his country's budget and, even in political circles, the subject 
was underemphasized. France generally was still bathing in its pros-
. 14 per~ty. 
As the "budgetary crisis 11 was one of the main issues that contrib-
uted to the bringing of the nnemocratic Crisis of 1934 in France," 
deeper analysis on the development of this problem is called for at 
this point. Beginning at the time when the Rerriot Government assumed 
13Einzig, Crisis, pp. 14-15. 
14 ' , .... M. Marc Rucart, Rapport General: Proces Verbaux de la Commission, 
Chambre des deputes, Annexe 3383 (Volume II), Documents Parlementaires 
(Paris, May 17, 1934), p. 1348. 
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office, the historian discovers that the Treasury was almost dry. The 
. . ' Treasury surpluses left by M. Poincare had been replaced by unpaid 
bills, an unbalanced budget, overestimated receipts, and a complacent 
attitude on the part of too many government financial experts. Further-
more, Premier Herriot found a budget which had not even been voted upon 
15 
for the past nine months. 
Further signs of the incoming "budgetary c:tisis'' appeared in 
June, 1932, when the public receipts were 8 billion francs below those 
of 1929, while the government expenses kepp increasing--expenditures 
had been augmented from 1929 to 1933 by more than 10 billion francs. 
To cover up these budgetary deficits, the governments dipped ~heir 
hands into the accumulated "special emergency resources" of Poincare. 
Then came the sudden announcement by the Herriot Government that the 
budgetary deficit for 1932 was 15 billion wrancs and, worst of all, 
that the Treasury itself was empty. A final blow was given public 
opinion when, on January 30, 1933, M. Ch~ron, the Finance Minister 
under Paul-Boncour, wrote to the Premier that the budget issue had 
. 16 
reached the form of a major "budgetary cris1s. 11 
Everything had been done by government officials to prevent this 
development. For one thing, a stronger attitude was taken towards 
reparations, and "Poincare 1 s gold mine n was scraped. When this was 
not enough, the Herriot Government rtforced the happy days to stay" and 
kept the "French prosperity balloon from exploding'.'"by formulating 
15Rucart, Rapport G~n~ral, p. 1348. 
16Ibid. 
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exaggerated tax returns. As.a last hope, the Herriot Government from 
June 3 to December 14, 1932 had floated 2,513,000 francs worth of bonds 
overseas, while the Boncour Ministry demanded 5 billions more in bonds. 17 
M. Georges Bonnet, the very able conservative Minister of Finances in 
the First Daladier Government, admitted the ''budgetary crisis" left him 
in a quandary, and he was unable to prevent more floating of loans out-
18 
side the country. 
Georges Bonnet did the best he could under the circumstances and, 
in fact, for a while it appeared that he had established some recovery. 
He courageously offered what he considered the needed remedy: further 
economies and pay cuts. The antipathy of the Socialists towards this 
so-called Article 37, as we have seen, snuffed out those who placed 
their hopes in this solution. The "budgetary crisis" was handed to 
the succeeding Sarraut Ministry which fell before it was given a chance 
to understand the matter. As the year 1934 came, the "budgetary crisis" 
remained to help turn a dejected French population against their "dem-
19 
ocratic parliamentary institutions." 
Depression hits France late.-- Before proceeding any further on 
the "budgetary crisis," we must reflect on the oncoming French depres-
sion and the part it played in bringing on the "Democratic Crisis in 
France in 1934.n Probably the best introduction to this tragedy came 
17Rucart, Rapport General, p. 1348. 
18Germain Martin, Les probl~mes actuels des finances publigues 
en France (Paris, 1933), pp. 20-22. 
19 Cameron, Prologue, p. 47. 
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" from the pen of the able Pierre-Etienne Flandin, former Minister of 
Finance--and Premier in 1935. In his famous memoirs he pointed to the 
technical reasons behind the depression in France by noting that: 
The bankruptcy of Germany in the year 1931, the Hoover 
moratorium which came in June, and the depreciation of the 
pound in September 1931, brought Europe to a serious economic 
cr~s~s. After 1931, the index of wholesale prices computed 
in gold fell, in England, to 98 and, after the devaluation 
of bhe pound in 1932, to 73. Later the United States was 
forced to devaluate the dollar and in 1933 American wholesale 
prices went to 7 5. After a year of fluctuations, British and 
American indices levelled off, at the end of 1934, at 63 and 
65 respectively. The price-index in gold had thus fallen to 
less than 50 per cent of its 1928 value. Such a shock was 
truly catastrophic for the world economy and obviously brought 
about serious repercussions on the French economy. 
No one can deny that our financial system makes the state 
an associate in all economic activity. By indirect taxes, 
more than by direct taxesj the Treasury obtains about one third 
of the profits and gains of all Frenchmen. The fall of whole-
sale prices, which approximately represent production costs, 
corresponds thus to a loss in budgetary receipts. 
Our maximUm governmental income was reached during the 
fiscal year 1929-~with receipts of 53 billion francs. From 
1929 to 1934, French wholesale prices fell about 40 per cent 
and, in the same period, revenues fell from 53 to 41 billions--
a reduction of about 22 per cent.20 
Thus from this viewpoint, it can be seen that the "budgetary crisis," 
brought on by a heavy decline in taxes and increased expenditures, was a 
major cause in bringing the depression to France. Another major contrib-
utory cause was the French refusal to "devaluate the franc," to accept 
a ''New Deal psychology, rr and to adjust their money system to the world 
economic .financial situation. Indirectly, moreover, the inability of 
the French banks to replenish the depleted Treasury or to play "their 
20Pierre-Etienne Flandin, Discours (Paris, 1937), pp. 22-24. 
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reciprocity role" contributed to the seriousness of the general economic 
crisis. Furthermore, added to these reasons for the coming of the 
French depression, was the fact that the little gold remaining was 
1 . 21 eaving the country to pay for imports. 
The depression reached France comparatively late--during 1932 and 
1933. During that period unemployment figures kept mounting from month 
to month, and soon poverty had invaded thousands of French homes. The 
government statisticians admitted that a record unemployment of 350,783 
. .. . 22 
persons had been reached by February, 1934. 
The implications were. no better when the business and industrial 
tables were bared, for these showed a progressive downward trend. More 
specifically, revenue from the sales tax was 34 per cent less in Feb-
ruary, 1934 than in 1929. The production index stood at 106 in 1934 
as against 139 in 1929. To comprehend further the impact of this dis-
tressing picture of the French economy, it should be recalled that the 
farmer was already subsidized, and that the languishing luxury trade 
was almost at a standstill. Foreign trade figures were no more en-
couraging, for they revealed a drop from about 108 billion francs in 
23 
1929 to a little less than 47 billion francs in 1933. These bare 
figures are of necessity extremely significant. 
21Einzig, Crisis, pp. 3-4; also Rucart, Rapport G~n~ral, p. 1349. 
22
rbid. 
23statistics taken from Imprimerie Nationale, Bulletin de la 
Statistique Generale de la France et du service d'observation des 
prix (Paris, 1?34). 
\ 
43 
By 1933, therefore, the .French people were thus gasping painfully 
within the claws of the world depression. This difficult struggle 
will strike home more vividly if a little more exploration is given 
to the following unemployment figures: 
Year 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
UNEMPLOYED GIVEN GOVERNMENT AID FROM 1931-1934 
January February May September December 
28,536 40,766 41,339 38,524 147,009 
241,487 293,198 262,184 259,956 277) 109 
316,259 330,874 283,068 226,634 313} 894 
332,266 350,783 323,427 323,365 412,129 
Source: Imprimerie Nationale, Bulletin de la Statistique, 1934, 
p. 140. 
The above chart suggested more distress. First, it indicated to 
the worried French conservative economists that as the unemployed were 
given government assistance, the government expenditures were increased 
by that much more. A second observation was that unemployment really 
became abnormal as early as January, 1932 and kept rising th~oughout 
1934. Furthermore, there were many unemployed who did not receive gov-
ernment aid--au informed guess places these around 500,000-600,000. 
Even then these figures do not include the majority of the French 
farmers who were in a very sad plight. The small businessman added 
to this distressing picture the fact that the number of bankruptcies 
24 
was accelerated at an alarming rate. 
24Imprimerie Nationale, Bulletin de la Statistigue; also Rucart, 
Rapport General, pp. 1347-1348. 
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Especially distressed were the small entrepreneurs of Paris. The 
Parisian market, depending heavily on the luxury trade, was hit with 
unusual brutality by the oncoming depression. It made the "city of 
lights" a painful sight, for there were but few visitors in the hotels; 
and the spacious restaurants, encircling the Grand Boulevards, were 
suffering from a lack of trade. Theater owners saw fewer and fewer 
foreigners confusing change at their cashiers. The chic shops situated 
" on the Champs~Elysees or the Rue de la Paix were almost emptied. The 
art studios were saris clients, and the intellectuals augmented the al-
ready bulging crowds that had been handed their final employment checks. 
25 Thus Paris took on a somber atmosphere. 
11Crise de confiance" and "Crise morale."-- Simultaneously, as the 
Great Depression reached France, came the Crise de confiance. This was 
based partly on latent French psychological concepts which, generally 
speaking, brought a low opinion of the morals and effectiveness of a 
French politician. The development of political events in 1932-1933 
only enhanced this lack of confidence in politicians. The ministerial 
instability, the deadlock over the budgetary issue, and the general 
social and economic atmosphere were major factors which brought on this 
lack of respect. This Crise de confiance gradually became a full-fledged 
attack against all parliamentarians. By the end of 1933 the political 
demoralization of the period brought many Frenchmen to the point of 
26 questioning seriously their "faith in parliamentary democracy. 11 
25Rucart, Rapport Gen~ral, p. 1348. 
26Einzig, Crisis, p. 5. 
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Closely connected to the Crise de confiance was the Crise morale. 
The Crise morale involved a loss of hope in the present and much appre-
hension about the future. The roots of the Crise morale were imbedded 
in post-World War I France. As in America, during that period, France 
found herself adopting a "business and pleasure11 psychology in what 
became the "Happy Twenties." The personal moral discipline of many was 
too often replaced by a more or less elastic moral code. The main 
point in this moral approach became; to make much money in the short-
est period possible. In reaching for this 11money bag dream, 11 the 
methods used were not the most ethical ones. If this loose code of 
public morals seeped down into the political affairs of the time, it 
was in part largely due to the 11business conditioning" then existing 
within the social and economic structure of the country. This period 
of prosperity built the French hopes very high and made them see the 
27 future through colored glasses. 
This strange new world of the "Happy Twenties 11 brought a special 
distaste to the majority of the French veterans. The ex-soldiers were 
bitter over the role they had played in la grande guerre and the paucity 
of returns they .had received from society after the war. Their attitude 
was that they had devoted months and years of their lives--for what? 
As the nouveaux riches of the Twent~es included few veterans, this en-
raged them only more. The veteran in 1933 saw his country isolated; 
he was disturbed over the failings of collective security, and he worried 
over the new role Germany was casting for itself in Europe. While in 
27 I I Rucart, Rapport General, pp. 1347-1348. 
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@uch a mood, he saw the standard of living tightening.in 1932 and 
1933, and he began to feel that his sacrifice in 1914-1919 had been 
in vain. Furthermore, one thought stood uppermost in his mind: unless 
something was done, he would go to another war--and what for he asked 
28 
himself. 
The erise morale was thus well-distributed throughout the veteran 
organizations of France by 1933. These had lost hope in the present 
and found no comfort when contemplating the future. The erise morale, 
however, was also rampant throughout most classes of French society as 
the documents on the period show. As to how deep and widespread this 
crise morale was, the historian is unable to say because of the many 
29 
intangibles involved. 
Capitalism on the Offensive 
Grand Capitalists dissatisfied with the Cartel.-- In 1934, the 
population of France was about 42, 000,000, which was nearly equally 
divided between the rural and urban districts. Demographic studies 
revealed that the urban population was concentrated in northeastern 
France, roughly within an arc extending from the English Channel to 
Alsace-Lorraine. It was in this area that industrialization was dom-
inant. Within a thirty-mile radius of Paris, the industries were even 
more compact, and often attained what even the fore~gn industrialists 
would accept as large factories. "Grand Capitalism" also existed·out-
28 I I 4 Rucart, Rapport General, pp. 13 7-1348. 
29Ibid. 
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side this "proletarian arc," with two noteworthy industrial clusters 
30 
centering around Marseilles and Lyons. 
France in the early thirties was, from an industrial viewpoint, 
dealing with midget-size industries, and the great majority of them 
were under the personal wings of small entrepreneurs. There was a 
reluctance to invest in larger concerns, because families preferred 
not to handle more than they and their relatives could personally di-
rect. There was a growth-choking, anti-expansion spirit, but this was 
part of the accepted folkways of French economic life. This "limited 
expansion psychology" was greatly responsible for the fact that after 
World War I over 94 per cent of all corporations employed about twenty 
31 
persons each. 
The't;rand Capitalist" tried to rely on his own profits for fur-
ther mechanization and expansion. He took as a personal attack the 
imposition of any extra taxes. ne was especially a strong opponent 
of the devaluation of the franc in the early·thirties. The creation 
of the corporationwas too often a very difficult accomplishment by a 
"strong" Frenchman, and anyone who succeeded in his efforts here was 
proud to be recognized as a "Grand Capitalist." On the other hand, 
he clung steadfastly to his wealth and fought anyone who tried to take 
32 it away from him. 
30 Walter Rice Sharp, Government of the French Republic (New York, 
1951), p. 5. 
31 Donald C. McKay, The United States and France (Cambridge, 1951), 
p. 144. 
32
neWilde, Political Ferment, p. 123. 
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In the early thirties, the Grand Capitalists were in control of 
the French banking system, the important iron-works, and the larger 
coal mines. They further enhanced their economic prestige by being 
the most active members of the higher echelons within Big Business 
groups. The Grand Capitalists made up the economic plutocracy of 
France, and they were all-important in the French Chamber of Commerce. 
As a group they considered any political measure trying to control in 
any way their 11 economic power" as detrimental to them. The strong 
Socialist returns in the Election of 1932, therefore, horrified many 
of them. The Socialists were ideologically organized to attack the 
Grand Capitalists and their basic assumptions. Openly did many of 
the Grand Capitalists admit their fear when contemplating the possi-
bility that the Radical-Socialists might bargain with the Socialists. 
Many felt such an alliance was inevitable. 33 
The Communists helped to fan this flame of suspicion by indicat-
ing that the Grand Capitalists were really responsible for the "general 
economic crisis . 11 A typical presentation of this point of view de-
clared: 
The social and political crisis, shaking the Republic 
to its foundations, arises from the small group of bankers 
and industrialists, who control this modern financial and 
industrial machine, to rob the mass of the people, in order 
to maintain their own privileged position now ~enaced by the 
economic crisis.34 
33Maurice Paz, Le six f~vrier (Paris, 1936), p. 4. 
34Ralph Fox, France Faces the Future (New York, 1936), p. 15. 
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, 
Edouard Herriot angered or frightened the Grand Capitalists in 
1932 when he preached against the moneyed interests. For political 
reasons the Premier denounced these foes in public speeches, but in 
actuality he did little against them. Although Herriot 1s actual con-
servative approach and his refusal to accept the Socialists as allies 
should have calmed the Grand Capitalists' fears, his attacks were a 
factor that turned some of the most powerful businessmen in France 
b M. . 35 against t e ~n~stry. 
Capitalists' antiparliamentary campaign.-- By early 1933, Grand 
Capitalism in France was taking the offensive, and it began a series 
of organized and merciless attacks against the democratic leaders of 
France and some of its political institutions. Through such media as 
mass meetings, public speeches, and mass demonstrations of all kinds, 
the procapitalist defenders made a case for their dominance of French 
economic life. This propaganda campaign left the impression that the 
technician should replace the politician in running public affairs. 
The newspapers tended to reiterate similar messages to their readers, 
for many of the presses in France were heavily subsidized by one or 
36 
more client riche. 
The name of M. Ernest Mercier stands out as the prominent one 
during this 1933 11Capitalist Offensive." Mercier was an example of 
35Jean Pierre Maxence, Histoire de dix ans (Paris, 1934), 
pp. 215-216. 
36Georges Michon, Les puissances d'argent et l'emeute du 6 fevrier 
(Paris, 1934), p. 5. 
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the self-made "Grand Capitalist." He was the magnate in such important 
pressure groups as the Electricity and Gas lobby, and the President of 
the very strong Coal Miners' Association. For his role in the Capital-
ist Offensive, all these positions of high honor were dwarfed by his 
honorary presidency of the Redressement Francais--the leading capital-
ist propaganda weapon; In 1933 the Redressement Frangais became the 
f 1 . t f 11 t. 1' ' 1' f F 37 oca po~n or a an ~par ~amentary cap~ta ~sts o ranee. 
On January 28, 1933, the antiparliamentary Capitalist Offensive 
had a beginning when, at Magic City before a tremendous audience, 
M. Large, who was the delegate for the National Federation of the T~-
payers (Association des Contribuables), in a fiery utterance threatened 
to lead a march to the Palais-Bourbon. He blamed France's economic 
miseries on the parliamentarians, and he sounded the call for action 
"to clean the scums within the Chamber."38 
In June, 1933, a gigantic gathering directed by leaders of the Re-
dressement FranJais met in Paris to hear the newest developments in the 
Capitalist Offensive from M. Ernest Mercier. Many veterans and national-
ists, for the first time, attended this assembly which abounded in harangues 
by capitalists denouncing the rtfgime. Some of the enthusiastic 11Big 
Businesstt leaders now were coming out in support of a plan to reorganize 
France's economic life along the lines of the corporate organizations 
found in Mussolini 1s Italy. Such important men as M. Mathon, President 
of the Woolen Association, and M. Nicolle, on the Committee of Economic 
37Michon, Les puissances, p. 7. 
38quoted by Michon from the inaccessible R~veil du Contribuable, 
February, 1933. 
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Safety, were proponents of such a program. As for M. Mercier, he kept 
his mind on the "parliamentary enemies," and he announced that in October 
would occur the "decisive hours" for the Redressement Francais. 39 
The Capitalist Offensive reached a climax on December 11, 1933 
when Mercier gave a very important address before the Redressement 
Francais. Mercier denounced the German menace, and he predicted that 
J 
"violent events" would bring about changes in the French parliament. 
Mercier was followed by M. Marcel Champin, metallurgical and mining 
magnate, who indulged in using semitreasonous language for mast of his 
talk. He finished his address by declaring that the "bad mood of the 
French people" would produce 11 a disorder during which the parliamen-
1 b . 40 tarians wou d e the first v~ctims. 11 
Exactly how much influence the above meetings, attacks, and sug-
gestions had on the already downhearted and overexcited public, it is 
difficult to say. This antiparliamentary campaign, spearheaded by 
some of the leading French capitalists, could only have a destructive 
effect on democratic institutions. The capitalist force, which took 
part in the antiparliamentary offensive, did not represent all of 
France's Big Business, but the latter's agitation only ended in fur~ 
ther depressing the French public. If the Grand Capitalis5 had placed 
faith in their democratic institutions, they would have hesitated be-
fore undertaking such a pointed and serious movement to bring·down the 
39Michon, Les puissances, p. 7. 
40rbid., p. 9; also Bulletin du Redressement Francais, December, 
1933. 
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system which kept them relatively free of controls. 41 
Venality and the Antiparliamentary Press 
The French press and public opinion.-~ In most democracies, it can 
be assumed--and usually is--that newspapers are very important agencies 
expressing public opinion. This does no~ hold true for France in this 
period unless we accept the assertion with serious limitations. 
For our period of interest, the foreign correspondents habit of 
reading a sampling from the leading French newspapers, and translating 
their contents usually eclectically for his country's readers, was a 
thankless and often an unreliable approach at best. French newspapers 
as a whole did not express public opinion, but rather the opinions of 
a particular clique with definite predetermined ends in mind. To con-
sider the French press uninfluential, however, would be foolhardy. In 
the past, its power had too often lighted the public's passion to a 
dangerous point and even brought on panic conditions. So was it to be 
42 during 1933 and 1934, as we shall see below. 
Traditionally, the French newspapers were divided into the jour-
naux d'information or the Grande Presse and the journaux d'opinion or 
the political press. Although this still held true in 1933, it is 
better not to insist too stubbornly on these categories. Such a rigid 
4lM. Marc Rucart, Rapport G~n~ral fait au nom de la Commission 
d'Enquete chargee de rechercher les causes et les origines du 6 fevrier 
1934 et iours suivants, Chambre des dlputls, Annexe 3383, Documents 
Par1ementaires (Paris, May 17, 1934). 
42Georges Boris, "The French Press," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 13 
(January, 1935), 321. 
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definition would not exactly be true of the existing conditions. The 
journal d'information, it was undeniable, made its profits largely by 
satisfying as large a public as possible; but it often very shrewdly 
presented a definite political tone. The journal d'opinion, on the 
other hand, did away with even this veneer of objectivity in treating 
the news. Most Frenchmen were aware that the distinguishing character-
istics of a tournal d 16pinion were: (1) a very limited circulation, 
(2) a troubled financial situation, and (3) a one-sided political schema 
43 
carefully constructed to indoctrinate its readers. 
The French press' finances and their influence on expression of 
objective opinion.-- The typical Frenchman bought his newspaper at a 
newspaper stall. He often purchased several, because French newsprint 
sold cheaply. In fact, although he was usually unaware of the fact, 
his newspapers were the cheapest in Europe outside the Balkans and 
Belgium. The condition created many press problems, especially in the 
financial areas. This system of newsstand purchasing, furthermore, 
made sales unreliable, led newspapermen to try to be sensational to 
keep their readers buying their sheet, and kept press incomes in a very 
erratic state. The more dependable or house-subscriptions were prac-
. 11 . . 44 t~ca y nonex~stent. 
Most publishers were only too often made aware of the rickety con-
clition of their finances. They were glad about one fact then: that 
43charles Micaud, The French Right and Nazi Germany: 1933-1939 
(Durham, 1943), pp. 5-6. 
44Boris, 11French Press," p. 321. 
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the usual newspaper was four to six pages in size. The reader also 
enjoyed this, for he could more easily fold his reading matter and 
deposit it inconspicuously in an appropriate pocket when not in use. 
Yet this was a disadvantage because it brought certain limitations to 
the press such as: (1) overemphasis on French national news, (2) ex-
treme condensation or omission of foreign news (handled mostly by the 
news-gathering agency Havas), and (3) limitation on advertising space. 45 
In France, the price of a newspaper was far below the total cost 
required to produce it. If the copy boys, the typesetters, the reporters, 
the relay men, the special columnists, and the editors were to keep their 
employment, their newspaper needed to look for supplementary income 
sources. Reliance on the sales was shaky, as we have seen, and the 
advertising market was just as undependable. In fact, the advertising 
in France was extremely poor; for the French public demanded a cheap 
46 
newspaper, but refused to accept too much advertising with its news. 
The advertising problem was succinctly presented by Georges Boris, 
a reliable authority on the French press in 1934, as follows: 
Suppose we take a newspaper with a circulation of between 
80,000 and 100,000, a figure which would class it among the 
more important papers in France. Its expenses will run at the 
very least to 6 million francs, and the strictest economy will 
be required to keep it as low as that. In the most favorable 
circumstances it can not expect more than 4 million francs from 
the sales and subscriptions. That leaves 2 millions to be taken 
care of by advertising. Now a newspaper of that size is far from 
being able to count on any such advertising revenue as that. 
45 . 
When the author described the size of our N.~w York Times to some 
French provincials, they accused him of having his .tongue in his cheek. 
46Boris, "French Press," pp. 320-321. 
Le Populaire, the organ of the Socialist Party, happens to 
be a paper of the kind described. In its accounting for the 
year 1931 it could not enter as high as half a million francs 
as having been received for advertising.47 
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French newspapers had three alternatives they could take to keep 
out of the red. A few newspapers availed themselves of all three. The 
first method was opened to the journal d'opinion only, and simply in-
valved the turning of its "deficit headaches to its raison d 1 ~tre 11 --
the political party whose views it represented. The professional pol-
iticians, the partisans, and the officeholders within the core party 
organization expected this r.equest annually, and usually made provisions 
to take care of rtthe party's main propaganda organ,n A second way to 
remove a newspaper deficit was to "send the tab to the rich proprietor--
often a Grand Capitalist--who owned the paper." In return, both the 
party and the capitalist demanded that their views be considered by 
th bl . t' 48 e pu ~ca ~on. 
The third method in vogue in the thirties in France by the press 
"to get out of financial embarrassment was some form of subsidization." 
These grants were made by: (1) individual cap~talists who did not have 
any financial control of your press, but sympathized with your views; 
(2) some interested business group; and (3) the government itself. 
When the recourse to government subsidization was revealed by the 
Stavisky Inquiry Commission in 1934, most of the newspapers--who were 
ashamed--did not print it or did not comment on the sessions taken up 
47Boris, "French Press," pp. 320-321. 
48rbid., p. 322. 
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with the subject. 
The political subsidization program received rather unsavory 
56 
publicity in 1934 when it was revealed how "special or secret funds'' 
were earmarked by government officials to tune down the wrath of cer-
tain newspaper editors. Former Premier Daladier testifying before the 
Stavisky Inquiry Connuission, in 1934, presented the "subsidization 
50 
program as involving four-fifths" of the French newspapers. 
J M. Camille Aymard, editor of La Volante, a Rightist organ, was 
later involved in the ensuing press scandals during the exposure of 
the venal French press in 1934. Before his accusers, Aymard admitted 
that few newspapers could balance their books without being "supported 
by friends in politics or by large business concerns, which consider 
that the policies of those papers are helpful to their interests and 
to the public welfare as they conceive it to be." This same investiga-
tion brought out also that many former Cabinet ministers had access to 
. 51 the "secret government funds" to hush up personal attacks aga~nst them. 
With these facts before us, it now becomes obvious that the typical 
French newspaper could not be considered as representing the objective 
·viewpoint, or public opinion, when taking up a domestic issue--especially 
a political one. The press' opinions were conditioned by such factors 
as political loyalties, purposeful advertisers, government officials, 
49B0iliis, "French Press," p. 322. 
50Rene Modiano, La presse pourrie (Paris, 1935), p. 9; also 
Sharp, French Republic, p. 32. 
5 ~oris, "French Press," p. 320. 
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and the Agence Havas. Havas, in our period, handled much of the pro-
vincial news as well as the foreign field; it held the biggest adver-
tisers under its thumb; and it wielded a powerful influence throughout 
the French press world. With all these forces impinging their demands 
on the editor, it was difficult for the latter to feel any special duty 
52 
to the people. 
Briefing on specific French newspapers and introducing the vicious 
governmental attacks.-- In spite of what has been said above, the his-
torian must admit that the French newspapers which existed in the sys-
tem just described were not all bad. Under normal conditions, much 
of the Grande Presse was rather reliable in its news and, within the 
period of the "Democratic Crisis of 1934 in France," Le Temps was un-
53 
usually trustworthy. 
Le Temps was almost in a category by itself in 1933 and 1934 •. 
Before making a brief survey of the French press in this period (needed 
if we are to interpret French source material along this line), Le 
Temps deserves special attention because of its uniqueness. Le Temps 
in 1933-1934 averaged approximately 120,000 subscribers and was owned 
by the Comit' des Forges--the French Steel Trust--controlled virtually 
by the Baron de Wendel family. The de Wendels could indirectly place 
pressure on Le Temps, but in actuality this did not occur. Le Temps 
was moderate during the Grand Capitalist Offensive, it was decent 
52 Robert W. Desmond, The Press and World Affairs (New York, 1937), 
pp. 199-205. 
53~. 
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towards government policies, and it kept a conservative attitude. 54 
The same comments cannot be made for the journaux d 1opinion 
during 1934, for these newspapers spearheaded a series of vicious at-
tacks against the Third Republic which came close to destroying the 
democratic r~gime. Traditionally unmerciful to the government was 
L'Rumanit{ (260,000 circulation), the Communist organ, which had been 
' ~ founded in 1904 by the Socialist leader Jean Jaures. Next to L'Humanite 
the royalist newspaper, the.Action Francaise (80,000 circulation) was 
usually well-known for its antigovernment diatribes. Daudet and Maur-
ras in 1933 and 1934 soon drove their newspaper circulation to new 
heights because of the leadership it took in a series of vicious and 
truculent attacks against the Third Republic. Third on the list of 
leading newspapers carrying an intense antigovernment crusade was the 
~ Socialist organ, Le Populaire (80,000 circulation), directed by Leon 
Blum. 55 
Politically the other major journaux d'opinion have been elassi-
fied as follows! 
54Editor and Publisher, International Year Book, Vol. 66 (New York, 
January 27, 1934), p. 219. 
55nesmond, Press and World, pp. 214-215. 
NEWSPAPER 
Journal des D~bats 
Le Figaro 
Le Temps 
L 'Ere Nouvelle 
L'Oeuvre 
Ami du Peuple 
L'Avenir 
Le Jour 
La Victoire 
PARTY POSITION 
Center 
Center 
Center 
Radical-Socialist 
Radical-Socialist 
Fascist (7) 
Nationalist 
Right 
Right 
CIRCULATION 
(normally in 1933) 
35,000 
100,000 
120,000 
Not recorded 
200,000 
Not recorded 
Not recorded 
250,000 
80,000 
Source: Editor and Publisher, International Year Book, 1934, 
p. 219. 
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Some of these are deserving of a few more comments. Le Journal 
I des Debats went back to 1789; it called itself the "oldest newspaper 
in France"; it was backed by the de wendels; and it was very conserva-
tive in approach to domestic reforms. Le Figaro was considered re-
spectable, although it was called "the most aristocratic of the dailies." 
It tended to be ultraconservative on matters involving the Grand Cap-
italists and the aristocracy. Le Temps was written in a dull, conserva-
tive style and it was fair during the "Democratic Crisis"--a period 
when it was difficult to be so. Le Temps was not widely read in France, 
but, because its leading editorial was often contributed by a member 
of the Cabinet, it did influence political leaders. L'Ami du Peuple 
was edited by Pierre Taittinger, leader of a revolutionary group called 
the Jeunesses Patriotes. It was subsidized by the perfumer, Fran,rois 
Coty, who gave the paper an authoritarian, Bonapartist, and antiparlia-
56 
mentary tone. 
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The journaux d 1 information had by far the largest circulation, 
and they emphasized domestic news. Outstanding under this classifica-
tion were the so-called Big Five~ Le Petit Parisien (1,800,000 circu-
lation), Le Matin (750,000 circulation), Le Journal (1,200,000 circu-
/ lation), Le Quotidian (600,000 circulation), and L'Echo de Paris 
57 (450,000 circulation). From this list cannot be omitted the very 
important L'Intransigeant, Paris-Soir, and Paris-Midi. The Big Five 
were all morning newspapers, and this fact made it easier to circulate 
all over France during the day. This also broadened their influence, 
for most of France read one of these newspapers--bought them or bor-
rowed from their neighbors. Le Petit Parisien, with the largest cir-
culation in France, was usually kept moderate by its political editor, 
Lucien Romier. It supported whatever government was in power because 
it defended democracy. Le Matin was extremely venal and antiparlia-
I 
mentarian, but well-~own because of its editor, Stephane Lauzanne. 
/ 
Le Journal was sensational. L1Echo de Paris was a nationalist sheet 
" / and boasted one famous writer--"Pertinax" (Andre Geraud). Le Quotidian 
was one of the strongest upholders of a democratic republic in the 
period. Thus briefly were the positions taken by the French press as 
58 the year 1934 was opening. 
56nesmond, Press and World, pp. 214-215; the author so labelled 
these newspapers according to the stand they took on domestic issues. 
57 Ibid. 
58
nesmond, Press and World; also writer's analysis. 
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As 1934 approached, the French press began an irresponsible at-
tack against the Chamber of Deputies and its methods of operations, 
the Cabinet members, the ministerial instability, and democratic in-
stitutions in general. This antiparliamentary campaign was unusually 
vicious, unsympathetic, uncooperative, and destructive in nature. The 
dejected atmosphere existing in France was channeled by members of the 
"fourth estate" against the government personalities in particular. 
By December, 1934, newspaper editors thought nothing of using vile 
names against the government leaders, of threatening them, and of 
59 dragging French democracy forever downward. 
A sociological study later made of the French press in its con-
elusions appropriately declared: 
The injustices under the preventive r/gimes and the 
excesses of repression, brought on--as a reaction--the birth 
of the freedom of the press. And, in turn, the uncontrolled 
freedom of the press led to the growth of abuses of the priv-
ilege. In a few words, the new press problem is: What can 
be done with a free press (in France), that has come to be 
synonymous with an irresponsible press?60 
The French press in 1933-1934 was to overplay trivial news. It 
made much ado about nothing. It printed much that was not "fit to 
print." It perfected the scandal sheet methods of sensational stories, 
lurid pictures, blatant headlines, lies, insults, and rabid attacks on 
leading personalities. Taking advantage of the Press' Loi de 29 
juillet 1881, which prbhibited censorship of what was to be printed, 
59Boris, "French Press. 11 
60Halim Tevfik, Le nouveau r~gime de la presse (Paris, 1937), 
p. 53. 
62 
it excited the French public against its own government in a libelous 
manner. This disgraceful campaign reached its climax during our period 
61 
of study. 
These vicious newspaper attacks only helped to provoke an already 
depressed and jangled French public. This "uncontrolled press charivari" 
was to be.one of the strongest elements which almost brought French de-
mocracy tumbling down. In retrospect, it is difficult to comprehend 
what role many newspaper editors had assigned to themselves. The press 
gave the appearance of being bitter against the democratic form of 
62 government, which gave it this freedom it was misusing. 
61 Sharp, French Republic, p. 31. 
62sisley Huddleston, France and the French (New York, 1925), 
p. 88; also Modiano, La presse pourrie. 
CHAPTER III 
THE STAVISl.Y AFFAIR AS THE POWDER KEG CAUSE: PART I 
· (Filling the Powder Keg) 
Stavisky Before 1926 
The Stavisky Scandal was to release such a charge over France 
that rumblings to this very day can still be heard. In the suffocat-
ing economic, political, and social atmosphere, so far outlined, it 
would not be incorrect to say that France had a powder keg full of 
troubles. Within this cylindrical chamber of miseries, one of the 
sensitive points was the city of Paris and its occupants. Here the 
great industrial and connnercial houses perpetrating the luxury trades 
were in full economic panic by the end of 1933. The usual rich tour-
ists were staying away. Paris waited impatiently daily for the rich 
buyers and the easy-spending visitors who never showed up. Paris pave-
ments were missing the delightful sound of foreign footsteps. No, 
instead, the streets of the "City of Lighys'' felt the pangs of unemploy-
ment, of high prices, of an unbalanced budget, of a depleted Treasury, 
and of a chilly antiparliamentary campaign. The disgusted foreign 
policy and the hackneyed ministerial instability only struck a deeper 
note of sadness into the citizenry. It was a sad mission that history 
had during those long, dark days. 
Family background and personality.-- Then, like a bombshell, in 
the midst of all this turbulence burst the Stavisky Scandal. It struck 
64 
the center of this sea of troubles and shook the Third French Republic 
to its very foundation. The date was December 23, 1933. The character 
was one Alexandre Stavisky. The place was France. The result was a 
catalytic agent which threatened to destroy France. The revelations 
1 
even outdid what the most optimistic smearers expected. 
The man behind all this, the one who lighted the fuse, was Alex-
andre Stavisky--one of the most intriguing figures in modern French 
history. This many-sided and energetic personality had an evil destiny 
to carry out on earth. That being so, he found it advisable to use 
many aliases in his checkered career: the names 11Sacha, 11 "Sacha-Jean, 11 
11Serge Alexandre, II 11Doisy de Monty, II TIBoitel Victor' II "Monsieur Maurice, II 
and simply nAlex 11 were all to have their usefulness. 2 
1Laurent Bonnevay, Les journees sanglantes de fevrier, 1934 
(Paris, 1935), pp. 15-16. 
2M. Ernest Lafont, Rapport G~n~ral fait au nom de la Commission 
d'Enquate chargee de rechercher toutes les responsabilites politiques 
et administratives encourue depuis l'origine des Affaires Stavisky, 
Chambre des deputls, Annexe 4886, Documents Parlementaires (Paris, 
March 7, 1935). This is a report of 5600 pages in three volumes paged 
continuously. It will be cited hereafter as Docs. Parl., rrRapp. 
Stavisky," followed by a reference to one of its four main sections: 
(a) D~position: contains verbatim testimony of witnesses. 
(b) Documents: contains other materials on photographs, checks, 
and data collected by the Stavisky Inquiry Commission. 
(c) Rapport General: contains the Stavisky Inquiry Commission's 
collective report, and opinions of some of its individual 
members. 
(d) Rapport Speciaux: contains special police reports. 
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Alexandre Stavisky was born on November 20, 1886 in Sobodka, 
Russia. His parents were named Dornia Adamov and Emmanuel Stavisky. 
His father was a man of some standing in society, as he graduated from 
the Faculte de Me'decine de Paris and had taken up the problems faced 
by a dental surgeon as his lifetime pursuit. "Alexandre" was still a 
small boy when both he and his father were naturalized French by a 
decree of August 29, 1900. nAlexandre 11 then attended one of the best 
secondary schools in Paris, the Lycee Condorcet. On December 28, 1900 
3 
Stavisky married one Armande Severe of Paris, but this ended in divorce. 
During his secondary school days, "Alexandre" began contacting 
ladies whose charms were fading. He became the favorite of an elderly 
lady who brought him in contact with the fun and race course of Deau-
ville. For the money he had, he became extravagant in his expenses 
there. When short of cash he would sponge on his. father and even older 
women. He was especially fascinated by the Petit Pot (a name he was to 
use later in one of his financial·enterprises) at the Porte St. Denis. 
Here he first became acquainted with the narcotic pushers, the white 
slave racket, and "love at a price." He was fascinated by gambling 
dens, bookmaking, brothels, and, above all, questionable financial 
. 4 transactl.ons. 
For a short while he served in the French army during World War I, 
although he had failed to register at first. He was unable to break 
3Docs. Parl .. , "Rapp. Stavisky, 11 Rapport Sp~cial: Pachot et 
Cousin (1931), p. 705. 
4Paul Lenglois, Vie et mort de Stavisky (Paris, 1934), p. 14. 
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away from his delinquent conduct pattern even then, and by 1915 he had 
found a way to be discharged by claiming Russian citizenship during 
the war. Later on, when times were more peaceful, he would renew his 
French 11patriotism." After his discharge at twenty-eight, he picked 
up a romantic affair with one Vivianne Lamarre. Miss Lamarre soon 
found her lover had stolen her jewels. All she could say to the author-
ities was that she forgave him because she was still madly in love with 
him. Thus, we can see how shiftless Stavisky really had become. In 
many circles his youth would even be considered adventurous, but surely 
5 
not defendable. 
If we probe even deeper, we find that Stavisky early developed a 
taste for the theater and the wild night life that can go with it. As 
he lacked definite employment and had no thespian ability, his back-
ground would appear to have been against him, but, as early as by the 
end of 1909, ttsacha11 was overcoming any barriers in his way. In fact, 
he decided to start at the top of the theater world by appointing him-
self artistic director of the Folies-Marigny Theater. This had been 
rented for him by his grandfather Abraham. 'This, as we shall ~below, 
6 
was to bring the first encounter '1Alexandre11 had with the law. 
The first major police investigation made of the immoral life of 
Stavisky was the Rapport Rannett of 1924. This revealed in no uncer-
tain terms how, after leaving his first wife, '1Sacha11 took his meals 
5Alfred Detrez, L'Affaire Stavisky (Paris, 1935), pp. 13-17. 
6Ibid.; also Alexander Werth, France in Ferment (London, 1935), 
pp. 79-81. 
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with his widowed father, but preferred to spend the nights with his 
many mistresses. After his discharge from the army, he kept himself 
fed through the money provided by his father or the mistresses he 
handled. But these were lean pickings as far as "Sacha" was concerned, 
7 
and he began looking for greener pastures. 
Although by 1915 Alexandre Stavisky had already been involved in 
petty theft and sharp deals, he believed his luck had changed when he 
formed a partnership with Charles Henri Amouroux that year. Amoroux 
claimed to have invented a fantastic machine called Le Matryscope which 
he asserted would become a boon to mankind. This instrument would re-
veal, once and for~all, whether a woman was pregnant so early as sev-
eral days after cohabitation. To the partners' great sorrow, their 
customers soon were disappointed and dissatisfied with the result. An 
irate female who had been swindled out of 24,700 francs finally exposed 
this lucrative racket to the police. ''Sacha" spent the next six mon:ths 
in prison. Amouroux, the inventor, received eighteen months. 8 
Once out of prison, Stavisky became the ftiend of Madame Jeanne 
Bloch. Jeanne was then a well-known cafl-concert singer. She became 
very fond of her lover, and she was willing to finance his whims if 
she could. In 1917, while the Montmartre cafes were listening to La 
Madelon, Madame Bloch installed Stavisky in a cabaret named the Cadet~ 
Rouselle. From the beginning, "Alexandre" carried on an illegal bus-
iness. A superficial visit to the Cadet-Rouselle brought to the atten-
7 , Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky, 11 Rapport Special: Rennett (1924), 
pp. 664-665. 
8
rbid. 
68 
tion of the customer that Jeanne Bloch was the featured attraction. 
Furthermore, the excellent chansonniers on the entertainment fare were 
termed outstanding. In fact, the place off~red variety for, too often, 
the guests were treated to a fight between Stavisky and his mistress 
because he had been caught with another woman. One of his biographers 
tells us how Stavisky sold cocaine and heroin in this boite de nuit as 
a sideline. The: cei.baret closed in two months. 9 
By 1918 Stavisky's protectoress, Madame Bloch, felt that she had 
"Alexandre" under her wings. She was sadly mistaken. From her view-
point the love affair was serious enough, but she soon discovered that 
Stavisky looked upon her as one more woman to bleed. When she would 
become enraged by his attitude and conduct towards her:. she would re-
fuse him money. Then he would take over and beat her--at times severely. 
She kept shouting and threatening police action; but she could not make 
herself go through with it. Moreover, Jeanne knew that at times "Alex-
andre" pleased her for, in the opinion of many, Stavisky could be re-
garded as possessing an attractive physique. In the world he moved in 
that was very important. Jeannewas aware also that "Alexandre" could 
be very charming and that he possessed the rare "gift of gab." On the 
other hand, he was lazy, of a doubtful moral stature, and was too in-
terested in older women if they could bring him a profit. Jeanne was 
one of those misguided creatures who kept trusting, forgiving, and 
9
nocs. Parl., "Rapp. StaviS.ky," Rapport Sp~cial: Rennett (1924), 
pp. 664-665; also Lenglois, Vie et mort, pp. 34-35. 
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10 
supporting as unscrupulous a Don Juan as we find in modern history. 
As we can conclude from the above sketch, Alexandre Stavisky's 
youth was shaky to say the least; but this was also made possible by 
the freedom a person could really enjoy under French law. An enemy of 
society, such as Stavisky, could make use of his questionable talents 
to take advantage of what he.considered "the weaknesses of the French 
legal system." One thing was clear to the Stavisky Inquiry C.ommission: 
society included the large majority of men who were bound by laws, but 
Stavisky was one person who made his own rules. 11 
Judicial past of "Serge Alexandre."-- It will be of some impor-
tance later if we take up several of these early encounters "Alexandre" 
had with the law. First on the list we find the Folies-Marigny Theater 
Case. This sprouted in 1909 when Stavisky's grandfather, desiring to 
start his 11boy Alexandre" on the right road, rented for him for the 
summer season the Folies-Marigny Theater. As the summer season was 
considered a quiet one, this theater had always been used only in winter 
time. But our new director had a theater and big plans, but no money 
to produce a play, no backers, and no cast. In spite of what even a 
seasoned director would consider major handicaps, "Sacha" Stavisky, 
the new genius director, was not worried. Offers of employment for 
all types of theatrical workers were published. Those who answered 
the advertisements were asked to put up security, in one form or another, 
10Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Rapport Sp~cial: Hennett (1924), 
pp. 614-615. 
11 ' Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Deposition: all testimonies on 
Stavisky's person. 
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which would be returned to themwith profits during the first three 
months. The theater never opened; the money was spent; the case went 
to court; and delayed justice in 1918 led the case into the filing 
12 folder. 
Our attention is next drawn to the Mazier versus Amouroux and 
Stavisky Case (1914~1916). This case had many interesting features. 
First, it led Stavisky and his partner, Amouroux, to establishing a 
banking front on the Rue Caumartin. Second, it was to place Stavisky 
behind bars for six months, as we have seen. Third, it showed that 
he already knew the value of lawyers who had contacts when he employed 
M. Ren~ Renault as his attorney. The case itself had a bit of the 
comic in it and involved Le Matryscope already mentioned. It appeared 
that a widow, Madame Mazier, had been swindled by the use of Amouroux' 
pregnancy machine. This widow had important financial resources and 
soon found she was parting too quickly with them. Puzzling indeed was 
how she was taken in so easily, for she was seventy-four years old! 
This case also presented Stavisky as taking a high and mighty attitude 
with French justice. He complained of delayed justice, of the moral 
prejudice of his clients, and the bad publicity the partners were re-
13 
ceiving. But all this was to no avail, for to prison he went. 
The audacity of the man was also well-illustrated by the.Stavisky 
versus Fisc case (1915-1932). In this court session, Stavisky was a 
12 . I I Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stav1sky, 11 Rapport General (1935), pp. 42-43. 
13Ibid., pp. 44-45. 
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claimant against the French Treasury for unpaid war damages. During 
World War I, "Alexandre" had made a deal with the Italian Government 
to deliver them 20·, 000 sheet iron bombs. The Italian Government paid 
Amouroux and Stavisky 416,250 francs to buy this shipment from Darracq 
de Suresnes of Paris. Although investigation revealed that the latter 
had never been paid by Stavisky, "Sacha" argued that he was 219,750 
francs short. As the police uncovered more and more dirt. Stavisky 
said Amouroux must have been the 11dirty crook." Amouroux had conven-
iently left for Austria in 1932. This matter surpassed all credence! 14 
The Pereaux versus Stavisky Case (1917-1918) involved his mistress 
Jeanne Bloch. Jeanne had bought an automobile by paying 10,000 francs 
down and promising to cover the balance of 20,000 francs .in future pay-
ments. A few days later, Madame Bloch went to the same car dealer, 
selected another car, and was allowed to drive it away without deposit-
ing anything. Her lover "Alexandre'' sold the first car at a lowered 
price to a rent-a-car businessman and loaned·the second car to the 
same dealer for 20,000 francs. Stavisky in thus assisting his mistress 
throughout all these transactions seemed to have been master of the 
situation. He did everything in such a way that the case, once in 
court, resulted in the conclusion of the court that an offense did not 
exist. It probably did not exist, but it still did not console the car 
dealer who had received only 10,000 francs for two vehicles worth 62,000 
francs. Stavisky 1 s testimonies showed his vicious intelligence at work, 
14 . ' ' Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stav1sky," Rapport General (1935), pp. 45-48. 
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and also proved that his shyster friends had coached him we11. 15 
In this period of initiation during which time Alexandre Stavisky 
was learning the ways to outwit justice, Jeanne Bloch, his mistress 
and accomplice, suddenly decided she had enough. This developed into 
the Jeanne Bloch case (1921). She made all kinds of charges in the 
complaint. The main charge was that Jeanne had given her lover 15,000 
francs to redeem a ring from the pawnbroker, but Stavisky swore he had 
lost it on the way. As the case hit bottom, it was brought out that 
Jeanne was jealous because one Madame Franck had been in on the deal 
with "Alexandre." Stavisky received thirteen months in prison, but he 
got out of this by playing on his mistress' heartstrings. Madame Bloch, 
unable to bear the thought of separation, reopened the case and in tears 
openly declared her love for ''Alexandre. n Proof of her love followed 
when she denied everything she had said before. ,It turned out that 
she had misplaced the money under question. Stavisky was acquitted. 16 
In the Zelli versus Popovici and Stavisky Case (1923-1924) the 
observer was treated to one more of the complicated tricks which Sta-
visky's mind was constantly devising to get his hands on money. This 
one began.when Popovici, at Stavisky 1 s instigation, went to a dance 
hall operated by Mr. and Mrs. Zelli and paid his bill with a $50.00 
bill in American money. He said that if Mr. Zelli would be so kind, 
he would prefer his change by a check. He explained that this was a 
15 I I Docs. Parl., ''Rapp. Stavisky," Rapport General (1935), pp. 48-49. 
16Ibidq pp. 50-51. 
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precaution on his part for, when he had too much to drink, he usually 
was rolled by some evil female. As Stavisky had been the tenant for 
two years -of a room above Zelli's restaurant, he was given as refer-
ence. The Zellis in this case regarded Stavisky as an intimate friend 
and did as they were asked. The check was tampered with and Stavisky 
collected the money. In court Stavisky got away with it, but Popovici 
received eighteen months. Thus it can be seen that Stavisky not only 
cheated his girl frli:ends, but also did not hesitate "to give the works 11 
17 
to his friends, landlords, and foreigners. 
The Juvet Case (1925) presented Stavisky as the leader of a 11mob." 
This gang now included the nervous and vulgar Henri Hayotte who was 
to become one of the closest men to Stavisky. In the matter under dis-
cussion, Hayotte sold two hundred casks of cognac to a M. Juvet and 
received 100,000 francs as p?-yment. The buyer, several days later, 
discovered that the original owner in Anvers had not received a cen-
time for the consignment. The sum involved was 290,000 francs. It 
was revealed later that M. Juvet, operating on the shady side of the 
law himself, had made a deal with Stavisky who then had enough police 
trouble. Hayotte cut this private settlement out of court and reimbursed 
Juvet 60,000 francs--thus·the Stavisky gang made a cool 40,000 franc 
18 profit. 
The above cases are typical of the high-handed methods used by 
17Docs. Parl., 11Rapp. Stavisky, 11 Rapport G~nlral (1935), pp. 51-
52; also Detrez, L'Affaire, p. 19. 
18Ibid., p. 61. 
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Stavisky before 1926. They should suffice in pointing out that Sta-
visky fleeced those who had any monetary traffic with him in those 
days. An exhaustive list would include many others but, space lack-
ing, we can only refer to some of the others. In the Paignault-
Valdivia Case (1923-1926), Stavisky was involved in a theft from a 
mailing bag on the South American ship, the Valdivia. The Wimille 
versus Stavisky Case (1925-1928) accused Stavisky of cheating Mademoi-
selle Wimille of 120,000 francs in war damages awarded to her; while 
the Zweifel or "Forgeries of Brunoy" Case (1926) centered around the 
forging of false treasury bonds. In the latter case the lithograph 
plate used to do the engraving was at Brunoy and usually held by Henri 
19 
Hayotte. 
The foregoing cases illustrate the development of Stavisky's 
methods in this period. The constant delayed justice throughout 1909 
to 1926, when the Stavisky cases came before the courts, reflects un-
favorably on the judges involved. Furthermore, especially in the 
Zweifel Case, the police did its job well and kept the court well-informed 
on Stavisky's forging of treasury bonds and other financial documents, 
but the courts refused to act on the evidence. The Stavisky Inquiry 
Connnission later concluded: "There is probably no other example, in 
i 1 f 1 . . 20 all jud cial anna s, o a neg igence as systemat1.c.rr 
19nocs. ParL,· 11Rapp. Stavisky," Rapport Gen~ral (1935), pp. 56-
73. 
20Ibid., pp. 73-74; also D~trez, L'Affaire, pp. 21-22. 
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From Prison to Bayonne 
"Les grandes affaires de 1926."-- The historian is simply amazed 
that, before 1926, Stavisky had been so often in court and yet escaped 
imprisonment for his swindling activities. It is indeed a sad commen-
tary on the state of French justice in those days! Yet, in the search 
for the truth behind the 11Democratic Crisis of 1934 in France," he 
must avoid emotional reactions and present his account in an objective 
manner. 
The year 1926 saw "Serge Alexandre" involved in two cases o.£ such 
magnitude that they should be temporarily isolated for proper analysis. 
These were the Labbe Case and the Laforcade Case--termed appropriately 
the 11 great affairs of 1926. 11 These, as we shall see, will cast Sta-
visky more into the mold that he was to be usually associated with 
thereafter. 
The Labbe Case rotated around the purchase of valuables (gold, 
silver, and the like) from M. Labb~, representative for the Banque 
Nationale de Crldit and the Banque Speciale de Cr~dit. These had been 
paid for with two checks drawn February 12, 1926, by a M. Perotti on 
his account in the great houses of Marseille: the Comptoir d'escompte 
(650,000 frartcs) and the Credit Lyonnais (450,000 francs). As can be 
seen, the sums involved were unusually large. But a little further 
check on M. Perotti would have revealed him as carrying the alias 
Martinelli and, in actuality, being none other than our acquaintance, 
Zweifel. Of course, no one suspected this yet, for the job of covering 
up had been meticulously planned. With Stavisky's lieutenant, Smilovici, 
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Zweifel as Perotti had journeyed to Marseilles to open up accounts and 
to add and withdraw amounts honestly from them, from time to time. 
Care had been taken to see that sizeable checks had been withdrawn, 
and more money later deposited to create a reputation of confidence. 
From now on, these considerable financial~ but normal operations, b~-
came part of the technique adopted by Stavisky. When M. Labbe presented 
the respective checks of 650,000 and 450,000 francs, he was sadly in~ 
formed that Perotti's accounts were almost dry. Stavisky, who had be~ 
come involved as a reference, now proceeded to calm down M. Labbe, ex~ 
. , 
pressed his sympathies, and even took a trip to Marseille with Labbe 
to check on this Perotti, who had so viciously tricked them. Zweifel, 
21 however, not "wanting to be left holding the bag, squealed everything.u 
It was a sad day for 11Alexandre," the swindler! 
The details of the Laforcade Case were yet of a more ambitious 
enterprise. Stavisky bought bullion to the value of 2,800,000 francs 
in Laforcade's name. Here was an operation without recourse to the 
usual banking facade. It was a theft, pure and simple. Stavisky's 
~ 
henchmen, Loiseau and Pourcelle, had stolen some bonds and other valu-
ables from Laforcade's files. The police were called in to investi-
22 gate. The trail led to Alexandre Stavisky's doorstep. 
The efficient Commissioner of Police, M. Pachot, was assigned to 
get Stavisky on April 2, 1926. Pachot meticulously went about his 
21oocs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky, 11 Rapport Ge'n~ral (1935), pp. 113-
140. 
22~., pp. 113-141. 
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task. His search brought him to Alexandre Stavisky's spacious villa 
at Marly-le-Roi. The "King_of the Crooks" was giving a farewell party 
before crossing the border into Switzerland. Pachot and the police 
arrested Hayotte, Loiseau, Pourcelle, Zweifel, Stavisky, and Stavisky's 
new mistress, Arlette Simon. 23 "Alexandre" had to postpone his sump-
tuous dinner party. His mistress being pregnant was released soon 
afterwards, but the others received free board and room in prison for 
a while. It looked as if everything was over. Apparently Stavisky's 
father thought so; for•, unable to face the disgrace, the elderly Sta-
visky committed suicide. 24 
Stavisky in prison.-- Alexandre Stavisky heard the doors of La 
I ' Sante prison clang behind him on December 8, 1926--the day he began 
serving his term. His feverish mind already was considering plans for 
his release. As if the prison's name gave him his clue, he began pre-
senting the state of his health as his principal debating point. He 
seemed to be hitting a blank wall when the essential ray of hope came 
in August, 1927. At that time, Doctor Paul of the prison staff con-
eluded his diagnosis of Stavisky's condition. He felt that Stavisky 
was possibly not faking and suggested treatment at the Fresnes in-
firmary. The neurasthenic Stavisky was disappointed. What he desired 
was his complete freedom. Therefore he kept plaguing the medical men. 
Finally Doctor Paul suggested that "Alexandre" probably should be re-
23 , ' Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Rapport General (1935), pp. 114-
116. 
24werth, France in Ferment, pp. 82-83; also Alb~ric Cahuet, 
"l.'Affaire de Bayonne," L 'Illustration, Vol. 4741 (January 13, 1934), 
p. 37. 
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moved to a health center for the necessary care. This required placing 
the patient under "provisional liberty. 1125 
The director of La Sant~'s prison, at this point, became suspicious 
of Stavisky's motives when the latter invoked pericaecal abscesses in-
stead of the previous gastrointestinal disorders. Then, without warn-
ing, Stavisky switched to dental troubles, head pressures, and the like. 
This farce ended by one. Doctor Desfarges on November 21, 1927, in a 
certificate, proposing the prisoner's release. Judge Decante, basing 
his judgment on the medical reports, gave the order to release Alex-
andre Stavisky. On December 27, 1927, Stavisky's tactics paid off; 
for, on that day, he walked out of prison under ~'provisional liberty" 
with 50,000 francs for bail. He swore he would never return again. 
26 Yet he was about to launch himself into the explosive Bayonne Affair. 
While in La;:;&ant~, nAlexandre" had been allowed to see his mis-
tress and illegitimate son. In 1929, Arlette finally became his wife. 
A rather untrustworthy authority on Stavisky later claimed that she 
was used, because of her physical attractiveness, as a go-between with 
politicians. This author also accused Arlette of passing money to cer-
tain Radical-Socialists and of being the mother of an illegitimate son 
in 1922. Part of this was later shown to be true--especially the son. 
His marriage was to become a mania with Stavisky. Although he was to 
25 Docs, Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Rapport G~n.[ral (1935), pp. 41-42; 
also Detrez, L'Affaire, pp. 25-28. 
26 Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky, 11 Rapport G.[ntfral (1935), pp. 41-42. 
be often away from home, he constantly insisted on referring to his 
family, usually in tears. 27 
Judicial Corruption 
French judicature or justice versus promotion.-- In order to 
understand how people like S~avisky could get away for so long with 
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what they did, we need to refer to the French judicial system. For-
tunately, an invaluable study of it has already been made. 28 
A French boy who aspired to enter the French magistrature, at 
this period, had a rather strict period of study ahead. First, he had' 
to complete his secondary school education and then move on to an ac-
cepted law school. In the latter institution, he spent a large part 
of his time studying the courts' past decisions, the French legal sys-
tem, and the French traditions. Next came a period of apprenticeship 
with a lawyer or a judge. Finally, hhe degree of Licencil en Droit 
., 
was given if the candidate passed a stiff qualifying bar examination. 
As the Ministry of Justice made all legal pro~ession assignments in 
France, the young man, having attained the minimum age of twenty-five, 
had to wait for an appointment from this bureau. If this hope was 
realized, he became a magistrat within the French magistrature. 29 
The magistrats were all considered as judges, and they were di-
vided into three main groups: (1) the bench itself, (2) staff member 
27 Jean Bardanne, Stavisky, Espion Allemand (Paris, 1934), pp. 96-98. 
28R. c. ~. Ensor, Courts and Judges (Oxford, 1933). 
29 Ibid., p. 26. 
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in the Ministry of Justice, and (3) the "parquets." The ambitious 
young man or French magistrat early was made aware of the importance 
of fast promotion within the conic legal system of his country: he 
had, above all, to try to prevent being pegged too long in one place. 
It did not matter at first what type of assignment he received, as 
long as he kept advancing upward. His journey to the top would acquaint 
him with three major types of work: (1) Civil Service labor in the Min-
istry of Justice, (2) State Attorney's briers and defense in the 11par-
quets 11 tied to the different courts, and (3) judging as we know it in 
the United States. Ensor here poignantly commented: 
Indeed, if he is to climb fast and go far in his pro-
fession, the less time he spends on the Bench itself during 
his climbing years, the better. There is more scope for 
distinguishing oneself in the "parquet;" while best of all 
for accelerating one's rise are the posts in the Ministry 
of Justice--at all events, those that bring one into any 
sort of personal contact with the Minister. An analysis 
of the careers of leading French judges leaves no doubt on 
these points.30 
As the so-called Principle of Collegiality dominated in every 
French court, several magistrats usually sat to hear and judge a case. 
The efficiency of such a system might bring was stifled by the 3,600-
odd judges the system demanded, and the poor pay that could be afforded. 
The temptation to venality was therefore always a possibility. This, 
in fairness, was not necessarily a black and white conclusion, for 
many of the members of the French magistrature came from relatively 
well-to-do families and could look to a financially favorable marriage 
31 
union. 
30Ensor, Courts, p. 27. 
31Ibid., pp. 28-32. 
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If the magistrature system had its idiosyncracies, so did the 
actual court system. Jurors were not used in civil cases while their 
activities were limited-to sitting only iil the highest courts for crim-
inal Gases. French juries were considered too sentimental and unreli-
able. The burden of deciding a case on facts tended more and more to 
fall upon the magistrats. 
To make things more complicated for the uninitiated, each court 
had a 11parquet 11 section attached to it. The head of the 11parquett1 was 
termed a ~r?cureu~ or State Attorney, and under him were the assistants 
" , called either substituts or avocats-generaux. These were collectively 
referred to as the Standing Magistrature, when compared to the magis-
trats, who judged within the assize and were known as the Sitting ~~g-
istrature. The 11parquets 11 had a serious duty: the defense of France's 
32 int!erests. 
In this system, before a defendant went to court, he appeared 
before an investigating judge called a juge d'instruction in a criminal 
case. The latter's position was a strategic one, for he issued the 
arresting order. The amount of power inherent in this status fell 
into its proper perspective when it was realized that the one arrested 
had no right to resort to Habeas Corpus, because it did not exist in 
France. Of course, it can be seen how a delaying order would help a 
culprit from languishing in prison where he belonged. The juge d'instruc-
tion was also the one responsible for ordering searches and seizures of 
documents and other property. Of paramount importance was his duty to 
32Ensor, eourts, pp. 33-34. 
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interrogate all suspects. As he was the initial cog that started the 
wheels of French justice moving, if he were bribed the machine never 
needed to start. This possibility was even more probable for this 
honor gave a very poor financial remuneration. The person in such a 
~tatus usually was still young and ambitious, and would be willing to 
overlook something if someone who could help his career was the one 
. 33 mak~ng the demand. 
In this work we shall need to refer to the French Court system 
as it was then. The author had therefore included a brief summary of 
both the Civil and Criminal divisions. The Civil Court branch could 
be outlined as follows: 
COURT 
Tribunal of First 
Instance 
(3 Judges) 
Court of Appeal 
(3 robe rouge 
judges) · 
Court of Cassation 
(separate chambers) 
NUMBER 
360 placed over 
90 departements 
1 per ressort or 
jurisdictional area 
(26 in France) 
1 only -- in Paris 
JURISDICTION 
Where civil litigation 
over 300 francs, for 
divorces, for damages 
Hears appeals. Only 
one appeal allowed 
Nationwide jurisdiction. 
Does not listen to ap-
peals but only revision 
(law questions). 
Sources: Ensor, Courts, pp. 35-38; also Leveque, Histoire, p. 503. 
33 , ;\ Ensor, Courts, pp. 35-38; also Andre Leveque, Histoire de la 
civilisation francaise (New York, 1950), p. 503. 
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The French Ctruminal Court System appeared as: 
COURT 
Correctional 
Tribunal 
Assize Courts 
(3 judges) 
Court of cassation 
(Separate chambers) 
NUMBER 
1 per 
arrondissement 
1 per 
departement 
1 only -- in Paris 
Source: Ensor, Courts, pp. 38-46. 
JURISDICTION 
No juries. Tries 
smaller offenses called 
d.:lits. 
Hears appeals. Twelve 
jurors used only in 
gravest crimes. No 
appeal above here. 
Hears no appeals; only 
revision on points of 
law. 
Now certain threads in this court system are more tangible for 
those like Stavisky who would misuse their services. One. conclusion 
was that the magistrats nearer Paris could be more influential in ad-
vancing their promotions than their colleagues out in outlying prov-
inces. A second connecting point of interest was that it would pay 
eventually to have friends who "could pull wires for you" at the Min-
istry of Justice. Last, but not least, was the truth that within this 
enmeshed system was a politician. He was the head of the Ministry. 
As we shall see, all these three points were made to be an advantage 
for Alexandre Stavisky. Again the indispensable Ensor clinched this 
view firmly when he wrote: 
For the most potent deputies in the Parliament, the men 
who are impregnable in their own seats and who can stampede 
the Chamber at critical moments, or who wield such blocks of 
votes that their support or neutrality commands a high price 
from day to day~-in short, the men with whom Ministers have 
traffic most and who may themselves at any moment become min-
isters--are by profession, as a rule, advocates. That is to 
say, they practice before the judges. But the judges depend 
on the favor of a Minister, and the Minister depends on that 
of these politician-advocates. The conclusion from such data 
is not difficult to draw, and in the practice of the French 
courts it is drawn quite freely. 
In private it is easy to hear the most staggering in-
stances, not as a matter of idle gossip, but from the lips of 
men in every way reliable, And the best confirmation of them 
lies in the fact that big clients with big money at stake 
flock to the advocates credited with this occult power.34 
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And what a power it was in our period of interest! A comprehen-
sion of it and all its inherent possibilities for corruption made up 
the subdivision called the "judicial scandal" within the larger frame 
of the Stavisky Affair. "Serge Alexandre" was to take advantage of 
most of the weaknesses. 
Delayed justice and Stavisky's "nineteen postponements.''-- From 
1929 to 1933, Alexandre Stavisky obtained the delaying of justice in 
his case, by one mean or other, nineteen times. Every move cost dearly 
but it was worth it. The following table showed the results: 
34Ensor, Courts, pp. 41-42. 
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Date of Date of Reason for 
Court Hearing Remittance of Case Case Postponement 
October 11, H29 November 15, 1929 For information 
November 15, 1929 November 22, 1929 For placing on agenda 
November 22, 1929 February 21, 1930 For placing on agenda 
February 21, 1930 First day possible For medical-legal reason 
May 23, 1930 June 20, 1930 For medical-legal reason 
June 20, 1930 In four weeks For placing on agenda 
July 18, 1930 October 17, 1930 For placing on agenda 
October 17, 1930 January 16, 1931 Stavisky's address needed 
January 16, 1931 February 20, 1931 Stavisky's address needed 
February 20, 1931 May 8, 1931 Stavisky's address 
May 8, 1931 July 3, 1931 Stavisky's address 
July 3, 1931 November 13, 1931 Stavisky's address 
November 13, 1931 January 22, 1932 Demand of Andre Hesse 
January 22, 1932 May 21, 1932 Demand of Andr~ Hesse 
May 21, 1932 October 28, 1932 Demand of Andr~ Hesse 
October 28, 1932 January 20, 1933 Demand of Andrt{ Hesse 
January 20, 1933 May 12, 1933 Lawyers demand time 
May 12, 1933 October 20, 1933 Lawyers demand time 
October 20, 1933 January 26, 1934 Stavisky was dead. 
Source: Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Rapport G~ntfral (1935), 
p. 125' 
These frequent postponements and the reasons given were "a laugh 
at French justice's expense . 11 It has been explained that Stavisky was 
placed on "provisional liberty" with 50,000 francs bail. Before these 
postponements started operating, "Alexandre" went through a lot of 
trouble to gain time to make "the proper connections. 11 A great help 
in this was when on January 8, 1929, Stavisky produced a certificate 
from his doctor, Pierre Vachet, declaring to the tribunal that his 
client had a general paralysis, symptoms of muscular deficiency, some 
form of speech trouble, mental characteristics emphasized by a persecu-
tion complex, delusions of grandeur, lapses of memory, and a weakening 
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intelligence. From then on Stavisky let his lawyers take over, and 
he made it clear that he did not want to return to prison--no matter 
what price it would cost. The results were the "nineteen postponements."35 
In January, 1934, the men involved in helping Alexandre Stavisky 
·to secure these postponements were to make the headline news. The 
latter revealed that M. Hurlaux, a Paris magistrat, had dealings with 
Stavisky. Many members of the "parquet" would have gladly hidden their 
heads in shame for they were especially responsible for renewing Sta-
visky's everlasting "provisional freedom. 11 For instance, it will be 
noticed that the court was often lax in pushing the case. The post-
ponements depended technically on the Paris Parquet whose procureur 
was M. Pressard, the Premier's brother-in-law. Pressard later testi-
fied before the Stavisky In~uiry Commission that all nineteen postpone-
ments could be legally justified. His testimony further proved that 
a man to do what Stavisky had done needed many friends in the right 
36 places within the French judicial system. 
Legal Corruption 
Lawyer-deputies and shyster techniques.-- In 1927, after the 
French "King of Crooks" was "provisionally released," he made sure 
that he employed the services of lawyer-deputies. "J!olitical lawyers 
with big connections" were part of the evil doers associated with Sta-
visky. The Stavisky Inquiry Commission later condemned these selfish 
35
nocs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Rapport General (1935), pp. 70-71. 
36nocs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Deposition: Pressard; also 
Werth, France in Ferment, p. 234. 
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individuals who sold their honor in such a disgraceful fashion. These 
attorneys usually knew Stavisky's record but, being shysters, they 
kept it away from the Paris Parquet's daily gossip materials. Negli-
gence and complacency already had invaded the Parquet's offices, so 
37 there was no danger of too many questions being posed. 
The greasing of the shysters' palms worked miracles for "Serge 
Alexandre." M. Ren~ Renoult, for instance, was a former Minister of 
Justice, whom Stavisky employed as his attorney before 1926. M. Renoult 
before the Stavisky Inquiry Commission admitted receiving 50,000 francs 
38 
to help suspend Stavisky's arrest through M. Prouharam, the procureur. 
This "legal scandal" was also to bring out that Pierre Chautemps, the 
Premier's brother, had defended Henri Hayotte. Arlette Simon, Sta-
visky's mistress, used Paul-Boncour as her lawyer. It was obvious that 
influential political friends could impress the parquet and the magis-
trats. Stavisky was surely aware of this fact, if we judge from the 
names of the legal advisors he secured. Some were innocently involved, 
39 but they served the purpose. 
Stavisky and the Police 
Organization of the French police.-- Besides !lnvolving a ''judicial 
scandal" and a 11 legal scandal," the Stavisky Affair, when it broke out 
over France, exposed that a serious "police scandal" was also within 
37
nocs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," ne'position: Pressard; also 
Werth, France in Ferment, p. 233. 
38
werth, France in Ferment, p. 234. 
39nocs. Parl., "Rapp. S tavisky, rr Rapport Ge'ne'ral (1935), p. 115. 
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France's powder keg of troubles. It will be.valuable for the under-
standing of the latter scandal if we gather some knowledge of how the 
French police then went about its business. For this mission and for 
proper guidance we will rely heavily on Paul Allard, an important 
40 
authority of the French police in this period. 
The French police in round numbers totalled 32,000 agents--hal£ 
of these public protectors were in Paris itself. Further microscopic 
analysis told us that of the 16,000 Parisian law-enforcement officers, 
14,000 were gardiens de la pa.ix, the well-known uniformed peace offi-
cers walking the streets of the great city. These 14,000 men were 
further broken down into four brigades whose members worked eight-hour 
shifts. In times of troubles or riots, they were doubled or worked 
overtime. This police force, however, was concentrated in the interior 
of Paris, and left the suburbs relatively unprotected. For example, 
St. Denis, a Communist center with a large, spreading population, had 
only forty policemen available. The weakness of such an organization 
41 
was evident. 
Less conspicuous than these 14~000 policemen, the remaining 2,000 
law-enforcement officers were plain-clothes men belonging either to 
" , the police judiciare (Judiciary Police) or the renseignements generaux. 
The Judiciary Police, as the name implied, took its assignment from the 
Ministry of Justice and it was responsible for the serving of warrants 
and other stints given out by the Paris Parquet. The other branch, the 
40paul Allard, L'anarchie de la police (Paris, 1934). 
41tbid._, pp. 5-6. 
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, , 
renseignements generaux, was in more ways than one the "eyes and ears" 
of the Paris Municipal Police. It had the more adventurous and danger-
ous undertakings such as the investigations, the following of suspects, 
the giving of police protection to important people, and the looking 
into any matter which involved the public's interest. This last duty 
had to do with the French counterspy activities--an extremely efficient 
42 but poorly advertised service, for obvious reasons. 
Now if we move away from the Paris Municipal Police itself to 
look at the larger and broader French police, we soon discover that 
it had two main arms: ~he Prefecture de police (Prefecture of Police) 
4 I II I> I 
and the Surete-generale (shortened to Surete). It does not take long 
to uncover the significant fact that the two groups are torn from with-
in by an extreme jealousy of one another. This jealousy was based 
partly on the opposition they gave each other in the areas they con-
sidered under their responsibility. Technically speaking, the Pr~-
fecture was in charge of Paris and the Department of the Seine; while 
4 ; the Surete was given the rest of France as its territory. In reality, 
the lines of demarcation were not that rigid. In fact, they were so 
fluid that at times the'problem of who should arrest whom-where became 
an inextricable maze. This anomalous system had deep roots and had 
evolved through the centuries. It would take a major national police 
reform before it could be straightened out properly.43 
42Alla.rd, L'ana.rchie, pp. 5-6. 
43tbid., p. 7. 
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This double supervision of Paris sometimes could in a specific 
case present a buffoonish situation. Such an absurd development usu-
ally occurred in railroad stations or on railroad routes. The yard! 
of the great Paris terminals were under the eyes of the Pr~fecture; 
the corridors of the station were covered by Commissioners from the 
Ministry of Public Works; and the other parts were usually left for 
the sGret:. An escaping prisoner could bring a lot of debating and 
quarrelling among the law officials in such a mess! At times it be-
44 
came. very difficult to know who had the power to act. 
For our later reference, it would be appropriate at this time to 
give a few moments to the police in the provinces. As we have seen, 
the uniformed policemen of Paris and all other towns were not gendarmes, 
a mistake often made, but gardiens de la paix or agents de ville. The 
Gendarmeries formed part of the Ministry of War, but certain of its 
sections, such as the garde r6publicaine (Republican Guard) and the 
gardes mobiles (Mobile Guards), were employed by the other ministries 
45 in time of emergency. These two last named subdivisions were to par-
ticipate actively in the quelling_of·the disturbances occurring in Paris 
in January and February, 1934, and totalled 38,000 men. The gendarmes 
were especially needed in some French towns and villages where the 
police were almost nonexistent. FurthermOre, those that did exist 
44Allard, L'anarchie, pp. 7-8. 
45Jean Galtier-B.oissiere, Mysteries of the French Secret Police 
(London, 1938), p. 9. 
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still operated as they did in the nineteenth century and lacked phones, 
. . 46 
proper financial support, and technical equ~pment . 
. Overlapping and jealousy in police administration.-- Much over-
lapping and. jealousy in law enforcement resulted in France in 1934 
under the police organization just described. If the Prlfecture had 
information on someone, it made sure that its rival did not get its 
hands on it. Furthermore, the deep-seated jealousy was. only infiamed 
daily more and more by the fact that the Pr~fecture's policeman was 
paid double the salary of his counterpart in the Surete. Here the im-
portant French authority on the French police aptly noted: 
The brave gardien de la paix of the Porte Saint-Denis 
makes 32,000 francs which represents the maximum salary of 
a First Class Inspector of the Surete. That is to say, be-
cause it is true, this places our functionaries in the police 
at the mercy of temptations. If there are some 11 itchy sheep" 
among them, it is because they are tempted to do some 11weaving; 11 
that is, private police work. 
These "itchy sheep," said a high personality to me in the 
snret~, 11are imposed on us, anyway, by·politics and the poli-
ticians. For do not forget that, by our laws, five-sixths of 
our civil servants are veterans placed in reserved posts by 
the Ministry of Pensions."47 
This political intervention in police work was a demoralizing 
factor; it could paralyze an investigation or an arrest; The Pr~fec-
ture here was more careful and kept a sort of defense by keeping secret 
documents under lock and key in·a special department called the "ser-
viceof the roses." The "roses" referred to prominent political fig-
ures on whom dossiers were gathered and filled with such delightful 
46 . . 
Allard, L'anarchie, pp. 69-70. 
47rbid., pp. 14-15. 
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material as the names of their mistresses, their irregularities, their 
bl . d h 1. ·t· 48 pu ~c appearances, an ot er revea ~ng ~ ems. But this political 
piston moving up and down the police hierarchy usually had its way, for 
when meeting obstructions, it could always be greased. How this could 
work was clearly shown in the Stavisky Affair. Once Alexarldre Stavisky 
sent word to the former Prefect of Police, Hudelo, informing him that 
the S~ret~ was about to search Rudelo 1 s home. The ex-prefect was alarmed, 
but Stavisky soon reassured him that there would be no further investiga-
tion and no search if Rudelo used his influence in the Prefecture to 
have him freed and his case adjourned. This Rudelo did. Stavisky, who 
originally had suggested the search, used his knowledge of the jealousy 
49 
rampant in the police to hush the matter .. 
Jealousy in law enforcement prevented valuable information as-
sembled by the Pr~fecture or the Suret~ from circulating. The Prefect 
of the Seine with his imposing headquarters next door to the law courts, 
on the Ile de la Cite, looked disfavorably upon the s{irete with its 
horrible offices on the Rue de-s Saussaies, Jean Belin, former Commis-
sioner at the S~rete'wrote in his memoirs: 
With all these resources at its disposal, the Pr~fecture 
constitutes a state within a state. Though the Prefect is 
appointed by the Minister of the Interior, if he is a strong 
personality, he may be difficult to remove because of his 
popularity with the public and with his own staff. Besides 
this, he has so much political power that, until 1939, it 
48 . 
Allard, L1 anarchie, pp. 52-60. 
49Pierre Lazareff, Derni~re ~dition (New York, 1940), pp. 194-196; 
also Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Deposition: Rudelo. 
was considered to be a promotion for the ·head of the S~rete' 
to be transferred to the Prefecture. The rivalry that existed 
between our two principal police organizations was such that 
time and again their men handled the same case in direct com-
petition and quite frequently they would try to discredit each 
other.50 
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The battle that was waged at high level was also fought lower down 
the ladder. This could be noticed in crime detect.ion in France for, as 
51 in many countries, this was then largely based on using informers. 
The latter were recruited from a group the police felt had committed 
misdemeanors. They would be "let off easy11 with the understanding 
that they would inform the police when they knew something important. 
In our period, the sGret~ and the Prefecture enjoyed damaging each 
other's work by arresting their rival informers. Apparently, these 
. f d f 11 f . k •52 1n ormers were not screene too care u y, or Stav1s y was one. 
Inspector Bayard had been the Pachot in 1926 when Stavisky was 
arrested at Marly-le-Roi. Soon after Bayard made "Alexandre" his con-
tact. Inspector Bayard of the Suret~ explained that. he had given Sta-
visky a card introducing him in case of need to fellow detectives. 
Bayard added that Stavisky informed the police chiefly about dope 
fiends, thieves, and forgers. The meeting place for the "passing of 
53 
the tips" was the Stock Exchange. The disclosure of this fact in 
1934 was to lead to many antidemocratic comments. 
50Jean Belin, My Work at the Surete (Toronto, 1950), p. 120. 
51 d ~ ... 1i ( 1935) h An re Ulmann, Le quatr1eme pouvoir: po ce Paris, , C . VII. ' 
52 . Belin, My Work, p. 120. 
53
nocs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky, 11 Rapport Geniral (1935), pp. 313-
314. 
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The famous police reports.-- The "police scandal" subdivision of 
the larger Stavisky Affair became even more shameful when the Stavisky 
Inquiry Commission uncovered the long record Stavisky had with the po-
lice. The police reports dated as far back as 1924. In that year the 
Rapport Hennett not only reflected credit on its compiler, but it was 
quite accurate on Stavisky's movements, legal and illegal, before that 
date. Yet this commendable effort was to remain unsung for a decade, 
for the S~rete kept it hidden for the time being. 54 
The S~ret; was no better than the Pr~fecture in tracking down 
Stavisky. The whole police had known ever since 1928 that "Alexandre" 
and Stavisky were the same man but, as Inspector Simon testified be-
fore the Stavisky Inquiry Commission, Stavisky "had been untouchable 
at the S~rete. 11 Inspector Colombani seconded his colleague and added 
that Stavisky could always count on leniency at the sarete. Colombani 
blamed the· strong ''political interventions 11 brought to bear in favor 
of Stavisky. Further testimonies only accentuated these disgusting 
t . 55 asser 1ons. 
The Rapport Hennett, dated June 20, 1924, was made for Commissioner 
Pachot of the Judiciary Police of the snret~. It told of Stavisky's 
early crooked escapades, his blackmails, his thefts, and his other 
schemes as far back as the Folies-Marigny Case of 1909. It concluded 
that Stavisky was a cheat and should be watched. The Rapport Imberdis, 
54nocs. Pari., "Rapp. Stavisky,'' Rapport Special: Hennett, 
pp. 664-665. 
55
nocs. Parl., ''Rapp. Stavisky," Deposition: Police, Volumes I 
and II. 
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completed on December 10, 1926, was again at Pachot's request. With 
intelligent precision Commissioner Imberdis described Stavisky, his 
56 
past record, and warned that his business was swindling people. 
On March 18, 1930 the monumental Rapport Gripois was ready for 
distribution to the proper people. That was never done! This docu-
ment not only included a very specific analysis of Stavisky's past 
but also gave "run downs on his gang." The Rapport Cousin et Pachot 
(May 21, 1931) went even further, for it was the most comprehensive 
report ever done on Stavisky. It showed that knowledge of Stavisky 
was widespread among the police administrators. Yet all this fine 
material based on minute investigation was allowed to be suffocated 
57 by the police. 
Andr~ Tardieu when testifying before the Stavisky Inquiry Com-
mission referred with force to the importance of one Inspector Lecerre's 
testimony. Lecerre explained that at the S~ret~ the "dossier Stavisky" 
was locked in the bureau of Commissioner Hennett, and that special per-
mission was needed to consult it. He further added pertinently that 
this was standard procedure in cases considered "especially important." 
Lecerre could recall only two or three times in eight years service 
h h i k d . 58 w en so muc precaut on was ta en to protect a oss1er. 
56oocs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Rapports Sp~ciaux: Hennett and 
Imberdis, pp. 664-667. 
57 , Does. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Rapports Speciaux; Gripois et 
Cousin-Pachot, Vol. I; also D~trez, L'Affaire, Ch. IV. 
58Andr~ Tardieu, Sur la pente (Paris, 1935), pp. 161-162. 
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. In summary, it is impossible to get around ohe fact found by a 
study of the Stavisky Affair and its connection to the leading French 
democratic institutions of the period: Stavisky's contact with the 
French Court System, the legal profession, the police, and the parlia-
mentarians added to unsavory comments on French democracy. Stavisky 
was known by those in charge of justice to have a long and checkered 
past. Stavisky was helped by the lawyer-deputies who placed "money" 
above "country. 11 • Stavisky was familiar to police circles through the 
Gripois and Cousin-Pachot reports. Especially damaging on the Third 
Republic's records was the willingness of a number of politicians and 
parliamentarians to use their positions and influence in behalf of 
questionable individuals. Very pointedly the Stavisky Inquiry Com-
mission expressed its repulsion after studying the ''judicial scandal," 
the "legal scandal," and the "police scandal" by the conclusion that: 
A very heavy accusation must be given to the responsible 
services because they permitted Stavisky to act without punish-
ment for many years. These responsible services are the par-
1 . ~, ''l " d quet de a Se~ne, the Surete-genera e, and the Prefecture e 
police .•.• 
The rivalry between the services of the Judiciary Police 
and the Pr~fecture prevented all initiative coming from one 
or the other. 
It is regrettable that the Judiciary Police did not be-
lieve itself obligated to transmit the "rapports" relative to 
the activities of Stavisky, and that seeing the records did 
not move in the Paris Parquet, they (members of the Judiciary 
Police) did not insist on more vigorous action by the superiors. 
The Parquet and the Judiciary Section, warned of 
Stavisky's previous activities and his many frauds since 
1930, did nothing during this period ..•. · 
These institutions stand condemned!59 
59nocs. Parl., 11Rapp. Stavisky," Rapport Gen~ral (1935), 
pp. 504-512. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE STAVISKY AFFAIR AS THE POWDER KEG CAUSE: PART II 
(Hunting the Vanished Crook) 
The Almost Great Financial Schemes 
The almost great financial dreams.-- In our last episode we saw 
how Stavisky's career was gradually moving towards the specialization 
in crooked high finance that was to make him notorious in modern French 
history. The historian's task is considerably lightened by the hours 
which the members of the Stavisky Inquiry Commission spent in gathering, 
sifting, and classifying an immense amount of disconnected data. To go 
through all of Stavisky's many financial schemes would be time-consuming 
and of doubtful value. Therefore, the presentation below will not only 
be a selective one, but it will be condensed to the essential points 
needed to comprehend how these financial affairs were a strong factor 
1 
in bringing on the "Democratic Crisis of 1934 in France." 
The initial financial schemes undertaken by "Serge Alexandre11 
were not so significant as the ones Stavisky organized after being re-
leased from prison in 1927. In order to understand the later but 
"more stupendous financial schemes," the historian must give attention 
to the early financial swindles engineered by Stavisky. These early 
efforts can be collectively termed the "almost great financial dreams . 11 
1see Footnote 2 in Chapter III for reference we will use in our 
footnotes for this chapter. 
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The first of the '1almost great financial dreams" was established 
in 1923 as Chez Elle. This company almost died in infancy and never 
amounted to much. Learning from the mistakes he made in founding Chez 
Elle, Stavisky threw himself into two more financial ventures almost 
simultaneously. The Compagnie Industrielle Transcontinentale dealt 
superficially with the sale of commercial goods and the transfer of 
rehabilitation bonds, while the company La Juranconne issued various 
--,--
types of watered stocks._ Both these schemes were used as a front for 
speculators, and Stavisky found them a great benefit when he wished to 
deal with crooked money-changers. The actual operations as stated in 
their charters never seemed to be realized as far as these two enter-
2 prises were concerned. 
But Alexandre Stavisky was also interested in building up a back-
ground for respectability in finance. This was his main motive when 
he invested in the Nouveau-Marseille or Societe Fonciere Phoceene. 
The founder of this company, M. Regnaudin, an important figure in fi-
nancial circles then, felt it was an honor for him to be trusted as 
the administrator of the funds invested by M. Alexandre Stavisky and 
M. Henri Hayotte. The purpose of this company was the development of 
3 
small property. 
With these initial endeavors behind him, 11Alexandre" felt he knew 
enough to stop playing "the silent partner," and so, in 1926, he began 
2 Docs. Pari., "Rapp. Stavisky," Rapport General (1935), pp. 147-
163. 
3 Ibid., pp. 160-172. 
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his first notable financial deal: the P 1ti Pot. The objective of 
this company was supposed to be the exploitation of a business produc~ 
ing condensed soup. So now "Alexandre11 was·talking, dreaming, and 
selling soup. This soup business for Stavisky was a milestone in his 
career because, for the first time, the Stavisky gang made its appear-
ance as stockholders in the P'ti Pot. These shareholders made up an 
impressive list of some of the top French underworld characters of the 
period: Cachard, Hayotte, Loiseau, Mikowsky, Pourcelle, Schmitt, 
Stavisky, and Doctor Vachet. Gilbert Ramognino, Stavisky's secretary, 
later joined this group; and Henri Hayotte, Stavisky's right-hand 
lieutenant, held the most shares (307). The gang soon had to sell 
their soup business for 11a stretch in the cooler. 11 The law placed 
4 
them behind bars for the Laforcade Affair! 
Once out of prison in 1927, Alexandre Stavisky set up one of the 
main props in his financial dreams: 
, , , 
the Societe des Etablissements 
Alex (1928). This company's interests involved varied dealings in 
jewelry, ornaments, gold and silver objects, and art works. Stavisky 
graciously allowed the use of his nickname, and the Stavisky gang once 
more was in business--the luxury trade. The Etablissements Alex showed 
that "Serge Alexandre" was now using the technique of putting up most 
of the money but keeping himself in the background. Henri Hayotte, 
his favorite 11 among the boys," was assigned the managership. Hayette 
, 
saw to it that the Etablissements Alex opened up three important jewelry 
4
oocs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Rapport General (1935), pp. 160-
172. 
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shops and placed the proper tentacles in Touquet-Paris-Plage, Biarritz, 
and Cannes. Within this triangular setup, the Stavisky gang became 
11big-time operators," and they used the Etablissements Alex''"as a front" 
for irregular financial activities. The Etablissements Alex carried on 
a loan trade which netted sizeable revenues. It was not long before 
false gems, especially emeralds, became a ''specialty of the house." 
For the connoisseur a certain amount of true precious stones were kept 
on hand. Eventually the latter totalled ten million francs in valua-
. 5 t~on. 
" The Etablissements Alex became almost entirely devoted to sponsor-
ing Stavisky's major interests. The false emeralds and fraudulent 
bonds involved in the later Credit Municipal d'Orl{ans, as we shall 
see, were possessions of the Etablissements Alex. The same use was 
made of this company to organize Stavisky 1 s most ambitious scheme--
the Bayonne Bond Fraud. When in 1931 it became impossible to keep the 
jewelry stock tied down, because they were needed for the yet larger 
, 6 
schemes under advisement, the Etablissements Alex were liquidated. 
Then "Alexandre" began to take trips to all points of Western 
Europe and founded numerous financial schemes. The complete list makes 
one gasp at the distance covered and the efforts expended in setting up 
these crooked financial companies. A roll call of these shaky enter-
prises would reveal the following to be of considerable size: the Cr{dit 
5nocs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Rapport G~neral (1935), pp. 179-
181. 
6Ibid., pp. 178-181. 
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National du Luxembourg, La Holding Bourgeoise, and Trust Fancier Belge. 
He seemed about to put much energy into Belgium and Luxembourg, but 
just as these international financial houses were demanding more atten-
tion, "Alexandre" was forced to reduce the size of their activities 
7 because of the time he had to devote in Paris to his major schemes. 
One of the main reasons why Alexandre Stavisky allowed "his foreign 
deals to cool'' was the attention he needed to give to his newest enter-
prise created in 1929: the Compagnie Fonci~re. This company placed 
Stavisky in control of the principal financial transactions although, 
, 
technically, his friend, Edouard Cazenave, held most of the stock. 
This was a sizeable company investmentwise, and it advertised its main 
interest as being the development of public works. Stavisky became 
convinced that this Compagnie Fonciere was as big a thing as he had 
ever attempted, and he decided that it demanded a lot of dressing. 
As he scouted around, Stavisky was informed that M. Hudelo was in 
charge of low-cost housing in the Ministry of Public Works; while M. 
Monod was the manto see if you had any "propositions to help salvage 
8 
the liberated regions. 11 "Serge Alexandre" also picked up the tip that 
these men were willing "to be reasonable if approached properly." 
Stavisky's political-lawyers, Gaulier and Guiboud-Ribaud, prov~d to 
be the friends he needed and "the right connections were made.'' Alfred 
~ Detrez, a rather amazing worker on the Stavisky Affair, in spite of his 
7Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Rapport G~n~ral (1935), pp. 183-
192. 
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prejudices against masons, struck an important chord when he wrote: 
When all was ready, one day in April, all that was left 
to do was to allow the administrators in on the deal. These 
were: President Rudelo, the Vice-President Monod, M. Verrier, 
the former Mayor of Paris; M. Dargent, honorary justice of the 
peace; M. Wurtz, member of the Cabinet; M. Linares, property 
holder; and the banker Cachard--who had never been in such 
good company--and the former President of the Military Inter- .. 
allied Commission in Bulgaria, General Bardi de Fourtou. 
The latter was a member of the reserve, who was pleased with 
his new friends, but hoped that he coul~ escape this time 
without recourse to his lawyer--M. Camille Chautemps.9 
It was not too long afterwards that General Bardi de Fourtou be-
came one of the most trusted individuals within the Stavisky gang. 10 
The hurdles all surmounted, Stavisky was on his way to forming 
the Compagnie Fonciere with a capital of 2,500,000 francs. The com-
pany's charter made it essential that the government support this scheme. 
This was done when the Compagnie Fonciere became the recipient of impor-
tant government contracts for works in the Paris suburbs, the construe-
tion of highways through the Pyr~nles, the pulling down of fortifica-
tions circling Perpignan, and the reconstruction of many demolished 
homes in Paris. The whole affair looked legitimate enough until the 
bills began pouring into the government offices--the prices seemed 
double or triple what they should be! Soon the whole package involved 
totalled 10,000,000 francs, and there seemed more where that came from. 
As the financial dealings became higher the Ministry of Finance threat-
ened an investigation. Rudelo, at this point, "calmed down the angry 
9Alfred D~trez, L'Affaire Stavisky (Paris, 1935), pp. 51-52. 
10Bardi de Fourtou was condemned to prison for two years in 1936; 
see Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Rapport Gln~ral (1935), p. 311. 
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spirits, 11 made a few appropriate phone calls, and upheld Stavisky as 
an 11honest man. 11 In our previous chapter, we mentioned how "Alexandre" 
l1 
had thrown the .scare into Hudelo. 
Next "Alexandre'' moved into a well-established firm, the S .I.M.A. 
(Societe d'Installations Mecanigues et Agricoles). The S.I.;M.A. had 
been founded in Paris in 1923 and was a legitimate corporation inter-
ested in mechanical, industrial, commercial, mining, and·agricultural 
machinery. The~, in 1929, Stavisky bought S.I.M.A. 's shares. That. 
year no more dividends were distributed to the stockholders. The an-
nnaJi~report was a little late for it needed doctoring to be done to it. 
Someone was absorbing the money semewhere, but the excuse offered the 
stockholders was that the profits were needed for expansion into the 
production of 11Ph~bor 11 refrigerators. ·Gaston Bonnaure, later deputy, 
was Stavisky's attorney, and he was in charge of providing the proper 
12 
terminology for this lack of dividends from then on. 
In 1932 came the creation of one more company by Stavisky, the 
so-called S.A.P.I.E.N.S. (Societ~ Anonyme de Pubiicit~ d'Impressions 
et d'Editions Nouvelles de la Seine). The leadership here was held by 
Albert Dubarry, the editor of the Paris newspaper, La Volonte. The 
S.A.P.I.E.N.S. was organized for the exploitation of the press, libraries, 
114 
· Edouard Cazenave, high stockholder in the ~C~o_m~p_a~g~n_i_e~F~o~n~c~i~e~~r~e, 
received two years' imprisonment in 1935; see Docs. Parl., 11Rapp 
Stavisky,n Rapport General (1935), pp. 53-55, 331. 
12 d d . . . Gaston Bonnaure was con emne to one year 1n pr1son 
see Docs. Parl., 11Rapp. Stavisky," Rapport G~n~ral (1935), 
198. 
~- - - - - - - - - - --- -- -- - - - -
in 1936; 
pp. 317-32.0, 
lOS 
publishing firms, publicity, advertisement, and the like. Dubarry had 
introduced "Alex" into the newspaper world, and both men decided that 
La Volorit' would be the vanguard of a campaign to muzzle unfavorable 
public opinion towards the "almost great financial schemes. 1113 . 
From the first, S.A.P.I.E.N.S. met much opposition .. This new 
mania "Alexandre" had to control the petite presse led him into many 
costly but fruitless negotiations. As the failure of S.A.P.I.E.N.S. 
became obvious, Stavisky and Henri Hayotte tried to prevent the whole 
matter from coll~psing by trying to interest Joseph Kessel and his 
brother George in spearheading a Stavisky-sponsored newspaper of major 
proportion. The Kessel brothers were lavishly entertained but, in 
spite of all this, they stuck to their original demand for a periodi-
cal. Stavisky tried to tempt them by balancing the sum of 18,000,000 
francs before them, but to no avail. It probably reminded "Alexandre" 
of 1926 when he attempted to control the Eiffel Tower 1 s radio trans-
14 
mission system but similarly failed to impress the right people. 
But "Alexandre'' would not give up S.A.P.I.E.N.S. so easily. He 
,; became involved, again unsuccessfully, with Paul Levy of Le Rempart 
, 
and Aux Ecoutes. He pushed 50,000 francs Camille Aymard's way; Aymard 
took the money but offered little compensation in his newspaper, La 
Liberte. Finally, Stavisky accepted defeat for S.A.P.I.E.N.S. in 1933--
13Jean Pennes (Sennep), Livre de Comptes de Stavisky: le rire 
(Paris, 1934); also Alexander Werth, France in Ferment (London, 1938), 
p. 84. 
14 . 
Joseph Kessel, Stavisky, l'homme que j'ai connu (Paris, 1934), 
pp. 20-31. 
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the venture had cost him 3~553,810 francs~ This financial scheme be-
. 15 
came a touchy subj7ct for "Alex." 
If S.A.P.I.E.N.S. could, at t:imes, bring ''Alexandre" to cry, the 
Societe Nouvelle du Theatre de l'Empire, founded in 1932, could make 
him furious by 1933. This company was organized to help finance show 
places, ticket sales, and the like. Henri Hayotte considered this 
scheme "his baby11 and.,. at first, "Alexandre11 was unable to refuse "mon 
cher Henri." A big music hall near L 'Etoile, the Empire, was bought 
and transformed into a theater for the production of operettas. The 
first production presented publicly was entitled Katinka and it had 
Rita Georg, the famous Austrian star, to play the lead. This turned 
out to be one of the best shows of the 1932 season, especially because 
of the notoriety it received. But Hayotte grew tired of it and, in 
spite of Stavisky's disapproval, he produced a monst~osity carrying 
the title Deux sous les £leurs. This enterprise soon became unpopular 
with producer Hayotte, and Stavisky was forced to disburse huge sums 
16 
every month to keep "the flop running.'' 
Orllans to Bayonne: The Great Financial Schemes 
"Optants Hongrois.n __ Alexandre Stavisky 1s crooked Doctor Vachet 
had diagnosed that his patient had "delusions of gran:deur. 11 One can 
almost believe it when faced by Stavisky 's "great financial schemes . 11 
15Paul2 L~vy, L'Affaire Stavisky: justice pourrie (Paris, 1935), 
pp. 7-45; also Camille Aymard, La v~ritable affaire Stavisky (Paris, 
1935), pp. 13-63. . 
16 Werth, France in Ferment, p. 84. 
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These are so called because of the tremendous amount of money invested 
in them, the many important government officials who were unable, or 
were refusing, to detect the immense frauds, and the impudence of the 
undertakings. When these enterprises were exposed through the French 
press in January, 1934, they brought on the "Democratic Crisis." 
Before seeing how the Stavisky powder keg exploded over France, 
let us follow the train to Budapest taken by Alexandre Stavisky in 
October, 1931. "Serge Alexandre" travelled as a tourist at that time, 
accompanied by his attorney, Gaston Bonnaure. These two men were actu-
ally not visiting Hungary as tourists, but they were on a mission which 
involved the erection of a vast borrowing operation based on the Hun-
garian Agri~ultural Funds. These funds stennned from a convention 
signed on January 20, 1930 at La Hague by France, Great Britain, Italy, 
Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Japan, Poland, Portugal, 
Greece, and Hungary. Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia had ac-
quired former Hungarian territories by the Treaty of the Trianon, but 
this transaction posed a problem: What was to be done for the landowners 
in the annexed territories? This question was finally answered when the 
powers involved gave a choice to the former Hungarian landowners between 
accepting the Hungarian nationality or joining their new owners. Those 
who chose to stay loyal to Hungary called themselves the Optants Hon-
. 17 
gro~s. 
The Optants Hongrois found the three new ruling nations decreeing 
17 , Werth, France in Ferment, p. 224; also Detrez, L'Affaire, pp. 
187-190. 
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a·grarian laws expropriating the large landowners, attempting to settle 
the question of indemnities for those staying faithful to Hungary, and 
trying to reach agreement on a standard and fair price at a time when 
the money was depreciating rapidly. This last problem ended in a com-
promise being reached by the interested nations. The latter accepted 
the creation of a common fund to be earmarked to indemnify the land of 
the Optants Hongrois. The money was to be raised by floating bonds at 
a low price. The regulation and determination of a fair price for in-
demnities for the Optants Hongrois were to go on until 1936, and the 
Hungarian Agricultural Funds were to emit redeemable shares beginning 
in 1944. Alexandre Stavisky began to see his "pot of gold" being made 
from this and~ in 1931, he was one of the first speculators to buy 
780,014,151 francs worth of Optants Hongrois bonds for as little as 
5 to 10 per cent of the face value. In 1944, he could collect the full 
18 
face value. 
For several years the Hoover moratorium and the Lausanne Treaty 
prevented "Alexandre" from throwing his Optants Rongrois shares on the 
market. Re held on 11until he felt the lucky day was at hand. 11 In 1933 
Stavisky concluded that the propitious time had arrived and, in October, 
he formed the Caisse Autonome des Reglements et Grands Travaux Inter-
nationaux (usually shortened to Caisse Autonome) for the purpose of 
emitting financial shares based on the Hungarian bonds he held. Gil-
bert Ramognino was installed in the Director's seat, but Stavisky kept 
18 . , , ( Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stav1sky," Rapport General 1935), pp. 223~ 
228. 
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hold of the operation himself. Ramognino later testified that 11Alex-
19 
andre considered this project his most precious treasure." 
In 1933, therefore, 11Alexandre" began laying the foundation for 
his Optants Hongrois scheme. Gaston Bonnaure--whose election in 1932 
as a deputy had 11milked Stavisky of quite a few sous"--travelled sev-
eral times to Budapest with introductions to the French legation. A 
trip with Stavisky to Stresa where nAlexandre11 and ''Gastonn dined at 
the same table as M. Georges Bonnet was to cause the latter many head-
aches. All these trips were made to prepare the ground for the "big 
20 
scheme." 
In the summer of 1933 Stavisky visited M. Franjois Albert, Min-
ister of Labor--the introduction being provided by the questionable 
M. Hulin, former Undersecretary of War. Stavisky glibly spoke of a 
new way to abolish unemployment by forming a company which would loan 
money easily and cheaply to municipalities. This money was, of course, 
to be raised with the Optants Hongrois bonds. "Alexandre11 suggested 
that it would be gracious on M. Albert's part if the Social Insurance 
Fund of France "would begin the movement to invest.'' M. Albert said 
1 1 . . f f i . 21 that he wou d consu t the M1n1ster o Finance or an op nlon. 
The Minister of Finance was none other than the respectable Georges 
Bonnet, who gave a 11 thumbs down" on the Hungarian bond scheme. Bonnet, 
19 , Docs. Parl., "Rapp Stavisky," Rapport General (1935), pp. 223-
228. 
20 .. 
. Werth, France in Ferment, p. 224; for opposite opinion on Bonnet 
see Henri Rochefer, Sta.visky, n'est pas mort (Paris, 1934), pp. 9-13. 
21werth, France in Ferment, pp. 224-225. 
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thus, probably prevented a five hundred million franc swindle from 
taking place-. The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs then published a circular warning everyone against the Hun-
garian bonds. This blow was to eventually end Stavisky's financial 
22 
career. 
Stavisky, the financier.-- Let us pause at this point to draw out 
more fully the techniques employed by 11Ale:Kandre11 in the establishment 
of his financial schemes--especially those activated during his "pro-
visional liberty." First, it should be noted that "Serge Ale:Kandre" 
was never hampered by the juridical limitations placed upon his dif-
ferent enterprises. He personally saw his schemes' activities as not 
limited within certain ~egal boundaries as written in the various char-
ters. Stavisky operated on a more fluid financial basis, for he con-
sidered it proper to take funds out of one enterprise to cover up the 
deficit in another one. The financial expert Guerbigny, employed by 
the Stavisky Inquiry _Commission, suggested in his personal report to 
the Commission that "Alexandre'saw all his companies' treasuries as one 
big cashier's desk with many drawers. 11 As time went on, the numerous 
checks from the S.I.M.A., the Compagnie Fonciere, the Etablissements. 
Alex, and others became so confused that even months of meticulous re-
search by the Stavisky Inquiry Commission's staff never completely 
straightened them out. How Stavisky knew what his assets were, it is 
23 impossible to say. 
22 Werth, France in Ferment, pp. 224~225. 
23
nocs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Rapport Gen~ral (1935), pp. 237-
238. 
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Besides these interchanges of funds, it should be observed that 
Stavisky's financial maneuvers, after 1927, included the fact that 
"Alexandre" was not technically associated with any of the schemes. 
After 1927 he simply became "M. Alexandre" for most of his contacts. 
In order to circumvent the law, he believed it more comfortable to 
leave the actual shares with someone else, although he gave in to the 
, . 
extent of allowing his nickname used once (Etabl~ssements Alex). In 
all his financial activities, however, Stavisky never relinquished 
h . 24 t e manageme~t re~ns. 
A third point to notice about Stavisky's financial schemes was 
that an extremely large amount of the companies' debentures were false. 
Furthermore, these bogus bonds were guaranteed by the false jewels 
~ 
handled by the Etablissements Alex. In times of stress, Stavisky 1s 
supply of genuine jewels was produced. Such an occasion was called 
. 25 
for when a "government snooper came around." 
The "Credit Municipal d 'Orleans .'J.- Stavisky 1 s move to the muni-
cipal pawnshops was based on a June 24, 1851 law which made it legal 
for a community to loan, temporarily, money to a member of a community 
if he were financially embarrassed. This money was borrowed by the 
borrower from the community at 7 to 8 per cent interest. A community 
involved in lending activities would accept jewels or other valuables 
from the borrower as security. If the borrower became delinquent in 
24
nocs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Rapport General (1935), pp. 239-
245. 
25rbid., pp. 247-248. 
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meeting his payments, the jewels held could be sold to cover up the 
losses. To secure initial funds for such an enterprise, a community 
would issue bonds paying 5 per cent in dividends. The purchase date 
and terms of these bonds were recorded in triplicate: (l) on the bonds 
themselves, (2) on the stub of the receipt book kept by the community, 
26 
and (3) on the receipt kept by the so-called "recorder of the bonds." 
The city of Orl~ans had established just such a pawnshop as des-
cribed above in 1928. Here aM. Desbrosses became Cashier-Director 
of all transactions, a M. Lacroix verified the bonds emitted, and a 
M Farault was the valuer of the jewels. The whole matter was honestly 
carried out until Henri Hayotte and Alexandre Stavisky entered the 
picture. After Hayotte and Stavisky bought a share into the Cr~dit 
Municipal d'Orleans, the total of the series of bonds placed on the 
market went up to 22,900,000 francs. Whenever suspicious eyes ques-
tioned the high valuation of the bonds emitted, "Alexandre'1 would order 
the jewels from the Etablissements Alex brought forward. "Alexandre" 
always made sure that only samples from the genuine .jewelry collection 
were ever scrutinized closely. The majority of the bonds issued at 
Orleans by 1931 were backed by 11 false emeralds." These false emeralds 
27 
were overestimated and were valued at the price of genuine jewels. 
Careless insurance companies all over France outdid each other to 
buy these bogus debentures issued by the Credit Municipal d'Orleans. 
"Alexandre" netted near 25,000,000 francs from this scheme before he 
26Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Documents, pp. 536-537. 
27 Ibid., pp. 536-539. 
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was suspected of any irregularities, A skeptical prefect and a ques-
tioning Municipal Council set the Stavisky gang in Orleans to trembling, 
, 
Stavisky decided it was time to get out of Orleans, and he gave the 
emergency order: it had become urgent to free the false emeralds and 
to reimburse the bonds before the full extent of the fraud was exposed. 
This was carried out successfully by the Stavisky gang. "Alexandre" 
28 
began looking for another municipal pawnshop. 
The Bayonne Swindle.-- The mayor of Bayonne was Joseph Garat, a 
respected man who had served his fellow citizens for nearly twenty-
five years. He was one of the most influential persons in his district, 
and the people sent him to the Chamber of Deputies with a high majority 
vote. As "Alexandre" checked the background of Garat, he picked up a 
few hints that the "honorable deputy from Bayonne was not completely 
satisfied" with his role in life. Garat longed for a dynamic and in-
teresting life as a youth, but middle age rewarded him with more re~ 
sponsibilities and little fun. ''Alexandre" knew that Garat had to be-
come a member of the Stavisky gang if a Bayonne financial scheme was 
to be set up. Garat was further indispensable to any such venture, 
for he was a welcome figure through the private doors of many minis-
tries in Paris. Stavisky visited Garat, gave the Mayor a taste of the 
brilliant life of pleasure that was his if he cooperated with the Bayonne 
scheme, and soon was successful in enlisting the services of the limping 
Mayor. After all, the handsome "Alexandre11 offered Garat what he had 
28
nocs. Parl., "Rapp. Sta'Visky,'' Rapport General (1935), pp. 248-
249. 
been desiring for years: 29 wine, women, and money. 
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As early as January, 1930, this movement to Bayonne by the Sta-
visky gang had begun. During that month, the Ministry of Finance 
. . 
warned that there were grave irregularities in the Cr~dit Municipal 
d'Orleans. The management by Desbrosses (a loyal Stavisky follower 
now) of the Orllans Pawnshop came under the supervision of higher local 
authorities in the Municipal Council. The latter demanded Desbosses' 
resignation. Moreover, by summer, the branch of the Etablissements 
"' Alex in Orleans was ordered out of the community. So the cry for the 
Stavisky gang came to be: 30 ''On to Bayonne!" 
By the fall of 1930 Bayonne was seriously considering creating a 
municipal pawnshop;· Deputy Garat asked M. Turbat, Mayor of Orleans, 
how to organize such an affair. The Ministry of Finance, informed of 
what Bayonne had in mind, forewarned Mayor Garat about the crooked Des-
brasses. This warning disappointed Mayor Garat for the latter had al-
ready asked Desbrosses to come to Bayonne and assume the role of 
Cashier-Director. Garat, in a quandary as· to what should be done, 
consulted Stavisky. "Alexandre" solved this problem by phoning M. 
Tissier, employee of the S. I. M.A., in Paris. Tissier was ordered to 
take the Cashier-Director position in Bayonne. Tissier did as he was 
31 
asked. 
29Docs. Parl., 11Rapp. Stavisky, 11 Rapport Spe'cial: Pachot-Cousin, 
pp. 369-377; also Alberic Cahuet, 'L'Affaire de Bayonne," L'Illustration, 
Vol. 4741 (January 17, 1934), p. 38. Garat was condemned in 1936 to 
two years in prison. 
30 , Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Rapport Special: Pachot-Cousin, 
pp. 369-377. 
31 , 
Detrez, L'Affaire, pp. 104-125. 
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In January, 1931, the Bayonne Pawnshop opened for business. Sam 
Cohen, Stavisky's friend, became the valuer-~he estimated the value of 
the jewels presented as security by the borrowers--and after his death 
~ his son, Henri Cohen of the Etablissements Alex, carried on this assign-
ment. Digoin, a former inspector of police who had entered Stavisky's 
service in 1929, was made Commissioner of the Bayonne Pawnshop. The 
Commissioner's job was to act as intermediary for those who wanted to 
buy Bayonne bonds but were unable to come to the Municipal Credit's 
windows. Desbrosses stayed around for a while to teach Tissier "the 
tricks of the game." Stavisky advised the Cashier-Director Tissier 
that the Bayonne Pawnshop's first duty was to "reimburse the Stavisky 1 s 
financial schemes that found themselves in the red for the time being." 
Tissier was told that the Optants Hongrois scheme would later cover up 
these Bayonne disbursements, Furthermore, to prevent any unnecessary 
inspections, Stavisky would not allow the Bayonne Municipal Credit to 
h . . f h b k bl' 32 join t e Assoc~at~on o Frenc Pawn ro ingEsta 1shments. 
M. Albert Dubarry, a newspaperman who knew many important govern-
ment officials, helped Stavisky in meeting the proper government fig-
ures who could give the word that the Bayonne bonds were above reproach. 
Through such an intermediary, in June 1932, was M. Dalimier, the Min-
ister of Public Works under the Herriot Government, reached. Dalimier 
soon declared the Bayonne bonds excellent, although he made no inves-
tigation of the Bayonne Pawnshop. Dalimier was further helpful when 
32nocs. Parl., 11Rapp. Stavisky, 11 Document, pp. 541-542; also 
Werth, France in Ferment, p. 85. 
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he wrote to M. Hermant, President of the Committee on Insurances for 
all France, and asked the latter to give backing to the Bayonne deben-
tures. This Hermant immediately did. This so-called Dalimier Affair 
33 greatly contributed to the early success of the Bayonne scheme. 
Now the Bayonne Municipal Credit, like any other Municipal Pawn-
shop, was subject to periodic inspections. The different government 
inspectors of control later testified that the Bayonne bonds looked in 
a healthy state when they checked the books. The reason for this was 
that Mayor Garat made such an inspection almost foolproof by having 
M. Constantin appointed as his inspector from the Ministry of Commerce. 
Constantin was not one to forget Garat-~the man who was most influen-
tial in placing Constantin where he now was. Constantin, moreover, 
when he came from Paris to Bayonne on an inspection tour, was given a 
11gay old time by the Deputy-Mayor." M. Sadron, the other inspector 
from the Ministry of Finance, was kind enough to give an eight-day 
warning before making his appearance in Bayonne. 34 
If these inspectors had really been doing what they should have 
done, they could have uncovered the following disgraceful financial 
situation prevailing in Bayonne: 
33 Docs. Pari., 11Rapp. Stavisky, 11 Document, pp. 541-542; 
also Werth, France in Ferment, p. 85. 
34Docs. Parl., 11Rapp. Stavisky, 11 Document, pp. 541-542. 
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YEAR REGULAR BONDS FALSE BONDS 
1931 11,500,000 francs 63,500,000 francs 
1932 4,450,000 francs 80,640,000 francs 
1933 6,550,000 francs 91,454,120 francs 
. , , ) Source: Docs. Parl., 11Rapp. Stav1.sky," Rapport General (1935 , 
pp. 266-270. 
Quite a disproportion for a community with 30,000 inhabitants! 
As he had done in the Credit Municipal d'Orleans, nAlexandre11 made 
his profits by allowing the issuance of bogus debentures at Bayonne 
based on borrowed jewels or the Optants Hongrois shares. The jewels 
used at Bayonne were estimated by the Cohens to be worth 22,717,000 
francs, but later government appraisers found them worth 608,000 francs 
35 
at most. 
The mechanics employed at Bayonne in issuing the bonds were the 
same as those developed at Orleans. The face of the bond carried a 
superior amount to the sum written on the public record and the stub 
of the receipt. The total on the stub or the counterfoil being the 
smallest, it was written on the books used by the accounting depart-
ment when the inspectors came. The control slips duplicated these 
entries. Tissier handled Diost of the important steps during a "bogus 
bond transaction, 11 forM. Piet, his superior, very conveniently signed 
the blank bonds beforehand. Tissier filled in the amounts and, when 
35
nocs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky,'' Document, pp. 541-542; also Werth, 
France in Ferment, pp. 85-86. 
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necessary, he forged the signatures. The false bonds issued in this 
manner up to the time of Tissier 1 s arrest added up to 238,594,000 
36 
francs. 
By the end of 1933, however, the Bayonne scheme was endangered 
because: (1) certain financial·newspapers were calling attention to 
the high emission of bonds from Bayonne; (2) the year 1933 brought 
mQre and more bonds to be caShed in; and (3) the impossibility of 
covering up the deficits at Bayonne by the Optants Rongrois scheme 
which had been nipped by the Ministry of Finance. It was a matter of 
time before the Bayonne swindle would be exposed. This happened in 
December, 1933, and the chain of events which it set off nearly de-
37 
strayed the Third French Republic. 
S tavisky 1 s Gang 
Stavisky's gang and its expense account.-- As early as 1926, the 
police were already denouncing Alexandre Stavisky as the "King of the 
Crooks" and as a major gang leader. By the early thirties, the Stavisky 
gang had become extremely well-organized. The gang's table of organiza-
tion classified the members into two categories: (1) the specialist, 
who naturally was a close friend of "Alexandre," and (2) the inter-
mediary, who was used by the gang but never shared all the secrets of 
the 11 inner circle." The specialists were assigned the most diversified 
36 Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Document, p. 542. 
37Lenglois, Vie et mort, pp. 55-82; also Werth, France in Ferment, 
p. 83. 
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tasks, and they included the company directors (Bardi de Fourtou and 
Henri Hayotte, for instance), bodyguards, the underwriters, there-
38 
ceivers of stolen goods, the informers, the doctors, and the lawyers. 
The intermediary never was trusted by the specialist of the Sta-
visky gang. In fact this group was also called the "intermediary 
leeches. 11 It was so named because the members collaborated wi.,th Sta-
visky only because they loved the sight of "Alexandre's" money. Yet 
Stavisky was aware of the importance of this group, for the success 
of a particular enterprise often depended on how well an intermediary 
did his work. The members of this questionable status came from the 
French police, the French judiciary, and the press. The great major-
39 ity of the intermediaries hobnobbed with high government officials. 
Stavisky's gang was constantly keeping "Alexandre" worried about 
how to get enough money to pay them all. In fact, when he was not 
busy trying to keep them occupied by inventing new enterprises, they 
were after him to get money from his private accounts. In private 
"Sacha Ale:x:andre 11 often mentioned the burden his gang made him carry 
and, when enraged, he shouted viperous language at individual gang 
members. "Alexandre" was seen in such a rage by Joseph Kessel, the 
newspaperman, one evening. After criticizing some of his experts, 
Stavisky attacked the intermediaries who took his money but gave no 
service afterwards. 
38 . 
Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky, 11 Rapport General (1935), p. 293. 
39Ibid., pp. 293-295. 
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This will not go on. I've had them in my service 
before, and I will get those that are against me. On the 
stirete's side, everything is fine. But at the Pr~fecture, 
I have enemies.40 
Stavisky's personal expenses.-- Stavisky loved extraordinary en-
tertainment. This desire thus increased that much more his need for 
money. Stavisky's tastes were expensive ones. He amused himself by 
giving valuable gifts to women, by organizing fabulous parties, by 
''splashing in front of his friends, tt and buying always the best of 
everything. Those who came in contact with this side of his person-
ality were charmed by his contagious exuberance, his irresistible 
amiability, his frequent gifts, and his sumptuous dinners. His clothes 
were impeccable--and expensive. This display of "conspicuous wealthrt 
.... 41 
was for stavisky a raison d'etre. 
The finesse and polite appearance, usuai~y displayed by the mag-
netic Stavisky before large gatherings, was sometimes replaced by one 
dominated by ill-manners and vulgarity in a smaller group. Kessel re-
lates how, early in 1933, Stavisky took him to dine in a Russian res-
, 
taurant near L'Etoile. Stavisky being a connoisseur of rich and well-
served Russian dishes became a gourmet on this occasion. He ate and 
drank too much. This was unusual for "Alexandre, tt for he normally was 
temperate in his habits. Kessel was shocked to hear the vulgarity 
used by Stavisky once he was drunk. It somehow did not go with the 
40Joseph Kessel, Stavisky, l'homme que j'ai connu (Paris, 1934), 
p. 67. 
41 \ \ Eugene Bortchy, 300,000 kilometres avec Stavisky (Paris, 1934), 
pp. 68-83. 
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. 42 
swindler's luxurious clothes and expensive perfumes. 
A costly item on Stavisky's expense account was the spacious 
apartment he occupied in the Claridge Hotel on the Champs-Elysees. 
The valets, chambermaids, managers, and sommeliers catered to his 
. h h . . . h 43 every w1sh, for e was t e heaviest t1pper 1n the otel. 
The aristocratic living standards kept by "Alexandre" kept him 
constantly in need of money. Especially costly were the gambling debts 
he would incur. Yet Stavisky was no easy "sucker" at a gambling table. 
In fact, he was an expert in the use of marked cards. The French Riv-
iera long remembered him for what he did in 1932 to Zographos. The 
latter then had the reputation of being "the greatest card sharp of 
all times. 11 Then he met Stavisky at the card table in 1932, and he 
44 found his master. Stavisky was proud of this dubious honor. What 
was even more impressive to the French underworld was· that 11Alexandre" 
had been outlawed "from casino life for cheating in the early thirties 
and that this had been his first night out11 since his readmittance to 
the card tables. Georges Thome, ~ " Director of the Surete in 1932, must 
take some of the credit here, for it was he who gave Stavisky a special 
card readmitting him to the gambling 45 rooms. 
42 Kessel, Stavisky, pp. 7-31; also Bortchy, 300,000, pp. 9-121. 
43Kessel, Stavisky, pp. 81-84. 
44Anonymous, Le drame de la 11banque ouverte 11 ou "tout va"-Zographos: 
Stavisky (Nice, 1939), pp. 1-5. 
45Georges Thome, Memoire (Paris, 1935), pp. 1-8. 
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Stavisky's love for taking trips, for beautiful and expensive 
works of art, for the race track, and for tailored clothes also de-
manded further disbursements. The private entertainment of beautiful 
and voluptuous women who were often showered with gifts by Stavisky 
and Hayotte also kept the swindler's budget "constantly in the red.n 
Eug~ne Bortchy, S tavisky 1 s driver for over three years, takes us ;bito 
this fabulous milieu in his memoirs. Bortchy relates how Stavisky had 
a mania for speed, how he enjoyed rushing from one beach to the next, 
how heavily he lost at the Deauville race tracks, and how careful he 
was in purchasing the best clothes and perfumes--regardless of the 
price. The houseful of toys Stavisky bought for his two children, as 
well as the huge closet filled with the newest styles that Arlette pos~ 
sessed, were constantly making demands on the head of the family. A 
con~tant merry-go-round of expenditures thus kept Stavisky perpetually 
46 
in need of more money. 
Last Days of Stavisky 
Stavisky's flight from Paris.-- On December 23, 1933 the Stavisky 
powder keg with its long chain of scandals--judicial, legal, and finan-
cial in nature--broke over France. This explosion had its fuse lighted 
by the end of November, 1933, when one of the insurance companies, which 
had invested heavily in the Bayonne·bogus debentures, filed a complaint 
through the Ministry of Finance and the proper courts. The resulting 
investigations led to the arrest of Tissier, the Cashier-Director of 
46 Bortchy, 300,000, pp. 1-87. 
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Bayonne, on December 23. 47 Stavisky's name, however, was not mentioned 
, 
or revealed publicly until December 30 by L 1Echo de Paris. But, by 
that time, ''Alexandre•• had escaped from Paris, and no one in the French 
police knew his whereabouts. 
Stavisky 1 s flight from Paris was planned from the moment the Sta-
visky ~ang heard of Tissier 1 s apprehension by the police. "Alexandre" 
decided not to leave Paris for a few days and to watch what would take 
place next. It should be pointed out that at that time the police 
would have encountered very little trouble if they had arrested Sta-
visky, for the latter was available in his Claridge Hotel suite. When 
it finally dawned on the police that such an arrest should take place, 
"Alexandre'' had made good his escape. 48 
Several days before Christmas, 1933, the Stavisky experts met in 
a hurried meeting and selected the companions to go with "Alexandre" 
while he "stayed low . 11 The ones chosen for this assignment:.were the 
gang's newest members: Henri Voix and Rene Pigaglio. In his memoirs, 
Pipaglio relates how on Saturday, December 23, he went to work as usual 
for the Mephisto, a newspaper edited by M. Pierre Guiboud-Ribaud. 
Shortly after Pigaglio's arrival, Guiboud-Ribaud rushed into the office 
with an air of irritation and disgust. Guiboud-Ribaud came right to 
_the point with "Piga. 11 It appeared·that.their mutual friend M. Alex-
andre was in difficulty. Guiboud-Ribaud as Stavisky's lawyer said he 
was worried about his client. Then came the question: "You have much 
47 Werth, France in Ferment, pp. 86-87. 
48 rbid. 
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ftiendship for Alex, don't you, Piga? 11 Pigaglio, who had become de-
voted to TIM. Alexand~e" since the latter had given him money for his 
daughter's recent emergency operation, affirmed his friendship for 
Stavisky. Guiboud-Ribaudthen asked Pigaglio to accompany "Alexandre" 
on a vacation if the occasion should present itself. "'Piga'' gave his 
immediate approval to this. That same evening Ren~ Pigaglio was in-
vited to Guiboud-Ribaud's house for supper. When 11Piga 11 got there, 
he was introduced to many of the members of Stavisky's gang, and he 
was informed that ''Alexandre" had accepted him as his travelling part-
ner. Pigaglio was dumbfounded. 49 
On Christmas Eve, Guiboud-Ribaud telephoned Pigaglio and invited 
the latter to a supper-conference at the former's home. At that supper-
conference Stavisky's lawyer entertained the Stavisky gang. Near the 
close of the festivities, Pigaglio was informed of the decision made 
for Stavisky's escape earlier that week: Pigaglio's villa called Les 
Vallons in Servoz (in the French Alps) was to be the perfect. nresting 
place needed by M. Alexandre during his recovery. 11 Pigaglio unsuccess-
fully opposed this choice. 11Piga 11 neglected to mention to the group 
that the main reason for his opposition was that in Servoz M. Pigaglio 
had many bill collectors just waiting for him to reappear. As a final 
instruction, ·pigaglio was ordered by the gang to drive nAlexandre" to 
Servoz in an outdated Peugeot automobile owned by the former. The 
reason advanced for such a move was that such a car would be less 
4 9 ' · l' . L ' . ' 1 d . ' d S . k Rene P~gag ~o, a ver~te sur es ern~ers ]OUrs e tav~s y 
(Paris, 1934), pp. 18-20. 
125 
likely to bring "undue attention to the occupants riding within."50 
At 1:00 A.M. Christmas morning, after a farewell party held at 
the Caf~ des coupoles for "M. Alexandre," Pigaglio and Stavisky said 
au revoir to the gang members and made their way to a nearby street 
where the Peugeot was parked. After some difficulty in starting the 
'car, the rattling automobile was on its way out of Paris. Pigaglio 
had mapped out the course and had decided to take the road to Lyons 
out of Paris. For a short period of time Pigaglio and 11Alexandre" 
were unable to find much to say to each other and concentrated their 
vision on the road ahead. The Beugeot slowly made its way towards the 
Porte d 1 Italie to the south of Paris. By this time, the two men in-
side the automobile were beginning to feel the sharp blasts of winds 
slapping their cheeks. Pigaglio noticed that 11Alexandre11 was shiver .. 
ing. When the Porte d'Italie was reached, Pigaglio stopped for gas 
51 
and then continued on his way. 
"Monsieur Maurice," Stavisky's new alias, broke the silence as 
the Peugeot.was leaving Paris. Stavisky spoke of "Christmas without 
your loved ones" and he thanked Pigaglio for the service he was render-
ing. While the two lonely men were exhausting this topic, the cold 
rain now coming down in torrents began pouring within the poorly pro-
tected car. Several miles south of Paris, near Corbeil, the two occu-
pants of the Peugeot ran into a thick, sticky snowstorm. By the time 
50Pigaglio, Derniers jours, pp. 28-30; also Docs. Parl., "Rapp. 
Stavisky," D~position: Pigaglio, pp. 2857-2860. 
51Docs. ParL, "Rapp. Stavisky," D~position: Pigaglio, pp. 2861-
2867. 
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they reached the Forest of Fontainebleau, Stavisky and Pigaglio were 
half frozen. Around 3:00A.M.> Christmas day, the two men decided to 
sleep for a while in a Fontainebleau hotel and to resume their journey 
1 h . 52 ear y t at morn1ng. 
Pigaglio and "Monsieur Maurice'' were up early as planned that 
morning. Soon after leaving Fontainebleau, the two travelers were 
stopped by engine trouble. Unable to repair the automobile, Pigaglio 
left the Peugeot in Sens. Both men then proceeded to Dijon by train 
and arrived in Culoz, a French resort in the Alps, too late to make 
connections to Servoz. Reluctantly, "Monsieur Maurice" and Pigaglio 
53 
sought refuge in a hotel. 
As both men were about ready to retire for the night, Stavisky 
pulled a Browning revolver out of his suit pocket and deposited it on 
the night table. Pigaglio gasped at the sight of the weapon, while 
Stavisky calmly explained: 
Do not worry for nothing, my good Piga, for I have 
no fatal thoughts in mind. But I want you to understand 
one thing: I would prefer to kill myself before I am 
arrested by the police_54 
Tracking down Stavisky.-- The little electric train running to 
Chamonix at 10:45 A.M. on Tuesday, December 26, carried Pigaglio and 
Stavisky to the safety of the villa, Les Vallons. The two "tourists" 
soon were disheartened by the run-down appearance of their new home. 
52Pigaglio, Derniers jours, pp. 31-33. 
53rbid., pp. 37-38. 
54Ibid., p. 38. 
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The rooms were dark and badly in need of repairs, and the howling 
winds outside penetrated within too easily for their comfort. When 
Pigaglio discovered that the villa's pipes had burst during his ab-
sence, he decided to visit a Madame Dussaix nearby to see what she 
could suggest. TheMadamewas accommodating and gladly offered her 
empty villa of Les Argenti~res to Pigaglio and "Monsieur Alexandre11 
if her price were acceptable. It was. Once the two tourists were 
established in Les Argenti~res, Stavisky made a phone call to Paris. 
There he reached Henri Voix, recent employee of the Compagnie Fonci~re 
and new gang member, and informed him that he was expected as soon as 
\ 55 possible at Les Argentieres. 
The so-called Second Browning Revolver Incident took place while 
Stavisky was unpacking his valise in his pleasant room in Les Argen-
ti~res. The sight of the dark and heavy Browning inside the valise 
made quite a contrast with the snow at the foot of Mont Blanc outside. 
Pigaglio tried to take the gun away from Stavisky, who finally refused 
to give it up. The two men then began a dull routine of meals, card 
games, and scanning of newspapers. The next morning, after Pigaglio 
had prepared breakfast, Stavisky decided to take a bath. While he was 
so occupied, "Piga" entered nAlexandre 1 s '' room and removed the Brown-
ing. Soon afterwards, Stavisky threatened to go to town unless his gun 
56 
was returned. Pigaglio did exactly that. 
55Pigaglio, Derniers jours, pp. 44-48; also Docs. Parl., "Rapp. 
Stavisky, 11 Rapport G~nJ'ral, p. 279. 
56p · 1 · D ' . 48 58 1gag 10, ern1ers )ours, pp. - . 
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When Henri Voix arrived at Les Argenti~res, Pigaglio was already 
packed and ready to return to Paris. This changeover was not done too 
smoothly, for just as Pigaglio was about to leave, his local bill col-
lectors caught up witl:t him. These unexpected visits made "Alexandren 
very nervous and moody. "Piga" finally was able to dispose of these 
57 
unwelcome visitors and left Chamonix for Paris on December 28. 
Once in the capital, Pigaglio went to Guiboud-Ribaud 1s home and 
found the latter in a frenzy. It seems that Stavisky had left nothing 
in his will to his attorney. This made Guiboud-Ribaud irritated and 
he told Pigaglio that he could not help "Alexandre 11 any longer. Guiboud-
Ribaud added that he did not ''care what happens to the dirty bum. 11 
Pigaglio further discovered that Voix' mistress, Lucette Almeras, was 
also angered because mon cher Henri had deserted her. The Stavisky 
gang decided that Voix would have to return to Paris to "shut her up. 11 
. ' Pigaglio was to return to Les Argentieres to make sure that "Alexandre· 
did nothing foolish." When this switch was carried out, "Alexandre" 
took further precautions. \ He decided to leave Les Argentieres as soon 
as possible, "just in case some of his friends in Paris spoke to the 
wrong people." While Pigaglio was making plans to carry out this change 
of residence, Voix and his mistress arrived from Paris. Pigaglio and 
Stavisky decided that it would be best if "Piga" went alone to Chamonix 
to find a new villa, for "Mademoiselle Alm~ras with her flashy fur coat 
. 58 
and excessive make-up might be noticed." 
57p · 1· D . . 59 69 ~gag Lo, ern~ers )Ours, pp. - . 
58Ibid., pp. 70-73. 
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11Piga" selected an expensive villa called the Vieux:-Logis and 
rented it from M. and Mme. Chatou "for the newlyweds M. and Mde. Fargeas 
(Voix and his mistress) . 11 On New Year 1 s Day, 1934, the four "tourists 11 
made the move to the Vieux:-Logis as quietly as possible. After this 
was done, Pigaglio decided to return to Paris and bring his family for 
a vacation in the Alps. While "Piga'' was so occupied, Voix, Lucette, 
and "Monsieur Maurice'' spent their days eating, sleeping, and playing 
card games. This monotony was broken only by Lucette and Voix doing 
the daily shopping, by Stavisky taking his evening constitutional, and 
by the two men spending hours locked up in "Monsieur Maurice's" room 
reading the daily newspapers. Lucette Alm~ras discovered that "Monsieur 
Mauricen and Stavisky were one and the same on January 6, 1934. 59 
On January 7, 1934 Lucette recorded the following conversation 
as having taken place with her lover when they discussed the moral let-
down of Stavisky during the past few days: 
If you had seen him a little while ago .... he was in a 
very depressed state. He frightens me when he gets in that 
mood. I fear that at any time he will kill himself, for he 
is tortured by the desire to end it all. He talks about 
committing suicide constantly, and he keeps his Browning 
always by his side.60 
While the three lonely figures were thus living under tension 
and depression in the Vieux-Logis, the outside world was on a manhunt 
for Stavisky. Alexandre Stavisky and his companions had left many 
tracks behind since they had left Paris. The many stops and changes 
59Lucette Alm~ras, Ce que je sais (Jaris~ 1934), pp. 44-93; 
also Pigaglio, Derniers jours, pp. 79-85. 
60Al " J . 154 155 meras, e sa~s, pp. - . 
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made by Pigaglio and Stavisky during their escape from Paris were 
traced by the police. In case the police lost the tracks, Stavisky's 
phone calls to Paris could always be traced. Furthermore, it had 
been poor logic for Stavisky's gang to send their boss to Pigaglio 1s 
villa where the latter was so well-known. All these trails, the move-
ments of Pigaglio back and forth between the Alps and Paris, and the 
exclamations of Lucette Almeras all over Paris, led the police to Sta-
visky. 
While Voix was casually doing the daily errands in 
Chamonix, either alone or accompanied by the conspicuously 
dressed Lucette, Pigaglio was not content to remain hidden 
in Servoz. The~tter took constant visits to Chamonix. 
One of these visits on January 6, made under the pretext of 
replenishing his food supply, was not completed without Pig-
aglio dropping by to see how Stavisky was doing. The latter 
gave "Piga11 an invitation to come the next day for dinner. 
On that day (January &)--which was the last one for Pig-
aglio in the vicinity--"Piga" missed the 2:00 P.M. train 
leaving Chamonix for Paris. He decided to go part of the way 
by sled with his family but, before beginning this journey, 
he again stopped by to see "Alexandre" and to tell the latter 
why he was going to Paris. Pigaglio had received a telegram 
from his secretary of the S.A.P.E.G. which declared, in con-
venient language, why he had to return. "Piga," himself, then 
telegraphed the news of his departure from the Haute-Savoie to 
his sister in Paris. This last telegram was neglectfully left 
on a table in the Servoz telegraph office. Soon thereafter 
Commissioner Charpentier entered the office in order to make a 
call to his superiors in the snret~. Charpentierts attention 
was brought to the telegram on the table signed "Rene." The 
Commissioner immediately associated the name with Madame Dus-
saix's lodger.61 
The day before the discovery of this telegram, on January 6, 1934, 
Inspectors LeGa11 and Girard led by Commissioner Charpentier had left 
61nocs. ParL, "Rapp. s t-avisky," Rapport Gen~ra1 (1935), pp. 281-
284; also Pigaglio, Derniers jours, pp. 85-86. 
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Paris in haste. They took the train to the Haute-Savoie to see a M. 
Drueault, father of Madame Dussaix, who had tipped off the police that 
he knew where Stavisky was hiding. The police followed the many tracks 
left by Stavisky up to the time of his change of residence to the Vieux-
Logis. Then the police were unable to make much headway. They did 
know, however, that Pigaglio if found would lead them to 11Alexandre." 
It was at this point, through the telegram coincidence mentioned above, 
that they knew Stavisky was in the area. The police then began to 
check hotel registries. Voix's signature was discovered on one of the 
registers in Servmz-- he had signed his true name through force of 
habit. Voix's unusual handwriting was found to be in the same style 
as that of the Farjeas of Servoz. The police later claimed that this 
d i h • f V • I h d • t • d • • • b k • th 62 ec p er~ng o o~x s an wr~ ~ng was ec~s~ve ~n rea ~ng e case. 
Death of nsacha11 alias 11Alexandre" alias 11Stavisky."-- January 8, 
1934 was destined to be the last day alive for Alexandre Stavisky. 
Early that morning in Paris, Pigaglio visited Gaston Bonnaure, Sta-
visky 1s deputy friend. Bonnaure at 10;25 A.M. was informed by Pigaglio 
of Stavisky's whereabouts. Bonnaure then advised "Piga" to give him-
self up to the police. Pigaglio later claimed that Bonnaure revealed 
Stavisky's hiding place to the police by 11:00 A.M. The police always 
63 
insisted that 11Alexandre" had been tracked down as described above. 
Unaware of what was going on in Paris or in downtown Chamonix, 
62Paris-Soir, January 8, 1934; also Docs. Parl., ''Rapp. S tavisky, " 
Rapport G~n~ral (1935), pp. 287-288. 
63Pigaglio, Derniers jours, pp. 114-121. 
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Stavisky, after breakfast, decided to take a nap. While "Alexandre" 
rested, Lucette and Voix departed for their usual shopping tour in 
downtown Chamonix. Not long afterwards, Commissioner Charpentier and 
his assistants headed for the Vieux-Logis. M. Chatou, proprietor of 
the villa, accompanied the police. Once at the Vieux-Logis, M. Chatou 
knocked on the villa's door. As no one answered,the visitors went in-
side. Stavisky was awake and locked in his room. Charpentier de-
cided to go through a "mock session of prospective tenants looking for 
a new villa." 1-lhether Stavisky was fooled by this "tenant visit" no 
one will ever know. In fact, from here on the events are very contro-
versial. One thing is undebatable: by 4:00 P.M. "Alexandre''s" body 
was stretched out in a pool of blood created by a bullet fired from 
64 his Browning. 
Throughout 1934 a heated debate developed over the question of 
whether Stavisky did or did not commit suicide. Commissioner Charpen-
tier's version of what did happen after the "tenant visit" was: 
I beckoned to LeGall and Chatou to retire to the dining 
room--which is extremely large--while I remained near "Alex-
andre's" door. I was hoping that the occupant within would 
conclude that the two inspectors and M. Chatou had left. 
I stood outside the door approximately twenty to twenty-
five minutes •••• 65 
Then around 3:30 P.M. Charpentier received an urgent call from 
Paris. The Commissioner was told of the call; he left the villa; and 
64 . Werth, France in Ferment, pp. 92-93. 
65 ~ Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Deposition: Charpentier, 
pp. 3362-3363. 
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A. "' he soon was talking to M. Ducloux of the Surete. Ducloux informed 
Charpentier that Stavisky was known to be within a radius of thirty 
to fifty kilometers of Chamonix. The Commis.sioner bellowed: ''What 
are you saying! I'm right onhis doorsill--what should I do?" Ducloux 
. ; 66 
replied: nAll you can do is to break the door down." · 
The testimony made by Voi:x before the Stavisky Inquiry Commission 
on Stavisky' s suicide was: 
M. Voix.-- 11What can we say to a man who wanted to 
commit suicide constantly. We did our best to change his 
mind, to console him, to build up his morale .... " 
M. President.-- "He therefore said clearly that he 
would resist arrest?--in consequence you do not doubt that 
Stavisky committed suicide?" 
67 
M. Voix.-- "There is no doubt in my mind!" 
Pigaglio 1 s comments on the "Suicide" were:· 
It is, however, incontestable--as I have previously indi-
cated when answering M. Xavier Vallat of the Commission, who 
demanded that I be specific on this point--that "Alex" decided 
to commit suicide because of his precarious situation. He was 
determined beforehand that, if there existed no other way to 
prevent being apprehended, he would shoot himself.-- I must 
state, however, that the police did not give the tracked man 
any other alternative,68 
Lucette Alm~ras iri. her memoirs. also decla:ted that she was convinced 
that Stavisky had taken his life. 69 
66 . . . , .. Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," Depos1t1on: Charpentier, 
pp. 3362-3363. 
67 . 
Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky," D~position: Voix, p. 2804. 
68pigaglio, Derniers jours, p. 101. 
6 9Alm~ras, Je sais, pp. 166, 223. 
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Thus Stavisky's nearest friends before his death unanimously pro-
nounced his suicide as definite. The later postmortem made on the body 
gave the same result. Even Stavisky's farewell letter, opened after 
his death, explained his distress, and underscored his decision to do 
away with himself. Commissioner Charpentier's detailed account to his 
superiors declared that Stavisky had shot himself. This version would 
seem to be the true one historically speaking, for the records all 
point to it as true. It must be pointed out, however, that: (1) it 
would have been possible to arrest Stavisky alive earlier; (2) nothing 
was done by the police to make a regular arrest; and (3) by silencing 
Stavisky the majority of the men connected with him would not be brought 
. 70 to justJ.ce. 
Stavisky Affair Unleashes the Press Campaign 
Stavisky Affair and the press.-- When the Stavisky powder keg 
detonated in France in December, 1933, it became the immediate cause 
of the "Democratic Crisis of 1934 in France." It brought with it a 
period of antidemocratic criticisms by the press as had not been seen 
for a long time in Western Europe. The royalist newspaper, L'Action 
Francaise, led the more dangerous attacks against the Third Republic 
~--
in early January, 1934 and brought on the so-called January Riots. 
The venal press campaign now released kept using the Stavisky Affair 
as the main symptom of a failing democratic regime. The press gave 
the numerous "calls to action" which declared that the various political 
70 , Docs. Parl., "Rapp. Stavisky, 11 Deposition: Charpentier, 
pp. 3362-3364. 
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leagues of France sho·uld war against the representatives of French 
democracy. By mid-January, 1934, this press campaign had succeeded 
in making Frenchmen fight Frenchmen on the streets of Paris. Thus 
began what can be termed the 11 active or violent phase of the Democratic 
Crisis. 11 
As a financial swindle, the Stavisky Affair was mediocre, 
but as a political and social ferment, it was one of the 
deadliest to ever appear 1n French history. 
The Stavisky Affair was a most grievous symppom of a 
country undermined, wasted and blighted, tottering on the 
brink of moral decay, a situation resembling in many ways 
the epoch immediately preceding the Great Revolution.71 
71Jean Dorgot, France Is Divided (London, 1945), p. 23. 
CHAPTER V 
THE POLITICAL LEAGUES 
(Playing with Matches) 
The Royalists 
Action Francaise.-- Because of the bold leadership which the 
Action Franiaise offered in France during the January and February 
Riots of 1934, the royalists occupy a prominent position in the his-
tory of the period. While the movement for 11monarchi'Sim" tended to be 
mostly an intellectual matter, Charles Maurras and L~on Daudet did not 
overlook the practical need for allies in their antiparliamentary cam-
paign. The e~plosion of the Stavisky Affair in the alre~dy charged 
atmosphere of France enabled them to assume the leadership of the anti-
democratic forces to which they had so often appealed through their 
newspaper articles. The fact that the two intellectuals also commanded 
the followers of the important political league, the Action Francaise, 
further assisted them in the events that were forthcoming. 1 
The Action Frangaise, a rightist organization, was chartered in 
1905 and declared its purpose to be the restoration of the monarchy. 
Before World War I the movement attracted few members, but by early 
1934 the membership was 8,300 in Paris and 60,000 in France as a whole. 
1M. Catalan, Pr~paration de la manifestation du 6 fevrier 1934, 
Chambre des d~put~s, Annexe 3385, Documents Parlementa±res (Paris, 
May 17, 1934), p. 582. The reader will notice that the conte~t will 
differentiate between the Action Francaise, the league or the news-
paper. 
137 
The political purpose was made clear to the new member, in case he 
had any doubt, on the day of his initiation into the league when he 
signed a declaration which stated: 
I associate myself to the work of restoring the monarchy. 
I join in the fight against any Republican regime. The Re-
public in France .is the foreigners' r'gime. Our unique future 
is in a monarchy such as would be personified through Mon-
seigneur le Due de Guise .... I dedicate myself to serve him 
by all means possible.2 
This militant rightist group had, in ·addition to Daudet and Maurras 
as polemicists and chief guides, a Board of Directors including such 
outstanding royalists as the well-known journalist, Jacques Bainville, 
and a retired vice-admiral, M. Schwerer. The latter, in fact, was the 
3 
President of the troops organized by the league. 
The work of the Action Francaise was carried out by two main 
agencies: the Ligue d'Action Frangaise, under President Schwerer; 
and the Federation des camelots du Roi (King's Hawkers), under Presi-
dent Real del Sarte, a sculptor by profession. During any major dem-
onstrations, such as the invasion of the streets of Paris in January, 
1934, both the Action Fra~aise league and the Camelots du Roi showed 
4 
their skill at carrying out orders. The Camelots were, for the most 
part, young men who did the footwork demanded by the organization. 
These young rowdies could be seen all over Paris selling the league's 
newspaper, giving protection to. the Action Francaise's leaders, keeping 
2catalan, Manifestation, p. 588. 
3Ibid., pp. 582-583. 
4Pierre Fr~derix, "L 1 action des troupes directes en France," 
Revue de Paris, Vol. of 41st Year (May l, 1934), 13. 
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,a constant watch on the offices used by the members and distributing 
pamphlets. When special reunions were held, the Camelots were respon-
sible for rounding up the participantsj and subsequently offered po-
lice supervision of the meeting hall. 5 
The Ligue d'Action Franjaise, whose membership fluctuated from 
time to time, could attract many intellectuals and wealthy bourgeois. 
These middle-class groups applauded the Action Francaise and its anti-
democratic doctrines. They listened attentively to the royalist leaders 
who preached the re-establishment of the monarchy, the return of politi-
cal inequalities of classes, and the reaffirming of loyalty to the old 
succession laws. Yet these intellectuals and wealthy bourgeois, who 
made up the majority of the royalists, were not willing to make an all-
out effort for the Due de Guise. One observer, noting the absence of 
any serious attempt to restore the king, wrote: 
The wealthy bourgeoisie is perfectly willing to slow up 
the march of democracy, but it wants to do so for its own 
profit and not for the benefit of the old feudal nobles. 
This stubbornness of the bourgeoisie explains a situa-
tion which must seem paradoxical to foreigners; namely, 
that while France is apparently so eager for a strong r~gime, 
the Royalist Party should have so little chance of success. 
The people of France remain totally indifferent to the 
Royalist Party because its platform contains no reference to 
economic reforms.6 
In time of great convulsions such as France was facing early in 
1934, the Action Francaise showed how effective it could become if other 
5
catalan, Manifestation, p. 582. 
6 Julien 'Benda,, 11The Enemies of Democracy in France," Foreign 
Affairs, XIII (January, 1935), 285. 
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dissatisfied elements would combine with its league in opposing the 
Republic. This possibility became arreality when the Action Francaise 
assumed the role of chie.f instigator in the antiparliamentary riots of 
7 
January, 1934. At that time, the newly found allies gladly accepted 
the first part of Admiral Schwerer 1 s assertion made before the Feb-
ruary Six Inquiry Commission: 
Our goal, it is to overthrow the Republic, for we 
believe that a republican regime will lead to ruin and 
death. We realize how natural it is to have a different 
opinion, but this is ours.8 
Rightists and Fascists 
Jeunesses Patriotes.-- The Jeunesses Patriotes were to be one of 
the earliest groups to join the Action Frang.aise. M. Pierre Taittinger, 
Deputy from Pari~; in 1924 formed the Jeunesses Patriotes because he 
felt that France, especially Paris} needed an organization that could 
prevent action from what he called the "parties of anarchy." In con'" 
sequence, a new recruit took an oath placing himself in opposition to 
any communist project and swore that he would support any national 
government which needed his services in maintaining order and prevent-
ing revolutionary troubles. This organization was highly nationalistic 
in character, and the members, totalling 6,400 in Paris and 90,000 over 
the rest of France, worked for the perfecting of the republican insti-
tutions within France by extolling the political doctrine based upon 
7 Alexander Werth, France in Ferment (London, 1935), p. 265 .. 
8catalan, Manifestation, pp. 583-584. 
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the application of the principles of authority) liberty, and responsi-
9 
bility. 
Membership into the Jeunesses Patriotes was open to anyone over 
seventeen years of age, and an adherent to the movement had to: 
Belong to no parties or political organizations who re-
ceived from foreign countries directives or money, whose acti-
vity is anti-nationalist and inspires international doctrines 
or which look to disturb the established order. 
These parties or organizations include among others: 
the free-masonry movement, anarchist parties, communists, 
socialists, S.F.I.O., and the like.lO 
The Jeunesses Patriotes were organized along military lines and 
had one of the most detailed structures then found in existing leagues. 
It had twenty-one 11regions" which, in turn, subdivided into numerous 
"sections." For instance, in Paris the league boasted of one ~lite 
/ 
division or "region" composed of sixteen "sections." M. Edouard Soulier, 
Deputy from Paris, commanded the twenty-one "regions 11 and was responsible 
for issuing orders during periods of activity. If Soulier were absent 
or could not easily be reached at the league 1 s headquarters, Colonel 
Ibar des Isnards, Municipal Councilor for Paris, gave the commands; and 
in case he also was not available, this power fell upon M. Jean Ybar-
, , 11 
negaray, Deputy from the Basses-Pyrenees. 
For a political league, the Jeunesses Patriotes was highly mili-
tarized along combat lines. T.he members were classified in one of 
9catalan, Manifestation, pp. 583-584. 
10Ibid. 
11Ibid. 
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three categories; namely, the MObile troops, the Centuries, and the 
Friends of the Jeunesses Patriotes. The 11m6biles'1 were young leaguers 
who received actual military training such as obstacle course work, 
quick movement in and out of heavy motor vehicles, mobilization drills, 
and minute attacks on a designated point of concentration. These young 
men were the shock troops of the o~g~nization. The only weapon allowed 
the "mobiles" was either a small, heavy cane or the handle from a hatchet 
12 
or its facsimile. 
The other two main categories within the Jeunesses Patriotes were 
not so active as their colleagues, the "mobiles." A reserve was made 
up from the "centuries 11 who were composed of adherents from all age 
groups. Each century had fifty men divided into three sections accord-
ing to the organizational chart. As for the "Friends of the Jeunesses 
Patriotes, 11 the members being over fifty years old, they only acted in 
dire need and as a last line of defense even then. Like their cohorts, 
the "mobiles," all Jeunesses Patriotes were to give strict obedience 
to the leaders. The leaders themselves received their orders from the 
. 13 
Central Committee of Action in Paris led by Soulier •. 
More concreteness was given the Jeunesses Patriotes as a political 
league when the members adopted their new constitution in March, 1934. 
As could be expected, it was along nationalistic lines and provided 
for a strong executive. This document outlines a new rule for the 
French Empire. At the apex would be the President of the Republic 
12Fred~rix, Revue de Paris, p. 116. 
13catalan, Manifestation, pp. 583-584. 
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elected for ten years by a suffrage which included both sexes. Every 
person over twenty-one could vote except civil servants and military 
men. The President of the Republic, who was eligible for re-election, 
was to be assisted by ministers and was to possess strong powers. Re 
was resp·onsibl,e for the initiation of laws, provided he consulted with 
the Council of State and the National Council of Labor. If these coun-
cils refused his demands, he could appeal to the people through a refer-
endum. The Empire was represented by a Council of the Empire elected 
by universal suffrage for a period of nine years. Three hundred mem-
hers was the limit for this Council of the Empire, and one-third of 
the seats were renewable every three years in rotating fashion. This 
body had the financial control of the Empire but, being unable to initi-
ate laws, it could only vote on bills proposed by the President of the 
. 14 Republ1c. 
It would be easy to observe the many characteristics of fascism 
found in the Jeunesses Patriotes--the militant organization, the dis-
cipline of the troops, the dictatorial t~ne of its new constitution, 
and its remnants of Bonapartism. Yet to apply a completely fascist 
label to the Jeunesses Patriotes raises difficulties: Further mate-
rials of the activities of the organization show that the leaders of 
the Jeunesses Patriotes were deputies and sincere upholders of a demo-
cratic form of government and its institutions. To conclude that all 
the Jeunesses Patriotes were fascists would be an injustice to the 
many members, such as M. le Mar~chal Lyautey, who believed the league 
14catalan, Manifestation, pp. 589-590. 
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desired to improve the government. 
Solidarite Francaise.-- If we are to accept the claim of the 
Solidarit~ Francaise that their league included 80,000 members in 
Paris and 180,000 in France, we must conclude that, next to the Tax-
payers Association, they were the second largest organized militant 
group in the country. The Solidarit~ Frangaise was started in 1933 by 
the perfumer, M. Fran~ois Coty. Coty, however, actually left much 
power to the Secretary General, M. Jean Renaud and to M. de Gueydan, 
known also as Vinceguide, who was the true DiEector. The objective 
proposed by the association was the study of modern French problems 
in the fields of finance, general economics, political science, and 
sociology. In consequence, its emphasis was on the intellectual ex-
15 
change of new ideas in these areas. 
The Solidarite Frangaise was organized into ''regions," these 
"regions" were broken down into 11secteurs, 11 and each "secteur 11 had 
"sections" as its main component parts. The 80,000 men in Paris ulti-
mately were subdivided into ten "sections." Like the Act'ion Francaise 
and the Jeunesses Patriotes, the majority of the members were young 
men. The Solidarite Francaise went further than those two sister or-
ganizations in such matters as symbolic represent~tions, for the Soli~ 
darit~'s leaguers were required to wear a beret, a blue shirt, and 
16 
grey trousers. The insig?ia was a small badge which had the relief 
of a red Gallic rooster upon a red backgro'und. It could be worn either 
15catalan, Manifestation~ pp. 582~583; also Fr:dtrix, Revue de 
Paris, p. 115. 
16 
.Ibid. 
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as a brassard attachment or on the beret. The young members of the 
association enjoyed this display and received yet more pleasure if 
they were selected as messengers; for then they could show them off 
all the time, These so-called emergency messengers were the communi-
cation line of the troops during times of action. These messengers 
formed bands of bicycle and motorcycle enthusiasts who trained them-
selves by racing through the streets of Paris. Contrary to what has 
been printed, the majority of these men did not come from North Africa, 
although an observer could spot an Algerian here and there on maneuvers 
17 
with these hoodlums. 
Again a superficial analysis of the Solidarit~ Francaise might 
lead to placing a hasty label of fascism on the organization. It is 
undeniable that the Solidarit~ Fran;aise had a military aspect, that 
its symbols reminded one of similar ones in Italy and Germany, and 
that the reliance on the leader principle was basic to the movement. 
But it was also accurate to record that this political league's goals 
were mainly intellectual ones, that the organization have no outstand-
ing military training to its members, and that the group had no de£-
inite economic program in mind. The documentary evidence on the Sol-
idarite Franjaise makes it much easier to agree with M. de Gueydon when 
he testified before the February Six Inquiry Commission that: 
I will, as you desire, give you information on our 
organization. We are a national organization, without any 
kind of loyalty to party; that is to say, we find among us 
17 Catalan, Manifestation, pp. 583-584. 
monarchists, some socialists. We do not care, as long as 
they are French, where they come from. We are an anti-
Marxist organization and mainly a nationalist movement.l8 
Francistes.-- Our attention now must be given to a relatively 
small group called the Francistes. These took their name from the 
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two-headed ax of the ancient Franks and were split into two branches, 
respectively under the leadership of M. Bucard and M. Coston. Both 
organizations, although differing on many points, had one objective 
19 
in common: anti-Semitism. 
Marcel Bucard 1 s Francistes were the only leaguers who openly de-
clared themselves to be the true French fascists. The association had 
been established in 1928. The members were either workers, industrial 
employees, or peasants. They wore light blue shirts, basque berets, 
and an insignia representing a Frankish ax decorated by a dented wheel 
20 
and a sword. 
Bucard's Francistes asserted that their political purpose was to 
see that the greatness of France was brought back and that a true peace 
be established. Furthermore, the members pledged themselves to destroy 
Parliament and to replace it by a leader, a legislative corps, and a 
corporate system. The followers of these beliefs were organized into 
"sections" and totalled only 1,500 men of whom three hundred were in 
21 
Paris itself. 
18 Catalan, Manifestation, p. 589. 
19 
Ibid., p. 584. 
20 , , . Freder~x, Revue de Paris, p. 114. 
21 Catalan, Manifestation, p. 584. 
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Coston's Francistes, on the other hand, ·were mainly interested 
in carrying the fight against the communists, the free-masons, and the 
Jews. They believed in reconstituting the state on a totalitarian 
basis without bringing any changes in the original Constitution of 
1875. Their membership was insignificant. This small number of dis-
sidents from Bucard 1s group wore a blue shirt different from their 
namesake, and their insignia had a Frankish ax but no wheel. Both 
Francistes camps failed to move into action on February Six and soon 
were disbanded. 22 
Front Universitaire.-- The Front Universitaire was a rather dis-
jointed association made up when needed from college students. Its 
organization was of a haphazard nature. Before February Six this 
association was an inconsequential one, but on that day it suddenly 
23 
mushroomed over the Paris streets. Why so many young men, especially 
college students, joined~~ the activities of the political leagues is a 
pertin.ent question at this point. A partial answer was provided by 
the philosopher, Julien Benda, when he wrote: 
The essential prudence of democracy, its lack of reck-
less daring, the prominence which it accords to maturer minds 
to the 11 greybeards, 11 have never had much appeal to the youth-
ful imagination, and less than ever since the war. The young 
people admire only action and feel little respect for a 
settled life of thought. They thus constitute a ready-made 
audience for fascist doctrine. It would be sheer folly to 
ignore that fact.24 
22
catalan, Manifestation, p. 584; also Fr~d{rix, Revue de Paris, 
p. 115. 
23 Catalan, Manifestation, pp. 585-586. 
24 Benda, Foreign Affairs, XIII, p. 289. 
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Croix de Feu,-- The Croix de Feu has been the most discussed of 
all the political leagues which made their appearance in France after 
World War I. Although it had been incorporated as early as 1927, the 
Croix de Feu still boasted of only 18,000 members in Paris and 50,000 
adherents in the French provinces by February, 1934. At first, the 
Croix de Feu was a sincere veteran organization working for veteran 
benefits. M. Maurice d 1Hartoy, the founder of the Croix de Feu, had 
attracted the disabled veteran to his organization because the Croix's 
charter concentrated mainly on the following objectives: (1) better 
veterans' hospitals, (2) free legal advice for the"veteran woubded in 
action, and (3) increased government compensation. By 1930, however, 
Colonel de La Rocque seized the Croix's power and turned the organiza-
tion into a political league. Officially the Croix could now be called 
the Croix de Feu et Briscards, but for our purpose, we will also use 
. 25 
the shorter version to refer to the overall association. 
The Croix de Feu et Briscards' military composition was developed 
to a very large extent around the disponibles. The latter made up the 
members of the large units called dispos. The "disponibles'' were the 
shook troops and totalled 1,500 units. They were to be on the constant 
alert in case they were needed for "combat. 11 One dispos unit contained 
numerous "divisions 11 --the "disponibles" in Paris, for instance, were 
broken down into three "divisions." The disponibles or young men within 
25MM. Dormann et Salette, La ~articipation des associations com-
battants ~ la manifestation du 6 fevrier 1934, Chambre des diputes, 
Annexe 3387, Documents Parlementaires (Paris, May 17, 1934), p. 660. 
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a '&ivision" were further subdivided into "groups." Each 11group 11 was 
further broken into three "hands.'' Each "hand'' was composed in such 
a way as to see that the five members could easily and quickly be 
moved into action in case of mobilization. One person within each 
''hand" was charged with transporting the others in his automobile when 
the call to action came. The disponibles were the spearheading troops 
26 
used by the Croix de Feu in time of need. 
The second most important groups within the Croix de Feu, after 
the dispos, were the Fils de la Oroix de Feu. The Fils did not actu-
ally become a reality until Colonel Francois de La Rocque gave the 
.t . 
matter his personal attention in October, 1933. This large subdivision 
of the Croix de Feu was formed to unite all the sons and daughters of 
the veterans within the Croix, so as not only to inculcate in them the 
memories of their fathers, but also to teach them honor, respect for 
the state, and discipline. These Fils de la Croix Feu were assigned 
to one of three categories once they.joined the group: (1) Pupilles--
eight to twelve years old; (2) Cadets--tw.elve to fifteen years old; and 
(3) all those over fifteen. The young men from fifteen to eighteen were 
assigned the various positions found in a communication corps in the 
army and were responsible for keeping all the mobile elements in con-
tact during a demonstration, a riot, or a public protest supported by 
27 
the Croix de Feu. 
26 Dormann et Salette, Participation des associations, pp. 584-585. 
27
rbid., pp. 660-661. 
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Next in importance within the military cadre of the Croix de Feu 
et Briscards was the Regroupement National, which included all people 
sympathetic to the objectives of ,the Croix. This group was also a 
late-comer into the organization and made its first public appearance 
on June 21, 1933 in Wagram Hall. A fourth and last echelon tied to 
the Croix de Feu was the Volontaires Nationaux. This military wing 
had recnuits from all the other three main Croix de Feu units and was 
assigned the task of coordinated action within any of the Croix de 
28 
Feu's groups when a demonstration was in process. 
The leader of the Croix de Feu was Colonel de La Rocque. His 
writings have been used by such men as Alexander Werth, the British 
I 
newspaperman who is an authority on the period, to show that France 
was being undermined by "fascists" in _early 1934. The author must 
admit that he believed this himself several years ago but, after the 
primary materials available were studied, he was forced to change 
this hasty conclusion. 
It is interesting to note that Colonel de La Rocque was born the 
same year as Stavisky, namely, 1886. His family, long resident of 
Auver~. had an aristocratic ancestry. This fact was usually listed 
as a reason why de La Rocque could be considered a fascist. As was 
usual around the turn of the century in France, one of the sons from 
an aristocratic family went into the army--de La Rocque was the rep-
resentative from his family. After attending S t·. Cyr, Colonel de La 
Rocque gave honorable service to his country, and he was stationed in 
28catalan, Manifestation, p. 585. 
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the Saharan and Moroccan zones from 1907 to 1917. In 1916 de La Rocque 
was seriously wounded in desert warfare, and as a result he was hospital-
ized. Recovering from his wounds before the end of World War I, he 
served in France as an infantry captain. The early twenties found him 
serving o~ Ferdinand Foch's general staff, and in 1928 he retired from 
29 
military service. In 1930 he became the President of the Croix de Feu. 
After 1930 Colonel de La Rocque collected his thoughts in a work 
entitled Service Public, which was to serve as a philosophical guide 
for the Croix de Feu. The latter organization, as we have seen, he 
transformed from a purely veteran association to a political league. 
De La Rocque's program as revealed in Service Public had a general 
characteristic found in fascist countries--it had an opportunistic 
tone. He clearly admitted this when he wrote: ''I have therefore put 
programs reso~utely away among my bookshelves, in company with my die-
tionaries and logarithm tables. I have given priority to the plan of 
30 
action. 11 
Another fascist trait, the appeal to a "mystic," was also strongly 
emphasized by de La Rocque when he stated: 
And still we guarded pure our links with all the martyrs 
of the agony of-France; and thus we caused the national mystic 
consciousness to gush once more, rich in vitality, heroism, 
self-sacrifice, and vital as in the days of Joan of Arc, of 
Fontenoy, of Valmy, of Montmirail, and of Verdun.31 
29 Gaston Bergery, "La Rocque, 11 L 'Europe Nouvelle, Vol. 877 
(December 1, 1934), p. 1183. 
30 Colonel de La Rocque., Service Public (Paris, 1934), p. 18. 
31rbid., p. 28. 
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The fascist characteristics of ''blind. obedience to the leader'' 
and "self-discipline to serve the state firstn were also part of de La 
Rocque's philosophy. On this last subject he declared: 
Without.a freely given discipline, no organization can 
amount to anything, no preparations can become worthwhile, 
or no judicious application of efforts will be possible if 
need for resolution, rapid action, and order arise.32 
Colonel de La Rocque was completely vague about what economic and 
social program he would initiate once he became the 11leader. '' His 
11moral discipline" was to add tnany men to his command, but many people 
were agreeing with Maurice Pujo, whom we already met as the editor of 
. n'Action Francaise, when he argued: 
What would take place on J day, how these sterile vows 
would become practical, and by what means these words uttered 
by honest men: "Fatherland, Work, Family, and National Recon-
ciliation,11 would cease to be words and become realities, that 
was the secret the leader would not explain. 
He says, '-Monsieur, I am not a royalist, I am not a Bona-
partist--but I am not a socialist--but neither am I for the 
capitalist--! am neither on the Right or on the Left. 
On the contrary, as M. de La Rocque multiplies his nr am 
nots," when he renounces one after another all the forms, all 
the solutions known; when.he opposes all attempts at national 
union; when he even refuses all opportunistic action--this 
method of acting only digs a bottomless pit of successive 
negations.33 
In retrospect it can be seen that Lieutenant~Colonel de La Rocque 
had many contradictions in his 11plan of action." If his ideas suggested 
certain fascist techniques, these were nev.er applied to France on any 
large scale. La Rocque's friends felt that the accusations of 11 fascism11 
32
ne La Rocque, Service, pp. 18-45; 
33Maurice Pujo, Comment La Rocque a trahi (Paris, 1937), pp. 12-14. 
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levelled against him and the Croix de Feu were unjust. One such friend 
presented the case forcefully by remarking: 
For nothing is more improperly used than this word of 
11 fascism11 as it is presently employed within France. Nothing 
is further from the truth than the dictatorial mask we assign 
to Colonel de La Rocque. 
La Rocque's actions have never restrained the individual's 
. " liberty, nor imposed on the country a regime by force. He 
wants exactly the opposite; that is, .to bring each one of us 
to be aware of the need to be concerned of the public's wel-
fare. He tries not to destroy, but to envigorate the demo-
cratic government.34 
In our period, the evidence available is rather thin that would 
objectively classify the Croix de Feu as a strictly fascist movement. 
Intellectually the documents could be used to show that fascism existed, 
but men such as Jacques de Lacretelle of the Academie Francaise have 
taken the same materials to build up a convincing case exactly the op-
posite. The conservative view would appear to be the acceptance of 
the Croix de Feu as one more organization that was antiparliamentary 
in the early days of 1934. A travesty on historical justice would 
appear to take place if we assigned to the Croix de Feu the role of a 
fascist organization of the same caliber as found in that period in 
Germany and Italy. If it carries any weight at all, it is only fair 
to record that de La Rocque himself always refuted this fascist charge 
35 
and said the Croix de Feu and its President were 11 deeply republicans •11 
34Jacques de Lacretelle, Qui est La Rocque? (Paris, 1936), pp. 3-4. 
35Marianne, March 1, 1934. 
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Veterans and Taxpayers 
Other veteran organizations acting as political leagues.-- Besides 
the Croix de Feu, which still was partially a veteran association in 
1934, there were other usually nonpolitical veterans who took an active 
role in the events of January and February, 1934. It was obvious that 
they acted as political leagues during the time period within the scope 
of this study. Therefore, they deserve to be developed in extenso at 
this point. Certain veteran organizations such as the Union des Com-
battants Gorses, the Association des Membres de la Legion d'Honneur, 
Decores au Peril de Leur Vie, and the Officiers de Reserve de L'Air 
limited their activities to publishing manifestoes and are easily dis-
36 
missed. 
Another group called the Association Nationale des Officiers 
(A.N.O.) founded in 1930 by Lieutenant-Colonel Ferrandi, a Paris Muni-
cipal Councilor, was normally nonpolitical. The long list of its ob-
jectives included the reunion between combat officers, the establish-
ment of unity and friendship among the latter, and the desire to pre-
sent a strong group which could get the government to listen to its 
demands. As the organization included only a thousand members, the 
A.N.O. leaders allowed their followers to join the political league 
f h . h . b . 37 o t e~r c o~ce on Fe ruary s~x. 
An extremely important veteran group was the U.N.C.; founded in 
1917 under the name of L'Union Nationale des Combattants. October 15, 
36normann et Salette, Participations de:: associations 1 pp. 640-646. 
37catalan, Manifestation, p. 585. 
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1933, was a decisive date for the U .N .c·., for on that day it met in 
Wagram Hall and declared itself to be a political league. Before a 
considerable gathering of delegates from all over France, the conven-
tion placed its weight behind an action program for national reforms 
in the areas of economics, finance, fiscal affairs, and politics. This 
manifesto was later circulated throughout France and adopted by the in-
dividual sections. Some 72,000 members in Paris approved this step made 
by the U.N.C., while the 900,000 others over France also gave their as-
sent. As we shall see, this unity of actionwas to give the U.N.C. a 
very weighty role in the February Six events. 38 
M. Georges Lebecq, the U.N.C. President in 1934 and also a Paris 
Municipal Councilor, testified before the February Six Inquiry Commis-
sion that the U.N.C. was motivated by a deep desire to bring the stag-
nant and almost decadent government structure to a better condition 
by removing its main faults. He further added that the association 
had become disgusted with existing political conditions and desired 
not only a "political housecleaning" and removal of political corrup-
tion, but also was working actively for a "national renovation." By 
·the end of 1933, Lebecq declared, the U.N.C. was ready to support any-
one or any group that could offer constructive changes within the 
framework of the democratic institutions of the Third Republic. In 
this fight the U.N.C. took its motto, "United AS At The Front," to be 
a challenge to its followers to support such efforts as the leaders 
38oormann et Salette, Participation des associations, pp. 643-660. 
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of the group would decide as accomplishing the goals developed above. 39 
Another veteran association, the Association R~publicaine des 
Anciens Combattants (A.R.A.C.) was not so democratic in approach as the 
U.N.C. The A.R.A.C. from its very beginning in November, 1917 de-
nounced capitalism, supported antimilitaristic propaganda, and de-
manded that all veterans adopt the aspirations of the working and 
peasant classes as their main objective. As a political league this 
group was dominated by a communist leadership. The President was 
Henri Barbusse, the Director of the weekly revue, Le MOnde. Barbusse 
claimed 20,000 adherents all over France--some 5,000 of these in 
Paris. Jacques Duclos, the Vice-President of the A.R.A.C., was also 
the Secretary of the French Communist Party. As we will see later, 
h A 1 . d b' . . h . 40 t e A.R •. c. was ater act~vate to :t~ng support.to t e Commun~sts. 
Taxpayers Association.-- It would be folly indeed if in this 
chapter on political leagues we neglected to mention the F~dlration 
des Contribuables (Taxpayers Association). Although organized late 
in 1928, by 1934 it had some 700,000 members. The Paris number was 
large but never completely known. Its President was M. le Baron 
d'Anthouard de Wasservas, but the power actually was delegated to M. 
Large, the General Delegate. This organization in becoming a politi-
cal league pledged itself to: (1) introduce programs of economics and 
tax abatements, (2) suppress abuses within the existing tax structure, 
and (3) investigate civil servants to see that they carried out their 
39Dormann et Salette, Participation des associations, p. 639. 
40
rbid., pp. 639-669. 
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tasks effectively. 41 
The role M. Large and the Taxpayers Association took in 1933 
during the ''capitalist offensive 11 has been discussed already. On Jan-
uary 29, 1933, M •. Large had begun his attack on the government with 
such aggressive words as: 
We will undertake a converging march towards the 
cave called the Palais-Bourbon if need be; we will take 
whips and clubs to sweep clean that Chamber of handicapped_42 
The discontent which was ravaging France in early 1934 found ex-
pression through the many political leagues that now were directing 
their activities against the existing government. Especially conspic-
uous in these political movements were the war veterans, the taxpayers, 
and the representatives from.the younger generation. Our analysis above 
taught us that the majority of the men in the leagues were predominantly 
interested in reforming French democracy. The minority of these were 
communists, fascists, and royalists. This minority, of course, found 
the existence of French democracy to be repugnant. Whether this min-
ority could assume and keep the leadership of a disgruntled French 
people, few were willing to say in early January, 1934. 
The following appraisal, although made soon after the Great Feb-
ruary Riot, still sums up most appropriately and adequately the politi-
cal leagues as they existed prior to the explosion of .the Stavisky bomb: 
41catalan, Manifestation, pp. 582-586. 
42Marc Rucart, Rapport General fait au nom de la Commission 
d 1Enguete de rechercher les Causes et les Origines des Evenements du 
6 fevrier 1934, Chambre des deputes, Annexe 3383, Debats Parlement-
aires (Paris, May 17, 1934), p. 1356. 
The various movements, manifested in conservative as 
well as radical circles, differed both in organization and 
program. Some were militant and disciplined, others were 
unorganized and largely intellectual in character. Those 
conservative in sympathy emphasized their nationalism, while 
those of radical tendency placed economic and social reform 
in the forefront. Some showed definite fascist leanings; 
others professed abhorrence of fascism as something alien to 
the French spirit. Yet, although divergent in aims, they 
were united in opposition both to parliamentary government 
as it functioned in France and to economic liberalism.43 
43John C. De Wilde, "Political Ferment in France," Foreign 
Policy Reports, X (July 18, 1934), p .. 127. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE JANUARY RIOTS AND THE FALL OF CHAUTEMPS 
(Sitting on the Lid) 
Riots Spearheaded by the Action Francaise 
The royalist press begins the attack on French democracy.--
Realizing the potential forces which would be released if the politi-
cal leagues should move into action, we are now prepared to understand 
how a general mobilization of these forces was carried out. The leagues 
were ready to respond to the commands of the archenemies of the Third 
Republic--the royalists. The time chosen was ripe, for in the social 
atmosphere which oppressed France at the opening of 1934, reaction to 
the Stavisky scandals could be turned to deadly account by plotters of 
evil. The public mood was well understood by the spokesmen 11 for the 
throne, 11 who began to put into words what some Frenchmen momentarily 
believed to be true: namely, that French democracy was synonymous with 
and inseparable from corruption and impotence in their government. By 
keeping the country both mentally and physically agitated, the Action 
Frang,aise brought·the crisis of French democracy sensibly nearer to 
its climax. 
Under the headline "Democratic Filth11 the royalist press began 
its devastating attacks on the Third Republic. As these picked up mo-
mentum, they attracted the attention not only of the monarchists but 
of all France as well. The newspaper 1 s circulation s~yrocketed to an 
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unprecedented height. The immediate cause of such a development was 
the relentless attack made on the ministry, .which had been headed by 
Premier Camille Chautemps since November 26, 1933. The exposure of 
the highly charged Stavisky Affair was built up into a series of char-
acter defamations that not only embarrassed chautemps politically, but 
1 
subjected his family to moral judgment by all of France. 
The Dalimier Letters.-- On the very first day of the campaign, 
Leon Daudet declared Camille Chautemps and his brother-in-law, M. Pres-
sard the Procurator of the Republic, guilty of being Stavisky's lead-
ing partners in crime. Chautemps became more clearly involved on Jan-
uary 3 when the royalist press published one of its most important 
scoops, the Dalimier Letters. The Dalimier Letters dated from June, 
1932, when M. Albert Dalimier, Minister of Public Works, corresponded 
with Joseph Garat, Mayor of Bayonne, about the recommending of the 
Bayonne Bonds to the French financial world. At that time, moreover, 
Garat made a similar request to M. Julien Durand, the Minister of 
Commerce. Garat reminded both men that the private insurance companies 
had not placed their investments in Municipal Pawnshop debentures 
lately, and that the two ministries involved here had a legal duty to 
the communities of France to advise such a move to them. Garat further 
added that purchases of the Bayonne Bonds by the Social Insurance Fund 
would also be welcomed. Durand declared himself in complete agreement 
with Garat and decided to give his immediate attention to the matter. 
1Action Fran,raise, January 2, 1934; also Alexander Werth, France 
in Ferment (London, 1935), p. 90. 
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The Minister of Commerce dispatched a forceful letter to Dalimier ask-
ing the latter to start the wheels moving. Furthermore, Dalimier was 
graciously warned that this purchasing of Bayonne Bonds could wait no 
longer and had been brought to the 11attention of numerous parliament-
arians. '' Within a week the whole Public Works hierarchy was shaking 
dd .. b . f 2 an o1ng 1ts est to sat1s y Mayor Garat. 
Dalimier, in recommending the Bayonne Bonds to the insurance com-
panies, assumed a tone which gave the impression to his correspondents 
that the purchases were required and would be considered a personal 
favor to him. The private insurance companies could not afford to 
pass up such a request, for after all it was elementary t.o all those 
involved that they needed the Minister of Public Works on their side 
if they were to continue in business. The companies' representatives, 
therefore, went out of their way to accommodate Minister Dalimier, who 
asked them this favor in the name of the "general welfare of France." 
The usual caution used by the insurance companies was neglected to 
their detriment for, as we have seen, most of the .Bayonne Bonds were 
false. The bogus debentures through Dalimier's letters had thus found 
3 
avid buyers • 
The exposure of these Dalimier Letters was the forerunner of a 
series of revelations which kept Frenchmen gasping from day to day. 
The reader can begin to understand the emotional effects of these even 
2 ,/ Alfred Detrez, Dossier d'histoire: l'affaire Stavisky (Paris, 
1935), p. 214. . 
3rbid., pp. 215-221. 
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when a brief synopsis of them is offered. On January 6 the Bayonne 
Scandal was linked to the international Optants Hongrois scheme. On 
January 7 Joseph Garat, then deputy from Bayonne, as well as Mayor, 
was arrested for being Stavisky's accomplice. On January 8 M. Dalimier, 
then Minister of Colonies in Chautemps 1 government, resigned in dis-
grace; and on the same day, the news of Stavisky's "suicide11 began to 
4 divide France into two camps. 
On January 9 the Chamber of Deputies met, elected M. Fernand Bouis-
son its President, and undertook the discussion of the interpellations 
on the Stavisky Affair. The press daily kept connecting more and more 
parliamentarians and Chautemps 1 friends to Stavisky. On January 10 
the public was informed of Stavisky's nineteen judicial postponements 
and how "delayed justice11 was possible if you could afford deputy-
lawyers. Among the latter Deputy-lawyer Gaston Bonnaure, who "might 
have revealed Stavisky's hiding place to the police,tr came up for un-
complimentary remarks. The climax of these disclosures was reached 
on January 11 when riots swept Paris. Such a presentation of so many 
unsavory events in less than a two-week period led to the demoraliza-
tion of many heretofore "solid citizens." To them every institution 
in democratic France seemed to be involved with Stavisky and had be-
5 
come rotten. 
The rapid rise of the public's anger over the Stavisky Affair was 
4Anon., "Politiques et littlraires," Journal des D~bats, Vol. 2081 
(January 12, 1934), p. 49. 
5Le Temps, January, 1934 series. 
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by then finding vigorous release not only through the press, but also 
through the political leagues. Reserving the last point for a later 
literary treatment, let us linger a little longer on the ·reactions 
registered by the French press after the announcement of the Dalimier 
Letters. The outcry of the press against the democratic forms of France 
became almost general. Only a few newspapers, more or less controlled 
by the Government, such as the Petit Parisien, continued to call for 
moderation. But with much of the press gone wild, the Action Francaise 
naturally had to go one better. On January 7 the Action Franca.:hse gave 
the first call to start the riots·against the Third Republic. The news-
paper flashed a gigantic headline to its readers on that day across its 
6 
front page which read: "A bas les v6leurs !" "Down with the thieves'!'" 
could be interpreted to mean "Down with Democracy!n and so it was by 
many Frenchmen if one is to judge from their resulting action. 
It must be clear by now why the campaign against democracy in 
early January, 1934, was of such vital importance to anyone interested 
in upholding democracy anywhere in the world. Here was a serious threat 
to a key European country in an age when many of her neighbors had "lost 
7 
faith in their democracy. 11 
Maurras and Daudet kept· using 11name-calling, tt "glittering gener-
ali ties," and the 11band-wagon' 1 techniques with amazing dexterity and 
results. The two champions of "monarchism" abandoned all caution in 
their attacks on the Third Republic. Every new day in early January, 
6 -Action Francaise, January 7, 1934. 
7 . Werth, France in Ferment, pp. 90-91. 
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1934, found them devoting more and more space to the Stavisky Scandals, 
revealing myriads of names and connecting them unmercifully in one way 
or another to Stavisky. Many innocent men found themselves crucified 
before they bad a chance to give one word in their defense. The epi-
thets began on January 4 when Camille Chautemps was addressed as the 
''courteous devil" and "a gang leader of robbers and assassins. 11 In 
case M, Chautemps wanted to know, Daudet informed him who 11 the boys" 
were: Henri Hayotte, Albert Dubarry, Dalimier, Pressard, and a hundred 
or so of France's 11 democratic 11 senators and deputies. 8 
With the Action Francaise now showing the way, the other French 
newspapers began following the antidemocratic drumbeats of the royalist 
press. On January 9 the Action Francaise printed a headline which bor-
dered on revolutionary action. It read: "Down with the thieves! Down 
with the assassins! Everyone tonight in front of the Chamber! 11 That 
of January 10 was not meant to bring any cailimness to the already aggra-
vated atmosphere, as it declared that "Camille Chautemps, Kingpin of a 
Gang of Thieves and Assassins" would soon be booted out. The rest of 
the "democratic band11 came up for censure on January 11 when Pujo, the 
royalist editor, gave the orders of "Down with the Ministers and Dep-
uties Who Sold Themselves! 11 The "call to arms" was sounded on January 
12 with: "The Paris Revolution against the Thieves! For France's 
Honor Let's Advance! 9 Fight to the End! 11 
8Action Frangaise, January 4, 1934. 
9rbid., January 9-12, 1934. 
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Stavisky's "suicide."~- The most juicy bit of news after the dis-
closure of the Dalimier Letters came when Alexandre Stavisky was re-
ported dead. The official version of "suicide'' published by Havas was 
shown later by the Stavisky Inquiry Commission to be highly incorrect 
in details, but acceptable in substance. Few Frenchmen were convinced 
that Stavisky had shot himself. At the bottom of such skepticism was 
the fact that the populace, in the past few days, had been conditioned 
to doubt anything and everything when it was made public from police 
sources. 
The Action Francaise thought the 11suicide version" was an illusion 
prepared for public consumption by a person trying to prevent his own 
exposure. It further quoted an anonymous friend of Alexandre Stavisky 
as saying that on last December 30 Stavisky had told him: "I am too 
hot--if I do not get away, they will kill me. 11 The royalists were con-
vinced that "they" meant the.police. 10 M. Hennessy's nationalist 
paper, Le Quotidien, also insinuated that the suicide story was a sham 
by declaringt 11Stavisky has received a bullet in the head?--From whom?--
Re had barely stopped breathing, when others began breathing better. 1111 
The same incredulous attitude was reflected in Stephane Lauzanne's venal 
Le Matin and Jean Piot's usually progovernment sheet L'Oeuvre. These 
two last newspapers received the official version without faith but 
would not admit anything else. If one went along with such.disbelief--
10Action Francaise, January 9, 1934. 
w--
11Le Quotidien, January 9, 1934. 
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and most of France did--the obvious conclusion that logically presented 
itself was that ":'tavisky had been murdered by the police. 1112 
M. L~on Bailby's nationalist newspaper, Le Jour, spoke clearly on 
the subject by noting: 
The affair becomes each day a little more repugnant and 
more dirty. 
Stavisky is dying. "Suicide," says the Surete. "Assassi-
nation," answers public opinion--whose instinct rarely fails. 
And furthermore,. the political crime disguised as suicide does 
not have to be edited for us.l3 
One could expect to find the conununists in L 'Humanitl~ presenting 
Stavisky 1 s removal from this world as "murder," but the cautious 
socialists in Le Populaire surprised many by join~ng the bandwagon 
with: 
Did we need to arrest this swindler and place him 
under police custody? If the police had so wished, they 
could have apprehended him at a moment's notice. But they 
were afraid of what he could say--they suspected that he 
would make a ''clean slate' 1 of it, and in doing so would 
reveal too many political and law-enforcement personalities.l4 
In direct results from such newspaper reports, it can be seen how 
easily most Parisians in 1934 were convinced that Stavisky had not 
killed himself. The Parisians furthermore were unusually well-organized 
into political leagues, as we have seen. The communists, nationalists, 
royalists, and veterans could all be called upon if their leaders 
thought the times demanded such a move. On the very day of Stavisky's 
12Le Matin, January 9, 1934. 
13Le Jour, January 9, 1934. 
14Le Populaire, January 9, 1934 •. 
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reported ''suicide, 11 the leaguers did begin to march in cadence on the 
Paris streets, as the initial mobilization of these troops entered the 
''actiiVe. phase 11 in what was to become the "Democratic Crisis of 1934 in 
France. 11 The Third French Republic was in a most serious plight. At 
stake was the very existence of French democracy itself. 
The Enigmatic Chautemps 
Chautemps 1 personality and cabinet.-- It is essential before we 
proceed any further that we give some attention to Chautemps, the pol-
itical leader at the helm of France's democratic machinery in January, 
1934. Camille Chautemps, a Radical-Socialist, had replaced the out-
going Albert Sarraut on November 26, 1933, and his Ministry was the 
fifth since the Election of 1932. 15 
Although Chautemps had hoped to form a wider cabinet than his 
predecessors, he ended with almost the same personnel as his colleagues. 
All he did was reshuffle the former cabinet members into new posts. 
Most of the press expressed disappointment with the narrow representa-
tion of the Cabinet, but French politic~ans placed their hopes in 
d • . 16 Chautemps--they consi ered h~m one of the great statemnenin the Chamber. 
Although his physical appearance presented a man of medium height with 
a little moustache, sparse black hair, and an unimpressive air, his in-
tellectual ability was usually assumed to be very high. His constant 
smile and zealous speeches impressed even his enemies. He was always 
15John C. DeWilde, "Political Ferment in France," Foreign Policy 
Reports, X (July 18, 1934), p. 123. 
16werth, France in Ferment, p. 74. 
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17 polite, considerate of others, and endowed with a charming manner. 
Camtlle Chautemps began his administration by making a favorable 
impression on his countrymen. His December 9 ministerial declaration 
had dealt with the need for a more stable Cabinet "before a strong 
policy could be tried." The new Premier declared that he must restore 
sound public finance before he could tackle anything else. To the sur-
prise of many observers, by the end of December, 1933, Chautemps had 
succeeded where his predecessors had failed. The Chamber of Deputies, 
with all the parties of the Left joining in, did meet what the Premier 
considered his 11urgent financial problem. 11 The finance bill he had 
suggested was passed with a comfortable ~ajority. It provided nearly 
five billion. francs of revenue, as well as the pay cut that had been 
so difficult an issue for two years. Chautemps then went on a much-
d d h . . 18 eserve C r~stmas vacat~on. 
While Chautemps and the deputies went home for the holidays, the 
Stavisky Scandals broke. Chautemps, from the first day that the Sta-
visky Affair became top news, informed the press that it was his firm 
resolution to bring all the light possible on the subject. He added 
that nothing, absolutely nothing, would shake his determination to see 
that justice was rendered. Chautemps, however, did not believe the 
matter needed immediate attention, for he took his family on a vacation 
17Pierre de Pressac, 11Chronique Politique," Revue Politique et 
Parlementaire, 40th Year (January 10, 1934), p. 119; also L'Action 
Francaise; January, 1934 series. 
18 ' Roger Nat:han, "Pe Chautemps a Daladier," L'Europe Nouvelle, 
Vol. 834 (February 3, 1934), p. 110. 
19 
to the Alps. 
When Chautemps returned from a stay in the Alps, the Stavisky 
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Affair had become the probilieme majeur. While he was away, the poisonous 
antidemocratic campaign by the Action Fran~aise had gone into full swing. 
Chautemps' renewed promise in January to do something quickly about the 
Stavisky Scandals resounded flatly in a Paris swept by hate for 11 those 
who ruled." In fact, this hate had reached such a high pitch that it 
was now time for the January Riots to move across the pages of French 
h . 20 ~story. 
The January Riots 
January Riots in Paris.-- January 9, 1934 was the day chosen for 
the first demonstration staged by the political leagues. On that day 
the Chamber of Deputies was holding its first meeting since the begin-
ning of the New Year. In order to vent their discontent publicly and 
vociferously to their deputies, about two thousand rioters converged 
on the Palais-Bourbon from two assembly areas: the Boulevard Saint-
Germain and the Place de la Concorde. From 5:00P.M. to 8:00P.M., a 
clamorous crowd demonstrated in front of the Chamber of Deputies and 
periodically tried to encourage itself by hollering: "Down with the 
Thieves! 
21 
On to the Chamber!" 
19Le Temps, December, 1933 series. 
20 . 
Werth, France in Ferment, pp. 75-76. 
21M. Amat, Les manifestations sur la voie publique en janvier 
1934 et jusqu'au 6 fevrier, Chambre des dlput~s, Annexe 3384, Documents 
Parlementaires (Paris, May 17, 1934), p. 582. 
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The Action Francaise had ordered this first "call to action" and 
naturally the Action Franjaise league, with its Camelots du Roi, made 
up almost 98 per cent of this unruly mass of Frenchmen on the Concorde 
that evening. The police, in an attempt to give the democratic Chamber 
of Deputies all possible protection from some of its constituents, had 
thrown a solid police cordon around the Palais-Bourbon. It was strange 
to see a Government "by the people" thus protecting itself from the 
22 
"wrath of the people." 
Little destruction by the rioters had been planned for this first 
day. Several iron grills were torn from nearby trees and deposited on 
embankments surrounding the area. A few trees were actually uprooted. 
Near the Concorde Bridge some 250 rioters from the Action Francaise 
seized M. Albert Sarraut, former premier and now Minister of Marine, 
as he attempted to cross the Seine. He was pummeled serio~sly and was 
saved from further punishment only by the timely arrival of a police 
rescue squad. The now irritated police began pushing the crowd around, 
arresting 132 who insisted-on being obstinate, and ending up with ten 
of their own officers beaten. The crowd was soon dispersed and headed 
23 for their homes. 
The rioters had doubled their strength for the January 11 riot. 
By then the effect of Stavisky's "suicide" had convinced another polit-
ical league that its members should join the Action Frangaise iron the 
22Amat, Voie publique en janvier, p. 582. 
23 Laurent Bonnevay, Les journ~es sanglantes de f~vrier, 1934 
(Paris, 1935), p. 35. 
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battle field. 11 Thus the royalists found a powerful ally when the 
troops of the Jeunesses Patriotes were ordered onto the streets for 
that day. M. des Isnards gave the matter his personal attention and 
united his forces with those of the Camelots du Roi. Around supper 
time a howling mob of Action Frangaise and Jeunesses Patriotes leaguers, 
therefore, began taking positions near the Chamber. Inside the Chamber 
the activities were just as dynamicaas the events outside, for the in-
24 
terpellations on the Stavisky Scandals were beginning. 
Around 5:30P.M., MM. Pujo and Calzant, leaders of the Action 
Francaise, directed a column of two thousand followers towards the 
~---- . . 
Palais-Bourbon, but were quickly dispersed by the ever-vigilant police. 
By then the two departure points, the Boulevard Saint-Germain and the 
Boulevard Raspail, were emptying their thoroughfares and the marching 
men were taking new positions on the Concorde and its surroundings. 
Until midnight this human mass was to have one dominating cry: "To 
25 
the Chamber!" 
Charge after charge was made by the police during the evening. 
Innumerable pedestrians were clubbed and kicked after being knocked 
down. A howling mob constructed small barricades from wheel barrows, 
pieces of lumber, torn metal pipes, and other d~bris near at hand. 
The mob shouting, "Shame on the Thieves! Murderers!" now pushed on 
to more clashes with the police. M. Marchand, Director of the Paris 
• I 
Municipal Police, arrived on the scene to give his personal leadership 
24Amat, Voie publique en janvier, p. 576. 
25 . , 1 37 Bonnevay, Les ]ournees sang antes, p. . 
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to his men. He was just in time, for around 7:30 P.M. occurred a 
vicious encounter between the two enraged opponents which resulted in 
26 
the energetic use of white sticks and fists. 
Around midnight the rioters had been checked and most of them had 
left the scene. The cost on the side of law enforcement to keep the 
rioters out om~the Chamber added up to twenty-two 'policemen seriously 
wounded. This mob not only had given the police many bruises, but it 
had also been very destructive. Its rage, once released, was taken 
out by the smashing of park benches, the uprooting of trees, the over-
turning of newspaper stalls or kiosks, the mutilating of public build-
ings, and the piling up of small hills of d~bris collected while on 
vandalism raids. A major attempt to invade the inside of the Ministry 
of Public Works had been prevented by a quic~Emoving police; otherwise, 
27 
the property inside would no doubt have been deposited on the street. 
The rioters carried their share of black-and-blue marks and a few 
were severely beaten. The police, as it felt the tension increasing 
during the evening, tended to react with more and more brutal action. 
At one moment the rioters pulled out iron rails from surrounding trees 
and threw them into tramway cable transformers. The police working to 
prevent the deadly short-circuits had no sympathy for the ones who tried 
to hamper this labor. In the evening the crowd grew to four· thousand 
rioters. As this crowd grew bigger and bigger, the police were under 
26 ; L 1Echo de Paris, January 12, 1934. 
27Amat v . bl" . . 576 , o~e pu ~que en Janv~er, p. . 
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great tension. This strain resulted in M. Vertex, a reporter from Le 
Jour, receiving one of the worst beatings on record during this tragic 
. . 28 phase of France's h1story. In all fairness, it should be pointed 
out that this was the worst case that evening. It was highly publi-
cized as an example of police brutality. The greatest French author-
ity on the subject under discussion later described the beating of 
M. Vertex as follows: 
His quality as a journalist was well known .... He received 
first, in back of the head, a heavy blow from a night stick--
then two more on the cranium. Seizing one of the night sticks 
striking at him he collapsed into a sitting position. Then he 
was struck hard on the right orbit with a b.low coming from a 
policeman's heel that knocked the eye out of the socket, drove 
itself into the sinuses, and knocked out all his teeth. A 
final attack took place, and this time he received such a 
violent kick in the groins that the urethral canal splitted and 
gushed blood. Once more on the ground a new blow slashed 
through his ribs and tore into his right kidney.29 
January 12 brought no relief from the constant pressure the forces 
in the streets were now applying against the existing democratic Gov-
ernment. Again on that day the Chamber of Deputies was discussing the 
interpe~latians on Stavisky, and once more those within the hemicycle--
where sat the deputies of France and the Government supporters--were 
the targets of the mob that began gathering outside. ~ Pujo had as-
sembled his Camelots ready to march when rain began to come down in 
torrents. The two thousand men were ordered to leave the Boulevard 
30 Saint-Germain and to take shelter at home. 
28 
Amat, Voie publique en janvier, p. 576. 
29Bonnevay, Les journees sanglantes, pp. 39-40. 
30Am v . bl' . . at, o1e pu 1que en 1anv1er, p. 576. 
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For a week the streets of Paris became relatively calm, but on 
January 19 the Action Francaise was again back on the boulevards. Jan-
uary 20 was a repetition of the previous day's rather limited demon-
stration. Both riots appeared to have been half-heartedly undertaken, 
for the police easily broke them up. These riots had shown foresight 
to be on the police side, for most of the law officers on duty fell 
fast and hard on the assembly points on the Grand Boulevards and the 
thoroughfares of the Richelieu-Drouot area. A total of thirty-two 
arrests were made, and the processions soon were broken up before they 
. 31 
were too well-organ~zed. 
The January 22 riot was the next most serious movement undertaken 
by the leaguers. This riot had certain different elements in it. One 
was that the rioters did not all organize in one mass before going on 
the Concorde, but rather they moved onto their initial objective from 
several points. Basically speaking, two large groups dominated the 
evening demonstration. The first group was formed on the Right Bank 
of the Seine and included some four thousand civil servants who ob-
jectedto salary cuts. A second group organized on the Left Bank of 
the Seine, was directed by the Action Francaise, and moved towards the 
Concorde by taking the Boulevard Saint-Germain. and the Boulevard Raspai1. 32 
From 6:00 P.M. to midnight a howling crowd faced a belt of police-
men protecting the Chamber. The police hit the civil servants first, 
arrested 310, and dispersed most of the rest .. But it was not so easy 
31Amat, Voie publique en }anvier, p. 576. 
32
rbid. 
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with the royalists, who kept using hit-and-run tactics against the 
police. Serious property damage occupied isolated units of rioters, 
while others passed their time away by beating the police. Some twenty 
policemen were seriously beaten, in spite of an additional 261 rioters 
. 33 being arrested later in the even~ng. 
As January 23 came, it was obvious that the peace lovers of Paris 
were not to be satisfied that day either, for yet another riot was 
ordered by the leaguers. The rendezvous was still on the Left Bank 
and,the objective remained the Chamber. The Action Francaise was as-
sisted by followers from the Solidarit~ Francaise and several hundred 
adherents to the F~d~ration des Contribuables (Taxpayers Association). 
The taxpayers and the royalists called out their members for 5:00P.M., 
and once more the march from the Boulevard Saint-Germain to the Con-
corde was successfully undertaken. Throughout the evening the leaguers 
kept sending reinforcements to the Concorde and converging their troops 
towards the Palais-Bourbon. The police, on hand to protect those in 
charge of France's democratic machinery, soon found the crowd turning 
their rage on them. 
rioters arrested; 13 
The police bulletin for that evening read: 
. 34 
police wounded. 
346 
By now most newspapers were free with their views as to what was 
wrong with French democriicy. Some preferred to use this intellectual 
way to do their protesting, but the young people wanted more action. 
In consequence, on January 26 a minor demonstration of Jeunesses Patri-
33 ; Bonnevay, Les journees sanglantes, pp. 40-45. 
34Ibid., pp. 46-47. 
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otes and Solidarit~ Francaise on the Grand Boulevards alerted the po-
lice. Near the Madeleine and the Concorde the young leaguers clashed 
with the law officers, and since they became extremely unruly and in-
1 . i h f h . d 35 su t1ng, twenty-e g t o t em were 1ncarcerate • 
On January 27 Paris witnessed the most serious street riot that 
month. It was the ninth of the series that made its appearance since 
the New Year in the capital. As it was Saturday, a tremendous crowd 
invaded the streets to satisf¥ their curiosity and watch the rioters 
at work. The mob this time was dominated by the adherents of the~:il\.ction 
Franiaise, the Jeunesses Patriotes, and the Solidarite Francaise. The 
leaguers formed a compact group of over two thousand members who pa-
raded up and down the Grand Boulevards, around the Madeleine, and along 
the Rue Royale. 
their objectives: 
Then around 6:00 P.M. the rioters began moving towards 
. 36 
the Chamber and the Ministry of the Inter1or .. 
Around 8:00 P.M. the_leaguers arm in arm marched towards the 
Madeleine shouting: 11Down with Chautemps! 11 and "Hang the Deputies! 11 
In all of January the police had never seen the leaguers as furious as 
they were that evening. The barricades set up by the police to stop 
these two thousand enraged men were smashed to bits. The procession 
soon was moving onto the Rue Royale and heading for the Chamber. The 
usual police cordon around the Palais-Bourbon assumed an air of tense-
ness. The grim police met.the leaguers' frontal attack as they reached 
35 Amat, Voie publique en janvier, pp. 576-577. 
36Ibid. 
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the highest point of the Rue Saint-Honore. For the time being the 
police took the challenge successfully and 37 pushed the rioters back. 
The gardiens de la paix, in compact groups, and the Mobile Guards 
were given a helping hand every now and then by small units of Repub-
lican Guards on horseback. They seemed to be occupying a conquered 
city. Although attempts had been made during the day to remove any 
potentially dangerous weapons from the area, the rioters fashioned 
makeshift clubs and tested them on the police. Other rioters became 
regular vandals and went on a rampage destroying caf/ furnishings, 
burning kiosks, breaking open gas pipes, forcing entrance into nearby 
homes and buildings, and lighting many fires. The firemen were quickly 
on the job; they were kept busy all night; and they fought off not 
38 
only the incendiaries but the rioters as well. 
The rioters formed a second column and attempted one more march 
towards the Chamber. Once more the police proved incapable of closing 
the Rue Royale to them. As they had previously done, the police moved 
to the Saint-Honorl heights, took their positions, and waited for the 
clash that came several moments later. Just as the assailants were 
gaining ground, to the surprise of the gardiens de la paix, the leaguers 
broke up the column. The excuse later given by the latter was that the 
Camelots du Rei had to leave to take their supper. 39 
37Bonnevay, Les journles sanglantes, pp. 49-50. 
38Anon., ''Malaise parlementaire et crise ministerielle, 11 L 'Illus-
tration, Vol. 4744 (February 3, 1934), p. 124. 
39 L · ~ 1 t 50 51 Bonnevay, es JOUrnees sang an es, pp. - . 
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Around 11:00 P.M. the human mass reunited, but after forming yet 
another column, instead of heading for the Chamber, the leaguers went 
about destroying and burning more public and private property. Many 
outstanding caf~ terraces, of which Paris was so proud, were left in 
shambles. Most puzzling was the conduct of the police, who just stared 
at the vandals and did little to stop them. By midnight the littered 
streets radiating around the Concorde were empty. A general survey 
later showed some 317 rioters had been arrested, eighty-three law of-
ficers had been severely beaten, numerous leaguers had been treated 
for cuts and bruises, and the total valuation of the destruction com-
40 
mitted added up to the worst riot of January. 
We should linger a bit longer to draw out certain noticeable and 
common characteristics inherent in these January Riots. One asks first 
whether any one group was responsible for starting this chaotic chain 
reaction. All evidence indicated that the Action Franjaise was mainljr 
responsible for·leading this "chantage dans larue." The royalists 
not only participated with great vigor in all the January Riots but, 
profiting from the Stavisky Affair, they seem to have worked for the 
downfall of French democratic life.41 
The convocations were usually in the morning and gave direction 
for the evening's demonstration. Even the journaux d'information pub-
lished these calls to assemble. The key members within each league 
that had received orders to march were given more specific assignments 
40Amat, Voie publique en janvier, pp. 576-577. 
41Maurice Paz, Le six f~Yrier (Paris, 1936), p. 5. 
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over the telephone. Few placards or tracts were used in January as 
guideposts. Furthermore, the question of league cooperation before-
hand was a serious one, for it would indicate a plot was being hatched 
against the Third Republic. All documents available at present point 
to only several minor contacts ever being made between the leagues 
. 42 
during January. No plots against the state can be uncovered. 
Another outstanding characteristic of these January Riots was 
their appeal to pent-up emotion. They always started with howls and 
shouts against the Government, the Stavisky Affair, and the democratic 
leaders and institutions. Unusual shouts, songs, whistles, and other 
rituals pierced the air next. As the emotional tempo increased, so 
did the destruction against private and public property. A new taetic 
seemed apparent in this January crowd also; that was, the rioters 
would test the police by breaking up when first coming face-to-face 
with them. Almost immediately they would reunite and begin movements 
that kept the police tense and up-on-their-toes. This would end by 
clashes with the police, as well as vandalism excursions to nearby 
43 points by some of the wilder leaguers. 
The continuous police cordon used around the Palais-Bourbon 
throughout January was reinforced by the placing of trucks, equipment, 
and other types of vehicles at strategic points. The gardiens de la 
paix were armed with their usual white night sticks, while the Repub-
lican guards carried pistols and sabers. ·The MObile Guards were used 
42Amat, Voie publigue en janvier, pp. 577-579. 
~ , Bonnevay, Les journees sanglantes, pp. 52-53. 
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sparingly. As the rioters had pin-pointed the ministry buildings and 
the Chamber of Deputies as objectives, the police in their orders were 
told: "At no moment should anyone go near the Chamber or the Ministry 
of the Interior." And it is to the credit of the police that these 
44 two points were never seriously threatened throughout January. 
But the police do not deserve too many laurels for the way they 
behaved. Often when the rioters were pillaging the areas the police 
just stood there and stared at them--and did nothing. They kept al-
ways on the defensive and thus gave the impression to the political 
leaguers that a greater force in the street could be led successfully. 
M. Chiappe, Prefect of Police, desired as few arrested as possible and, 
even with those apprehended, he was much "softer with these Rightists" 
than he ever had been with communists who had done much less. The 
courts themselves never gave more than fifteen-day sentences--and then 
suspended them. A lack of efficiency and firmness by those in charge 
of law enforcement at this time makes their complete paralysis on the 
45 
momentous Sixth of February more understandable in retrospect. 
Although the police should be praised for not firing on the crowd, 
M. Bonnevay concluded his treatment of the January Riots by condemning 
the police as follows: 
This "goodwill towards the rioters of the Boulevard 
Saint-Germain," this "nonchalance during the repressions," 
those "orders given to the gardiens de la paix not to employ 
force" ended by bringing protests from the gardiens de la paix. 
44Amat, Voie publique en janvier, pp. 580-581. 
45Bonnevay, Les journees sanglantes, pp. 56-57. 
It is equitable to recognize the softness of law-
enforcement> which was surpassed only by the excessive 
indulgence of the Paris magistrature, showed itself to be 
of an impossible weakness. The punishment given for the 
wrecking and public destruction cases, of those involving 
assaults, was assured continuance by the insignificant 
condemnations made. 
Thus during this period, the successive mistakes made 
by all the authorities, their lack of firmness with those 
administratively responsible or those who committed mis-
demeanors, increased the audacity of the disturbers of the 
.peace, who concluded that by coordination and cooperation 
their efforts would make them master not only of the streets 
but of the Government as well.46 
Fall of Chautemps 
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The interpellations on Stavisky.:...- On January 11 President Fernand 
Bouisson of the Chamber opened the new sitting of the Chamber with the 
announcement that he was swamped by demands for interpellations on the 
StaviskyAffair. As Camille Chautemps confronted the chamber that day, 
he knew that with the riots existing outside the Palais-Bourbon, with 
the police protecting France's lawmakers, with the deputies demanding 
reasons, explanations, and action, he had a difficult task ahead. Par-
liamentary government was completely impossible until something was 
done to overcome the Stavisky hurdle. It was comforting to some to 
see the smiling Chautemps mount the tribune. The Premier said he 
wanted to get through the long list of interpellations on the Stavisky 
Affair as soon as possible; and he added that he hoped that the debate 
would be sensible, calm, and constructive. M. Bouisson then called on 
46Bonnevay, Les journles sanglantes, pp. 56-57. 
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M L f h d 1 f h . . 11 . 47 . agrange or t e eve opment o ~s ~nterpe at~on. 
M. Lagrange, a member of the Socialist Party which had been coop-
erating with Chautemps since November last, gave one of the best sum-
maries on the known facts on Stavisky up to that date. He was as ob-
jective as a deputy could be in January, 1934. Without giving a detailed 
analysis--it might be useful for the reader to compare it with what has 
been said in Chapters III and IV of this work--it will be enlightening 
and will act as a review of the main points in Sti.avisky's career if we 
give a synopsis of his speech. Such a condensation would reveal that 
the following points were known then! (1) Stavisky had been watched 
by the police for a long period of time; (2) in 1915 Stavisky had been 
condemned to six months in prison; (3) in 1926 the Labb~ Case had broken 
out and soon thereafter "Serge Alexandrert was arrested at Marly-le-Roi; 
(4) in 1927 the cagey Stavisky was placed under "provisional liberty; 11 
" (5) in 1928 the crook had formed the Etablissements Alex; (6) in 1933 
Stavisky had attempted unsuccessfully to organize the Caisse Autonome; 
and (7) Lagrange explained how Stavisky reimbursed the Orl:ans Bonds 
with money from Bayonne. These were actually amazing revelations for 
the time, and again M. Lagrange's objectivity deserves high praise.48 
Deputy Lagrange further saw two personalities in Stavisky: the 
playboy who was a casino habitue; and the financial swindler who was 
47
chambre des deputes, Journal Officiel du 12 janvier 1934, 15 · 
ieme Legislature, D~bats Parlementaires (Paris, 1934), p. 20. The 
_Journal Officiel to be abbreviated to J.O.C. from here on when refer-
ence is in a short form. 
48J.'o.c. du 12 janvier, D~bats, pp. 21-25. 
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a serious figure at the Bourse. The Socialist continued that the 
"schizophrenic" Stavisky had brought certain questions to mind. La-
grange said that above all he desired to know the answers to the fol-
lowing queries: (1) What had happened to the Pachot reports? (2) Why 
was "Alexandre11 freed after 1927? (3) Did Stavisky commit nsuiciden? 
(4) Why had the Municipal Pawnshops' inspectors been unable to discover 
fraud was going on in Bayonne? Lagrange's words made a thundering im-
pression not only on the Chamber but throughout France. Frenchmen were 
49 demanding answers. Did Chautemps have them? 
M. Chautemps did not desire the floor yet and allowed the other 
Socialist, M, Monnet, to disclose the details of his interpellation. 
Monnet said much less than Lagrange had brought out. The venal press 
and the police came up for some tongue-lashing, and an emotional tinge 
from then on could be detected throughout his harangue. He ended by 
giving an ultimatum to the Government: Either you do something about 
the Stavisky Scandals or do not depend on Socialist cooperation any-
50 
more! 
, 
The Rightist, M. Rene Dommange, wanted nLes Noms 11 -;.. 11The Names." 
He said a large number of high-placed people had given Stavisky a smooth 
path,through government offices. Who were they? Premier Chautemps de-
cided that was enough for one day and interrupted Dommange at this point. 
Chautemps stated he would tell all he knew of Stavisky. The Premier 
reported how Stavisky after 1926 had foiled the authorities by the 
49 ~ J.O.C. du 12 janvier, Debats, pp. 25-30. 
50
rbid., pp. 31-34. 
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medical-legal excuses he kept producing. Chautemps apologetically 
said the police and the judiciary were greatly hampered in carrying 
out their duties when the shysters were doing everything possible to 
assure the nineteen postponements. The eighteen-page Cousin Report 
was brought as as illustration that administrative laxity had existed. 
The Premier then completed his summary by promising reforms in three 
areas: the judiciary, the police, and the press. The first day's de-
b . k 51 ate on Stav1s y was over. · 
On January 12, at 9~30 A.M., the debate on the Stavisky Affair 
reopened. The President of the Chamber informed his colleagues that 
there were still twelve interpellations on Stavisky to be heard. M. Al-
fred Lacourt had the floor next, and he felt that Chautemps had offered 
adequate reforms. The first completely subjective speech then was given 
by M. Arthur Ramette, a communist. Ramette blamed the bourgeoisie for 
Stavisky and, after listing wild and unfounded accusations, this deputy. 
ended with a "call for the Communist Revolution." M. Michel Walter and 
M. Marcel Deat, who followed, said they were both satisfied with Chau-
temps' proposals. At this point it must be seen that the tide seemed 
. 52 
to be turning in the Premier's favor. 
, 
M. Ybarnegaray was the next deputy in line on the interpellation 
list. The Basque deputy was conciliatory and took some time to review 
the Stavisky Affair. Then he threw a bomb when he demanded an investi-
51J.O.C. du 12 janvier, D~bats, pp. 34~42. 
52 . I I Chambre des deputes, Journal Officiel du 13 janvier 1934, 
15 i~me Legislature, D~bats Parlementaires (Paris, 1934), pp. 43-78. 
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gating commission of forty-four members to look into the whole matter. 
A heated debate followed this request and soon the Chamber looked like 
an arena filled with enraged men. Chautemps then announced that he 
opposed such a motion, and furthermore he affixed the question of con-
fidence to it. The resulting vote gave the following: 376 votes 
against, and 229 for, having an investigating commission; 376 votes 
out of 589 deputies supported the Government. Chautemps had won for 
53 
the time being, but he had made important enemies while so doing. 
During these two moving days of debate within the Chamber, the 
press and the public galleries were bulging with guests. Many, who 
were curious to see if any political butchering were going on inside, 
took the standing room only outside and waited impatiently for a space 
inside the Chamber. The lobbies were filled with more people who also 
wanted to be "near the show. 11 Many of these elements were disappointed 
54 that Chautemps was not defeated. 
Chautemps' mistakes and his fall.-- While most of France became 
saturated with the Chamber's emotional attitude when the subject of 
Stavisky was being discussed, Premier Chautemps committed two major 
sins in the public's eye. The first one concerned the manner of M. 
_Dalimier's resignation from the Cabinet. The Minister of Colonies who 
was responsible for the unforgiveable letters to the private insurance 
companies was patted on the back by Chautemps as he left. Chautemps, 
furthermore, gave Dalimier a "good character reference" in accepting 
53 ~ J.o.c. du 13 janvier, Debats, pp. 82-112. 
54
werth, France in Ferment, pp. 101-102. 
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his former colleague's resignation. The public reacted vigorously 
against Chautemps for this and believed he was definitely "coddling 
55 
the crooks." 
The press' response to Chautemps' refusal to go along with M. 
Ybarn~garay's proposal was also unfavorable to the Premier. This only 
goaded the editors to more attacks on the blundering Chautemps. The 
Premier would not give ground on this subject of forming a parliamen-
tary commission, for the Stavisky Scandals, and ended up by doing him-
self much damage. Surely, his sympathetic critics commented, he must 
have seen that his refusal to give in on this point cast serious doubts 
in many people's minds as to whether the Premier was impeding the 
56 
course of justice. 
It was also maddening for many to see such a seasoned politician 
as Chautemps treating the matter so lightly. He set up a counterproposal 
to the parliamentary inquiry by alerting some of the key investigators 
in the administration to study and report, as soon as possible, on the 
Stavisky Affair. What the Premier failed to realize was that the ad-
ministrative machinery was itself under suspicion by the public. The 
press was convinced that this method of probing into the Affair was 
e~actly what the Cartel desired. Secretly, the argument went, the 
choking process will be carried out. A few civil servants, a few mag-
istrates, and a few fools would be brought forward to be disciplined. 
But at the bottom of the Affair the light would be kept as dim as the 
55werth, France in Ferment, pp. 101-102. 
56Ibid., pp. 104-107. 
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politicians dared to keep it .. With this general theory accepted as 
the truth by many, it can be seen how Chautemps' behavior on this ques-
57 
tion was misinterpreted. 
As the month and the Chamber sitting wore on, the deputies began 
reading the writing on the wall, and many decided to play the safest 
course and bring the Government down. As January 20 approached, this 
change in attitude by the deputies became more and more noticeable. 
With the riots outside and the Stavisky Affair inside the Chamber, the 
Palais-Bourbon soon became a madhouse. The Right accused the Left, 
the Left howled back at the Right, and the Communists called both a 
"bunch of dirty bourgeois capitalists." When this mudslinging had run 
its course, the Chamber assumed a dangerous mood as far as the Chau-
temps' Cabinet was concerned. An insidious campaign against the mem-
bers of the Government now began. This campaign brought out one dom-
inating belief: Chautemps was hushing up the Affair. 58 
On January 23M. Philippe Renriot of theRight began a devastating 
campaign against the Chautemps Cabinet. M. de Monzie, Minister of Ed-
ucation, and M. Paul-Boncour, Foreign Minister, defended themselves 
successfully after being attacked by the deputy. Then Philippe Ren-
riot, young demagogue from the Gironde, selected M. Raynaldy, Minister 
of Justice,. as his quarry. Renriot's attack and language on Raynaldy 
57Anon., "L 1Affaire Stavisky devant le parlement," Journal des 
D~bats, Vol. 2082 (January 19, 1934), p. 93. 
58werth, France in Ferment, pp. 105-109. 
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became so strong that the Chamber had to be cleared to stop the fist 
59 fights. 
When the deputies returned to order, the wi,bld Renriot continued. 
In a harsh tone that whistled past his black moustache, Renriot ac-
cused Chautemps of having been General Bardi de Fourtou 1s attorney and 
reminded the Chamber that de Fourtou had been one of Stavisky's most 
trusted accomplices. With this digression against Chautemps, Henriot 
returned to attacking Raynaldy. The emotional deputy said he knew why 
the Minister of Justice could not uncover any more names--Raynaldy was 
a crook himself who was afraid of being exposed. With this introduc-
tion, Henriot then revealed that Raynaldy was a key backer in the 
60 
Sacazan Affair. This SacazanAffair was a reference to a colllitemporary 
Commercial Holding Company which had issued--and had been caught doing 
it--watered stocks. This had nothing to do with Stavisky, but when 
Raynaldy admitted that he had been one of the backers behind this dis-
graced banker Sacazan, the old politicians knew this was the beginning 
of the end for the Chautemps Government. Yet the experts were them-
selves amazed that day to see that this Raynaldy Question ended with 
the Cabinet gathering 367 atlherents on a "vote of confidence. '' 61 
However, public opinion, and not a parliamentary vote, was to 
overthrow Chautemps. On January 27 M. Raynaldy handed in his resigna-
59Anon., "Malaise parlementaire, 11 L 1Illitstration, Vol. 4744 
(February 3, 1934), p. 125. 
60 I I 
· Chambre des deputes, Journal Officiel du 24 janvier 1934, 
15 . ' ' . l D 'b P 1 t i (P . 1934) ~eme Leg~s ature, e ats ar emen a res ar~s, • 
61 . , l 40 Bonnevay, Les JOUrnees sang antes, p. . 
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tion in order to "better defend himself from his accusers." That same 
day, as we have seen, the worst and the ninth of the January Riots oc-
curred. These two events were too much for Chautemps, who immediately 
resigned. This downfall is unusually interesting because, for the first 
time in the Third Republic's history, a cabinet fell after receiving two 
f f 'd 62 votes o con ~ ence. 
Was Chautemps innocent?-- It is a fact that during the last week 
of his stay in office Premier Chautemps had antagortized most of the 
press by proposing an ill-timed newspaper reform. The press naturally 
saw this as an attempt to crush the freedom of the press. The ~remier's 
press reform, which would have removed the slanderous press cases from 
the jurisdiction of the emotional French jurors, was rejected by the 
Chamber in January. But the press became irreconcilable with the Pre-
mier. Even the newspapers who had formerly defended Chautemps, such 
as L'Oeuvre, could not forgive the Premier this attempted press reform 
63 
and condemned him. 
While the press' attacks on Chautemps are to be met with a highly 
critical skepticism, the charges made by the serious Andr~ Tardieu 
against the Premier are not so easily dismissed. Tardieu was convinced 
that Chautemps was the key politician behind Stavisky. Bluntly Chau-
temps said Tardieu was wrong in his accusation, for the Premier denied 
ever hearing the name Stavisky before the fall of 1933. Tardieu replied 
62 Werth, France in Ferment, pp. 113-117. 
63 I Anon., ·"Memorandum, 11 Journal des Debats, Vol. 2084 (February 2, 
1934), p. 169. 
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that this was a lie and that Chautemps was forced by the law of self-
preservation to check any exposures on Stavisky that connected the 
64 
crook to the·Premier. 
First, argued Tardieu, through his friends could we prove that 
Chautemps was a liar. These 11 fttends 11 included such ministers as 
M. Gaston Hulin, Secretary of War in Daladier's First Ministry; "' Gui-
baud-Ribaud, Stavisky's lawyer, who was charged with periodic visits 
to the Ministry of Finance; and M. Dalimier; who was in the Ministry 
of Public Works. All these men knew Stavisky in 1932 and were in close 
contact with Chautemps. Tardieu mentioned that, secondly, Chautemps 
was guilty of bei!lg Stavisky 's "se.l7vant" by reason of the position 
that he held. From June, 1932 to the end of January, 1934, Chautemps 
was Minister of the Interior almost continuously. As Minister of the 
Interior during this critical period, Tardieu felt that it would have 
been almost impossible for Chautemps not to have come in contact with 
Stavisky. The head of the Ministry had constant relationships with the 
I ,. ' Prefecture, the Surete, and the Paris Parquet--and these last three 
offices were very much aware of Stavisky. With such an entourage, con-
eluded Tardieu, Chautemps would have had to be quite inefficient and 
ignorant as an administrator not to have heard of 11 le bel Alexandre.u 
The reader is reminded here that Chautemps' contemporaries had selected 
65 M. Chautemps as one of the outstanding state:SIIBiil among themselves. 
64 ' Andre Tardieu, Sur la pente (Paris, 1935), pp. 118-122. 
65Ibid., pp. 123-145. 
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Furthermore, added Tardieu, some of Chautemps 1 closest advisers 
had been associated with Stavisky. It was logical to believe that 
through conversation the subject of Stavisky would have been broached. 
The list of these 11associates 11 is quite an impressive one and reads as 
follows: (1) M. Tissot, General Director of the Social Insurance Fund--
a parliamentarian who had admitted the Radical-Socialist, Joseph Garat, 
to his office on many occasions; (2) M. Constantin, the Inspector for 
the Bayonne Municipal Credit--he admitted that Mi Louis Proust, Radical-
Socialist, and he had many dealings with Garat and Stavisky; (3) M. Gaston 
Bonnaure, the Paris deputy--he had introduced Stavisky to many Radical-
Socialists; (4) M. Julien Durand, a Radical-Socialist and Minister of 
Commerce under Herriot in 1932--he admitted assiting Stavisky on numer-
ous occasions; (5) M. Puis, a Radical-Socialist occupying a Senate seat--
he assisted Stavisky in setting up the Orleans Pawnshop; (6) M. Odin, 
a Radical-Socialist senator--he had been involved in Stavisky's attempt 
to set up the Caisse Autonome; and (7) MM. Hesse and Renault, two 
Radical-Socialist attorney-deputies--they had constantly defended Sta-
visky in court. All these men had been very intimate with Stavisky 
and were also cherished friends and associates of Camille Chautemps. 
Chautemps said they never mentioned Stavisky to him, while Tardieu 
66 
replied that he could not admit this to be true. 
In case the evidence against Chautemps coming from the study of 
"his friends, 11 his 11associates," and his "position as Minister of the 
66Tardieu, Sur la pente, pp. 120-122; the Radical-Socialist Party 
in 1934 expelled Garat, Bonnaure, Proust, Dalimier, Hesse, and Renault 
from the party. 
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Interior11 was not convincing enough, then Tardieu wrote, we could 
linger on the evidence offered by the study of Chautemps as "an attorney 
and family head. 11 It was difficult to get around the following undeni-
able facts. Pierre Chautemps, his brother, had defended Henri Hayotte, 
Stavisky's right-hand man, on June 5, 1924. In October, 1930, Camille 
Chautemps himself had defended General de Fourtou. On May 21, 1931, 
all those who had defended Stavisky and his g~ag received access to 
the Cousin Report. Finally, when Camille Chautemps began his investi-
gation in J~nuary, 1934 into the Stavisky Affair, he had placed his 
67 
already questionable brother-in-law, Pressard, in charge. 
That so many who knew Stavbkyand aided him were close friends 
with Camille Chautemps is serious enough. That, as Minister of the 
Int;erior, Chautemps should head the police and the "parquets" inves-
tigating Stavisky and he never heard of the man, is more difficult to 
accept. That his own brother and his own cousin, Robert Chautemps--
not to mention his brother-in-law, Pressard--knew Stavisky and never 
mentioned him is very doubtful indeed if we are to accept the objective 
evidence on the matter. M. Guernut, Chairman of the Stavisky Inquiry 
Commission, found Chautemps' testimony confused and contradictory, and 
67Ligue Franc Catholique, Le Sublime Prince du Royal Secret et 
sa famille (Paris, 1934), pp. 8-11. Camille Chautemps was later tried 
for his associations with Petain in 1940. 
68 , Docs. Pari., "Rapp .. Stavisky, 11 Deposition: Chautemps, pp. 516-
532; also Tardieu, Sur la pente, pp. 148-151. 
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As the Chautemps Ministry fell in late January, 1934, many won-
dered why Camille Chautemps still hesitated to order more arrests. 
Madame Stavisky, Gilbert Romagnino, Guiboud-Ribaud, Bardi de Fourtou, 
Gaston Bonnaure, and others known to be involved in the Stavisky Scan-
. 69 dals in early January were still free. When all was taken into con-
sideration on the strange behavior of the confused Chautemps, many 
agreed with the following appraisal: 
And furthermore, the Chautemps Ministry had desired 
to give the appearance of integrity, of impartiality, and 
of honor. It could not afford to do this--the wretcfi--
because it had to arrest men on the Left--for it was the 
Radical-Socialist who had benefited most from Stavisky's 
millions. 70 
Forming the Daladier Government 
Attempts at a broad ministry.-- The sudden resignation of the 
Chautemps Cabinet placed the President of the Republic, M. Albert 
Lebrun, in a delicate position. The Ministry had not actually been 
overthrown, and the Radical-Socialists under Chautemps had a working 
coalition in the Chamber of Deputies. As no major modification of 
the political orientation was needed by the one chosen to replace 
Chautemps, M. Lebrun consulted M. Gaston Doumergue, former President 
of the Radical-Socialist Party as well as President of the Republic, 
to see if he would take up the challenge. Doumergue refused and added 
that his age was against assuming such a difficult task. After several 
69 Andre Germain, Guerre Civile (Paris, 1934), Ch. I. 
70Georges Imann, La journee du 6 fevrier (Paris, 1934), p. 34. 
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I' 
more tries and refusals, M. Edouard Daladier, on January 29, gave his 
definitive answer that he would attempt to form a broad ministry. 71 
Daladier had the reputation of being energetic and of having the 
ability to make quick and correct decisions. His earlier Ministry had 
72 favorably impressed France. One periodical expressed this feeling 
thus: 
M. Daladier, when he was President of the Ministry a 
few months ago was received favorably by-some, impartially 
by others. He has benefited from his action and experience. 
Finally he has stayed mysterious enough, and he has shown 
at different periods sentiments that are generally approved.73 
Daladier devoted MOnday, January 29, to the rituals necessitated 
by one forming a French Cabinet. He spent most of the night and early 
morning of the next day in numerous pourparlers. His wish was to form 
a cabinet of resolute personalities that would be above parties. Da-
ladier was convinced that he needed to break with parliamentary habits 
if the democratic r~gime was to be saved. To accomplish this, ),he needed 
the S.F.I.O. 1 s cooperation and so informed the Socialist M. Frossard. 
Frossard, impressed, but a good party man, consulted his chiefs, MM. Leon 
Blum and Vincent Auriol. These Socialist leaders refused to allow F~os-
sard to join Daladier. From then on, Daladier found his efforts to 
form a ''cabinet above party" impossible, and he went back to the old 
71Anon., 11Malaise, 11 L'Illustration, p. 145. 
72Roger Nathan, "De Chautemps a Daladier," L'Europe Nouvelle, 
Vol. 834 (February 3, 1934), p. 111. 
73Anon., "La crise, 11 Journal des Debats, Vol. 2084 (February 2, 
1934), pp. 172-173. 
74 formula of getting a coalition cabinet. 
194 
By the dawn of Tuesday, January 30, the Cabinet was complete. A 
glance at its composition was a bit disappointing to the older politi-
cians who could identify few of the members--for they were mostly pol-
itical unknowns. Most of the press was hostile to the new "dull 
Radical-Socialist Cabinet.'' Colonel Jean Fabry, the new War Minister, 
was of little value politically, for he had been expelled from his 
party as soon as he accepted a post in the name of the Center. Mod-
erate young men such as Pierre Cot, Jean Mistler, and Guy la Chambre 
were considered wild and completely inexperienced. The press, as well 
as much of France, wanted to know what Daladier expected to do with 
75 
such a Cabinet. 
But a member of the Cabinet, Colonel Fabry, did not agree with 
this pessimistic impression of disappointment. 
To really look at it. aligned by rank, in front of the 
President of the Republic, our troop didn't seem to me to 
be worse in composition than any other--nor better either. 
No major star of first class rank which ever glittered in 
the firmament of previous ministries was there. Besides 
the basic quadrilateral: Foreign Affairs, Finance, War, 
Interior: Daladier, Pietri, Fabry, Frat--there was a multi-
tude of young radicals: Cot, Mistler, Paganon, Guy la 
Chambre--who were burning with a desire to make a name and 
also to replace the venerated pontiffs of the Radicals who 
were at last evicted. We had, it is true, given them-cer-
tain chaperones of quality and age: Lisbonne, Valadier, 
Berthod, Ducos, Bernier, over whom as over all the group, 
Henry de Jouvenel spread the brilliance which the others lacked.76 
74Georges Suarez, La grande peur du 6 fevrier au Palais-Bourbon 
(Paris, 1934), pp. 9-35. 
75Ibid., pp. 39-45; also Werth, France in Ferment, p. 123. 
76 Jean Fabry, De laPlace de la Concorde au Cours de l'Intendance 
(Paris, 1942), p. 38. 
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But French public opinion, though disappointed with the Cabinet, 
was willing to give Daladier a chance. His January 30 remarks stirred 
the hopes of many and brought him many sympathizers, for on that day 
Daladier had forcefully declared: 
I did not preoccupy myself to remedy the groups or 
personal quarrels. I wanted to form a Government of Reform 
and Republican authority. We must end, quickly, this re-
course to brutal force by bringing all the light that public 
opinion demands, by correcting the errors that have troubled 
our country. "VITE ET FORT" (Quick and Vigorous)--such is 
our intention.77 
77M. Catalan, Preparation de la manifestation du 6 flvrier 1934, 
Chambre des deputls, Annexe 3385, Documents Parlementaires (Paris, 
May 17, 1934), p. 593. 
CHAPTER VII 
AFFAIRE CHI.APPE AS A MAJOR CAUSE 
(Lighting the Fuse) 
The Administrative Changes and the Unscrupulous Press 
With the disintegrating political situation being what it was in 
France as the Second Daladier Ministry took office, any Government 
would have to be unusually careful to see that public opinion, espe-
cially in Paris, would not be further antagonized. Furthermore, no 
mistakes would be overlooked by leaguers who already had a taste of 
what pressure by the street could accomplish against a blundering 
Government. Above all, the Third French Republic was badly in need 
of a man who could re-establish the strong faith in democracy that 
had once existed in the country. would Daladier be the one to bolster 
up its spirit? Could he avoid adding any more political blunders to 
the many already associated with the Third Republic? 
Daladier fires Chiappe.-- M. Daladier had promised action "Fort 
et Vite," and this he began to carry out even before presenting his 
Cabinet to the Chamber of Deputies. On February 3 France was shocked 
by a series of administrative changes and dismissals. This was Daladier's 
way of fulfilling his promise of "Fort et Vite." These removals by 
Daladier involved six persons; (1) M. Fabre, the Administrator of the 
Comedie-Frangaise, who was forced into an early retirement; (2) M. Ren-
ard, the Prefect of the Seine, who chose to resign rather than to serve 
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under Daladier; (3) M. Pressard, the Procureur de la R'publique, who 
~ 
was nominated counselor to the Cour de Cassation; (4) M. Thome, the 
Director of the S~rete, who was named the new Director of the Com,die-
Franzaise; 4n9 (5) M. Geay, who replaced M. Thome as Director of the 
S~retl. But all these administrative changes were dwarfed in impor-
tance when they were compared to (6) the discharge of Jean Chiappe as 
1 Prefect of Police. 
Premier Daladier had contemplated needed administrative altera-
tions almost as soon as he had completed the formation of a cabinet. 
His research into what was to become the Affaire Chiappe had led him 
to the study of the Rapport Masse. This important report had been con-
eluded by January 21, 1934 for Premier Chautemps, and divulged the 
' secret activities of the Prefecture while handling the Stavisky Case 
since its inception. As Premier Daladier always insisted that the 
decision to fire Chiappe was the result of perusing through this docu-
ment, it is essential for us to look at the matter a bit closer. 
M. Armand Moss~ pointed out in his report that among the most striking 
. I documents compiled by the Prefecture on Stavisky was the Rapport Cousin 
of May, 1931. In this revealing treatise, Connnissioner Cousin had 
warned the Pr~fecture that Stavisky was leaving the Orl~ans Municipal 
Pawnshop and was moving to exploit the newly established Bayonne Pawn-
shop. MOreover, he called attention to the valuer Cohen who was a key 
1 M. Amat, Les manifestations sur la voie publique en janvier 1934 
et jusgu'au 6 flvrier, Chambre des d~putls, Annexe 3384, Documents 
Parlementaires (Paris, May 17, 1934), p. 577. 
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man in both swindles. Surely this demanded serious investigation. 
Yet no one took the initiative to do anything about this amazing reve-
lation. Daladier was dumbfounded as he read this and was impressed by 
the thought that, as early as 1931, the Stavisky Scandals could have 
2 
been ended. 
Daladier was also surprised by the gross neglect revealed by the 
police as he continued the Moss~ Report. ~ Mosse explained how the Rap-
port Cousin had first been given by the Division Commissioner Cousin 
f to the head of the Judiciary Delegation of the Prefecture, M. Pachot. 
Pachot, in turn, sent copies to the financial section of the Procureur 
de la R~publigue, and to the Judiciary Police of the Pr~fecture admin-
istered by M. Xavier-Guichard. Yet no one along this chain of communi-
cation took any action on the Rapport Cousin. In fact, M. Guichard did 
not transmit this revealing report to the rival police service--the 
Surete'. However, Guichard did remit it to M. Ch:happe, the Prefect of 
1 . 3 Po ~ce. 
As Daladier read on into the MOss~ Report, he was informed that 
Chiappe, when asked, had not been sure if he had everi;received the 
Rapport Cousin. Moss~ said that the evidence proved that Chiappe had. 
Now, concluded Mosse", if the Prefect had the Rapport Cousin in his 
possession, and if he had transmitted it to the S~rete, the sGrete 
would h~ve communicated it_ to the Prefect of the Basses-Pyren~es, and 
2M. Catalan, Pr~paration de la manifestation du 6 fe'vrier 1934, 
Chambre des d~putls, Annexe 3385, Documents Parlementaires (Paris, 
May 17, 1934), p. 595. 
3 Ibid., pp. 595-596. 
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the questionable Bayonne Pawnshop would never have materialized. As 
Daladier interpreted what Mosse' had written, Chiappe had been derelict 
in his duties. 4 
MOss: then asked if the S~rete was absolved of all guilt in this 
matter--and quickly added that it was not. The Rapport Cousin had 
fourid its way indirectly to the snret{'s offices. Such a charge, if 
true, would place the blame of inefficiency on M. Thome'. Daladier was 
quick to make this observation. 5 
A revised Rapport Cousin was brought ~on Stavisky by M. Pachot 
from October to December, 1931. As the chain of communications began 
once again, the Procureur de la Republique's office seized upon the 
document and demanded a follow-up be made by the Judiciary Police of 
the Pr~fecture. Before the probing went too deep, M Guichard of the 
Judiciary Police found a major impediment in his way; namely, M. Dorn 
y Alzua. M. de Monzie, attorney for Dorn y Alzua--a minor member of 
/ Stavisky's gang--said that his client was an officer of the Legion 
d'Honneur and could not be involved in any such scandal. Guichard 
called off the investigation. . / The trenchant Mosse here points out 
that Guichard tended to take the easy way out too often, and Daladier 
made up his mind that the Pr~fecture needed new life--a revitalization. 6 
In January, 1932, when M. Pachot was sent into retirement and M. 
Ameline took over his duties, the latter received an anonymous letter 
4catalan, Manifestation, Pt:-596. 
5tbid., pp .. 595-596. 
6rbid. 
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exposing Stavisky as a swindler. This developed into an investigation 
by Inspectors Sevestre and Cousin on February 3, 1933. While the Prl-
fecture seemed, at last, to be moving into action, M. Albert Dubarry 
arranged a meeting between Stavisky and Chiappe. Just when the "heat 
was on" from the Pr~fecture, Stavisky complained to Chiappe of these 
inquiries against his person being made by the Judiciary Police. Chi-
appe promised to look into the matter and did. The Pr~fecture unloaded 
the Rapport Sevestre-Cousin on Chiappe--yet Chiappe did nothing about 
it. Daladier agreed with Moss~ that here was a flagrant example of 
Chiappe's unforgivable complacency when it involved a truly important 
7 but nondramatic matter. 
After the fall of 1933 no further new discoveries were communicated 
on Stavisky through police sources, but during October Stavisky was 
brought in by Ameline and interrogated. Again on December 22, 1933 
M. Lacambre, Ameline's secretary, arrested Stavisky for more question-
ing. On both occasions Stavisky insisted that the police had no tang-
ible evidence to hold him on, and they let him go. I Daladier and Mosse 
were amazed by three outstanding facts! (1) en December 23, 1933,one 
day after "Alexandre" had been questioned, the Stavisky Scandals erupted; 
(2) though the police were aware of the Rapport Cousin, they could not 
find any ground for holding Stavisky; and (3) knowing as early as Octo-
ber that they could not hold him without more evidence, the police had 
8 
not even thought of "tailing le bel Alexandre." 
7catalan, Manifestation, pp. 595-596. 
8rbid., pp. 596-597. 
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The February Six Inquiry Commission went on record as believing 
Daladier when he answered the question: 11Was the measure taken against 
,/ Chiappe a consequence of the Rapport Masse?" 
M. Daladier, former President of the Ministry, has af-
firmed before the Commission that.it was the examination of 
the results of the inquiry by the services of the Pr~fecture 
of Police, written in the report of M. l'Inspecteur-G~nlral 
MOss~, that brought him to name the Prefect of Police (Chiappe) 
to another function ..•. 9 
It will be useful and revealing to return to January 30 to seek 
more information on this subject of the administrative changes, for 
on that day not only was the Daladier Cabinet constituted, but M. Ber-
gery, a leading Socialist deputy, deposited a request for an inter-
pellation on Stavisky. This interpe~lation might have influenced 
Daladier' s decision to remove Chiappe, ::for when it was announced by 
the newspapers, it was reported as dealing with the responsibilities 
and actions of M. Chiappe when handling the Stavisky Affair. M. Ber-
gery, Deputy from Mantes, was a man of no mean importance and it was 
obvious that he was only voicing the Socialist viewpoint towards Chi-
appe. Chiappe was accused not only of general inefficiency as a Pre-
feet, but Bergery made no bones about what was required as a remedy 
h f h . 10 here; t at was, the suspension o M. C J.appe. 
As has been suggested above, Daladier desired the Socialist sup-
port of his Government and could not neglect any serious demands coming 
from them. Aware that he must be ready to give strong and convincing 
9catalan, Manifestation, p. 602. 
10Ibid., p. 599. 
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answers when Bergery had him cornered, Premier Daladier, on January 31, 
held a special conference with M. Eug~ne Frot, Minister of the Interior, 
and M. Jean Penancier, Minister of the Seals. The chief problem neces-
sitating this group meeting was the Stavisky Affair and the possible 
troubles it could create for the Daladier Ministry. The outcome of 
the discussions was that Daladier demanded to see the Stavisky dossiers. 
M. Frot, soon afterwards, secured three dossiers--those of MM. Plytas, 
Lescouv~, and Mossl--and read them himself first. In this way, Frot 
later explained, he would be better prepared to advise the Premier 
11 
on the possible course of action to take. 
On Thursday morning, February 1, M. Frat turned over the secret 
documents on Stavisky to the Premier. At the same time, the red-
bearded Frat gave the co~alusive findings he had made from his read-
ing through them. The Minister of the Interior then presented certain 
possibilities and suggestions to be considered in this case. The sug-
gestions by Frat were highlighted by the general statement that 11 a 
complete administrative reshuffling 11 was needed. The Minister of the 
Interior quickly added that this was mex:ely a ''suggestion on his part, n 
12 for he knew that the Premier had to make the "final decision." 
On Friday, February 2, 1934, M. Martinaud-Deplat, Daladier's 
Undersecretary of State, telephoned M. Four~s, a Republican of the 
Center, and M. Laniel, another Republican, to meet with him at the 
quai d'Orsay at 10:00 A.M. At that time Deplat mentioned that the 139 
11 Catalan, Manifestation, p. 599. 
12Ibid. 
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Daladier concluded that M. Thoml of the S~retehad shown a lack of 
cooperation in the whole affair. Therefore, as we have seen, Thome 
was t f d h "d. F 15 rans erre to t e Come 1e- ranlaise. 
These administrative changes were not new in French history, for 
the Waldeck-Rousseau Government had established such a precedent. Pre-
mier Rousseau had removed the Procureur de la R~publigue, the Prefect 
of Police, and several military chiefs when they had embarrassed him. 16 
Now the historical question again poses itself: Did Daladier fire 
Chiappe because of the "fear of M. Bergery' s interpellation, 11 because 
Frot advised him to do so, or because thedossiers convinced him it 
had to be done? A critical examination of the records leaves little 
doubt that Daladier correctly furnished the answer to this query when 
he presented the following elaboration before the February Six Inquiry 
Commission: 
I read the Rapport Moss~ .... 
Even today, I tell you, having read it, I found in it 
nothing that seemed to indicate a stain on the personal probity 
of M. Chiappe, Prefect of Police. But I believed that I had 
found a certain number of facts which demonstrated that at 
the Pr~fecture, as elsewhere, that spirit, that dynamism that 
could have arrested Stavisky in 1931, at least apprehended him 
in September 1933, was not manifested with the force and energy 
needed. It was necessary to make much needed changes within 
the three great administrative posts mentioned. These changes 
had to be made in order not to hamper the investigations that 
had to be made into the Stavisky Affair--for the Government I 
headed subscribed itself, in its ministerial declaration, to 
the establishing of an immediate parliamentary investigation. 
Above all, these removals had to be made because there was a 
15catalan, Manifestation, pp. 599-603. 
16rbid., pp. 599-600; alsop. 616. 
demand to infuse in these orga11isms a new blood, a need to 
get rid of the parasites; briefly, to arrive at a point when 
no notorious swindler could dupe France for six or eight 
years and get away with it. 
Have I taken my decision alone, ask the newspapers? 
YES I HAVE, ALL ALONE.17 
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The angry policeman.-- Jean Chiappe, Prefect of Police, had not 
been conditioned, since Daladier's rise to power, to believe that he 
would be removed from his present position. On the contrary, all the 
Prefect's contacts with the new Premier had been very gracious and 
satisfactory. On January 31, for example, the day after the Daladier 
Ministry was formed, the Premier discussed with Chiappe what measures 
could be taken to check or prevent the Union~:Nationale des Combattants 
from demonstrating on Sunday, February 4, as President Lebecq of the 
U.N.C. had announced. M. Chiappe promised to get in touch with Lebecq 
and do all he could to stop the march by the U.N.C. from becoming 
another nriot on the Concorde as in January. 11 Daladier, overcome 
emotionally by the promise Chiappe had just made, held the Prefect's 
hands tightly and warmly assured him in his deep voice: "You are not 
18 
'a friend1 1 you are· 'the friend. 111 On Thursday, February 1, Jean 
' Ghiappe visited Eugene Frot, Minister of the Interior, and was asked 
to intervene in the proposed U.N.C. march. As he had done with Da-
19 ladier, Chiappe said he would do his best. 
17 Catalan, Manifestation, p. 600. 
18Alexander Werth, France in Ferment (London, 1935), p. 130. 
19Georges Suarez, La grande peur du 6 fevrier au Palais-Bourbon 
(Paris, 1934), pp. 48-60. 
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Jean Chiappe now felt that he could not postpone visiting Lebecq 
any longer and undertook to go right away to see him. The u~N.C. 's 
President refused to-listen to the Prefect's proposal at first. Chi-
appe, disappointed, telephoned Frot and suggested that Lebecq be in-
vited by the Minister to a conference at the Interior that evening. 
Frot was in complete agreement and did as the Prefect proposed. At 
that rendezvous, the U.N.C. ·President refused to give ground and said 
that the Sunday meeting would go on as planned. Prefect Chiappe then 
saved the day by giving an ultimatum to Lebecq: "I will resign if you 
do not call off the demonstration Sunday." Lebecq, who considered him-
self Chiappe's intimate friend, then yielded and promised that the U.N.C~ 
would not invade the streets on Sunday. The strain was so great on Chi-
appe that, after leaving the meeting, he went home with a fever and be-
came bedridden. 20 
It was at this point that M. Frot was made out to be a "two-headed 
monster and a hypocrite" by the French press. 
, 
Stephane Lauzanne, ed-
itor of Le Matin, produced in his newspaper what he considered "impeach-
able evidence" to show Frot was planning to "stab-Chiappe" and get the 
Prefect fired. According to Lauzanne, M. Marquet, the Socialist Deputy 
from Bordeaux, had visited Frot on Friday, February 2, and assured the 
Minister that Daladier would get the Nee-Socialist and the S .F. I.O. 's 
support if he would do one favor for them--remove Chiappe. Lauzanne 
said that Frot then rubbed his red goatee and admitted to Marquet that 
20 Suarez, La grande peur, pp. 59-62. 
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the idea had crossed his mind. Frot then supposedly visited Daladier 
and told him that Chiappe had to go if the Ministry was to carry the 
Chamber on Tuesday. This story has no existing evidence to show it 
ever occurred, but this account was taken as the truth by most of 
Paris when Chiappe was fired on February 3. History was to be influ-
21 
enced by the theory that a Socialist-Frot deal had been a reality. 
While Chiappe was going under the misapprehension that the Pre-
mier now favored pim because of his success in getting Lebecq to call 
off the U.N.C. march, Daladier had completed the Rapport Mossl and had 
made up his mind to remove Chiappe. Daladier called an emergency Cab-
inet meeting for the next day. Few Cabinet members were aware, up to 
the last hour, what the meeting was to be all about. 
Daladier had called the Cabinet meeting for Saturday, February 3, 
I 
at the Elysee Palace. Before the official gathering got underway, 
Daladier summoned Jean Fabry, friend of Chiappe in the Ministry, to 
prepare him for the blow the Premier was about to deal. Fabry, un-
aware of what was up, made his way to the Quai d'Orsay as quickly as 
he could.. He found Daladier impatiently awaiting him. After the usual 
polite greetings, the Premier informed Fabry that he should know that 
the Ministry was about to sanction numerous administrative reforms. 
Daladier then added that Jean Chiappe was above suspicion and would 
be transferred to the Resident-Generalship of Morocco, the highest 
post within the French Civil Service. Fabry opposed the change and 
warned Daladier that the matter should be reconsidered before action 
21 Le Matin, February 21, 1934. 
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took place. The Premier gave little encouragement to this suggestion, 
and Fabry decided to see what would transpire later, on the Chiappe 
22 Question. 
Actually, by the time Daladier had this Fabry Interview, the Pre-
mier was still boiling from what had occurred earlier that morning. 
This brings us around to 9:00 A.M. when Daladier had telephoned M. Chi-
appe to ask him to please come to see him immediately. Chia.ppe, still 
bedridden with an attack of sciatica, answered that he was sorry, but 
he could not comply with this request. Daladier then concluded that 
there was no other way but to inform the Prefect of his removal over 
the phone. It displeased Daladier to have to do it this way--but he 
did. 23 
Chiappe had been thoroughly unprepared for what was coming. As 
we have seen above, the Prefect of Police had not seen the Premier 
since Wednesday, January 31. Now at nine o'clock on Saturday morning 
the Premier appealed to Chiappe, "the good citizen and the good French-
man.rr Then came the pitch--Chiappe was to go to Morocco, The Prefect 
muttered something about the honor--to succeed Marshal Lyautey in Mor-
occo was no insult--but he could not leave Paris. The Prefect explained 
that this would be a surrender to his enemies--the Socialists and the 
Communists. M. Daladier, however, refused this answer and kept on in-
sisting. then Chiappe followed this statement by his famous reply: 
22 Jean Fabry, De laPlace de la Concorde au Cours de l'Intendance 
(Paris, 1942), p. 41. 
23
catalan, Manifestation, pp. 604-605. 
It is·. no good going on like this. Whatever reason you 
may give for offering it to me, I can not leave Paris. Oh, 
I know--! can feel it--you will probably chase me out of the 
Prefecture de Police; the Paris Prefecture to which my wife 
and I have devoted seven years of our lives. Well, never 
mind! I entered the Pr~fecture a rich man; but I am leaving 
it a poor man. I shall be IN THE STREET, perhaps an unhappy 
man, but an honest person. Monsieur le President, I pay you 
my respects.24 
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As Jean Chiappe had been in bed for several days for sciatica, it 
is difficult to see how the phrase "be in the street" could mean any-
thing but the blowing of so much emotional steam on the Prefect's 
part. Premier Daladier later claimed that the Prefect had threatened 
to ''come down into the street'' and organize a riot against the Govern-
ment. Whether Chiappe said dans la rue (riot implication) or ~ la rue 
(unemployment implication) now was the semantic problem existing here. 
The evidence available gives no sound basis to those who would con-
d h h 1 d . d h 25 clu e t at Jean C iappe p anne to ~nva e t e street. 
Before the Cabinet meeting began at 11:00 A.M., Fabry did bring 
nut one interesting point in conversation with the Premier: Why should 
Chiappe be sent to the more difficult Moroccan post if he were guilty 
.of inefficiency as Prefect? Moreover, to allow Chiappe to leave the 
Prlfecture at that moment was leaving the route free to disorder. 
Fabry sincerely expressed the belief that such a move would provoke a 
riot. Fabry continued that the January Riots were still fresh in mind 
and that Paris needed an experienced Prefect in times of disequilibrium 
24catalan, Manifestation, pp. 604~605; also Werth, France in Fer-
ment, pp. 131-132. 
25
werth, France in Ferment, pp. 132-133. 
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like the present. The validity of these arguments did not sway Dala-
dier to change his mind. 26 
A few moments after Premier Daladier formally opened the Cabinet 
sitting, he announced the removal of Chiappe. President Albert Lebrun, 
both hands holding his head, seemed far away from the debate as the 
Premier's voice filled the room. Immediately after Daladier had fin-
ished listing the administrative changes, Fabry protested. A vigorous 
debate on Chiappe ensued. Fabry objected that it was cowardly to say 
to a man "you are an irreproachable servant of the country--but you're 
fired." He added that it was tactless to remove a man just as an in-
terpellation against him was pending in the Chamber. But Fabry's 
audience appeared to be indifferent or impervious to what he was say-
27 
ing. 
In his memoir on this Cabinet meeting--invaluable because Cabinet 
sittings are held without mormal recording of the minutes--Jean Fabry 
wrote: 
And suddenly Frot brought in the argument of the tele-
phone call; 11Chiappe said: 'Tonight I will be dans la rue. 1 " 
In vain Pietri and I protested; in vain Pi~tri demanded that 
we should take some time to reflect on the matter, to get more 
information. 
Cot, Mistler, Guy la Chambre, Vrullidier, Queille wanted to 
get to the bottom of it. Daladier said nothing. Henry de 
Jouvenel asked that before voting, w~ should know what we 
were doing: he personally disapproved formally of the measure, 
26Fabry, De la Place de la Concorde, pp. 43-44. 
27Ibid., pp. 44-45. 
but he would stay with whatever decision was made_ I de-
clared that in case the Cabinet should approve the changes, 
which seemed apparent would be the case, I would resign.28 
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M. Pi~tri got up and expressed what he thought of the official 
opinion. Calmly, but severely, Francois Pietri announced that the 
~ 
Cabinet members would not receive his collaboration any more, for the 
Cabinet had just voted to fire Chiappe. Pi{tri based his decision to 
resign on the seemingly obvious fact that Daladier had offered no spe-
cific reason why the Prefect should be fired. Pietri could not see 
what was so chronically wrong with Chiappe, for afeer all he had been 
29 Prefect for seven years. 
Fabry followed Pi~tri and also defended Chiappe. Like his col-
league, he resigned. Fabry's resignation brought President Lebrun 
out of his trance. President Lebrun showed a shocked appearance and, 
throwing his arms upward, he stated: "Messieurs, do you know what you 
are doing! Two ministers quitting at such a time .... Now, it is the 
end! 11 :rhe revered Henry de Jouvenel agreed with President Lebrun that 
these administrative changes were becoming tragic in their results. 
Without any further comments or exclamations, the silent Daladier ad-
journed the meeting. The clock struck 1:00 P.M.--but not all was 
' 30 
well. 
The Fabre-Thom~ Affair.-- The Cabinet meeting of Saturday, Feb-
ruary 3, was indeed an historic one! Its most important move, of 
28 Fabry, De laPlace de la Concorde, pp. 45-46. 
29
rbid., pp. 45-47. 
30Ibid., pp. 44-46. 
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course, was the elimination of Chiappe from the Pr~fecture de Police 
and his _appointment as Resident-General of Morocco. M. Ponsot, the 
Resident-General still at his post, was to be recalled, and M. Bonnefoy-
Sibour was given the Pr~fecture. All these changes were necessary to 
get the Prefect out of Paris. 31 
But the other decisions made that noontime by the Cabinet should 
not be overlooked. Of great importance was M. Thom~'s removal from the 
S~rete~Generale. What was strange, however, was that Thom~ was to be 
, 
Emile Fabre's new replacement as Administrator of the Comedie-Francaise. 
Fabre was forced into retirement. These changes soon carried the label 
of the Fabre-Thom~ Affair. 32 
The Fabre-Thom~ Affair resulted not only out of a~,need to find 
Thom~ a new post, but was also conceived as a form of punishment for 
Fabre, who had allowed Shakespeare's Coriolanus to be presented to the 
Comedie-Francaise audiences. Fabre, a0well-versed person in his field, 
had produced Shakespeare's play so successfully that the critics almost 
unanimously applauded it wildly--a rare event in Paris circles. Through-
out January, 1934, Coriolanus drew a ''standing room only" audience. 
For being so enterprising, M. Bardon, Undersecretary of the Department 
of National Education, informed Fabre on February 3 that he was through. 
Besides being given no reason for his removal, Fabre was told that he 
33 
could count on no more Government employment. 
31 I 1 Gaston Cherau, Concorde. 
32
rbid., p. 56. 
33
rbid., pp. 56-57. 
6 f~vrier 1934 (Paris, 1934), p. 48. 
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But the historian and reader cannot be satisfied with such an 
arbitrary measure--there must be some underlying causes. As we probe 
further into the subject, we see it as tragic that a man should be re-
moved for efficiency. It was bizarre that no better reason was given 
than the post at the Com~die-Francaise was needed for Thoml. It was 
at the same time comical, because those who led France for the moment 
were aftaid that Shakespeare might help to overthrow the Third Republic. 
Our research shows that this last point was taken to be a serious matter 
h . 34 by t ose ~n power. 
Many months before, the Reading Committee of the Comedie-Francaise 
had approved Coriolanus as excellent material for the theater. Strangely 
, 
enough, the records show, Emile Fabre was the only one to refer to the 
dangerous antidemocratic connotations of the play. Fabre was put at 
ease when the Reading Committee asserted that Coriolanus was a classic 
above the petty quarrels of party politics. So naturally Fabre formu-
lated plans that would include the presentation of the play in the 
near future. Even M. Mistler, then Undersecretary of Fine Arts, had 
35 
given his blessings and approved the final launching of Coriolanus. 
The unexpected success of the play surprised even Fabre. Whistles, 
riotous conduct, extended applause followed every antidemocratic line 
spoken by the actors in January, 1934. 
34 , Cherau, Concorde, pp. 57-58. 
35Ibid., p. 59. 
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There were demonstrations in the French manner?--God! 
We applauded the eternal truths of Shakespeare, the decadent 
causes for the fall of Rome--which were the truths of Byzan-
tium, the truths of all fallen empires--which are the striking 
truths of today .... 36 
In retrospect, it would have seemed better to stop Coriolanus in-
stead of firing Fabre. Thom:, who knew nothing about producing plays, 
was bound to come up for severe criticism from a culture-conscious 
France. This anger in Paris was soon increased, because of the Fabre 
and Chiappe removals, when the resignations of the two ministers, 
Fabry and Piltri, were made public. By February 4, the opposition 
brought against the Government by the removal of Chiappe, the Fabre-
Thom~ Affair, and the resignation of the two ministers, led M. Edouard 
Renard, Prefect of the Seine District and friend of Chiappe, to_resign 
in protest. The press reacted to all these administrative changes by 
returning to its campaign against French democratic institutions and 
37 11 those who ruled. 11 
Press sides with Chiappe.-- The first major newspaper protest 
against the Chiappe transfer to Morocco came from the caustic Andr: 
Tardieu. Tardieu denounced the injustices committed against M. Chiappe 
the very same evening that the official announcement had been made. 
The former premier and author claimed that the Daladier Government 
had 11slaughtered Chiappe in order to sacrifice him for Socialist votes." 
This belief found many sympathizers. L'Ami du Peuple, La Libertl, and 
other Rightist newspapers echoed the same tune--behind the move was a 
36 # Cherau, Concorde, p. 59. 
37 Catalan, Manifestation, p. 605. 
38 
strong Socialist pressure. 
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The nsocil!llist pressure" argument appeared to many observers of 
the period to be undeniable. Confirmation of this belief appeared 
obvious to this group of thinkers when M. L:on Blum, in a speech be-
fore the Congress of the Socialist Confederation at Clermont-Ferrand, 
revealed that a Socialist "change of heart" towards the Daladier Min-
istry was in a formative stage because: 
..•. when the party met on Thursday morning, it was 
unanimously resolved to vote against the Government. It 
is possible that the events of yesterday will modify the 
position of the group, because of the fact that the dis-
missal of M. Chiappe has brought ~ttacks from the Center 
and the Right who are using this leader as an excuse to 
attack the Government .•.. 39 
Such insinuations infuriated the Right and Center only more. The 
Rightist -presses now made tremendous appeals to the "emotional sides 
of all true Frenchmen.'' Their publication of Chiappe 's formal letter 
of refusal lined up thousands of Frenchmen behind the Prefect. The 
Daladier Government was called every vile name for what it had done, 
and the "poor mistreated Prefect 11 was allowed the front pages to give 
his message to all of France. So the reader will be able to judge why 
this message made such an impact on the French nation then, a transla-
tion follows: 
I have just been informed that you have decided to re-
tire me from my duties as Prefect of Police and that you are 
calling me to the post of Resident-General in Morocco. 
38
catalan, Manifestation, p. 605. 
39 , Cherau, Concorde, pp. 71-72. 
This morning, when you gave me the honor of tele-
phoning me to inform me of your intentions, you made an 
appeal "to the good citizen and the good Frenchman." You 
told me that my departure was necessary and that it had 
nothing to do with current events. On that matter, moreover, 
you had renewed the confidence of your predecessor. 
It was impossible for me to tell you my surprise. I 
then recalled for you, in effect, that, neither during our 
long meeting of nearly two hours that you have me three days 
ago and during which you gave so many compliments, nor during 
my meeting with the Minister of the Interior, who met with me 
only last evening, and who also gave me congratulations and 
thanks--nothing could have prepared me for such intentions. 
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I added that my removal from Paris and the Pr~fecture de 
Police, in spite of the promotion offered by the post in which 
you called me to serve, would be under the present circumstances 
wrongly interpreted by public opinion. 
I could not, to facilitate a political operation--for there 
was no other reason for your decision--sacrifice to you my per-
sonal reputation and the prestige that I had been bringing to 
my post and my title. 
I have entered rich into the office that you forced me 
to leave; I leave a poor man. 
During ten years, either at the S~ret{-G,nerale or at the 
Prefecture de Police, I have always served my country passion-
ately and obeyed my chiefs loyally, devotedly, and faithfully. 
I have always defended, and yesterday again--by family tradi-
tion and personal conviction--the Republican institutions; al-
ways also I have dedicated myself fearlessly and unequivocably 
and--this will be the pride of my life--without shedding blood 
to maintain order. 
The unexplainable promotion that you offer me so generously 
is, from my viewpoint, at this hour, only a sign of distrust for 
me. This is ·why I give you my refusal. But this refusal does not 
affect the sentiments that have always guided my conduct. Giving 
to my colleagues, for the last time, a proof of civic pride and 
republican discipline, I ask them, if they really feel the injus-
tice inflicted on their chief, to stay at their posts, united by 
a compatible love for order, for the Republic, and for Paris.40 
40catalan, Manifestation, p. 605. 
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As had been anticipated, this letter of refusal aroused very 
strong emotional responses from the reading public. The Rightist pub-
lications, especially, defended Chiappe's cause as if it were a matter 
of ''life or death. 11 Even the Presse d 'Information was furious and 
joined the choir of protests. A very serious accusation penqed by 
, 
Henri de Kerillis appeared in the Echo de Paris: that was, this ad-
ministrative change was the beginning of the Daladier coup d'~tat. 41 
Le Figaro decided that the ''removal of Chiappe was a sign of a drunk-
ard 1 s behavior, 11 and called upon the solid citizenry to riot against 
42 
such a Government. 
we shall see later. 
La Libert~ had already issued such a call, as 
, 
L'Ami du Peuple went a step ahead of L'Echo de 
Paris and stated that the coup d'~tat was not beginning but that a 
revolutionary committee had already seized power. 43 With such accu-
sations being made, it was difficult to see how permanent peace on 
the Paris streets could continue. 
Many people blamed Daladier's strange administrative changes on 
the "mad and mysterious" Minister of the Interior, Eug~ne Frot. Those 
who disliked Frot in the press asserted that he was the strong man be-
hind Stavisky. Moreover, his enemies kept accusing him of having 
brought the downfall of Chiappe in return for a promise of the Soc-
ialist votes. Frat was plagued by this last accusation for years and 
4lL'Echo de Paris, February 4, 1934. 
42Le Figaro, February 4, 1934. 
43L'Ami du Peuple, February 4, 1934. 
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always denied that he had ever been so underhanded. Furthermore, it 
should be added here that Frot was:annocent of such intrigue accord-
, 44 ing to the later testimonies given by Vincent Auriol and Leon Blum. 
Chiappe Leaving the Pr~fecture as Explosive 
Jean Chiappe's record.-- To comprehend why Jean Chiappe's depar-
ture from the PrEffecture became the match that lighted the Explosive 
February Six fuse, it is essential to look at the impressions he had 
made on Parisian public opinion. In Paris the Prefect's strongest 
supporters were the royalists. Chiappe was aware that he was "their 
favorite" and tended to treat their members with more leniency than 
he did his enemies--the Communists, for example~-when they were ar-
rested. Jean Belin, a close worker with Chiappe during this period, 
in his memoirs has recorded: 
Both Daudet and Maurras were on the closest terms 
with the Prefect of Police--Jean Chiappe. Chiappe gave 
them his secret support for, although he may not have been 
a royalist, he saw in the Royalist Movement a means of de-
feating the Government.45 
Chiappe's own officers also were strong defenders of their chief. 
Although he demanded strict obedience from those under his power, he 
was an "enlightened administrator." He knew how to praise and how to 
win friends by being gracious. He rewarded his "friends" by giving 
splashy parties for them, by sending them small but welcome gifts, 
and by helping th~m out with their family problems. His policemen 
44catalan, Manifestation, pp. 601-603. 
45Jean Belin, MY Work at the sGretEf (London, 1950), p. 141. 
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were loyal to him and considered 11 their prefect'1 an excellent admin-
istrator. That he was able to secure raises and better working condi-
46 tions for those under him added to the friends he made in the ranks. 
Those who knew of Chiappe's career also became great admirers of 
the Prefect. He had been born in Corsica in 1878 in a peasant environ-
ment under conditions where it is usually impossible to get very mar 
in life. With ambition driving him to do better than those around him, 
the young Chiappe worked.his way to a clerkship in the Ministry of Elie 
i:Ennet,ior. This was often the first step in what could become an im-
pressive career. Young Chiappe learned to develop the irresistible 
manners that became associated with him and; soon after his arrival 
in Paris, he met a charming and wealthy woman. After the dapper little 
Corsican married the lady, his financial troubles were over. From now 
. 47 
on he had no scruples in spending freely to advance his career. 
In 1924 Camille Chautemps appointed Jean Chiappe head of the 
snrete-Generale. With his wife's fortune, Chiappe kept entertaining, 
regardless of expense. He developed a taste for fine clothes, and he 
became a connoisseur of art. No one in a high place was refused ad-
mittance to his home if he could help him to climb the public servant's 
.. 
ladder. Soon he desired the luxurious offices of the Prlfecture, in-
stead of the dingy ones in the S~ret~. His l~ck was with him in 1927 
46Belin, Work, p. 142. 
47Ibid., p. 123. 
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when M. Albert Sarraut, the Minister of the Interior, was undertaking 
a fight ·against French Communism and believed that Chiappe was of the 
same mind that he was on the subject. Consequently, in 1928, Chiappe 
b f t f 1 . 48 ecame Pre ec o Po ~ce. 
Besides having the loyalty of the royalists and his policemen, 
Chiappe had also become the idol of thousands of Parisians who wielded 
their influence for Chiappe in 1934. Chiappe had handled the traffic 
problems in Paris by introducing the light system, by rerouting, by 
strictly controlling traffic at dangerous intersections, and by pun-
ishing the dangerous motorists. His battle for morality in Paris had 
also won the praises of the respectable people of the city. Prostitu-
tion was placed under strict supervision. Foreign white slave opera-
tors were chased out of Paris. Pimps and "street girls" were given 
rough treatment if caught on the main boulevards. These social improve-
ments made it possible for a man to enjoy a stroll without being ac-
d f . . 49 coste every 1ve m1nutes. 
Although Chiappe_ was later accused of everything from being a 
dictator to backing a monarchy, the evidence for this period of his 
life does not support such a harsh judgment. It is true that Chiappe's 
ideas on police administration had certain sympathies with the Royal-
ists' beliefs. He was convinced that aristocratic control by an ad-
ministrator was the ideal, and he looked upon the Prtfecture as his 
48
werth, France in Ferment, p. 127. 
49Pau1 Allard, "L'Anarchie de la police," Revue de Paris, 41st 
" Year (March 15, 1934), p. 417; also Cherau, Concorde, p. 26. 
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50 
fortress. Even as understanding an observer as Werth used Chiappe's 
letter of refusal to show that the man was a royalist. The author 
through discussions with the French police has discovered that the 
rather strong paternal and administrative obedience demanded by Chiappe 
is not uncommon within the French bureaucracy even today. To call a 
man antidemocratic and a royalist because he followed the accepted 
mores of his time in administration seems to be unfair. On the other 
hand, Chiappe appeared to be a sincere democratic supporter in this 
period. His letter of refusal ended with a strong pledge to democratic 
institutions. His guide to police work reflected this democratic spirit 
when he wrote: 
For this essential task for the safety of the country, 
I call upon the professional devotion of everyone. I ask 
you--and the Government asks the same through me--to stay 
always clearly and resolutely republicans! It is essential 
that all of you, by your attitude and actions, should give 
the example of unfaltering attachment to the ideas and prin-
ciples that formed and constituted the Republican tradition--
which are the essence and spirit of our democracy.Sl 
Daladier, to his credit, never claimed that he removed Chiappe 
because he had undemocratic ideas, but rather because Chiappe had 
shown that 11negligence and decadence were apparent within the top brass 
of the Pr~fecture." Yet, unless Daladier offered a complete reform 
program when he removed Chiappe, it would appear that the inefficiency 
and carelessness evident by the reading of the Rapport MossJ would 
still continue to exist. History here must record that the precipita-
50P. L. Darnar, Chiappe, un chef de bandits (Paris, 1936), pp. 8-
32. 
51Jean Chiappe, Paroles d'ordre (Paris, 1930), pp. 34-35. 
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tion of the Chiappe Affair did not show the way to solve the existing 
political administrative problem. On the other hand, the elimination 
of Chiappe from Paris at this time was interpreted as an arbitrary 
measure taken against a man who was extremely popular. Chiappe would 
have been more valuable to the Daladier Government if he had been kept 
52 
at his post. 
Press calls for early February street riots.~- As we have seen 
above, Chiappe's departure from the Pr~fecture was received very badly 
by the Paris press. On Sunday, February 4, the majority of the news-
papers denounced the Government's administrative changes as nmeeting 
Socialists 1 pressure . 1' In La Liberte', M. Pierre Taittinger, head of 
the Jeunesses Patriotes, expressed what soon became a general cry 
throughout the French press: 
Paris deserves to demonstrate to M. Chiappe its grati~ 
tude. It owes it to itself not to allow him to leave without 
giving proof of its indignation. 
We are facing a Jacobin coup d'esat.' The Government 
strikes M. Chiappe today. Tomorrow, the Socialists will ask 
for General Weygand' s head. Will M. Daladier give it to them? 
In any case, we must expect large demonstrations, that 
could lead to extremely grave consequences. The veterans, the 
Latin Quarter, the patriotic associations, and various other 
leagues announce their intentions to riot with force in order 
to shout their indignation.53 
Even Lucien Romier, in the conservative Le Temps, pointed to the 
intense pressure the Chiappe Affair had brought. Romier issued the 
52catalan, Manifestation, p. 603. 
53La Liberte, February 5, 1934; also Catalan, Manifestation, p. 601. 
warning that: 
.•.• the structure of our electoral and parliamentary 
system is in danger, day after day, of being overthrown by 
an assault from the nation. 
Once the French people have lost their patience, they 
can become one of the most violent known.54 
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The presentiment of'the press, that the French people would not 
allow Chiappe's removal to go unanswered, was verified on February 4 
when at 2:00 P.M. the Grands Boulevards were filling up with a pro-
Chiappe crowd. Men paraded the Paris streets all afternoon and demon-
strated at different intervals in favor of the Prefect. On the whole, 
the marchers were not unruly--they knew that Chiappe desired order in 
Paris. Around 3:30 P.M. the U.N.C. demonstrated in front of the Clem-
enceau statue on the Champs-Elys{es and then marched its small column 
of three hundred men to pay their traditional respects before the Tomb 
of the Unknown Soldier at the Arch of Triumph before disbanding. 55 
During the evening of February 4, small crowds gathered at di-
verse points all over Paris to demonstrate for Chiappe. The police, 
not out of sympathy with the crowds, made as few arrests as possible. 
A main center of unrest that evening was the Comldie-Francaise where 
Coriolanus played before a capacity audience. Every antidemocratic 
speech was used as the spark to drive the audience into the disorder 
and shouts of: "Long live Fabre!--Long live Chiappe!--Hang Daladier!" 
The performers were dismayed to see how impossible the outraged audience 
54Le Temps, February 4, 1934. 
55Andr~ Benoist, Les mysteres de la police (Paris, 1934), p. 227. 
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became and were glad when the evening performance of the tragedy 
56 
ended. While the welcome calm to the Paris streets returned, the 
Croix de Feu et Briscards, which up to this point had not participated 
in any demonstration, decided that a major protest would be made by 
57 
their members on February 5. 
The February Six Inquiry Conunission later concluded: 
The riot of February 6, whose leading cause, the Stavisky 
Affair, had been motivating street protests for a month, was 
to be precipitated faster because of the measure taken towards 
M. Chiappe.58 
The Croix de Feu's demonstration of February 5.-- The January 
Riots directed by the Action Francaise had attracted numerous politi-
cal leagues to order their troops to invade the Paris streets, but the 
F{d/ration des Contribuables, the Jeunesses Patriotes, and the Soli-
darit~ Francaise had given only limited assistance to the Royalists . 
.s-
Other leagues had not even bothered to participate in any demonstration 
against the Chautemps Ministry but, when the Chiappe Affair occurred, 
the period of 11watchful waiting" was over for these. 5·9 Of these, the 
first one to react was the Croix de Feu. 
Thus the Croix de Feu, deciding that it had waited long enough, 
proclaimed that the first major demonstration by its followers would 
56Amat, Voie publique en janvier, pp. 576-577; also Cherau, 
Concorde, p. 70. 
57Ligue des droits de l'honune et du citoyen, Le coup de main 
fasciste et la riposte republicaine (Paris, 1934), p. 9. 
58catalan, Manifestation, p. 595. 
S9Ibid., pp. 594-595. 
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take place on Monday. This Croix de Feu demonstration of February 5 
was to equal in importance those in January if we are to consider the 
number of leaguers called out, for the total of 11 disponibles 11 parading 
reached four thousand men. These four thousand marchers were applauded 
~ by the public on the Grand Boulevards and the Champs-Elysees as they 
moved from the Madeleine to the Arc de Triomphe. These Croix de Feu 
columns were well-organized; they carried out their leaders' commands 
in cadence; and they made a deep impression on those watching--if we 
60 
are to judge by the newspapers' accounts. 
Colonel de La Rocque had ordered the Croix's H-HOUR to be 7:00 
P.M. on February 5. The main points of concentration were the Champs-
~ Elysees and the Madeleine. The objective to secure was the Ministry 
of the Interior building. On February 5 everything went according to 
plans. By 7:00P.M. a group of about a thousand members of the Croix 
de Feu et Briscards had assembled at the Rond-Point on the Champs-
Elys~es, while another group estimated at two thousand 11disponibles'1 
formed at the Madeleine. No arms were being carried by the demon-
strators. As the disciplined leaguers began leaving their two assem-
bly points, the police and the MObile Guards--who had set up barri-
cades at certain salient points along the announced route of march--
61 
tightened their cordon near the Ministry of the Interior. 
60Amat, Voie publique en janvier, pp. 576-577; also L'Echo de 
Paris, February 6, 1934. 
61MM 1 tt L . . . d . . 
. Dormann et Sa e e, a part~c~pat~on es assoc~at~ons 
~'anciens combattants a la manifestation du 6 f~vrier 1934, Chambre 
des deputes, Annexe 3387, Documents Parlementaires (Paris, May 17, 
1934), p. 663. 
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The Croix de Feu from the Champs-Elys~es arrived in front of the 
Ministry Building first and began shouting for the Daladier Government 
to resign. While this Rand-Point crowd kept hurling its shouts in 
front of the Ministry, the larger Croix de Feu's columns from the Made-
leine arrived. The Republican Guard on duty near the Ministry charged 
the incoming leaguers. A guardsman directed his horse towards the 
flagbearer, drew out his saber, and slashed the staff holding the 
Croix de Feu's insignia. This flag incident aroused the demonstra-
tors, who unhorsed the guilty rider and forced him to kneel before 
the broken flag and apologize. Then the strangest thing happened: 
Instead of concentrating on the Ministry Building, as planned, the 
Croix de Feu reformed into an immense column and headed for the Arc 
de Triomphe while singing La Marseillaise. After appropriate cere-
monies before the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, the leaguers returned 
to the Concorde and were dismissed. 62 
Returning from this mass protest, Colonel de La Rocque addressed 
the following message to President Lebrun: 
Conscious of my heavy responsibilities, I have decided 
today to make a march on the street, for a visible protest 
with the irreproachable front-line veterans of the Croix de Feu. 
All the decent elements in the country--even if they do 
not have the precise awareness of the danger or the force 
necessary to shout it aloud--are gravely alarmed by the state 
of public affairs. Coups de force of semidictatorial nature 
are being executed through Socialist influence by a Government, 
at times, weak and incensed, and in a nation strongly united to 
its familial, patriotic, and dedicated traditions. I report 
62oormann et Salette, Participation des associations; also Ch~rau, 
Concorde, pp. 76-78. 
that the several thousand Croix de Feu, detached from my 
local "sections 11 for their demonstration, carried on per-, 
fectly and successfully through the Champs-Elysees, the 
Place Beauvau, the Place de la Madeleine, and the Concorde. 
A horseman from the Municipal Police, too faithful no doubt 
to the orders received, tried vainly to slash the tricolored 
flag carried by my admirable colleagues.63 
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This letter warned President Lebrun that this was just the begin-
ning of the 11 treatment to be given the Daladier Government." This 
February 5 demonstration had caused little physical damage in Paris; 
it had led to few arrests being made; and it had brought out a league 
which had never before tried to use the street in order to influence 
political decisions. The quiet and relatively well-behaved march of 
the Croix de Feu was to be the ••calm before the storm. 11 It was the 
dramatic event that disturbedwhat could have been a quiet and pleasant 
Paris Monday. It was the introduction of things to come on the eve of 
one of the most serious days in modern French history: FEBRUARY 6, 1934. 
63 , Cherau, Concorde, pp. 78-79. 
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SCHE1ffiTIC r~P OF·THE CONCORDE AREA ON FEBRUARY SIX 
FIGURE l. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE GREAT FEBRUARY RIOT: PART I 
(The Flash) 
The Attack against Parliamentarians 
and Republican Institutions 
Attacks by the press, periodicals, and leagues.-- There is prob-
ably no better way to understand the viciousness of the attacks made 
against the Government and the Chamber on February 5-6, 1934 than by 
quoting extensively from the contemporary materials; for the ana~ysis 
of such materials led to the obvious conclusion that the Action Fran-
caise was again in the vanguard of those who were determined to over-
:J 
throw French democracy as it was t"hen. The Royalist newspaper charged 
that the Daladier Government did not "give a darn'' about rendering jus-
tice. The Government had discharged the only man worth anything, added 
the Royalists. It had given in to Socialist pressure, and it was part 
of the international group of freemason thieves. The Action Franjaise 
declared that MM. Daladier and Frot did not care in the least for the 
French indignation that existed at the time. All that mattered to 
these corrupted politicians, the Royalists continued, was the preser-
vation of the "crummy kind of power" they had gained over the country. 
The Action Francaise then predicted that the French public, having had 
enough of this "stinking mess," would "tonight, at the time when the 
shops and offices are being cleared, assemble in front of the Chamber 
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and shout: 'Down with the Thieves!'" The "thieves" referred to the 
ministers and the parliamentarians. 1 
The "call to arms" issued by the Solidarite" Francaise, an aggres-
sive political league, was especially vicious and illustrated that the 
time for reasoning had gone by. In this "active phase of the Democratic 
Crisis," the dominating pleas against the Third Republic and against 
those in charge of its political equipment were emotional in nature. 
It did not matter that the statements made were half-truths. What 
mattered was: enough people believed these statements to be true. 
The Ami du Peuple and other newspapers featured the following accusa-
tiona and appeal from the Solidarite Franjaise: 
Be on the alert all adherents and youths, for our Father-
land is in danger! 
After the Scandals came a period of trying to cover up 
mistakes. This ended by the expulsion of the Prefect of 
Police, M. Chiappe, whom we do not especially care for except 
that he has been removed in spite of justice demanding the 
contrary. 
Such insolent behavior will not be allowed by those of us 
who are the sons of those who fought in '89, or will it? 
Your public officials, dear patriots, are allowing them-
selves to be led, as sheep to the fair, by one Daladier whose 
utterances have become despicable and similar to those held 
by the Blums, the Kaisersteins, and the Schweinkopf. 
The result, if this is allowed to continue, people of 
France, will be a dictatorship. It is obvious that your Par-
liament is rotten and your politicians are not to be trusted. 
Your country is given up to scandalous filth, while your very 
1Action Fra~aise, February 6, 1934. The FIGURE 1 MAP will serve 
as&a guide to in~cate the broader movements taken by the February Six 
rioters. 
security is being menaced. In fact, the signs of a Civil 
War, or at least a short war, can be detected. 
The police is mobilized and--you must understand that 
it is against their better sense .and sentiments but it is 
ordered by those who rule--this is done to get the help of 
the Revolutionary Socialists. This will result in placing 
the 11 thieves 11 in charge of an exasperated people. 
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The peasants are facing ruin because of the wheat scandal. 
The workers and intellectuals find their jobs endangered by 
foreigners. Small taxpayers and functionaries, as well as 
small businessmen, your lives are threatened. Are you going to 
stand for what is going on? 
FRANCE MUST BE RETURNED TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE ! 
It is time that the French become master in their house 
once again! This can be brought about if we all take time out 
to clean up the mess. 
In all cities, in all villages where they are found, the 
members of the Solidarite Frantaise are ordered to rise on 
Tuesday and, by 7:00P.M., to eon the Grand Boulevards to 
participate in a demonstration ~gainst the parliamentary r~gime 
which is interested only in its profits.2 
This highly disconnected and emotional message issued by Jean 
Renaud, leader of the Solidarite Francaise, was purposely rather vague 
and suggestive in sections. By such emotional suggestions Renaud felt 
that most adherents in his league could become aroused to move into 
action against the state. But the Secretary of the Solidarite Fran-
caise did not have a monopoly on the emotional tracts put out on the 
., 
eve of February Six or early next morning. The manifesto released 
by the Jeunesses Patriotes was just as wild in tone as that of their 
3 
colleagues. 
2L'Ami du Peuple, February 6, 1934. 
3M. Catalan, Pr~paration de la manifestation du 6 fevrier 1934, 
Chambre des deput~s, Annexe 3385, Documents Parlementaires (Paris, 
May 17, 1934), pp. 607-608. 
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After accusing the Communists of being responsible for Chiappe's 
removal, the Jeunesses Patriotes' proclamation warned that pressure 
was actually coming from Germany to see that the courageous General 
Weygand was retired. Then the following revelations and distortions 
of truths were made: 
A formidable hecatomb is being prepared. In the army, 
in the magistrature, in all ranks and files. of the adminis-
tration, will be struck those who have given proofs of their 
independence and their patriotism. 
The r:gime by .decress will return! 
The crime against having an opinion is back! 
Will you allow the dictatorship of the clan? 
Are you going to allow the strangling of your liberties? 
Small functionaries, independents and patriots, are you 
going to allow your work to be suppressed? 
Public opinion must protest in force. The people must 
clamor its will. 
To the parliamentary decomposition now going on,, it will 
impose silence on the parties and bring dignified leaders to 
the nation. There is a plot being organized within and out-
side our country. We will know how to unmask it. 
People of Paris you will come to affirm with us, in the 
Place de Gr~ve, in front of the HStel de Ville, cradle of your 
communal liberties, that the COUNTRY IS IN DANGER.4 
The Jeunesses Patriotes called Chiappe's departure from the Pr'-
fecture the beginning of a "coup de force." To check this coup from 
going any further, Parisians were told that it was their duty as good 
Frenchmen to join the Municipal Councillors at 7:00 P.M. on February 6 
before the Hotel de Ville. Then a march to the Palais-Bourbon was to 
be on the schedule. It was obvious that if this call by the Jeunesses 
4Gaston Cherau, concorde! 6 fevrier 1934 (Paris, 1934), pp. 83-
85. 
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Patriotes was answered, the Third Republic was in for trouble. The 
parliamentarians and the democratic institutions of France were in 
fact to face this very real challenge when this force came to "dictate 
its wishes from the streets. 115 
The Croix de Feu et Briscards, fresh from tasting the applause 
from the Paris march of the night before, joined the Solidarite Fran-
caise, the Jeunesses Patriotes, and the Action Francaise by deliver-
~--
ing a manifesto of its own on February Six. Through the medium of the 
press, the. Croix de Feu addressed the nation, the French people, and 
their "disponibles. 11 The appeal began with the assertion that the 
Communists had enslaved the Daladier Government and that the dictato-
rial r~gime was well on its way. Quick action could prevent this totali-
tarian bid for power if all serious citizens would line up behind the 
Croix de Feu on February Six. This "call to action':' ended with a dia-
tribe against the ppliticians and democratic institutions of the time. 6 
A new member now joined the .familiar list of protesters, namely, 
the Front Universitaire. For the first time in French history, this 
student-group became a major political element which demanded to be 
heard. Its appeal called upon all students to be: 
Outside and above parties, independents from all organi-
zations either of the Right or the Left, we come to appeal 
to those among you that have always refused, as we have, to 
be involved in politics. 
France is in peril. Tomorrow, the revolutionary organi-
zations will attempt to seize power and will surrender our 
5
catalan, Manifestation, pp. 607-608. 
6
rbid., p. 608. 
country without a fight to the conqueror. 
It is not necessary to be inscribed within a group to 
revolt before the horrible scandals which today condemn the 
republican system, and those that are parasites in it. 
For the honor of our generation, the students must rise 
up and lead the great national movement which is about to be 
depicted. 
We are not asking you to follow one committee or one 
group. We are asking you to descend, on Tuesday night, and 
to shout so that the country will be torn from the political 
pirates, from the cravens, from the traitors, and from the 
swindlers. 
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All of you meet on the Boulevard Saint-Michel on Tuesday, 
February 6, at 6:30 P.M.7 
Taking the cue from the Front Universitaire, the Fed{ration Nation-
ale des Contribuable.rde la Seine through their chief, M. Bardou, de-
clared itself above parties in its presentation. Claiming that the 
Taxpayers Association always had the national interest at heart, the 
Fedlration Nationale communicated publicly that it could not neglect 
to move into the streets of Paris. This league called upon its ad-
herents to protest vigorously on February Six, so that its combined 
voices would be loud enough to let the Government know that it opposed 
11 an immoral political clique. 118 
The veterans of the L~gion d 1Honneur n{corls au p{ril de Leur Vie, 
I . 
led by President Josse, a former senator, was like the other leagues 
already mentioned, indignant over the recent series of scandalous reve-
lations. These veteran heroes placed the bulk of the blame on the 
7L'Ami du Peuple, January 6, 1934. This appeal was independent 
of all those made by the other political leagues. 
8catalan, Manifestation, pp. 608-609. 
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Radical~Socialist Governments by saying that France's disgraceful in~ 
ternal and external policies, under the Cartel des Gauches, must im-
mediately be reversed if the country were to be saved. For the quick~ 
est possible action on this matter, the Legion d'Honneur summoned all 
the patriotic associations--as well as all individual Frenchmen de-
serving of the name--to group themselves, to unite, and to act with 
the maximum of cooperation. 
. , 
With such elan, the drive to awake sleep-
ing energies and to combat the 11dictatoria1 rule of the free-masons 11 
would become an overwhelmingly successful operation. 9 
Continuigg with the chronicling of the appeals made by the ~ri-
ous leagues before the February Six Riot, we encounter the very power-
ful Union Nationale des Combattants protesting that the Daladier Gov-
10 
ernment was two-faced. The U.N.C. ordered its followers to assemble 
at 8!00 P.M. Tuesday night in front of the Grand-Palais, the Cours-la-
Reine, and the Victor-Emmanuel III Avenue. 
Forty-eight hours ago, in the presence of our leaders, 
M. Frot shook M. Chiappe's hands wtth great affection and 
thanked him fervently. Twenty-four hours later, he handed 
him to the vengeance of the Socialist Party. 
If the Prefect of Police was guilty, what was this 
Judas 1 kiss?--and why offer him a post in Morocco?ll 
Here the contradictory action of Premier Daladier and his col-
leagues was cited as a major issue. in the U.N.C. 's manifesto. Similar 
questions were being asked all·over the country. But as no answers 
9catalan; Manifestation, p. 609. 
10ch~rau, Concorde, pp. 85-86. 
11
catalan, Manifestation, p. 609. 
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or explanations were forthcoming from the Premier, the periodicals of 
France that appeared that week reiterated their objections to Chiappe's 
removal. 
, 
The Journal des Debats, the oldest periodical in France, cata-
logued the work done by the new Daladier Government and stated that 
this new 11ministerial crisis" revealed the degradation of the French 
political system. Secondly, asserted the weekly, it was obvious that 
the na.tion and the parliamentary cartel were enemies. Especially dis-
, 
tressing to the French people, continued the Journal des Debats, was 
the reshuffling of practically the same Radical-Socialists in succes-
sive ministries. 12 The next week 1s issue carried the following ap-
praisal of this Government by the Cartel des Gauches: 
A Government was needed. It was anarchy that installed 
itself in power. The nation demanded justice, cold facts, 
and reasoning. What it got was incoherence and brutality.l3 
The rather biting periodical Revue Politigue et Parlementaire re-
peated the now familiar tune that Daladier had dismissed Chiappe to 
obtain Socialist votes, and then gave its opinion of the Government as 
being one of: 
Illusions, prevarications, concussion! 
Stup~faction, indignation, abomination! 
Interpellations, manifestations, confusion! 
Explanation, verification, putrefaction! 
Continuation?l4 . · 
12Anon., nLe minist~re Daladier," Journal des Debats, Vol. 2084 
(February 2, 1934), pp. 173-174. 
13 Anon., 11 La crise politique, 11 Journal des D~bats, Vol. 2085 
(February 9, 1934) , p. 211. 
14 J. Compeyrot, 11 Les divagations du cre'dit de 1 1 etat, 11 Revue 
Politique et Parlementaire, Vol. 41 (February 10, 1934), p. 209. 
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As far as the nervous public of Paris in this period was con-
cerned, it was decided that 11 continuation11 would not be the final word. 
This was definitely the attitude adopted by the more aggressive ele-
ments of the Municipal Council of Paris when that body turned against 
the National Government itself. These did not exactly help to calm 
down the already frenzied protests that had been issuing in ever-
increasing numbers from the press, the periodicals, and the leagues. 
Those men elec~ed by the Paris citizenry held a meeting on Feb-
ruary 5 and, in the name of the city of Paris, declared themselves in 
• opposition to the administrative changes--especially the elimination 
of Chiappe from the city. The following day placards were posted on 
many walls all over Paris making this position known. These angered 
public servants blamed politics for their losing two fine men: Chiappe 
and Renard (former Prefect of the Seine who had resigned in protest). 
The Municipal Councillors were convinced that the Daladier Government 
was idle, immoral, and on the road to eliminating cherished French 
freedoms. This manifesto made a strong appeal to the Parisians because 
. f h . 1 d . 15 ~t came rom t e~r own e evate representat~ves. 
When even their representatives told them to move into the streets 
to protest, many Parisians wondered, understandably~ whether the coun-
cillors had been motivated by some secret political information. The 
appeal made by the Municipal Councillors could not be taken lightly by 
the Government for the signatories included: (1) Colonel Jean Ferrandi, 
President of the Association Nationale des Officiers Combattants; 
15
catalan, Manifestation, p. 607. 
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(2) Charles des Isnards, Vice-President of the Jeunesses Patriotes; 
16 
and (3) Georges Lebecq, leader of the U.N.C. 
To this call for action by the Municipal Councillors was appended 
a second manifesto when the first one was placarded all over Paris 
walls and kiosks. The second manifesto was signed by some thirty dep-
uties of the Seine district who vigorously protested the departure of 
Chiappe and Renard from their respective posts. The original copy of 
this document had been sent to the Ministry of the Interior. The dep-
uties' signatures included such well-known men as MM. Denais, Dommange, 
Douissain, Jean Fabry, Louis Four~s, Marcel H~raud, Paul Reynaud, 
Georges Scapini, Soulier, Pierre Taittinger, and Lionel des Tastes. 
All these men could depend on sizeable followers in time of need. The 
. . 17 
emergency and the need were declared to be now. 
With the press, the periodicals, the leagues, the Municipal Coun-
cillors of Paris, and even the Deputies of the Seine issuing ncalls to 
action11 on February 5-6, 1934, the public became uncontrollable. When, 
on the Great February Six, the masses of human beings invaded the 
streets, it was obvious that·these appeals had been answered. Through 
the use of placards, through circulated brochures, and through other 
communicative media, a profound antiparliamentary and anti-Daladier 
spirit was expressed. The human forces which had been brought to 
understand that their Government had cheated them were not to be easily 
16catalan, Manifestation, p. 607. 
17ch~rau, Concorde, pp. 74-75. 
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18 guided once they invaded the streets. The "Democratic Crisis of 
1934 in France" was entering its most critical period, The issue to 
be resolved was an extremely important and serious one for France·: 
Would France be able to withstand this organized onslaught against 
the Third French Republic and its imperfect but democratic institutions? 
.The Early Phase of February Six 
Meeting places set by appeals.-- It was on the eve of February 
Six that the numerous appeals just presented were formulated. In them 
were given the objectives on which to concentrate, the assembly points 
for the different organizations, and, of course, the times to congre-
gate. It will be invaluable, if we desire a comprehensive view of the 
Great February Six Riot, to restate the political leagues' orders on 
these three points. Such a presentation will help bring clarity to a 
subject which, otherwise, might appear as extremely confusing. 
The Action Francaise had commanded the royalists to assemble 
immediately after working hours in front of the Palais-Bourbon. The 
Chamber of Deputies was to be their objective. From the appeal it 
19 
could be deduced that the time would be between 5~00 P.M. and 6:00 P.M. 
The Solidarit~ Franjaise had already established its objective as 
far back as January 15. On that day, while the association had been 
assembled in Wagram Hall, M. Jacques Fromentin pronounced the follow-
ing words which were to receive the approval of his league: 11Faced 
18Maurice Paz, Le Six Fevrier (Paris, 1936), p. 11. 
19Action Fran~aise, February 6, 1934. See FIGURE 2 MAP for move-
ments of various leagues during early hours--before 9:00 P.M. 
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with the enemy within our country, faced with the Palaia-Bourbon 
20 gutter; it is our duty to cleah them up! 11 With the Chamber of Dep-
uties as the center for their adherents' assault, the Solidariti Fran-
caise was to be ready to move at 7:00P.M., after using the assigned $ 
assembly points near the Grand Boulevards. A special precaution for 
February Six was:·;made by the Solidarite: in case the approaches to 
the Palais-Bourbon should be blocked by the police on the side of the 
Place de la Concorde, a turning maneuver was planned so as to attack 
21 
the Chamber from the Place du Palais-Bourbon. 
The Jeunesses Patriotes' meeting place was publicly announced to 
be the Place de l 1HStel de Ville by 7:00P.M. From there the leaguers 
b . . 22 were to move towards their o jectLve--the Chamber. 
Thus the list went on and on. For brevity's sake, it is useful 
to sunnnarize the rest of the political leagues by stating that: 
(1) the Front Universitaire was to assemble on the Boulevard Saint-
Michel by 6:30 P.M. and head for the Palais-Bourbon; (2) the F~d~ration 
des Contribuables invited its followers to join all other leagues dem-
onstrating according to their political affiliation, their personal 
preference, and the access from their home to the group selected; 
(3) the Croix de Feu et Briscards ordered its 11dispos" to be ready 
for 6:00 P.M. to receive further orders; (4) the A.R.A.C. called its 
meeting for 8:00 ~.M. at the Rond-Point and near the borders of the 
20L 1Ami du Peuple, January 16, 1934. 
21catalan, Mani'festation, p. 611. 
22Ibid. 
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I 
Champs-Elysees so as to facilitate movements towards the Chamber; 
(5) the Association Nationale des Officiers Combattants' members were 
to start mixing with other leaguers of their preference around 8:00P.M.; 
and (6) the U.N.C. was called for 8:00 P.M. on the Champs-Elys~es. 
From the above commands, it is obvious that all political leagues were 
alerted to begin their activities for February Six between 5:00P.M. 
and 8:00P.M., and that they were to demonstrate near or in the vicinity 
23 
of the Palais-Bourbon. 
It would also appear from the foregoing that the political leagues 
had agreed beforehand to concentrate their efforts on the Chamber of 
Deputies. Yet the evidence showing that such agreement existed is 
very thin. On this matter, the records reveal that during the January 
Riots, a few phone calls and personal conversations had been exchanged 
for January 9, 11, and 12. The groups involved then were the Jeunesses 
Patriotes, the Action Franjaise, and the Ftd~ration des Contribuables. 
These contacts, however, had been of minor importance and involved un-
importapt matters. The historian who relies on the available objective 
evidence is forced to conclude that no overall action by these politi-
. . d 24 cal leagues had been ant1c1pate . 
Another noteworthy observation derived from a study of the 
"leagues' calls to action" is that the special assembly areas assigned 
by the various associations formed a vast circle around the Palais~ 
Bourbon. Beginning on the Champs-Elys~es, we find the U.N.C. activating 
23
catalan, Manifestation, pp. 612-613. 
24
rbid., pp. 611-612. 
243 
its members, while the A.R.A.C. was to be at the Rond-Point. Further 
to the right, on the Grand Boulevards, would be the SolidaritlFran-
, 
caise; while far to the right, several miles from the Champs-Elysees, 
d 
on the Place de l'Hotel de Ville, the Jeunesses Patriotes had been 
alerted. Moving in back of the Chamber to the extreme right we find, 
on the Boulevard Saint-Michel, the Front Universitaire was to assemble. 
The Action Francaise' followers had the immediate rear of the Chamber 
for they were to move from the Boulevard Saint-Germain. Finally, the 
Croix de Feu et Briscards, yet unassigned, was to cover the left of the 
Chamber and complete the circle. Thus it can be seen that if all went 
according to plans, a circular formation would isolate the Palais-
25 
Bourbon from the rest of France. 
Before dismissing this question of the political leagues' objective--
the Palais-Bourbon--it is pertinent to try to answer the question: 
what political goals did these associations have in mind? M. Jean 
Renaud, leader of the Solidarite Francaise, later testifying before 
the February Six Inquiry Commission, suggested that the leaguers de-
sired the Daladier Government to fall. M. Taittinger of the Jeunesses 
Patriotes asserted that this had also been his main goal. The various 
Municipal Councillors when questioned reiterated the same. 26 
In a letter dispatched by Colonel de La Rocque to his provincial 
sections on January 5, the commander wrote: 
25catalan, Manifestation, pp. 613-614. 
26rbid., pp. 614•615. 
The goal that we have is to end the dictatorship under 
the influence of the Socialist; and to call to power a clean 
administration; get rid of the corrupted politicians no 
matter who they might be, and to have as objective the re-
establishment of national order within a secure ring of 
se'curite'. 2 7 
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The existence of such political leagues, no matter what their pol-
itical aims, was a dangerous element within the frame of French democ-:; 
racy because of their allegiance to an authoritarian and semimilitary 
discipline. Once these forces were unleashed over the Paris streets, 
it would be difficult to prevent disorder even with the strictest con-
trols being used, Exactly what role these leagues hoped to play within 
the established French democratic system was also highly questionable. 
The answer to such a query would furthermore depend on what a person's 
view on the following matters was: (1) Did the leagues have the right 
to consider themselves speaking for the French people? (2) Was the 
11pressure from the stl:'eet" proposedaquantity found in a sound demo-
cratic system? (3) Would such 11pressure" benefit French democracy? 
Evidence shows that France was divided as to what were the correct 
replies to these questions at that moment in history. 
Paris on Tuesday afternoon.-- During the early hours of the morning 
of February Six, the crowds circulated on the Grand Boulevards, on the 
Champs•Elysees, on the Concorde, and near the Palais-Bourbon, as they 
always did. There was no sign of anything different from any other 
days, except that no taxis were to be seen, for they were on strike. 
Soon after the usual morning rush, the Paris streets assumed a semi-
27catalan, Manifestation, p. 615. 
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deserted appearance for a while. As lunch time approached~ certain 
precautionary measures were taken by the police. Unusually large 
28 groups were not allowed on the Concorde. 
By noontime, however, these efforts proved in vain, for larger 
and larger groups began forming around the areas surrounding the Place 
de la Madeleine, the Rue Royale, and the Place de la Concorde. This 
amassing continued for several hours and then, around 3:00 P.M.--the 
time when the Chamber was about to open its sitting to listen to Da-
ladier 1s ministerial declaration--this crowd broke by waves into the 
. 29 
strateg1c and relatively unprotected Place de la Concorde. 
Our study of the leagues' appeals above pointed to the Place de 
la Concorde as not chosen so early by any of the leaguers as an assem-
bling area. Around 3:00P.M., because of this fact, the Place de la 
Concorde was still relatively free from police protection as those 
waves of human beings kept pouring onto it from all directions. This 
crowd became, in a short while, a massive sea of people whose voices 
kept rising in volume with the passage of time. While this steady 
drone continued, the crowd kept swelling and swelling. This early 
Tuesday mob was not homogeneously grouped. It was composed of: (1) 
leaguers, who had arrived early; (2) women and children, who soon de-
parted when the proceedings became vicious in nature; and (3) hundreds 
of curious, who just wanted to see what would take place. All these 
people were calm enough and kept lingering around, moving about, and 
28 Candide, February 8, 1934. 
29 Le Temps, February 8, 1934. 
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turning here and there to see what was developing. It reminded an 
observer of the crowds that pile into a Spanish arena to see a torea-
30 dor do the ''slaughtering or be slaughtered" by the bull. 
As it was later agreed by many witnesses testi~ying before the 
February Six Inquiry Commission, this early crowd took on an atmos-
phere of expectancy because of certain reports fo.und in the press of 
late. Many just desired to demonstrate their disgust with the exist-
ing Government and believed this the best way to express their feel-
ings. Other witnesses said that this human mass gave the impression 
that .a huge carnage was being prepared. Certain newspaper reports, 
alluded to above, had given some basis for such a belief to exist. 
These reports involved.the secret movements of colored troops, machine 
guns, tanks, and cannons. The newspapers ciliaimed these military tools 
had been slowly entering Paris for the past few days and were to be 
used in a forthcoming coup d'Eftat. It was further suggested that the 
Daladier Government was planning to use this equipment against any 
31 demonstrators or rioters. 
Leon Daudet had caused much emotional comment all over Paris after 
he had disclosed that; 
Now, they have imagined that such a regime cannot be 
defended except by machine-gun fire. I know, from unimpeach-
abilie sources, that twelve of these dismantled instruments have 
been--four days ago--transported with great secrecy to the 
Palais-Bourbon.32 
30Pierre Appell, La soiree du 6 fevrier 1934 ~ la Concorde, Chambre 
des deputes, Annexe 3386, Documents Parlementaires (Paris, May 17, 1934). 
31catalan, Manifestation, pp. 610-616. 
32Action Franjaise, February 3, 1934. 
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Other newspapers reaffirmed the truth of such statements and 
added that no one could be calm when colored troops were secretly 
alerted to move on Paris at a ·moment's notice. Le Jour added that in 
combination with these troops, the Government had started moving tanks 
f h . . ' d rom t e Comp1egne epot. These stories were believed to be true by 
:33 the crowd on the Concorde that Tuesday afternoon. 
While this considerable but relatively passive crowd circulated 
slowly back and forth over the Place de la Concorde, the deputies were 
moving towards their seats within the Palaia-Bourbon. Premier Daladier 
arrived hurriedly, quickly made his way into the building, and the 
Chamber of Deputies soon. came to order so as to hear the leading item 
34 
on the business for the day--Daladier's ministerial declaration. 
The Tumultuous Chamber 
Disgraceful sitting.-- T~e Chamber of Deputies opened precise~y 
at 3:00 P.M. that afternoon with the reading of the minutes of the last 
meeting by one of the Chamber's secretaries, M. Guillaume Ballu. The 
presiding officer over the legislative body of France was its President, 
M. Fernand Bouisson. After the initial rituals, President Bouisson 
read Daladier's letter which demanded the convocation of the deputies 
so as to listen to the ministerial pronouncements. With this business 
out of the way, Daladier mounted the tribune. ·From the Left and most 
of the Extreme-Left came thunderous acclamations. 35 
33Le Jour, February 5, 1934. 
34Le Temps, February 7, 1934. 
35
chambre des deputes, Journal Officiel du 7 flvrier, 1934, 15 
i~me Legislature, Debats Parlementaires (Paris, 1934), pp. 405-406. 
Messieurs--
For a month now a scandal born fram several individuals' 
failures ... ,36 
248 
Daladier could go no further. Cackling and laughter broke over 
the Chamber, especially from the Right and Center benches. Philippe 
Henriot, the young and vigorous heckling representative from the Gironde, 
hollered that other "public officials are involved." While this racket 
was going on, a member of the Chamber. arrived late and received applause. 
Daladier, seemingly unaffected by such disturbances, went on: 
.... has paralyzed the work of the Chamber, has set the 
·parties one against the other, has demoralized the country, 
and has furnished the adversaries of the regime the chance 
to take up again the attacks that the republican vigilance 
got rid of in the past.37 
This last statement brought down "the Chamber. The Right, believ-
ing the insinuation was made for them, began laughing loudly and made 
the hemicycle reverberate with various types of disturbing noises. 
The Left joined this clamor by trying to counteract it with vigorous 
hand-clapping. In the center of this Chamber gone berserk was Premier 
Daladier. He still kept on the appearance of imperturbability and 
when the chance appeared, he carried on: 
We will get out of this insufferable atmosphere only 
by bringing full clarity to the subject, by being courageous, 
and by showing energy. The Government before you has already 
begun this task.38 
36J.O.C. du 7 fevrier, D~bats, pp. 405-406. 
2 7 Ibid. , p . 405 . 
38rbid., pp. 405-406. 
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Now the last word brought a repetition of the disturbances des-
cribed above, especially from the Right. The Right had correctly as-
sumed the last words referred to the administrative changes. An in-
cessant booing, shouting, laughing, and bangingi~ now resulted. The 
Left shouted reprimands to the Right and applauded in Daladier 1s di-
rection. The Right in turn hollered that they 11had enough of Daladier." 
Daladier then threw in the comment that he had been in power only eight 
days and wanted to be judged on only what he had done. This proved 
to be the wrong statement to make. With great difficulty President 
Bouisson brought back order, he scolded the deputies for their conduct, 
and he told them to behave from now on. Daladier managed to go on: 
Besides the faults that your Inquiry Commission will 
denounce, and which will end in my punishing the guilty--
without mercy--your Government has established that within 
certain public services exists a relaxation of vigilance, a 
weakening of the sense of responsibility, which demand a 
renovation of personnel and methods, You tell us if we did 
the right thing.39 
The Left and Extreme-Left gave a strong ovation to these state-
ments, but the Right shouted that the country already had indicated 
what it thought of Daladier 1 s 11Vite et Fort. 11 Daladier made several 
attempts to continue. He interjected the double question of whether 
he was correct when he desired to restore authority within the Repub-
lican state by refusing to allow backward conditions to exist; and 
whether he could be blamed for refusing to keep an irresponsible admin-
istration. The Chamber, however, was not listening and proceeded to 
39 I , i J.O.C. du 7 fevr~er, Debats, p. 406. 
40 
more disturbanc~s. 
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Pandemonium reigned. The Left kept applauding as hard and as 
long as possible until exhaustion would set in. This was repeated 
time after time in various attempts to drown out the rather derogatory 
remarks emanating from the Right. President Bouisson begged the Dep-
uties to control themselves, for no one could speak under such noisy 
conditions. Daladier tried unsuccessfully to shcut his ideas on the 
composition of an Inquiry Commission. The attempt to speak made by 
Daladier was cut short by M. Renaud Jean. Jean, representative from 
the Communist section, got up and bellowed: . . 41 11Long 11ve the Sov1ets . 11 
This had a sobering effect on the assembly for a moment. Daladier, 
taking advantage of the opportunity, stated that the Inquiry Commission 
would allow the Chamber and the Senate to return to their normal legis-
lative duties. Then everything broke loose. All the deputies rose 
from their seats, made threats to their opponents, booed loudly and 
incessantly, sang songs, and some shouted for Daladier's resignation. 
Others went all over the hall laughing like fools, dancing, and jump-
ing here and there. Giving up the thought of bringing back some order, 
President Bouisson suspended this disgraceful sitting. 42 
It had been a good time for President Bouisson to take such a 
course, for fist fights were about to start. The Communists were 
singing the Internationale, and the Third Republic's Chamber resounded 
40 " /. . J.O.C. du 7 fevrier, Debats, p. 406. 
41Ibid. · 
42Ibid. 
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with demands for the fall of the Republic and the setting up of 
soviets everywhere. Daladier at the tribune was stunned, while Frat 
occupied a position in front of the Premier, and his clenched fists 
were ready to take on all comers. The press gallery was filled with 
heads who just could not turn fast enough to see all they desired to 
observe. Never in the Third French Republic's history had a sitting 
been suspended in the middle of a ministerial declaration. All the 
decorum demanded in a well-ordered democracy was lacking. The demo-
cratic principle of respect of an opponent's opinions was completely 
disregarded. 43 
After President Bouisson reconvened the Chamber, he admonished 
his colle~gues and threatened the closing of the session if any more 
disturbances occurred. The deputies, apparently afraid of what the 
public's reaction would be if the session should be closed, listened 
to Daladier give the rest of his address. Few interruptions were made 
as Daladier declared: 
We need to vote laws protecting savings--effectively. 
We must have a budget before March 31. If we do not, the 
labors exerted for eighteen months by five successive gov-
ernments will be incomplete--and will become sterile. 
While the unemployed are waiting impatiently for news--
true or false--of the scandals, while certain partisans be-
lieve they are in need of revenge because of their misfortunes, 
the peasant is asking how he can sell his harvest, the worker 
sees his remuneration reduced, and he is frightened by the 
menace of "loafing. 11 The business man and the industrial 
leader are struggling against a foreign competition which every 
day is getting more severe and more pressing. The middle 
classes are overwhelmed by high.prices, while our youngsters 
are in doubts about their future. 
43Alexander Werth, France in Ferment (London, 1935), p. 148. 
You--elected by the people--in contact with them in all 
our provinces--know their sufferings, their worries, and 
their hopes. Is it possible, without hurting your feelings, 
that you prefer passionate conquests instead of carrying out 
the duty assigned to you by France? 
The scandals will pass, but the problems will remain. 
The Republic, in order to carry on, must solve the latter. 
We have decided not to change our monetary status--but the 
budget must be voted. The budget, once voted, will be the 
beginning of the fight against unemployment. Next we will 
take up the task of bringing new life into the economic acti-
vities of the country .. · The improving of our trade balance 
depends on realistic policies founded upon reciprocity and 
compensations. 
We will also need to reform, from the bottom up, our 
ancient fiscal system. We must replace this archaic and 
complicated machinery by a simple mechanism run along more 
modern lines .... with more regular, and less precarious, re-
turns. 
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· In the face of a worried and divided Europe, we reaffirm 
our faith for the peace and security of France, whose politics 
internationally can be summari~ed by two phrases: international 
cooperation--national defense.44 
Daladier went on speaking about world peace and France's reliance 
on the League to accomplish this goal. As his last remarks to the dep-
uties, he again reminded them that: (1) heavy responsibilities had 
been entrusted to them by the people of France; (2) the Daladier Gov-
ernment was backing an investigation into the Stavisky scandals through 
the use of a parliamentary commission; and (3) he hoped to be given the 
chance to try to solve France's chronic problems as he had outlined 
them above. The Left and Extreme~Left received these final words with 
thunderous approval. The Right, on the other hand, waited for the nexS 
45 
move. 
44J.O.C. du 7 f~vrier, D~bats, p. 406. 
45Ibid. 
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Interpellations and confidence votes.-- A comparatively quiet 
Chamber had listened to M. Daladier give the last sections of his min-
isterial declaration. The Radical-Socialists and the Socialist S.F.I.O., 
except in several places, had kept cheering his words rather weakly. 
It seemed apparent that the opposition cared little about the content 
of his declaration, for their uncomplimentary ejaculations tended to 
dominate the assemblage. The latter were looking for a scapegoat on 
which could be deposited the blame for France's troubles. Daladier 
46 
was to be the one who presented himself as the goat to them. 
After the Premier had presented his views on the present situa-
tion, President Bouisson took a minute to remind the deputies that all 
interpellations addressed to the Chautemps ~istry were now obsolete 
as a new ministry now held the reins of power. The President continued 
that he had some seventeen demands for interpellations on the agenda 
against the Daladier Ministry. These interpellations were of such a 
variety that to answer them satisfactorily would keep the Chamber in 
session for weeks. The interpellations covered such topics as the 
Government's views on the agricultural problems, the sale of cheap and 
dishonest housing in Wdrthern France, the situation in Indochina, the 
movement of certain infantry troops, and the recent scandals and 
changes. To answer these correctly, not only would the time element 
be considerable, but a person would need information then not even 
47 
available. 
46 Werth, France in Ferment, p. 148. 
47J.O.C. du 7 f~vrier, D~bats, pp. 406-407. 
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Daladier was obviously shaken by the impact of so many interpel-
lation demands presented so quicktY> and he mounted the tribune once 
more to announce that time was now of the essence.· Because of this 
serious time factor, Premier Daladier insisted that the immediate 
discussion of all these interpellations could not be undertaken. If 
it were, continued the Premier, the debate would go on for days. But 
as a compromise measure, Daladier suggested listening to only three 
opposition speakers: MM-<- Dommange, Ybarne'garay, and Franklin-Bouillon. 
Further reflection prompted the Premier to add the Communist interpel-
lation to the list. Before stepping down from the rostrum, he further 
declared that his ministry wanted to know--tonight--if it had or had 
not the confidence of the Chamber. Besides, on the acceptance of this 
political expedient he had just proposed, he posed the question of 
48 
confidence. 
President Bouisson then recognized M. Franklin-Bouillon, the 
speaker from the Right, Franklin-Bouillon stated that apparently a 
new technique for handling interpellations had been devised, for the 
Premier had no such right as he had just exercised. Bouillon sarcasti-
cally thanked Daladier for keeping him on the suggested list to be 
heard, but he preferred to leave the compliments of oratory to those 
who deserved them; namely, MM. L~on Blum and Frossard. Strange as it 
might seem, the Left did not applaud this complimentary statement. 
Franklin-Bouillon next stated that M. Gaston'Henry-Haye would speak 
first for the Right. The President of the Chamber said this was out 
4 Bwerth, France in Ferment, p. 148. 
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of order. Henry-Haye insisted and insisted and finally succeeded in 
forcing himself onto the floor. 49 
Henry-Haye took on the attitude of bewilderment. He could not 
comprehend why the Left was refused the right to present its much dis-
cussed interpellation against Chiappe. Henry-Haye was further shocked 
by Daladier 1 s position, for. the Premier had just spoken of Republican 
liberties, and no sooner had he so spoken, than he tried to abridge 
them. This proved, continued the enraged deputy, that Daladier was 
a tyrant who was undertaking a coup to destroy the hard-fought-for 
French liberties. Throughout this heated presentation, the Right 
and the Center applauded vigorously every accusation, and the Chamber 
took on the mood of a political rally. Henry-Haye, encouraged by pro-
longed sympathies, declared that he would never "submit to Prince 
Daladier." Daladier was a fascist in disguise, said the speaker--
and a poor one at that. Haye concluded with an emotional call for 
50 
action to save French liberties. The Chamber turned into an uproar. 
At that moment came a shout from the Communist benches that Henry-
Haye was a "dirty Jesuit." Anticlericalism now flared up as Renry-Haye 
hollered that the Communists were 11not only turncoat Jesuits, but false 
revolutionists." Haye asserted proudly that he had been brought up 
with nice people and not a "hunch of scums 11 like the Communists were. 
President Bouisson could well be nearing a nervous breakdown by now, 
as he continued trying to restore order. Bouisson finally shouted to 
49 I • I 4 J.o.c. du 7 fevr~er, Debats, pp. 407- 08. 
50rbid., p. 408. 
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Haye to "shut up." Haye refused. M. Lionel des Tastes then jumped 
up and threw further obstructions into the proceedings by demanding 
a "scrutin public ~ la tribune" on whether Daladier's selection of 
interpellations was acceptable. 51 The session was again suspended. 
When the session reopened, President Bouisson in a calm and con-
trolled tone announced that the scrutin public ~ la tribune was in 
order and voting would take until 5!05 P.M. This delaying maneuver 
required that each deputy mount the tribune to drop his vote into an 
52 
urn. The procedure took an hour. 
The result of the scrutin public was that Daladier's proposal 
was carried by three hundred votes of the 517 cast--with 217 opposed. 
Henry-Haye.had barely heard this when he got up once more. Haye ac-
cused the Premier of trying to smother the traditional democratic pro-
cedures of the Chamber. M. Blum2asked for and received the right to 
have the floor at this juncture. Blum identified the present buf-
foonery in the Chamber as a deliberate aampaign by the 9pposition to 
prevent the wheels of free institutions from turning. The Socialist 
leader pleaded for moderation in this moment of crisis and said the 
present debate was an aimless one. Blum proposed that an understand-
ing could be reached if the seventeen deputies desiring to question 
Daladier should meet, select three among themselves, and those chosen 
would challenge the Premier. This plea to save time received approval 
51 , , . J.O.C. du 7 fevrier, Debats, p. 408. 
52werth, Ferment in France, p. 149. 
53 
from all over the Chamber. 
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From the Right, M. Xavier Vallat arose. This ex-serviceman made 
quite a striking figure, for he had a wooden leg. Vallat declared 
that he would just as soon not speak, for he was soon to join his 
veteran friends in the streets. Daladier took the floor and noted 
that he had never imagined that his suggestion on the interpellations 
would create so much steam. Turning towards Vallat, Daladier pointed 
out that he had to preserve peace and would not condone any rioting. 
Besides, those veterans out there 11 in the streets 11 had been born 
after 1900. Returning to the interpellations, the Premier explained 
that he had arbitrarily selected those he believed offered the great-
est threats to his Government, but that he did not care which were 
54 heard. 
Henry-Haye once more on the floor demanded another scrutin public 
' a la tribune. Daladier jumped up and bellowed that he had enough of 
this. The Right was definitely obstructing the session. He moved 
that the time be saved by all the interpellations being shelved in-
definitely. A great tumult swept the gathering. ~ M. Andre Tardieu 
demanded the floor. Just as the latter stood up to speak a Communist 
rushed towards him, called him vile names, and a debacle ensued. Once 
more the Chamber was suspended. A nearby clock struck 6:00 P.M. 55 
At 6:10 P.M. the Chamber returned to order. A glance around the 
53J.o.c. du 7 f~vrier, D~bats, p. 409. 
54
rbid., pp. 409-410. 
55werth, France in Ferment, p. 150. 
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meeting hall revealed that half of the press seats were empty, while 
a similar condition existed in the public galleries. The former occu-
pants of these chairs had gone outside where more tragic events were 
going on, as we shall see later. Yet the deputies kept droning on and 
on. Every ten minutes or so even a few of them got tired and left the 
56 debating hall. 
When the Chamber reopened, Tardieu began accusing Daladier of 
being the 11 first fascist of France, 11 and added that no premier could 
check the number of interpellations--this was checking liberty itself. 
Maurice Thorez, the Communist leader, pooh-poohed such an interpreta-
tion and began sending cat~calls in Tardieu 1 s direction. Thorez then 
unrolled his name-calling vocabulary and hurled several choice words 
at the former premier now on the floor trying to be heard. Tardieu, 
taking as much of this as he could, answered that Thorez ~as a loud-
mouth pig, and that he (Tardieu) had ordered the Communist behind bars 
d ld 1 d . . 57 once an wou ove to o Lt agaLn. 
While the Tardieu-Thorez insults were flying, the spectators who 
had stayed in the galleries felt this was the best part of the show 
yet and well worth staying for. Thorez spoke about the 11class war11 
being near, developed the idea that Tardieu was a d--- liar, and that 
he would enjoy spitting in Tardieu 1 s eyes. The Communist leader con-
gratulated himself for being present at the moment when parliamentary 
institutions were showing how decadent they had become. Furthermore, 
56
werth, France in Ferment, p. 150. 
57 , ~ J.O.C. du 7 fevrier, Debats, pp. 411-412. 
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he added, the Communists were ready for the revolution against Daladier--
the "Jacobin." President Bouisson, shaking with disgust, told Thorez 
58 
this was enough and 11 to shut his big mouth." 
The discussion led to another scrutin public ~ la tribune being 
taken on whether to accept cloture. Daladier once more connected a 
confidence vote to the scrutin public. Voting went on--much by proxy--
and of some 506 ballots cast, Daladier received a majority of 303 
59 
votes. 
This was barely over when yet another balloting was taken on 
whether to throw out all the interpellations. 
, 
Leon Blum jumped up and 
startled the deputies present by saying that his party not only con-
sidered this the voting of confidence but also a "vote of combat." 
Someone interrupted Blum to say that trouble had reached a serious 
stage in the Concorde. 
the day of revolution. 
The Communists, shouting in unison, cheered 
60 
The Right shouted accusations towards Daladier. 
Werth described this dramatic moment as follows: 
I returned to the Chamber at 7:45 P.M. and found the 
place in a state bordering on panic. Some of the deputies 
were hurriedly leaving by the back door. 
The debate still dragged on, stupidly, pointlessly .... 
And then a most dramatic thing happened. M. Scapini, 
the blind deputy of the Right, suddenly rose to his feet and 
cried: "They are firing!" And pointing a threatening finger 
towards the -Government bench: 11Monsieur le President diOConseil, 
did you give orders to fire?" There was an uproar on the Left. 
5B J .o .c. du 7 fEtvrier' ne'bats' pp. 412-413. 
59Ibid. 
60
rbid., pp. 413-414. 
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11Down with the Fascists! 11 they cried. But the blind man 
persisted: "Did you give orders to fire, M. Daladier, 
answer me!'' And then M. Lionel des Tastes, another deputy 
of the Right, rushed into the hall, and cried! "The Pre-
fect of Police has just told me that shots have been fired. 
Go to the Concorde Bridge and look for yourselves!"61 
This disorder led to' one more suspended assembly. 
At 8:10 P.M. the Chamber reconvened. President Bouisson pleaded 
not to have any more disturbances and then proceeded to a vote of con-
fidence. The Journal Officiel here records: 
M. Camille Blaisot.-- The Government should leave there-
fore! (Loud exclamations from the Left and Extreme-Left.) 
M. Jean Lerolle.-- We are firing on the crowd, 
President! All the Paris deputies are protesting! 
on the Left and the Extreme-Left.) 
monsieur 
(Movement 
M. Georges Scapini.-- It is a Government of assassins! 
From the Center and the Right.-- Resign! Resign~ 
(Lively interruptions on the Left and Extreme-Left--prolonged 
disturbance.)62 
President Bouisson in exasperation threatened adjournment to Thurs-
day. The Chamber shouted its unanimous disapproval of this. The show 
went on with Franklin-Bouillon attacking the Daladier Government and 
advising Daladier to get out. The President said such language was 
inadmissible. The resulting vote of confidence gave 360 votes of ap-
proval to the Daladier Ministry. 63 
The political charivari was now completely out of control after 
this announcement. Daladier, dumbfounded, held both of his hands over 
6lwerth, France in Ferment, pp. 151-152. 
62J.O.C. du 7 f~vrier, nlbats, pp. 413-414. 
63
rbid., pp. 414-415. 
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his face so as not to see the mass of hollering, bickering, and jump-
ing deputies. 
; . 
The Basque deputy, Ybarnegaray, said that the "Civil 
War" had begun. Franklin-Bouillon leaped towards the speechless Pre-
mier and began swinging his fists while telling Daladier to resign 
and leave. Daladier did not even take notice of this as his young 
ministe~ Jean Mistler, Pierre Cot, and Guy la Chambre formed a pro-
tective ring around their leader. 64 
"Turn off the lights," shouted a deputy, "they will think the 
Chamber is empty!" The deputies began flying for the exits, and panic 
swept the Chamber clean. Daladier, hesitating on what should be done, 
was conducted by his colleagues to a waiting automobile outside and 
65 
spirited, still almost speechless, to a nearby point of safety. 
As the Chamber lights were extinguished, a comical scene occurred 
in the midst of these tragic events. This is a reference to the inci-
, 
dent M. Edouard Herriot encountered while speeding on foot along the 
Boulevard des Invalides to his home. Herriot was spotted by several 
rioters, who soon seized him and began beating him up. One rioter 
struck the victim and suggested: "D111own him in the Seine!" Herriot, 
who represented Lyons and was mayor of that city, answered that at 
least he preferred being "thrown into the Rh?,ne." Without having to 
66 
undergo any more beating, several gardiens de la paix rescued him. 
64Pierre Lazare££, Derni~re Edition (New York, 1940), p. 221. 
65Ibid., p. 222. 
66
:Edouard Herriot, Jadis, Vol. II (Paris, 1934), pp. 376-377. 
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Firing in the Street and the "Spilling of Blood" 
The rioters arrive.-- We must now backtrack to 3:00P.M. to ob-
serve how the rather calm group we had left on the Concorde came to 
drive the deputies into such a panic. As we have seen, the morning 
of February Six had been uneventful in the Concorde area. The day had 
started as a warm one for the season and had developed an air of usual-
ness until noon. It was at that time that crowds had gathered around 
the Concorde and finally, around 3:00P.M., had invaded the Place de 
67 la Concorde by waves. 
It was through the Place de la Concorde that the main assaults 
were to come that day. jThis main foyer of the February Six rioters 
became more and more the principal center of attraction as the after-
noon wore on. The police, realizing that this gathering crowd would 
not be convinced easily to go home, began preparing--too late--for the 
68 
worst. 
The police after 3:00 P.M. took on the duty of protecting the 
passage through the Concorde Bridge. Commissioner Rott~e, who was to 
take charge of the defense in this area, arrived around 4:45 P.M. He 
had orders to allow no one to pass over this key passageway to the 
Chamber--no matter the cost. To see that this command was carried out 
effectively, he had been assigned the small force of 195 men. The de-
fense for the time being was to depend on: (1) seventy gardiens de la 
67Laurent Bonnevay, Les journe'es sanglantes de f~vrier, 1934 
(Paris, 1935), p. 87. 
68p S. f I • az, l.X evr1.er, p. 13. 
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paix, (2) a hundred Mobile Guards, and (3) twenty-five Republican 
Guards on horseback. 69 The Mobile Guards were relatively new at this 
business, for it was only in 1927 that the mobile platoons of the in-
fantry legions and the rookie gendarmes--recuited at 1,500 to 2,000 a 
year--formed a corps called the Republican Mobile Guard. Serving under 
the Ministry of the Interior, they owed their allegiance to the National 
Government. , 70 Rottee was trying them out as riot shock troops that day. 
These 195 men were rather poorly equipped considering the task 
they had to carry. The gardiens de la paix carried their usual white 
night sticks and an automatic pistol each. The mounted Republican 
Guards had sabers, while the Mobile Guards had pistols. These police-
men were distributed at strategic points near the Place de la Madeleine, 
in the Faubourg Saint-Honor~, near the corner of the Rue Royale, and 
71 
near the Ministry of ~rine. 
Facing these new police recruits as well as the police which had 
been on the Goncorde since noon, the demonstrators of the Place de la 
Goncorde were increasing in number. The majority of this crowd was 
made up still of brave Frenchmen who had come to protest. They did 
. 72 little to prevent the police from taking their posit1ons. 
An ominous air hung around Paris as darkness came. Shutters were 
being tightly drawn, while steel curtains rattled down also earlier 
than usual. The restaurants in the rioting areas also took their pre-
69 Appell, La • I so1ree, p. 617. 
70 Colonel L. A. Grasset, 11 Qu 1 est-ce que la Garde Mobile? 11 
L'Illustration, Vol. 4747 (February 24, 1934), p. 235. 
71Appe11, La soir~e, p. 617. 
72Andr: Tardieu, Sur la pente (Paris, 1935), p. n. 
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cautions and closed early. The aristocnatic H~tel Crillon, opposite 
the Chamber and facing the Place de la Concorde, agreed with these 
movements and bolted its iron gates and barricaded its doors. The 
American Embassy to the left, still relatively new, had protection 
behind a high grillwork. Construction materials nearby were to be 
B 
used by the rioters that evening as dangerous weapons. 
While these precautions were being taken, the leaguers began 
moving on the Concorde. The process was slow at first, but at its 
74 
height that evening it included 100,000 human meMa~s. The new Prefect 
of Police, M. Bonnefoy-Sibour, arrived while these activities were 
being carried out. He took a position near the center of the Concorde 
Bridge which he kept most of the evening. It was just about that time 
also that the large crowd in the Place de la Concorde began surging 
forward towards the Concorde Bridge. Commissioner Rottte, feeling 
the crowd was moving too near, ordered the clearing of the embank-
ments south of the Place de la Concorde, as well as the immediate 
vicinity of the bridge. The Republican Guards charged into the human 
mass and succeeded in pushing it back. Circulation near the Concorde 
75 
Bridge was now prohibited. 
I This five o 1 clock charge, concluded Rottee, was to be the first 
of many similar attempts to seize control of the precious bridge. 
Therefore, the police were reassigned and the following pattern was 
73New York Herald (European Edition), February 7, 1934, pp. 1-2. 
74T d' ar ~eu, Sur la pente, p. n. 
75Appell, La soir~e, p. 617. 
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constructed: (1) on both sides of the bridge were placed thirty 
gardiens de la paix and Mobile Guards; (2) cars and police vans were 
placed at the bridgehead so as to leave only a small passage between 
the central vehicles; and (3) in front of these vehicles was established 
a cordon of twenty gardiens de la paix. 76 
Until 6:00 P.M. the police were unquestionably the masters of the 
situation. For many hours this leaderless crowd had been swelling to 
an immense size. But at that moment it still did not appear either 
. h . . 1 ... 1 77 as very v1cious or as av1ng a po 1t1ca purpose. But around that 
time, however, the mood of this human mass began to change. The po-
lice could also feel what was transpiring and were obviously worried 
as the leaguers now began to unload their followers on the already over-
crowded area. Alarming reports arrived that the Front Universitaire 
h d b . h 1 d . . 78 a egun to move on t e Bou evar Sa1nt-Germa1n. 
As these leaguers arrived on the Concorde scene, the crowd became 
denser and denser, and the resulting pushing and packing brought vio-
lence. The shouts now became more distinct. The clearest ones were: 
"Down With The Thieves!" ''Resign! 11 "Down With Daladier! 11 "Long Live 
Chiappe!" and "Policemen Join Us!" Not yet did the crowd show any 
79 
antagonism towards the law-enforcement officials. 
76Appell, La soir:e, p. 617. 
77 Le Temps, February 8, 1934. 
78paul-Emile Cadilhac, 11L 1Emeute dans les rues," L'Illustration, 
Vol. 4745 (February 10, 1934), p. 158. 
79Bonnevay, Les jourriees sanglantes, pp. 83-87. 
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From §:00 P.M. to the firing on the crowd.-- Around 6:00 P.M. 
vans filled with police guards, while coming from the ctt~ towards 
the Grand-Palais, were insulted and heavily stoned by the crowds along 
the way. This new violent mood now introduced was soon communicated 
all along the line from Notre Dame to the heights of the Champs-Elys~es. 
As this emotional wave of vengeance reached the Concorde, the Republican 
Guards near the Concorde Bridge made a charge. For a moment this ap-
80 peared to have been successful in tuning down feelings. 
Suddenly, the Republican Guards were pelted with all kinds of 
objects as attempts at bringing about cooperation between the crowd 
and the police were discarded. Numerous flying projectiles began fill-
ing the air and were aimed in the direction of the Republican Guards. 
Asphalt pieces, torn grill bars, diverse metal pieces broken off from 
the arched fences covering the Cours-la-Reine and the Tuileries Gardens, 
found their way into human flesh. Thus began the so-called "spilling 
of blood." Three Republican Guards were unhorsed, severely beaten, 
and a rescue squad evacuated two to the hospital. This six o'clock 
charge was to set the pace and the pattern of the charges for the 
. 81 
even1ng. 
I M. Rottee, in charge of the police on the Bridge, realizing the 
serious turn events were taking, asked to have reinforcements. These 
were sent to him as soon as the contacts with the individuals could 
be made, but throughout the evening the police force was to be always 
80Appell, La soir~e, p. 617. 
81Ibid. 
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insufficient to handle the tasks ahead. The first reinforcement ar-
rived at 6:30 P.M.--three platoons of twenty-five Mobile Guards. At 
6:55P.M. were added one hundred more gendarmes. At 7:00P.M. came 
seventy gardiens de la paix, while at 7:10 P.M. some hundred more gen-
darmes joined their colleagues at the Concorde. Fifty Republican 
Guards arrived at 7:25 P.M. and by 8:00P.M. some 225 more law officers 
came to help. Thus several hours after the six o'clock charge, the 
authorities had answe~ed the emergency by sending the total of 625 new 
82 
men to the Concorde. 
The rioters, still arriving in droves, began appearing from sub-
ways. Too few policement were available to block these subway en-
trances; and besides, the double duty of handling the charges and pro-
tecting the Concorde Bridge were keeping them constantly busy. The 
police so far had shown an unusual amount of patience and, as the 
records show, no weapons had been used by them up to this point. But 
the time was at hand when the gardiens de la paix would use their night 
sticks, and the horsemen would go about brandishing their sabers. 83 
While the Concorde charges were getting more exasperating for the 
police, the rioters filling the Tuileries were busy building barricades 
with park benches, park chairs, garden d~bris, and uprooted kiosks. 
Commissioner Rott~e at 6:30 P.M. ordered a major charge against these 
obstructions. The Tuileries rioters, who had just about solidified 
their positions, saw the horsemen coming at them. The alert was sounded 
82Appell, La soir~e, p. 617. 
83
rbid. 
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on the rioters' side, and the onrushing police were welcomed with 
blows given by metal bars, shivers, metal pipes, and clubs. A frenzy 
developed and bones could be heard being smashed, and blood.flowed 
freely. The police, now fighting for their lives, began returning the 
blows with an uncontrolled rapidity. When this most serious charge 
was over, several rioters were pulled back unconscious and covered 
with blood. The police in the meantime evacuated some twenty-two of 
84 
its own to the nearest hospital. 
While the Tuileries charge was going on, a similar cleaning-up 
operation was made to the left of the bridgehead--towards the Cours-
la-Reine. Simultaneously, a bus from the A. C. line was brought to 
a stop by five hundred persons on the Concorde, the windows were 
smashed, and the driver was pulled out. The driver later testified 
that he had been crossing the Place de~la Concorde--amazingly some 
traffic had been getting through the center--when his bus was invaded 
by a group of demonstrators who were shouting: "To The Bus~ To The 
. 85 
Bus! Long Live Chiappe! Throw Out The Thieves~ 11 
The driver had been removed from his seat after some rioters had 
pushed his feet as hard as possible ggainst his pedals. The passen-
gers, the rear ticket collector, and the driver had then been roughly 
handled and pushed out of the vehicle. In the meantime, other rioters 
began dipping a newspaper into the opened gas tank. The latter were 
84 I Appell, La soiree, p, 617. 
85
nroits de l'homme, Coup de main fasciste--riposte r~publicaine 
(Paris, 1934), p. 21. 
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well-dressed and were using a copy of Le National (Jeunesses Patriotes 
organ) to igni~e the driver's seat. The Republican Guard charged and 
dispersed these hoodlums. The driver then quickly seized his fire ex-
tinguishers and put out the flames. Part of the crowd near at hand 
then jumped on the Republican Guards, while young men tried unsuccess-
fully to lift the bus and dump it near the Obelisk--in the center of 
86 the Concorde. 
While the rioters kept the Republican Guards busy, a youth unscrewed 
the bus' carburetor and lighted the gas inside. The firemen who had 
just arrived then rushed to the scene and carried out their duties. 
But it was not long before the rioters also seized these firefighters, 
began a free-for-all with them, and succeeded in putting the bus to 
flame. Throughout the evening this fire was to cause a glow in the 
center of the Concorde. The residue further brought a strong smell 
f b bb h . h 1 f h h h . h 87 o urnt ru eri w ~c a so was part o t e atmosp ere t at n~g t. 
A little after this bus incident, there occurred what was. later 
called the Marly Horse Incident. This began when a barricade behind 
, 
the Concorde and near the mouth of the Champs-Elysees was erected. 
A group of unsuspecting police on bicycles·fell right into the rioters' 
hands near the Marly equestrian statues. One of the policemen~was not 
so lucky as his colleagues in finding a way out, and this guard--Del-
croix--was rolled on the ground and his skull was opened by blows 
given by an iron pipe. Some spectators, shocked by seeing the uncon-
86Bonnevay, Les journ~es sanglantes, pp. 87-91. 
87Appell, La soiree, p. 617. 
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scious Delcroix, rescued him and took him to the nearest hospital. 
These rioters who gave this beating were later identified as Camelots 
d . 88 u Ro~. 
The situation became critical near the Concorde Bridge as some 
four thousand rioters began moving towards this objective. The mounted 
guards now received special attention from these newcomers, as stones, 
glasses, metal pieces, and iron railings began seeking their human 
targets. Razor blades attached to walking sticks were used to slit 
the horses' legs and the nearest part of their bodies which came in 
contact with these rioters. 89 Around 7:00P.M. the newly arrived po-
lice reinforcement helped to clear the bridgehead once more. This as-
sault had cost sixteen serious wounds on the police's side. The whole 
while, the burning bus and the flood-lighted Obelisk (all nearby lamps 
90 had been smashed) gave a gruesome appearance to this scene. 
Then came the so-called seven o'clock charge. For the first time 
that day the police were pushed within their own cordon by the rioters. 
The flying missiles were thicker than ever. The police checked this 
latest threat to their security by forming two groups and charging 
both to the right and to the left. Although the police succeeded in 
re-establishing lost ground, the effort disabled litailf of the law-
enforcement men used in the charge. This seven o'clock charge also 
brought forth the firsttgunfire that night. The bullets apparently 
88Appell, La . , so~ree, p. 617. 
89
nroits, Coup de main, p. 21. 
90werth, France in Ferment, pp. 154-155. 
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first came from the rioters' sidet and at 7:10P.M. one bullet found 
a deadly target when it entered Guard Richard's body. Richard was the 
first casualty from a bullet that evening. 91 
From this point on, it is not possible to bring into our 
account what actually took place; however, we must remember 
that the shots which were fired, between 7:00 P.M. and 7:20 
. . , 
P.M., came from the gardens of the Champs-Elysees situated 
between the Avenue des Champs-Elysees and the Avenue Dutuit, 
and the two embankments on the left of the Place de la Con-
corde (about thirty pistol shots) •••• 92 
Unscrambling eye-witness reports.-- From this point on, the eye-
witness reports are full of contradictions and are of doubtful relia-
bility. The many witnesses who testified before the February Six In-
quiry Commission disagree on the hours a certain event occurred, and 
contradict each other on numerous points. Some witnesses changed 
their minds on the aspects on which they were questioned when they 
were confronted by other evidence. Our report in the next chapter 
will rely on what the majority of the witnesses believed took place. 
Although disagreements on details abound, the historian is fortunate 
that along the broader aspects, the reliability of the evidence avail-
93 
able is quite acceptable by most of the more conscientious observers. 
91Appel1, La soiree, pp. 617-618. 
92chJrau, eoncorde, p. 118. 
93Appell, La soir~e, p. 616. 
CHAPTER IX 
THE GREAT FEBRU.ARY RIOT: PART II 
(The Explosion) 
The March of the Municipal Councillors 
A Hotel de Yille to the Chamber.-- While the Chamber of Deputies was 
going through its disgusting drama and while the rioters on the Concorde 
became more impudent and dangerous, the Municipal Councillors of Paris 
were preparing to demonstrate their dislike for the Daladier Govern-
ment. The Paris Municipal Council was composed of eighty members at 
this time and was domina ted by a pro-chiappe minority. This minority, 
as we have already seen, had taken a strong stand against the resig-
nation of Renard, Prefect of the Seine, and Chiappe, Prefect of Police. 1 
This manifesto, later published and distributed all over Paris, had 
been voted a few hours before as an official city resolution. Although 
the message took the vigorous stand Just outlined, the Municipal Coun-
cillors invited all good Parisians to keep calm. Besides the above 
motion being publicly declared on February 5, there also had been plas-
tered on countless walls all over the city, numerous copies of the 
appeal we have mentioned under our summary of the appeals above. It 
will be recalled that in this document some fifteen Municipal Coun-
cillors blamed Daladier for Chiappe and Renard leaving their posts. 
1 Laurent Bonnevay, Les Journees sanglantes de feYrjer. 1934 
(Paris, 1935), p. 145. 
With this in mind, let us proceed to study what follow-up procedure 
the Paris Municipal Councillors took on February Six. 2 
27.3 
Up to 5:00P.M., the Place de l'HStel de Ville had its usual 
physical appearance. This was changed, however, as special police 
units arrived to supervise the large square. The nearby storeowners, 
seeing the gardiens de ia paix and the Republican Guards jumping out 
of their vans, ordered their shops closed. The owners of caf:s in 
the vicinity took similar precautions~ cleared their terraces and 
within a few minutes bolted all their doors. 3 
In the meantime the Paris Municipal Councillors were gathering 
in their meeting room within the HStel de Ville. Not too long after-
wards M. Louis Peuch called the meeting to order. Peuch, the Chairman, 
began the discussion with a summary of the possible dangers to the 
city the immense crowd on the Concorde could bring. Then he asked his 
colleagues what they thought about cooperating with the new Prefect of 
Police, M. Bonnefoy-8ibour. This question brought vehement replies 
from. MM. Armand Massard and Georges Prade who could not understand why 
the Municipal Councillors should help such an inefficient and unquali-
fied person. They argued that Sibour was an ignoramus as far as his 
duties were concerned, and that it would be best to take action which 
would lead to his removal. Massard then moved that the Councillors 
join the people of Paris on the Concorde. Once assembled on this 
2MM. Paul Perrin, de Pouet, de Ti~y, La manifestation des 
Conseillers Munici aux de Paris le 6 f~Y.rier 1 , Chambre des d~put~s, 
Annexe 3388, Documents Parlementaires Paris, 1934), pp. 672-673. 
3 Le TeffiQs, February 8, 1934. 
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strategic vantage point, continued Massard, they could decide on the spot 
what measures should be taken against the Daladier Government. With 
very little discussion taking place the Paris Municipal Council decided 
to-follow this course of action.4 
With the passage of such a vague motion, it was easy for the anti~ 
Daladier minority on the Paris Municipal Council to twist the following 
events to their belief. M. Charles des Isnards, an anti-Daladier 
Councillor, later testified before the February Six Inquiry Commission 
that a phone call coming after the sitting described had changed the 
motion just voted. This phone call came around 7:00 P.M. and informed 
the Councillors that firing was going on at the Concorde. This brought 
on a lively discussion among the Municipal Councillors who concluded 
that a march to the scene of action was called for here. M. des 
Isnards added that: 
We started our march--we Municipal Councillors--with the 
intention of going to the Chamber. We did not know if the 
crowd along our way would follow us. Later events proved that 
the crowd did follow us, and we were very pleased that they 
did so.5 
In his testimony, des Isnards further reiterated several times 
that the formal intention of the group was to march to the Palais-
Bourbon--in spite of the n~r0us impediments which might be encoun-
tered to prevent such a move. TWenty Municipal Councillors led by des 
Isnards made their way towards their objective. It should be pointed 
out here that only one-fourth of the Municipal Council believed that the 
4P • M • • d err~n, un~c~paux e Paris, pp. 679-681. 
5 Jbid., pp. 679~681. 
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situation called for such a march by them. Those who did participate 
in this march averred afterwards that1 as elected representatives of 
Paris 1 they were convinced that it was their duty to go to the Chamber 
to sp~ak for the Parisians. 6 
The march of the Municipal Councillors began in front of the 
H~tel de Ville around 7:15 P.M. that evening. ·The Councillors wore 
their red and blue sashes across their chests. This insignia was the 
symbol which designated that a Councillor was acting in an official 
't 7 capac~ y. 
M. Taittinger, undisputed commander of the Jeunesses Patriotes 
and one of the marching Councillors, had his young men ready outside 
A the Hotel de Ville to accompany the City Fathers. In fact the whole 
Committee of Direction of the Jeunesses Patriotes had been alerted for 
this event. Thousands of adherents therefore were on hand to carry 
out what they considered 11 a sacred Mission." The Municipal Councillors 
and the Jeunesses Patriotes made their way towards the Concorde, whil~ 
a wild crowd packing the streets along the ways gave their wholehearted 
approval to the marching men. 8 
As the mar~h began, the Jeunesses Patriotes leaders and the 
Municipal Councillors agreed that: 
Our ~ission was t6 protest against the turn that recent 
events had taken, and against the dilatoriness with which 
6Perrin1 Municipaux de Paris, p. 681. 
7 Le Temps 1 February 8, 1934. 
8 , . 
L'Echo de Par:~..s, February 7 1 1934, 
the Stavisky Affair had been handled. We came to the Chamber 
to express the indignation that this scandal brought to Paris. 
We further made the march in orde+ to speak out against what 
we believed to be a denial of justice, in the cases of the 
Prefect of Police and the Prefect of the Seine--who had always 
served Paris faithfully and were removed in a few minutes. 
Thus had Paris been decapitated of her heads~-of her leaders--
this was done without even demanding the opinion of those 
elected to represent the city.9 
The marching men soon attracted approximately three thousand 
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followers who began to form a swelling and long column. This massive 
line of demonstrators sang La Marseillaise, followed·the streets 
along the Right Bank of the Seine for a while, made an "oblique March" 
to cross the Royale Bridge, and soon had the front of the column 
parading on the Left Bank. The mounted police on duty at this point 
began charging and snipping off the tail, bit by bit, of this long and 
thick column. Still these tactics could not prevent the line from 
moving towards its objective--the Palais-Bourbon: 10 
. It was about 7:30 P.M. when the Municipal Councillors reached the 
Place du Ctatelet. From here on the marching men, arm in arm, were 
twenty men abreast as they moved, in cadence, along their way. The 
Municipal Councillors guided the procession.towards the Chamber by 
giving short commands every now and then. Suddenly, as the group 
neared the approaches to the Solferino Bridge, the lighted Chamber of 
Deputies loomed in sight. Up to this point the march had been carried 
t •th t • .d t 11 ou w~ ou any 1nc1 en s. 
9Perrin, MuniciJ2aUX de Parisi p. 682. 
10 
:..nd.Q., p. 683. 
11 , Bonnevay, Les journees sanglantes, p. 147. 
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In front of the column now ap~eared a police trumpeter who blew 
the legally required three summations (as noted in the riot act of 
1791 and amended in 1848). The significance of this was: if the 
marching men took another step the police were not responsibl.e for what 
followed. To proceed any further was at "the rioters' own risk." Dis- · 
regarding this warning the Municipal Councillors led the massive 
column onward. The police charged.12 
Night sticks, clubs, and makeshift weapons now went into action. 
MM. Taittinger, LobligeoisJ D'Andign:, Fr~deric Duport, Contenot, 
Massard, Ferrandi, and Lev~e were clubbed. The Jeunesses Patriotes 
came to the Councillors' rescue but were received by angry policemen 
who kept swinging at anyone that came near their cordon. The 
Jeune§ses Patriotes ended up with three hundred casualties as a 
result of this encounter, 13 
Yet th? police were incapable of stopping the ever-advancing 
line. After a few more incidents, the Municipal Councillors reached a 
corner of the Palais-Bourbon. M. Desire Ferry, a deputy, allowed a 
door on the Rue de Bourgogne side to be opened and took four Councillors 
inside the Chamber. The police, however, quickly arrived in force at 
this spot and refused to allow any more demonstrators to enter the 
building. The Councillors now left outside proceeded to debate the 
12 
Perrin, Municipaux de Paris, p. 683. 
l3L 1Echo de Paris, February 7, 1934. 
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. 14 
matter with the pol~ce. MM. Contenot, Paul Piel, Armand Massard, and 
Charles des Isnards were the Councillors-escorted within. 15 
Inside the Chamber and meeting with Daladier.-- The Municipal 
Councillors admitted within the Palais-Bourbon were spirited from one 
roam .. to another, ~n what struck the four representatives as being~-­
a "mysterious manner. 11 Just after crossing one threshold- the men were 
pushed on and the door was locked behind them. Finally M. Barthe, the 
Chamber's purser, conducted the men to his office. Once there, the 
"invaders of the fortress" demanded an immediate audience with the 
P
. • 16 
re~er. 
M. Bartbe later testified that the reason for all these doors 
opening and closing was that, by regulation, a member of the Municipal 
Council could only enter the hallways of the Palais-Bourbon, and not 
the actual hemicycle, when parliament was in session--as it was. 
Therefore he took them all around to his office where be could more 
easily make contact with Daladier. Suspecting that unpleasant 
situations might develop if the four Councillors did not calm down, 
Barthe conducted them to the furthest office from the center of the 
Chamber. He hoped that in the time thus used the obviously pent-up 
. . d . 17 emotions of the unwelcome v~s~tors woul subs~de. 
14Perrin, Municipaux de Paris, p. 68J. 
15 Le Temps, February 8, 1934. 
16Perrin, Municipaux de Paris, p. 686. 
17 . Ib~d., p. 686. 
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The news that the Municipal Councillors were within the Palais-
Bourbon soon circulated through the deputies' ranks. The Deputies 
from the Seine, once made cognizant of this fact, immediately left 
their seats and came to join their colleagues in M. Barthe's office. 
Barthe warned the group not to cause him any embarrassment while he 
went to find Daladier. The Premier told Barthe that he could not leave 
his post for the time being, and he requested M. Penancier, his Vice-
President of the Council, to talk to the irate Councillors. The 
Councillors, however, refused to deal with Penanc:j.er. TheJ insisted 
• th p • 18 on see~ng e rernaer. 
Twenty minutes later, Premier Daladier appeared. The Premier 
briskly stated that he wanted the room cleared--he alone would hear 
the Councillors. What happened during his interview b~came a centro-
versy later. On one side of the argument were the Municipal Councillors 
who asserted that they had told Daladier to resign. Penancier agreed 
that the Councillors had, in substance, given him this message~ 19 
Daladier refuted this version of the interview. The Premier 
declared that the main topic under discussion had been whether it was 
wise to use the mounted guards on the Concorde against the crowd. He 
continued that: 
I have read with the greatest of surprises, in M. Barthe's 
deposition, tha.t one of the Councillors, in a defiant tone, had 
asked me to submit my resignation. 
18 • . . d Perr~n, Mun~cJ.pau:x e Paris, p. 686. 
19 . ~., pp. 687-688. 
I assure you that the tone was quite different from the 
one reported. I have never heard such a demand--if I had you 
can be confident that I would have ended such a proposal 
without delay.20 
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The February Six Inquiry Commission was puzzled by such contradic-
tory testimonies·. By a majority vote_, the investigating committee 
concluded that the Municipal Councillors did demand the resignation 
of the Government. No matter what the truth of this matter was 1 the 
historian greatly doubts whether such a move at this late hour could 
have satisfied the angry mob now in charge of the Goncorde. As we 
will see later; by this time the Concorde crowd was beyond one man's 
ability to contro1. 21 
Political Groups Attempt to Storm the Chamber 
Did the veterans have a common plot to hatch?-- In the previous 
chapter 1 we presented the evidence on the political leagues with the 
thought of shoWing or disproving that pre-riot agreements were made by 
the various groups involved. At that time we were forced to conclude 
that no overall plan was collectively formulated beforehand.· Similarly 
a study of the records on the veterans 1 league reveals no traces to 
prove that the veteran groups protesting on February Six had agreed on 
a pre~conceived plan before moving onto the Paris streets. Later on; 
the Paris press kept insisting that a veterans' plot against the 
staten had existed. In view of the lack of do:cumentary evidence to 
prove it) the historian is faced with the inevitable conclusion that 
20 • . • 666 Perr1n; Mun1cipaux de Par1s) p. oo. 
2S1 
such a plot was "the fabrication of a lively imagination11 which has no 
basis of facts. 22 
M. Noedts, Commissioner of the Renseignements G~n~raux at the 
I Prefecture, testified that his staff made a systematic and minute inves-
tigation of the so-called ''veterans' plot against the state." His 
office discovered that jealousy was rampant among these veterans and 
that, in fact, careful plans were made to avoid coordination. Noedts 
was surprised to find that no ties existed between the ~roix de Feu and 
the Action Francaise where Colonel de La Rocque had two brothers. 
. ;,-
M. Lebecq, named by the P,ress as the one responsible for coordinating 
the U.N.C. 's movements with those of the A.R.A.C., explained afterwards 
that, although the A.R.A.C. did join his association on February Six, 
he had never asked them to do so. In view of the scarcity of documents 
to the contrary, it is safe to conclude that there had been no previous 
23 
agreement among the veterans. 
Role of the Qroix de Feu.~- Another questionable theory, peddled 
for many years by writers engrossed in the history of this period, was 
that the Qroix de Feu was on February Six the advance guard for a 
fascist revolt. The theory went on -- and later became treated in fact 
--that the Croix de Feu had been the dominant group to come out on the 
Paris streets that historic day of February Six. This view is 
22MM. Dormann et Salette, La participation des associations 
d'anciens combattants ~ la manifestation du 6 flvrier 1934, Chambre des 
deputes, Annex 33S7, Documents Parlementaires (Paris, May 17, 1934), 
p. 641. 
23Ibid., pp. 641-642. 
24 inconsistent with the actual facts as we shall see, 
On February 5, the Croix de Feu had announced that it intended to 
lead a demonstration on the streets of Paris and was going to attempt 
to enter the Chamber area. On February Six, Colonel de La Rocque 
claimed eight thousand of his 11 disponiblesu were ready for action. He 
had divided these men into three groups: Group A, which was to meet 
in the Rue de Varenne in back of the Chamber, estimated at two 
thousand men; Group B,which was to assemble at the Petit-Palais, es-
timated at four thousand; and Group C, which was assigned a. reserve 
role near the Petit-Palais, the remaining two thousand. These three 
groups we1"e to be keptin contact with each other by the 11signal corps 
disponibles 11 who were stationed in different telephone booths along 
. 25 
the proposed route of march. 
At 8:45P.M. on February Six, Group A of the Croix de Feu entered 
the Rue Bourgogne in back of the Chamber of Deputies. Group B bad 
started moving from the Petit-Palais at 8:30 P.M. towards the Gare des 
Invalides by going through the Cours-la-Reine, and around to the Alma 
Bridge. Group C as planned stayed ready for actton near the Petit-
I Palais enbankments not far from the Cbamps-Elysees. As the two active 
g1"oups of 11 disponibles 11 met close to the Place du Palais-Bourbon, the 
Adjutant-Chief of Police in this sector pleaded with Colonel de 
24
normann et Salette, Participation des associations, p. 642. 
25Jean-Henry Morin, "Interview du Colonel de La Rocque sur les 
e'venements du 6 fe'Vrier? 11 .Les Anru:!.les Politiques et Litteraires, 
Vol. 103 (March 2, 1934;, 237. 
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Puymaigre, the Q~oix de Feu's field commander, not to proceed any further. 
His efforts proved in vain, for a series of encounters between the police 
and the Qroix de Feu took place. The Croix de Feu quickly checked the 
police opposition and, since the police made only mild efforts to pre-
vent their forward march, the Croix de Feu found'themselves in back of 
the Chamber of Deputies. 26 
Colonel de La Rocque, at his headquarters, was notified that the 
deputies had left the Chamber. In an interview a month later, the 
Colonel explained that: 
I learned that the Chamber sitting had been closed. Because 
of this fact I had my two groups go their separate wa~ once more. 
One group marched, by way of ,.the Alma Bridge, to the Etoile where 
it disbanded after ceremonies before the Tomb of the Unknown 
Soldier. The second group went in perfect order over the same 
·bridge to the Champs-Elys~es, proceeded to the Place de la 
Concorde onto the Rue Madeleine, and finally reached the Madeleine. 
Here the men WeFe disbanded and told to go home.27 
La Rocque later falsely claimed that, without firing a shot, his 
1tlisponibles 11 had forced the Chamber to run out. This egocentric boast 
was accepted as a fact in many foreign journalistic circles. Colonel 
de La Rocque, helped by such propaganda, thus took the role of the 
"hero of February Six." La Rocque claimed that he had only desired to 
bring pressure against the Chamber and that he had no wish to invade 
the building. A former lieutenant under La Rocque disagreed with his 
conuna.nder here when he divulged that: "The general watehwerd was to 
26:Morin, 11 Interview,n .Annales Politigues, p. 2.37; also Dormann et 
Salette, Participation des associations, p. 664. 
27Morin, 11 Interview," Annales Politigues, p. 2.37. 
try to break into the Chamber. We were to attempt to get in by the main 
door, while our comrades would rush to our aid over the Concorde Bridge.112B 
Further probing into the records brings out the fact that La Rocque 
had meant to seize the Chamber, but his men were so disorganized that 
he was unable to do. so. In spite of all the precautions made in advance, 
the telephone communication system wa.s a miserable failure. Group A 
and Group B once united were at odds as to what formula to follow in 
working together effectively. 29 Yet Colonel La Rocque boasted that 
the Volontaires Nationaux, the Fils de la Croix de Feu, and the older 
Qrgix de Feu-~11 subdivisions of the main Croix de Feu et Briscards-= 
had carried out their maneuvers on a perfect schedule. The. loquacious 
assertions of the Colonel were accepted by newspapermen and writers as 
facts. 30 
One fact stands uppermost in·. m:i:nd when the part of the Croix de 
Feu in the February Six Riot is discussed: the Croix came nearest the 
Chamber that evening, but they did not seize their objective. Some 
writers on the subject later felt that La Rocque could not take the 
Chamber although he so ~esired. Jean Belin, Commissioner of the Surett, 
clearly had th~s in mind when he recorded: 
When I look back to the strange happenings of that black 6th 
of February I have often thought how near France came to disaster. 
There was a moment when Colonel de La Rocque could have made him-
self master of Paris and possibly of the whole country, at least 
for a while. Had he done so it is as certain as the rising sun 
2B 
Lt. Chopine, Six ans chez 1es Croix de F~u (Paris, 19.34), p. 114. 
29Maurice Paz, Le Six Fetvrier (Paris, 1936), p. 18. 
30 Dormann et Salette, Participation des associations) pp. 665-666. 
that a bitter civil war would have ensued, with the possibility 
of a repetition of the various Coups d 1,tat of the Nineteenth 
Century. 
It is my own opinion that he was not big enough for the 31 job in hand and that his nerve failed him at the last moment. 
Werth wrote: 
And instead of going into the Place de la Concorde, they 
gathered in the Esplanade. des Invalides and its sidestreets, 
at the back of the Chamber. Marching backward and forward, and 
singing the Marseillaise, they created the impression that they 
might have broken into the Chamber (which was poorly defended 
from that side) had they wished to do so, and had they been 
prepared to sacrifice a few lives.32 
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·Maurice Pujo, the Royalist editor and a former admirer of Colonel 
de La Rocque, is left the final word with 
This is what the admirers of M. de La Rocque have termed his 
usuccess. 11 We usually give this name to positions that have been 
conquered, to advantages ta,ken--no matter how modest they have 
been--taken against an adversary, Here the 11 success" consists of 
the fact that he was able to reassemble honest Frenchmen--more 
n:ume:rous at that moment than any other group--but these honest 
men were no sooner organized jhat they were just as quickly 
immobilized andneutralized.J 
Initial police firing and the U.N.C. march.-- In Chapter eight,. 
we had brought our account of the activities on the Concordeto approx-
imately 7:30 P.M. It was pointed out then, that a few moments after 
, 
seven o'clock, the first shots from the gardens near the Champs-Elysees 
had been fired at the onrushing guards, and that this had struck the 
first victim of the evening: Guard Richard. With these facts in mind 
31 A I Jean Belin, MY Work at the Surete (London, 1950) 1 p. 147. 
32Alexander Werth, Which Way France? (London, 1937), pp. 56-57. 
33Mau~ice Pujo, Comment La Rocque a t~hi (Paris, 1934), p. 8. 
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we can go on with the account on the Concorde. 
By 7:30 P.M., the dominating curious elements on the Place de la 
Concorde had left the scene to be replaced by the organized followers 
of different leagues. The Action Francaise had arrived and taken 
J 
strategic positions facing the Coneorde Bridge in front of the 
Tuileries, The nearby terraces were overcrowded with followers of 
either the royalist banners or those of the Jeunesses Patriotes. These 
Jeunesses Patriotes had joined the Municipal Councilors earlier that 
evening, as the latter had marched toward the Chamber, but instead of 
crossing to the Left Bank of the Seine, this group had gone along to the 
Concorde. The Front Universitaire had marched from the Boulevard Saint 
Michel to the·concorde after 7:00P.M. to join the leagues already 
there. 34 
Of the royalist followers, the Camelots du Roi were most numerous 
and brought a recklessness among the leaguers already amassed on the 
Concorde. Reliable witnesses claimed that the crowd on the Concorde 
at this time was dominated by young men, and that all social classes 
were represented. The Front Universitaire, filled with disappointed 
college students, was ready to move into action once the need appeared 
for doing so. All in all the mob covering the Place de la Concorde , 
around 7:30 P.M. was the largest yet assembled that day.35 
Immediately in front of this mob stood the ever vigilant police 
strung out on both sides of the Seine. The lights from the windows of 
34 , 
Paz, Six Fevrier, p. 12. 
35 , 
Bonnevay, Les Journees sanglantes, pp. 85-86. 
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the Chamber behind them gave a shadowy appearanceto these tired law 
officers. On the Concorde Bridge, behind the barrier of the six police 
vans, stood bleeding mounted guards and gardiens de la paix •. The 
police with the more serious wounds were rushed, ~s quickly as possible, 
into police vans on the bridge and taken to the improvised infirmary 
in the lower rooms or the Chamber.36 In the meantime a solitary figure 
was ruffling his fur collar in the center of the bridge and smoking 
countless cigarettes. It.was M. Bonnefoy-8ibour, who had been at this 
point since 5:00P.M., but who refused to give any guidance to the 
events unrolling before his eyes. He, the Prefect or Police, had ~ome 
to observe!37 
Suddenly, coming from the Grand Boulevards to the northeast, 
appeared the columns or the Solidarit~ Fran~ise led by M. de Gueydon 
who took his column--estimated at 11 500 adherents--straight to the 
Concorde Bridge. Everyone sensed that trouble was ahead as these new-
comers . pushed their way rapidly through the crowd. As this energetic 
column moved forward it kept shouting:· "On To The Chamber! Throw The 
Police In The Seine!"38 
A certain tenseness swept the Concorde as the SolidariteFrancaise 
J 
arrived near the lined trucks in front or the Concorde Bridge ~nd began 
36Alexander Werth, France in Ferment (London, 1935), pp. 150-151. 
37 Bonnevay, Les .iourn~es sang1antes, p. 87. 
38 ; 6 , • ... M. Pierre Ajlpell1 La soiree du revrJ.er 1934 a la Concorde, Chamb~ des d'putes, Annexe 3386, Documents Parlementaires (Paris, 
May 17, 1934), p. 618. 
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penetrating the passages in between. This was the furthest any rioters 
had reached that day. The police, responsible for keeping this entrance 
to the Chamber blocked, became panic-stricken for the moment. The 
young leaguers launched themselves at the police barricade and began 
demolishing it. All the while, the mounted guards, as if stunned by 
what was going on, started slowly to back up. 39 
But the police soon regafned their ability to act decisively. 
Believing that this advance by the Solidarit~Francaise~laced them in 
a "state of the legitimate defense of the country" (as required by the 
Nineteenth Century Laws on the subject), the gardiens de la paix and 
the Mobile Guards drew out their pistols and fired on the approaching 
leaguers. This was the first use of gunfire by the police that 
evening. At first the police aimed their bullets above the heads of 
the SolidaritEf Francaise, but as the adherents of this league inched 
ahead bullets began ripping through the nearest human targets.40 
Many of the onrushing rioters later testified that they believed 
blanks were being used. ·The smoking guns stopped the SolidaritEf 
Francaise's front units in their tracks. For a few moments, the pistols 
J 
were silenced. Then the crowd gave the idea to the police that it was 
surging forward once more. This brought on a series of blasts from the 
police ranks. Captain Fabre, leading the Republican Guards, rapidly ad-
vanced with his men and seized the lost ground. The rioters were dis-
persing in every direction as the heavy breath from the galloping 
39Appell, La soir;e du 6 fevrier.l934 A la Concorde, p. 618. 
40Ibid. 
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horses began coming down their necks. And, in a short while, a great 
calm fell over the Concorde. 41 
The rioters counted six dead and forty seriously struck by the 
flying bullets. The Solidarite Francaise's assault bad turned out to 
.. 
be the most aggressive so far, but had ended in failure. The leaguers 
gathered their dead and drove them to the hospitals close by. Because 
of the mounting casualty lists on both sides, emergency first aid 
centers were created. I The famous Cafe Weber on the Rue Royale, for 
instance, was one of the busiest places that evening for the tables 
were made into beds for those struck. "' The Val de Grace hospital was 
flooded all night with victims, while--as we have seen--the lower rooms 
of the Chamber of Deputies served as a combat medical center and 
evacuation point for the police. 42 One casualty from that 7:30P.M. 
charge was an innocent bystander--a woman who was on the terrace of 
the H~tel Crillon way across the Concorde.43 
Commissioner Rott~e, who was still on duty when the charge occurred, 
had been struck in the ankle--but he insisted on staying at his post. 
The leader of the Republican Guards, Captain Fabre, discovered, after 
he pushed the rioters back, that his intestines were wide open and 
bleeding profusely--they were housing a huge piece of metal. He was 
evacuated immediately to the hospital. This Captain Fabre incident 
41 1 . , 618 Appel , La so1ree, p. . 
42 . , lt Bonnevay, Les .Journees sang an es 1 J:L 96. 
43 
• ' 618 Appell, La so1ree, p. . 
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developed into a rumor which told of the ho~rible tortures the beloved 
Captain had gone through_before he died on the way to the hospital. His 
friends on the Concorde took an oath to avenge their chief. The police 
therefo~e, goaded to extremes, reorganized itself, and with one charge 
sent the rioters flying a hundred meters from the Concorde Bridge.44 
At 8:00 P.M. the Place de la Concorde was still solidly packed 
with discontented Frenchmen. Near the obelisk a vehicle was in flame, 
while numerous fires gave their lights all around the square. The 
front of the Concorde Bridge was strewn with d~bris. As one glanced 
in the thickets near the Champs-Elys~es and the Cours-la-Reine, the human 
ma.ss seemed to have no end to it. The police was packing this crowd 
still tighter by pushing them back from the Concorde Bridge to the Marly 
I Equestrian Statues not far from where the Avenue des Champs-Elysees 
started. 45 
Suddenly stream after stream of flying projectiles began once more 
to fall on the police watching the Concorde Briqg~. Thunderous voices 
kept shouting: "Assassins! Assassins J 11 The rioters however stayed 
where they were and made no attempt to advance towards the Chamber. 
Especially distressing to the rioters was the arrival of more police 
reinforcements at this time. The latter quickly lined up in battle 
formations and stood ready for what might come. For the time being a 
stalemate had been reached in this sector.46 
44 . 
Appell, La soir~e, p. 618. 
45 Ibid. 
46Ibid. 
·~~~~-·----- ------- ·'' ------
But this equilibrium did not last for long, as attention shifted 
to the Ministry of the Marine. The Concorde rioters started to move 
toward the corner of the Rue de Rivoli and the Rue Saint Florentin 
where the building of the Ministry was located. As the rioters 
advanced, they smashed all in their way that could be broken. Gas 
pipes and gas burners were torn from their moorings. A wounded rioter 
in front of this unruly mob caught his foot and slipped to the ground. 
His eolleagues1 without verifying what took place, and unable to dis-
tinguish any sound coming from the fallen man, concluded that someone 
was shooting at them from the Ministry of Marine. The howling mob 
. . ~ 
now turned their attention against their supposed assassins. 
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So at 8:15 P.M. rocks, stones, chair pieces, park bench parts, and 
asphalt wedges were thrown into the Ministry of Marine. The lights from 
within bad already been knocked out, as the rioters set fire to the 
first floor of the building. The concierge's home close by was br9ken 
into and a fire had begim there also. The mob was not aware that within 
slept a one-year old child. Admiral Darlan and a few unarmed sailors, 
who were inside the building, at the risk of their lives, rescued the 
48 infant just as the flames were reaching his little body. 
The enraged and shouting rioters, in the meantime, tried to enter 
the Ministry. The young leaguers in the lead finally entered the front 
door, only to be greeted by a jet of water coming from a hose held by 
Captain Fenard. Courageously, while soaking the assailants, he convinced 
47 
• , 618 Appell, La so1ree, p. • 
48 , Bonnevay 1 Lea .iournees . sanglantes 1 pp. 97-98. 
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them that no one from within had fired at them.49 
Meanwhile a rescue squad of Mobile Guards, protected by their steel 
helmets as they pushed through the crowd, made an avenue through which 
the firemen could come. The firefighters had arrived earlier on the 
Concorde and, at different intervals, threw powerful streams of water 
on the Concorde crowd. 50 As the firemen reached the Ministry, the fire 
within was really starting to blaze. The hoses were connec~ed and, 
just as the fire seemed under control, the rioters hacked into pieces 
the leading one··thousand-foot-hos~. 51 
The blaze was extinguished after the arrival of Commissioner 
Boulanger and his men from the Grand Boulevards. The rioters were cleared 
from the vicinity, but not until several firemen were severely beaten 
and more equipment destroyed. The police made effective use of their 
night sticks, and the firemen were given enough time to put out the 
f~re. 52 
The Place de la Concorde (the irony of the name Place of Agreement 
or Harmony) was ablaze with more bonfires by this time. Near the 
Concorde Br~dge the police were still in control of the situation. The 
repulse of the SolidarittFrancaise's assault had acted as a quieting 
3 
agent on the mob. The police, conscious of the advantage they had for 
I 
49 I Bonnevay, Les ,iournees sanglantes, p. 9S. 
50 London Times, February 7, 1934, p. 12. 
51New York Herald (Paris Edition), February SJ 1934. 
52Appell, La soirJe, p. 61S. 
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the time being, decided to empty the terraces and the Tuileries Gardens.53 
This involved an assauit on the mob by the Republican and Uobile 
Guards and a turning movement to clear the terraces on the Concorde's 
right or east flank. The mounteq.·.police infiltrated rapidly through 
the human mass in the areas under attack, separated the groups by using 
night sticks liberally, and cleaned out the more stubborn rioters by 
once more opening gunfire on them. At the same time, pistols began 
taking a heavy toll further down the Concorde 1s left. By ·S:45 P.M. the 
police were the masters of a large and deep arc on both sides of the 
rd . 54 Conco e Br~dge. 
At S:45 P.M. a strong new element made its first appearance on 
the Place de la Concorde; namely, a thick and very long U.N.C. column. 
The U.N.C. •s leaguers had assembled in the vicinity of the Grand-Palais 
as scheduled in its appeal. Once the dOlumn was ready to move, 
M. Lebecq, President of this powerful veteran league, and his official 
assistants took the front of the immense procession and gave orders to 
move. Immediately behind the officers of the U.N.C. were the standard 
bearers of the organization who carried a long rectangular banner in-
scribed with: 11We desire that France should exist under honor and 
cleanliness. 1155 
As the U.N.C. column, with its six to eight thousand adherents, 
' reached the Marly Equestrian Statues at the end of the Champs-Elysees, 
53 ; 
Bonnevay, Les ,journees sanglantes, pp. 100-103. 
54 , 
Appell, La soiree, pp. 61S-619. 
55 . 
Le Temps, February 8, 1934. 
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everyone gave way before it. A great calmness struck the Concorde as 
the U.N.C. marched on it in perfect order. Once the U.N.C. was in the 
center of the Concorde, it led the crowd in singing La-Marseillaise, Le 
. , 
Chant du Depart, an~ La Madelon. Most of the Association des Decor~s 
au Ptril de Leur Vie led by Colonel Jossl-some three hundred strong--
were here to join the U.N.C. A group unwelcome to these two organiza-
tions was the A.R.A~C. which tried to disrupt the singing by giving 
56 
their version of L'International. 
After this patriotic singing was over, the U.N.C. leaders surprised 
everyone on the Concorde when, instead of heading for the Concorde 
Bridge, they led their immense'column to the Rue Royale away from the 
bridge. Colonel Josse and his three hundred men detached themselves 
from the U.N.C. and made straight for the bridgehead. The Association 
des D~cor~s au P~ril de Leur Yie reached this critical point around 
9:00 P.M. and, once near the police barricade of police vans, demanded 
passage through. While these useless talks were going on, an impatient 
gardien de la paix came out of the police ranks and swung his night 
stick at the veterans in his way. This developed into a free-for-all, 
for even the firemen, still angry o~er the Ministry incident, turned 
. 57 their hoses on the 1nsurgents. 
The excitement reached a high pitch as the rioters threw the d~bris 
'
56Dormann et Salette, Participation des associations, pp. 651-667; 
also Bonnevay, Les journels sanglantes, pp. 102-104. 
57Gaston Ch~rau, Concorde! 6 flvrier 1934 (Paris, 1934), pp. 125-
126; also Dormann et Salette, Participgtion des Associations, pp. 671-
672. 
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materials piled up in front of the bridge at the police. Voices could 
. be heard bellowing: "Long Live Chiappe! .Assassins! Resign! On To The 
Chamber! Down With The Thieves!" The veterans could not budge the law 
officers from their position and finally retreated. Despair swept the 
,~ / / ~ . Concorde crowd as the .Association des Decores au Per1l de Leur V1e 
were ordered back to the Rue Royale. The police did not receive any 
more serious threats in this area until 10:00 P.M.5S 
Late attempt to take the Concorde Bridge.-- .After the six to eight 
thousand men of the U.N.C. took their oblique march on the Rue Royale--
around 9:00 P.M.--the proces_sion paraded through the Rue Saint-Honore:, 
returned to the Rue Royale, went past the Madeleine, and made for the 
Grand . Boulevards toward the Faubourg Montmartre. All along the way 
crowds cheered them on, some joined the column, and the men went as far 
as the highest points in Montmartre, turned around.' and began their 
march back to the Concorde.59 
By 10:45 P.M., when the U.N.C. column reached the-Conoorde once 
again, it had gathered innumerable young elements who tended to keep 
shouting phrases which excited the older veterans. By the time the 
procession entered the Concorde, the original U.N.C. column had changed 
its attitude. It was not the peaceful group which had sung patriotic 
songs on the square_ earlier. As the excited U.N.C. appeared on the 
Place de la Concorde, there was no doubt what it had in mind: it went 
58. . • , 6 d- 6 Appell, La so1ree, pp. lo- 19. 
59 I I h ~ Anon., "Elements d'une enquete sur la soiree tragique," 
L 1 Illustration1 Vol. 4747 (February 24, 1934), 235. 
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straight for the Concorde Bridge. 60 
Once in front of the bridge, the U.N.C. leaders demanded that the 
police open ranks to allow the veterans to go to the Chamber. The 
police, of course, refused to comply with such a request. The trouble-
some elements, who had inflated the size of the procession, sent out a 
loud cry of 11Forward!" The column began moving towards the approaches 
on the sides of the Seine. The police, incapable of realizing what 
had brought such a sudden challenge to their positions, were pinned 
against the trucks. The rioters mad with hate broke into the vehicles 
and proceeded to dismantle them. The police had the sensation that 
a hundred hands were reaching for their throats. Many testified later 
that they thought this was the end .. Clearly this was the most serious 
crisis the police had faced on the Concorde since the Solidarit{Fran~ 
61 
caise's assault of 7:30P.M. 
J 
This climactic attempt to take the Ooncorde Bridge almost succeeded. 
The police, now fighting for their very lives, gave an all-out effort 
which confounded their attackers. Using night sticks, clubs, firehoses, 
and other weapons they could get their hands on, the police began the 
most determined couhter~attack of the evening. Never had the police 
appeared so enraged. The mounted guards struck and struck and struck 
again at any human forms in their way. Blood from their victims soon 
covered their weapons, their clothes--even their faces. The Concorde 
crowd fought back with a barrage of asphalt pieces, stones, sticks, and 
60 . ~ Bonnevay, Les journees sanglantes, pp. 121-122. 
61 
. ~ 619 Appell, La so~ree, p. . 
29'7 
I 62 
other kinds of debris. The ferocity on both sides defies description. 
The result of this protracted struggle was that the police re-
gained the initiative after many charges on the mob. Until 11:30 P.M. 
both sides made periodic attempts to crush each other. The police 
on their part carried out twenty charges, only to find that the rioters 
were still as close as the first trees of the Cours-la-Reine: not far 
to the left of the bridge. Both sides made:·.liberal use of gunfire 
and little mercy was shown. But by 11:30 P.M. the Concorde Bridge was 
still held by the police, but only at a tremendous cost in human 
casualties and destruction of property. 6J 
As for the brutality which had been displayed, the ablest French 
study on the February Six moralizes thus: 
As one checks over the events of February Six, he can not 
but think of the terrible responsibility that must be placed 
on those who, by their mad lust for excitement, brought men to 
such an attack against one another. This brought out, even 
from the besl of th~ the worst instincts that exist in the 
human beast. 4 
Letting Loose Man's Latent Aggressiveness 
The "Human Beast" of February Six.-- In one of the most remarkable 
I . . 1\ 
works of Emile Zola's Rougon~cquart series entitled La Bete Humaine, 
the distinguished author uses the character Jacques Lentier as the 
symbol of a human being whose desire to kill and destroy what he loves 
is forever getting the best of him. In agreement with Zola's belief 
62Appell, 
63Ibid 
-· 
I La soiree, p. 619. 
64Bonnevay, Les .iourn~es sanglantes 1 p. 135. 
29S 
is a modern school of psychology which teaches that in everyone of us, 
to varying degrees, exists a "need for destruction. 11 When this need 
dominates in a person, and it is allowed to express itself negatively--
that is, against the accepted mores and folkways of society--it 
demands more and more satisfaction once it is given satisfaction.65 
Zola believed that such a "human beast 11 wa.s latent in every person. 
Laurent Bonnevay probably would not have agreed with so inclusive a 
belief--but of one thing he was sure: the 11human beast" had appeared 
on the Concorde on the evening of February Six. The facts on the 
66 
event would appear to corroborate such a view. 
The atrocities to man and beast on February Six were abnormal 
in nature. Especially is it distressing to observe that these horrible 
and savage deeds took place within a peace-loving nation--such as 
France was in 1934. First, the police would seem to have committed 
outrageously cruel acts that in retrospect seem uncalled for. ~ny 
times during the evening of February Six rioters were struck uncon-
scious and obviously they could do no more harm. The police, in such 
cases, too often, went on beating the unconscious person as he lay 
there senseless. Such was the punishment given to one M. de Noblens 
on February Six. 
Two Mobile Guards came out of the ambush, behind the police 
vans, fell on de Noblens, struck him unmercifully with night 
sticks and walked on to their left. At this point, the rioters 
and the police were far apart. Another police officer rushed 
65 Walter Langer, Psychology and Human Living (New York, 1943), 
pp. S2-S3. 
66 ~ Bonnevay, Les journees sanglantes, p. 135. 
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towards the crumbled figure and, taking his turn in a line he 
struck the pleading figure three or four hard blows. Then' 
believing the miserable being had not taken enough punishm~nt 
the police gave four or five vicious kicks to the motionless 1 
form crumbled on the ground.67 
Physicians later asserted that M. Chesnier de.Noblens had died as 
a result of these blows. 
M. Jean-August D.ucrot, a twenty-nine year old journalist working 
for· the sensational picture magazine VU, told the February Six Inquiry 
Commission that near the Concorde Bridge around ll:JO P.M., he noticed 
police officers· amusing themselves by betting among themselves as to 
see who could hit the most rioters. The witness added that he was 
shocked to see the policemen going about this 11 sport11 while they con-
tinued eating, laughing, and apparently enjoying themselves. And so 
the witnesses testified. Some were obvious lies, while others were at 
least questionable. A few were cranks who wanted publicity. But the 
fact remains that the polic~ were unusually brutal on the night of 
February Six. 68 
The tired state of the police might account for such behavior. 
Their overtaxed nervous systems were nearing a breaking point, because 
for over a month many of them had been working overtime under very 
tense conditions. The January Riots had engendered much conversation 
on their part and some policemen came to believe that the rioters were 
indeed dangerous. Before arbitrarily condemning the law-officers, it 
is only fair to realize that the tension they were working under could 
67 , Appell, La soiree, p. 6Jl. 
6$ . Ibl.d. 
JOO 
easily lead to nervous breakdowns. 69 
But the records indicate that atrocities were more commonly seen 
on the rioters' side. The witnesses in their testimonies before the 
February Six Inquiry Commission brought out the most gruesome acts 
committed by the rioters. !n a brutal fashion were the rioters said 
to have jumped on a policeman's back to bring him down. While in 
such a defenseless position, other rioters would kneel down and start 
tearing at the victim's face or body with such lethal weapons as 
broken glass or asphalt knives. Still other rioters preferred to use 
pointed rocks and jagged stones. Lead pipes drew blood from more 
than one unwary policeman that evening. Worst of all was the 
reliance on those long open straight razors or Gillette blades strapped 
to the end of canes. The gashes the latter weapons made to man and 
b t k f 1 t d . t• 70 eas rna e or unp easan escr1p 1on. 
As early as 7:15P.M., near the Marly Equestrian Statues, for 
example, the mounted guards attempted to clear the area. As usual 
tney were received by a flood of flying d6bris. But it would seem 
that it was at.this time that long metallic and pointed pieces first 
appeared, for many law-officers came out of this assault with torn 
flesh and muscle. The onrushing police, kept on in spite of their 
bleeding faces, only to be met this time by long pieces of wood with 
sharp screws or spikes on their ends. Furthermore, bamboo sticks 
crowned with sharp spearheads, striking pieces from broken chains, 
69 11 La . ; 6"1 Appe , so1ree, p. ~ . 
70Ibid. 
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park bench bats, and other makeshift instruments brought their share 
. 71 
of deep wounds. 
The effective force of 305 healthy horses was also severely cut 
on the evening of February Six. These animals, under the command of 
four squads of Republican Guards, were most horribly disfigured in 
the vicinity of the nose, the pastern, the rump, and the leg. In a 
few cases the animal's head was seized by several rioters, while 
others tried to tear out the eyes. The leg muscles were the pre-
ferred spots for those canes topped with razor blades.we have mentione~ 
M. Chamvoux, who had twenty-five years as an inspector of slaughter~ 
houses reported the following conclusion to the February Six Inquiry 
Commission: 
Some of the wounds, nine in total, seemed thus to have been 
caused by razor blades fixed to the extreme end of canes; in 
fact, it was impossible, without taking the chance of being 
kicked, to use other means. The use of knife, stiletto, or 
poignard, for example, would have exposed one to serious dangers 
and given wounds of a different character than those studied.72 
Some writers on the Great February Six Riot have been so impressed 
by these atrocities that they have named their works after them; for 
,/ 
example, Bonnevay refers to the 11 ,1ournees sanglantes"--"the bloody 
days. 11 One question recurs which will probably never be satisfactorily 
answered: Were all these extreme measures necessary on February Six? 
Perhaps Zola was correct when he asserted that man becomes a beast when 
71 • 1 6 6 Appell, La so~ree, pp. 33- 34. 
72 M. Chamvoux, La nature des blessures des chevaux de la ,garde 
republicaine de Paris, Chambre des deputes 1 Annexe 3390, Documents 
Parlementa±res (Paris, May 17, 1934), pp. 692-693. 
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he pushes his nervous .system too far and places himself in a situation 
where he "must kill or be killed.n73 
The c~sualty list.-- February Six exacted too heavy a human toll 
for a nation classified as civilized. Statistics concerning the 
wounded and killed on February Six are rather controversial depending 
on the sources from which they are taken. Below is presented the total 
official number·of wounded and dead for all Paris. It is a pertinent 
fact that most of the policemen wounded (except a dozen officers} were 
struck either at the Concorde, the Gours-la-Reine, or the Ghamps-
Elys~es. The statistics include some fifty struck near the Solf~rino 
Bridge. With these limitations in mind the following summary is the 
correct casualty list of February Six:74 
Police Rioters and Spectators 
Killed 1 14 
Hospitalized 92 236 
Treated for wounds 688 419 
Totals 781 669 
*Source: Appell, La soir~e, p. 619. 
Thus 1,450 people were killed or so seriously wounded as to re-
quire medical care. The people who received light wounds or were 
73 '* " Emile Zola, La bete humaine (Paris, 1953--Livre de poche 
edition), Gh. XIII. 
74 ' Appel:+, La soiree, p. 619. 
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given first-aid treatment are not included. It is impossible to get 
figures as to what totals the latter group made. Of the fifteen human 
beings killed that evening, the evidence shows that all of them were 
struck by bullets. Mme. Caroline Gourlan was the only woman on the 
, A 
casualty list and was the one struck on the terrace of the Hotel 
Crillon around 7:30 P.M. The first bullet had been received by Guard 
Richard at 7:10 P.M. according to medical reports. From that time to 
10:30 P.M. bullets found some forty-seven victims; ~hile, f~om 10:30 
P.M. to 1:00 A.M. (February 7), twenty more persons were hit. These 
official figures, however, do not take into account all those who 
suffered physically from all types of wounds inflicted during the 
riot. Everything taken into consideration, the seriously wounded and 
those who we~e ambulatory cases probably amounted more nearly to four 
75 thousand. 
Clearing of the Place de la Concorde 
Rioters' last assault and Colonel Simon's counteroffensive.-- But 
our narration of February Six is not yet completed, for we left our 
account at 11:30 P.M. The numerous police charges made after 11:00 P.M. 
gave the impression for a while that all was over. The mounted police 
did not encounter too much opposition in clearing-the rioters out of 
the Cours-la-Reine. Then the police turned around and discovered 
that the riot~rs were beginning what later became known as the "rioters' 
75MM. Gardiol, Amat, et de Framond, Les victimes des ,journe'es du 
6 au 12 fe'vrier 1934, Chambre des d~putes, Annexe 3389, Documents 
Parlementaires (Paris, May 17, 1934), pp. 690-691. 
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The 11:30 P.M .. assault by the rioters was as aggressive a threat 
to the Concorde Bridge as had been attempted that day. As the human 
mass surged forward once again, the police unloaded more pistol shots 
on the insurgents. The shout of: 11Throw ~e Guards Into The Seine!" 
filled the air. 77 The mounted guards, whose remaining horses were 
covered with blood, were pushed back to about the same arc the 
Solidarit~ Frangaise had placed them in the earlier 7:30 P.M. charge. 
Exhausted and.disillusioned the police seemed to have no spirits 
left as they drew their pistols. Gunfire succeeded in sending the 
rioters scurrying behind diverse points of safety. No one knew it 
then, but this was the last serious attempt to be made to take the 
d 'd 78 Concor e Br~ ge. 
Since 7:00 P.M. the numerous charges, scuffles, assaults, and 
bullet exchanges had by 11:30 P.M. exhausted both sides. The 11:30 P.M. 
advance had been half-heartedly carried out by the rioters. When this 
last try failed, rioters by the hundreds began departing for home. 
For the first time that evening it became possible to notice certain 
bald spots on the Place de la Concorde. A desperate core of various 
elements later identified as Cam~lots du Roi, Jeunesses Patriotes, 
Solidarit:Francaise, and Communists, and just plain scums harangued 
those leaving to stay. The leaguers insisted that it was their duty 
76 Appell, La soiree, p. 619. 
77 ; Cherau, Concorde, pp. 128-.129. 
78 
Appell, La soi~e, p. 619. 
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to fight. These speakers soon were speaking to the winds. 79 
The angry young men, with their allies who remained on the Concorde, 
then made united thrusts at the police~ Gun play on both sides became 
dominant, and the rioters, scared, hid behind their barricades and 
started to hurl more missiles in the police's direction. While this 
was going on, Colonel Simon, Commander of the LEfgion des aardiens de la 
Paix, dropped by to see how his men were doing. Simon had been off 
duty but, worried about his men, he decided to go to ~be Concorde. He 
arrived at a time when his gardiens de la paix looked more dead than 
alive, and when the rioters were;:again becoming audacious. and violent. 80 
Disgusted with what he observed, Colonel Simon took command. 
Their chief making such a move encouraged the gardiens to regain new 
hopes. Colonel Simon felt that the police were in no shape to resist 
another assault if it should come. When he discovered that such a 
move was being prepared by the rioters Simon took the .initiative.81 
He told his men: 
My friends, you must keep yourselves going. You must go 
as far as the Rue Royale to the end of the Place de la Concorde. 
I will follow you with all the other police--and the mounted 
guards. It will be your last charge--be assured of that!82 
Therefore, .around midnight, Colonel Simon asked the Republican 
Guards to cooperate with his men and really clear the. area. With this 
79 . ~ 
Appell, La soiree, p. 619. 
80 . 
Ibid. 
81 • 
rug. 
82 ~ Bonnevay, Les Journees sanglantes, pp. 127-128. 
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injection of renewed hope within the police ranks, the law enforcement 
agents charged the rioters' barricades, demolished them, pushed the 
mob behind them to the Rue Royale, and made a complete sweep from the 
Avenue Gabriel to the embassies. The rioters tried to stop what they 
saw as an avalanche, but the most serious trouble they caused was the 
sending of a bullet into the mounted Guard Riou.S3 Thus the Concorde 
was cleared. 
Next Colonel Simon directed Captains Merzeraut and Gilles of the 
Mobile Guards to follow him in emptying the areas to the right of the 
Coneorde. M. Marchand, who had replaced Commissioner Rottte earlier 
that evening, simultaneously led a police detachment into the Cours-
la-Reine. Commissioners Challier and Jannette took the points not 
yet covered. Jannette was struck by a bullet before he got too far, 
but the police kept pushing on and, when Jannette fell, they opened 
~re on the rioters. The crowd paniestrieken could not disperse off 
the Concorde's surroundings fast enough.S4 
The Great February Six Riot was all over. The Place de la 
Coneorde was deserted, but the police, taking no chances, stayed at 
fueir posts until 2:30 A.M. The final counteroffensive by Colonel Simon 
had resulted in six rioters being killed and seventeen seriously 
wounded. By J:OO A.M. the exhausted police were able to be sent to 
rejoin their families.S5 
pp. 
SJ . I Appell, La so1ree, p. 619. 
S4Bonnevay, Les .iourne'es sanglantes, 
129-132. 
85Appell, La soire'e, p. 619. 
/ p. 12S; also Gberau, Concorde, 
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Critical Comments 
What could have been done.-- The critics, on the effectiveness of 
police methods on February Six, asserted later that little trouble 
would have occurred if the Place de la Concorde had been cordoned off 
and made off limits. These writers further claimed that the Champs-
, 
Elysees could have been blocked off1 as could the Rue Royale, the 
Right and Left Banks of the Seine, the Tuileries, and even the subway 
entrances. This last point was in reference to the fact that the 
subways had not been closed until eight o'clock. 86 
Gaston Ch~rau propagated the idea that not only could the above 
have been done, but even after the police had neglected to cordon 
off the Concorde, they could have still cleared it earlier during 
the evening of February Six. , . Cherau added that: 
If an encircling movement had been carried out by the 
police, in such a way as to amass the demonstrators in a 
corner of the Place de la Concorde--either on the side of 
the American Embassy, or on the Rue de Rivoli side--tney 
would have obtained more effective results, than did all 
those dashes of small columns8-in a blind manner--around the Concorde Bridge area ••••• 7 
The records disclose that the Place de la Concorde could have been 
isolated from the rest of Paris by a plan formulated back in 1919. 
M. Guichard, in his testimony before the February Six Inquiry Commissio~ 
recalled that this scheme had been successfully used on May 1, 1919. 
But on February 5 this method had not even been considered. The Paris 
Municipal Police commanders later explained that such a plan took some 
86 Appell, 
~ , 
Cherau, 
~ La soiree, p. 619. 
Concorde, p.120. 
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ten thousand men to carry out, and that in all of Paris there were but 
seven thousand law ofricers. To carry out this design with any 
88 
success the troops had to be called out, as they were in 1919. 
More important and serious is the criticism which declared that 
the police force assigned to the Concorde Bridge and nearby areas 
had been too picayune for the task at hand. Numerous policemen 
testified afterwards that the police leaders had underestimated the 
violent mood of the rioters. Colonel Simon was the main proponent 
of this criticism, but he was not alone in this, for almost every 
writer on this event since has emphasized this point. 89 
Another criticism, which also cast a bad reflection on the 
efficiency of the police, was the observation that the Mobile Guards 
and the Republican Guards were not allowed to use their long range 
muskets. Close combat was thereby made more of a certainty for any 
encounters between the rioters and the police. The police themselves 
were the chief supporters of this view. The explanation went that a 
musket permits one to push an opponent without getting into hand-to-
hand combat. Also this weapon would have prevented much trigger-happy 
behavior which a pistol lends itself to so easily. In defense of the 
police commanders here, it should be noticed that these guards had 
not shouldered muskets on Paris streets for years. 90 
88 • I 6 i 6 Appell, La so~ree, p. 20; also Werth, France n Ferment, p .1 2. 
89 Ibid. 1 p. 621 
90Ibid. 
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Another criticism brought out by Colonel Simon was that the police 
command had been disorganized on February Six--no one gave the orders 
or took the responsibility to do so. As no one man had charge of the 
area, the measures taken were by nature uncoordinated and often 
chaotic. Added to this was the neglect by the various police commanders 
to make use of tear gas or barbed wire.91 
As a final criticism came the suggestion that almost no arrests 
were made that evening. The worst violators and troublemakers were 
not even reprimanded. The encouragement thus given, along this line 
to break the law, and remain unpunished if you did, proved too great 
a temptation for many--so went the argument. Again in defense of the 
police, it must be recalled that the police were few in numbers. 
Arrests probably were out of the question, for three or four policemen--
and they could not be spared--would have been needed to catch some of 
the younger and more vicious rioters. 92 
Misconceptions . .,..- Certain erroneous conceptions were·accepiied as 
truths by most Parisians in 1934. Unfortunately too many writers on 
February Six, in spite of the evidence to the contrary, still keep 
presenting as facts such misconceptions as: (1) that the police were 
drugged; (2) that black troops were brought into Paris and used against 
the rioters; (3) that machine guns had made_their appearance near the 
Concorde Bridge-when the police became desperate; (4) that the army 
was called in; and (5) that armored tanks were ready to carry out a 
91 , Appell, Lg-soiree, 621-622. 
92Ibid. 
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coup d 1 ~tat. 93 
The machine gun story revolved around the fact that several dis-
mantled machine guns had been brought to the Chamber of Deputies the 
first few days in February. The press concluded that these were 
mounted on February Six and turned against the rioters. Some witnesses 
even testified seeing them in action.94 M. Bartha, however, gave the 
adequate explanation when he declared that on: 
The night of February Six were to take place the funeral 
rites or the obsequies of General Lef~vre who resided on the 
Rue de Bourgogne--in back of the Palais-Bourbon. 
You, of course, know that at the obsequies of a general 
it is customary to send different detachments of the many 
arms found in a division. That is why we saw parading on the 
Place du Palais-Bourbon on February 5--around twelve--some 
machine-gun units, some 75 millimeters, and a detachment of 
corps troops (some black).95 
No records exist to support the tank rumors. Such stories had 
been circulated mainly by La Liberte and Le Jour. All that can be 
said is that no tanks were moved on Paris streets on February Six. 96 
The story about the drugging of the guards was shown afterwards 
to be based only on suspicions and not facts. The press again jumped 
to quick conclusions. An objective investigation of this matter 
93ch~rau, Qoncorde, pp. 136-140. 
94 Action Francaise, February 7, 1934. 
95 , M. Catalan, Preparation de 
, , 8 
~ la manifestation du 6 fevrier 1934, 
Chambre des deputes, Annexe 33 5, Documents Par1ementaires (Paris, 
May 17, 1934), p. 610. 
96La Libert~, February 6, 1934; also Le Jour, February 5, 1934. 
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reveals that these rumors were based on what occurred in the improvised 
hospital within the Palais-Bourbon on Februacy Six. This mistake was 
made because: 
At a given moment four or five wounded were near fainting 
on a table. No "cordial" or stimulants were near at hand. 
Mme. Barthe,wife of the Chamber's purser, sent someone to get 
a few bottles of rum which helped to revive the wounded. From 
this was born-the legend of the doped guards.97 
97 , 6 6 Bonnevay, Les journees sanglantes, pp. 1 4-1 5; also Gardiol, 
Les victimes, p. 690. 
CHAPTER X 
DALADIER RESIGNS - DOUMERGUE ASSIGNS 
(Picking Up The Pieces) 
Rioting and the Fall of Daladier 
Morning of FebruarY Seven.-- In a previous chapter we were left 
with a depressed Daladier. We saw the tumultuous Chamber sitting 
had made the Premier a very confused leader. His colleagues did 
their best at the time to bolster his spirit, but with very little 
success. Daladier by the end of the debate on the interpellations 
kept his hands in front of his bent head as if crying. The young 
Cabinet members, who stayed around to pro~ect him, found the 
Premier incapable of making clear decisions on questions involving 
his own safety--not to mention theirs. They, therefore, took things 
into their own hands and rushed the stunned Premier out of the 
Chamber. 1 
At midnight, Premier Daladier had regained his composure once 
again. He called an emergency Cabinet meeting shortly after 12:30 A.M. 
at the Ministry of the Interior. Present at that time were MM. Pierre 
Cot, Eug~ne Frot, Dona t-Guigue, Guy la Chambre, Mistler, Pailht, 
Penancier, and the Premier. 2 Daladier came right to the point. They 
1 Jean Fabry, De laPlace de la Concorde au cours de l'intendance 
(Paris, 1942), p. 49. 
2 . 
Le Temps 7 February 8, 1934. 
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had assembled to decide: (1) what measures needed to be taken to main-
tain order in Paris, and (2) what could be done to merit the respect 
the parliamentary votes or confidence gave the Ministry.3 
M. Frat insisted that a "state or siege" should be proclaimed. 
He explained that such a state would make it possible to undertake 
systematic searches, to apprehend the culprits responsible for 
February Six, to check the venai press, and to outlaw the irresponsible 
leagues. A n state o£ siege," furthermore, would place the police under 
military orders and, as a consequence, they would end this molly-
coddling of the. irascible veterans. Daladier, upholding the tradi-
tional French democratic liberties, took a strong stand against this 
proposal and it was dropped. An alternative proposal to investigate 
whether a plot against the safety of the state existed was abandoned 
after Frat spoke against it. 4 
M. Frat then brought up the matter of "preventive arrests. u He 
felt that such action was. Justifiable if the arrests would place the 
"plotters of February Six11 behind bars. Bonne£oy-8ibour, Prefect o£ 
Police who had walked in late, stated that legally he could not make 
such arrests. The newspapers later insisted that the Cabinet made an 
extended list to be arrested at this point. Daladier and his ministers 
just as strongly asserted that no such long list had ever been created. 
Rather, stated Daladier, Maurras, Daudet, Pujo and all militant league 
. 
3MM. Jean Piot · et de Nadaillac, Lea de'cisions du governement au 
lendemain dU 6 r{vrier 1934 sur la voie publique, Chambre des dlputls, 
Annexe 3391, Documents Parlementaires (Paris, May 17, 1934), p. 69:3. 
. 4Ibid. , p. 693-694. 
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commanders were brought up as possible names.5 
Without a warrant, early on the morning of February 7, the police 
~ 
went to Leon Daudet's house. Daude~. opened the door, asked the law-
officers what they wanted, and was told he was under arrest. Daudet 
demanded to see the warrant. The police answered that they did not 
have one, but it did not matter for the arrest was .only a formality. 
They wanted to ask him a few questions. The royalist leader insisted 
on a warrant: no warrant, no Daudet. They had no~ they said, He 
told them to leave. Maurras wheu visited was even humorous about the 
whole thing. He refused to leav~ his home and added that he never 
did so before 3:00 P.M. Reason~ it was bad for his health! 6 
As for what was done about ~he league leaders' arrests a police 
report~.dated February 8 read: 
Conforming to the instructions received, certain pro-
visions were made yesterday morning to place under arrest 
the military-minded leaders within the leagues: Action 
Francaise, Solidari~~ Franqaise, and Jeunesses Patriotes. 
3 J 
Thus followed the apprehension of MM. Jacques Ditte 
(Solidarit~), Vinceguide, Pierre Besan£on, de Fran~ueville 
(Jeunesses), as they were leaving their domiciles. 
Besides carrying out these "preventive arrests" until noon on 
February 7, the Daladier Government released a communiquJ in which 
it thanked the veterans for having refused to join the professional 
rioters on the evening of February Six. The message divulged that 
5 
. t d , • • 694 695 P~o , Les ec~s1ons, pp. - . 
6
aaston Cherau, Concorde! 6 f~vrier 1934 (Paris, 1934), pp. 152-
153. 
7Piot, Les d~cisions, p. 695. 
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11 a plot against the staten had been nipped in the bud. The release 
ended with an appeal to all honest Frenchmen to rise in defense of 
the republican institutions of France. On the much-disaussed plot, 
. , 
the commun1que read: 
Nevertheless, certain political leagues fomented the desire 
to riot and attempted a coup de force against the Republican 
regime. 
Gangs :armed with revolvers and knives assailed the gardiens 
de la paix, the Republican Guards, and the Mobile Guards. They 
even opened fire on the defenders of the law and wou~ded numer-
ous law-officers. The proofs were given of such a plot from · 
the identifications made by the riqters arrested. There was 
defini~ely an organized armed attack against the safety of the 
state. 
This "plot against the state 11 theory was upheld, on February 7, 
by Radio-P.T.T. and Radio-Paris, The newscasters for these stations 
announced on that morning that Paris was now calm. They continued 
that such was not the case the evening before when a vicious minority 
unleashed a mad crowd on the city's streets. 9 The commentators 
placed the blame for the destruction and unruly conduct on the Action 
Francaise, the Communists, and the unemployed. The facts show this 
IS 
to be incorrect for: (1) the Action Francaise never had control of 
the crowd on February Sixj (2) the Communists and their sister organ-
ization, the A.R.A.C., were ineffective and negligible: and (3) not 
only the unemployed, but the ·bourgeoisie from all ranks dominated 
the crowd on the Concords. The February Six Inquiry Commission fur-
ther discovered that the Government had brought pressure on M. Pellen9, 
8 . I P1ot, Les decisions 1 p. 696; also Le Temps, February 8, 1934. 
9 I Cherau, Concorde, pp. 148=152. 
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Director of the French Radio, to issue such a version of the events of 
February Six.10 
After the Daladier Government took the necessary measures to 
, 
carry out the ·11preventive arrests 11 and the communiques, it made 
immediate provisions to replace the disabled policemen-.. Besides these 
replacements, provisions were made to bring in reinforcements. Colonel 
Barthe in the Ministry of War made arrangements for fifteen platoamof 
Mobile Guards to be alerted by 2:00A.M., February 7. These troops 
11 
were never used. 
After the Government leaders did these things, they went home. 
Soon afterwards, the Parisians, who had gone to bed early the night 
before, woke up to find their Paris riddled with scars. Then.began 
a steady stream of curious and nf souvenir hunters. The police kept 
them moving throughout the morning and, by noon, every person on the 
Concorde was ordered out of the area.l2 
Daladier visits the hospitals.-- B'L"emier Daladier wanted to visit 
the hospitals on the morning of February 7 to see if the reports that 
he read about the Great February Six Riot were true~ Accompanied by 
Frot and Bonnefoy-Sibour, Daladier arrived at the Maison de Sant~ to 
which the gardiens de la paix had been evacuated the night before. 
From 9:00A.M. on, the three visitors silently moved from one ward to 
lOP. t L d' •. 10 , es ec1s1ons, pp. 696-697. 
11Ibid., pp. 697-698. 
12Action Franjaise, February 8, 1934; also Alexander Werth, France 
in Ferment (London, 1935), p. 169. 
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another and could not believe what they were seeing. A few questions 
posed to the suffering men acted at times to break the deadly silence 
kept during the tour.13 
Even more distressing for the three men were the sights awaiting 
them at the Val-de-Grace Hospital. There they were confronted by 
the mangled and suffering bodies of the Mobile Guards and the Republi-
can Guards. Daladier later admitted the distressing effects these 
scenes had made on him. For over an hour the men continued their visit 
to the wounded and dying. Frot and Bonnefoy-8ibour kept staring as 
cries came from some of the tormented men. Both men, obviously shaken 
by what they saw, broke the silence only long enough to let Daladier 
know that it would be difficult to maintain order that evening. 14 
Daladier resigns.-- After Daladier's return to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs following these hospital visits-=around 10:15 A.M.--
the Premier found MM. Cot, Guy la Chambre, Martinaud-Deplat, and Mistler 
waiting. These men strongly urged him to resign. This was the first 
time that this course of action was recoimnended by the official family. 
They insisted that, according to their sources of informa-
tion, the arsenals of Paris and of the suburbs had been raided. 
Furthermore, the widespread purchase of arms that was going on 
would end up by· groups of exasperated rioters leading success-
ful assaults against any barricades constructed by the police. 
The resulting number of victims would be considerable. They in-
sisted forcibly, because of these reasons, that the Cabinet 
should leave.l5 
13 
Piot, Les d~cisions, pp. 698-699. 
14 
Ibid. 
15 
Ibid. 
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Soon thereafter .the Premier was visited by L~on Blum, the Social-
ist leader. Daladier asked Blum what he thought of his intention of 
proroguing the Chamber. This was necessary, added Daladier, for he 
could not afford to waste his time answering questions, interpellations, 
and other matters. Blum vigorously opposed any such adjournment of 
the Chamber at this time, as this would only act as another stimulus 
to excite public opinion.l6 
M. Jeanneney, President of the Senate, around 11:00 A.M. was 
consulted by the Premier for his opinion. Jeanneney said he could 
not advise resignation. Bouisson, President of the Chamber, when 
asked what he thought, declared that Daladier should get out for 
the good of the count~. Thus, Bouisson felt, would the threat 
against the parliamentary democratic institutions be calmed down. 
He further added that plans should be na.de immediately for a 11(1lovern-
ment ot Nationa1Union.rr17 
Frot 1 who was tied up for the moment, sent M. Frossard to 
Daladier with the message that the Minister of the Interior advised 
11 resisting th~ mob 11 no longer. Frat was of the opinion that his 
police could not cope with another February Six Riot. Consequently 
he proposed resigning. Frat wanted to be rid of the burden he carriea18 
Blum now took a strong stand against the Government leaving. 
16 / d , .• Laurent Bonnevay, Les Journees sanglantes e fevr1er 1934 
(Paris, 1935), pp. 183-207; also Piot, Les decisions, p. 699. 
17 
• d, . 69 P1ot, Les ec1sions, p. 9. 
18 Werth, France in Ferment, p. 166. 
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Blum believed in the existence of the "fascist plot,n that is, that 
the French fascists had deliberately brought on February Six. The 
Socialist leader was only repeating the version which was accepted as 
the truth by his party followers .. Blum therefore insisted that 
Daladier was doing a disservice to his country if he yielded to 
11 fascist mob rule," that this was exactly what the plotters wanted. 19 
But the .decision was Daladier's to make. The Premier, before the 
February Six Inquiry Commission, gave two reasons for resigning. 
First he asserted that in the present confused situation in France, 
nothing could be done to solve the country's economic problems. But 
the decisive reason for his departure was: 
On February Six, the riot was a failure--the riot was now 
broken. The rioters tried to invade the Chamber--they attempted 
to begin a national revolution--to proclaim the overthrow of the 
Government:.--to set up a Provis,fonal Government. These objec-
tives were never attained. There is no doubt, the riot was 
checked for good! 
But, in spite of this fact, during that evening too much 
blood had been spilt. Now, on February.?, the Army was needed 
for intervention. We needed to throw twenty-year-olds against 
the mob--against an angered mass of misguided souls. To have 
guns--machine-guns. Hundreds of dead would have resulted--for 
sure .... 20 
Thus Daladier decided to resign. Before departing he made a final 
plea with the leagues who had been active the night before: desist 
from any further demonstration. Around 3:.30 P.M. the French press 
19 
Werth, France in Ferment, p. 166~167. 
20 
Piot, Les d~cisions, p. 699. 
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informed the public that another Cabinet had resigned. 21 
Many would agree with the following statement as the true reasons 
why the Daladier Cabinet had to leave: 
M. Daladier had made one mistake after another for eight 
days. He was mistaken in the constituting of his cabinet. He 
made more errors by the administrative measures he took. He 
cannot be forgiven for refusing to explain why he did so before 
the Chambers.22 · · . 
For the second time within a two-week period a Government had 
been overthrown by the 11 forces of the streets." The Daladier Ministry, 
like its predecessor led by Chautemps, had the confidence of the 
Chamber, but it was led to admit--even though unconsciously--that the 
extra-parliamentary pressure continued to challenge the traditional 
French democratic procedural rules. To many observers the Daladier 
Ministry leaving in such a fashion meant that the very existence of 
"democratic principles" was in jeopardy. As Werth su.ccinctly put 
it: 11Was 'the street' to be allowed to make and unmake governments? 11 23 
Street rioting on February 7.-- As a result, probably of the 
.announcement of Daladier 1 s resignation, the rioting on February 7 had 
little support from the political leagues. This rioting, furthermore, 
became highly disorganized and sporadic. As on February Six, the main 
, . 
centers of activities were the Concorde and the Champs-Elysees, but 
the Place de la Coneorde and the Tuileries areas never became the 
21 Werth, France in Ferment, p. 170 
22Anon., ttLa demission du ministere," Journal des Debats, Vol. 2085 
(February 9, 1934), 215. 
23 Werth, France in Ferment, p. 165. 
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trouble spots they had been the previous evening. 24 
The curious, as we have said, were kept from assembling on the 
Concorde that morning. By 2:00P.M., the first incident was underway 
when some 120 Mobile Guards were pelted with numerous asphalt pieces 
and small stones while taking up their posts. Nothing serious came 
out·of this, for the police scared the assailants away. 25 
From 4:00P.M. to 7:00P.M., small groups of rioters mingled with 
the peaceful crowds, gathering near the Place de la Concorde, and 
attempted to overturn busses~ The police quickly put an end to such 
rough play and kept the would-be demonstrators moving. · Memories of 
the previous evening reappeared at 4:30P.M. when several thousand 
rioters began marching out from·the Rue Boissy-d'Anglas, pushed 
everyone in their way to one side, and headed straight for the Concorde 
Bridge. The police came forward to meet these onrushers, struck them 
hard, and just as quickly as possible dispersed them in all directions. 26 
The police were plentiful in number that afternoon. In fact, by 
7: 00 P.M. , M. Marchand, Director of the Municipal Police 1 had four 
thousand men on duty--a considerable number indeed! Marchand had 
alerted all police vans to patrol the streets throughout the night and 
to allow no unusual bunching of crowds. Besides these law officers, 
the Mobile Guard was on duty with 11 400 men (1,100 on foot patrol and 
24Piot, Les decisions, p. 700. 
25 Ibid. 
26Piot, Les decisions,; p. 700. 
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three hundred as mounted cavalry). This combined'force was enough to 
check any demonstration that took place that evening. 27 
But this heavy police supervision of Paris did not deter the 
rioters from trying to d~velop trouble spots all over the city. Con-
centrating our attention first on the Concorde~ we find at 5:30P.M., 
some three thous~nd passive Frenchmen idling in the vicinity--waiting! 
By 7:30 P.M. this crowd had doubled its size and the police, not 
waiting any longer for more .addition, pushed this human mass beyond 
the Ministry of Marine and cleared the square. For the time being 
~vents calmed down in the Concorde area.2S 
" ' But the same cannot be said for the Champs-Elysees and the 
Grand Boulevards during the same period. The police on the Champs-
Elys~es were especially well placed at strategic points in this sector. 
At 4:00P.M., for instance, the police had little difficulty when some 
five-hundred overstimulated Jeunesses Patriotes started to stone the 
, 
Elysee Palace. The police quickly removed the hoodlums. Around 
7:00P.M., again near the Elys~e Palace, a column of two thousand men 
singing La Marseillaise clashed with the police line on duty. Someone 
on the rioters' side opened fire while the charges and clashes were 
going on. The police answered this shot with a forceful charge which 
cleared the vicinity.29 
27Piot, Les decisions, p. 700. . 
2g.Ibid. 
29Ibid. 
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On the Grand Boulevards the rioters were constantly parading from 
11:00 A.M. onward. Throughout the afternoon these marches back and 
forth continued with steady chants of: 11Thaeves! Down With The 
Thieves! Death For Frot! Hang Daladier! 11 The police trying to keep 
order were menaced constantly by gangs coming from side streets. 
During the evening these tactics continued as small isolated police 
bands found themselves under attack. The roving police vans always were 
on time to prevent any'serious development against their colleagues.30 
From 7:00 P.M. on, the Grand Boulevards experienced attacks 
carried on the "apache gangs. 11 These 11 apaches 11 were bent on des-
truction and shamelessly went about looting stores along the Rue de 
Rivoli, the Rue de la Paix, the Boulevard des Capucines, and as far 
north as the Gare St. Lazare shops. These hoodlums did an unusually 
destructive job on the shopping centers, where glass windows were 
. 31 
unprotected by steel curta1ns. 
From 9:00P.M., .vandals coming from the direction of the Opera 
began a systematic destruction. Kiosks were overturned, the large 
and expensive shops' windows were shattered into hundreds of pieces, 
fires were set, trees were uprooted, and the Grand Boulevards were 
blocked with pushcarts and assorted debris. At different intervals 
pistol shots would whistle through the streets. On Rue Tronchet, 
Ch~rau witnessed the following incident: 
30L'Echo de Paris, February 8, 1934. 
3lAlexander Werth, Which Way France? (London, 1937), p. 58. 
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I saw this disgusting affair: a motorcycle with a sidecar 
raced along the street, clipped the stores on its way, while 
the driver broke the windows by using a club. Immediately be-
hind him came the looters who entered the shops and the dis-
play windows and seized all they couid carry.J2 
While the Grand Boulevards were undergoing this mass vandalism, 
/ 
the street lamps on the Champs-Elysees were smashed by flying stones 
thrown by hundred of rioters. The police in the dark took no 
chances and made vicious charges to clear the whole avenue. Spotting 
rioters, for instance, who were tearing up park benches and burning 
them;.,. 
The police did not want to be bothered for nothing. Nearing 
the culprits they jumped into the crowd and began swinging their 
night-sticks against all bystanders. 
At the height of the Avenue, a lonely figure stood near the 
curbing with his official badge shining. It was our colleague 
Jean Goujon. 
A blow from a night-stick: hit him smack on the skull, and 
he hit the ground. Ten seconds later, our collaborator attempt-
ing to rise was assaulted by. six policement who tore away his 
insignia, and hammered him with· heavy blows which soon placed 
him in an unconscious state.JJ 
/ With such determination, the police had the Champs-Elysees and the 
Grand Boulevards swept clean. By 11:00 P.M, the police were still on 
duty but the crowds had left. The streets were deserted. The price 
paid by human beings that evening was: 289 policemen seriously wounded; 
four rioters killed and seventy-three seriously wounded. Hundreds 
were given first aid on both sides. The records further show that of 
32 , Cherau, Concorde, pp. 158-159. 
JJL'Intransigeant, February 8, 1934. 
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the four killed that night not one had been struck by a bullet . .34 
The influence of Prov-incial.Rioting 
Provinces answer Paris riots.-- Historically speaking relatively 
little attention has centered on the role and importance of the 
:Provincial riots on February 6-7. Based on the severai studies made 
on this subject and on the meager records a\l'ailableo::--mostly newspaper 
accounts--it can be concluded that the 11provincial riots" had a 
national significance. For a balanced picture as to what the 
9Democratic Crisis iri France in 19.34" actually meant nationally the 
reader must also be presented with the remarkable provincial protests 
made on February 5-7, 1934. 
With a few exceptions and generally speaking, it is accurate to 
state that the Socialistic version of what the Great February Six 
Riot was, or was to become, was accepted by the prov-incials of 
France. This interpretation saw February Six as a 11Fascist-inspired 
p~otn which had failed for the time being. In retaliation the 
provinces simultaneously were swept by a desire to let their feelings 
be·known. The resulting provincial uprisings placed the provincials 
in direct opposition to what they believed had almost transpired in 
the capital on the evening of February Six. Here the historian en-
colinters once more the age-old question: Does Paris dictate to the 
provinces and does it speak for France?35 
34Piot} Les dicisions, p. 700. 
J5Marc Bernat-d, Les .journees ouvrieres des 9 et 12 fevrier-1934 
(Paris, 1934), p. 19. 
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Goaded by the reports ~oming out of Paris, the provincials in such 
major population centers as Cherbourg, Gir'enoble, Lille, Lorient, Lyons, 
Nancy, Nantes, Nevers, Nice, Ntmes 1 Marseille 1 Rouen, Saint-Nazaire, 
Toulouse, and Valence put on their own mass demonstrations. In these 
industrial cities the workers were united by a 11 feeling to make their 
voices heard by all France."· The common cry issuing from all these 
points was: 11Down With Fascism! n36 
In Lille, for example, some four thousand demonstrators hunted 
and chased off the streets the Action Francaise leaguers of that city. 
The port city of Saint-Nazaire was the site where six thousand· 
proletarians, answering a call made by the local labor unions and the 
League of the Rights of Man, protested vigorously before the windows 
of the royal newspaper: the Courier de Saint-Nazaire. In Toulouse, 
an appeal published by local newspapers brought out a column of 
twenty thousand which paraded incessantly through the streets with 
streamers and banners reading: 11The Fascist Reaction .Shall Not Come 
To Pass! and lfThe Workers Will Seize Power! "Lorient had a similar 
parade with three thousand taking part.37 
At Grenoble, the demonstrators addressed a message to President 
Albert Lebrun-=which received wide circulation~-and which read: 
The Representatives from the Labor Organizations in Vizille 
and Grenoble remember their traditions and are conscious of the 
strength they have even if they have remained calm. 
36 , 
Bernard, Les ,journees ' ouvrieres, p. 19. 
37 
Ibid., p. 20. 
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Workers, peasants, functionaries, townspeople, and moun-
taineers have decided to form a Vigilance Committee. This 
Vigilance Committee is ready, if need be, to become a revolu-
tionary committee. 
For instanc¢ 1 we know what our immediate task is: to 
maintain calmness, a questioning attitude; and furthermore, to 
prepare, silently--for there is one idea which transcends all--
the provincials have remained calm before all appeals which 
demanded murder, which demanded excitement. 
The Vigilance Committee of the Workers of Vizille and 
Grenoble believes i~ is necessary to remind you that Paris is 
not all of France.3 · 
' This manifesto is illustrative of the elan typical in the provinces 
at this time. The Vigilance Committee .in its message refused to follow 
Pa~is' example and en~ed by stating: 
The Republic is probably weak in Paris, but in theirQvinces 
it is strong. The workers of Vizille and Grenoble decided--not 
by opening each others' heads, but by firm resolution--to defend 
their liberties, and to be ready to bring back, throughout the 
province, the rebirth and the restoration of the word nRevolution~~ 
to its original noble meanings and to its generous objectives.39 
But these words came on February 7. On the Great February Six not 
all provincial France had been so peaceful as suggested by the Grenoble 
Manifesto. On February Six some of the larger provincial communities 
.had witnessed the branches of the different political leagues parading 
and fighting on their streets. Lille watched the students of the city 
gather on its Grande Place. Around them soon crystallized a huge crowd 
which kept shouting~ 11 Down With The Thieves! 11 A certain tenseness had 
developed by 6:00 P.M. as the Communist elements started to dominate 
38 . , Bernard, Les ,JQurnees . " ouvr~eres, pp. 20-21. 
39Ibid., p. 21. 
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the crowd• Six platoons of Mobile Guards were kept busy most of the 
evening trying to clear the Grande Place.4° 
These riots in Lille after 6:00 P.M. became especially violent. 
The inhabitants from the suburbs and the students filled every bit 
of space on the sidewalks around the Grande Place. The quadrilateral 
Grande Place was cordoned off by the police. Soon thereafter cries 
coming from one of the corners of the Grande Place announced that the 
Communists were on their way. As the notes from L'Internationale 
" came nearer and nearer, the mounted guards decided to clear the cafes 1 
terraces. They made several charges, causing men, womenJ and children 
to disperse in all directions.41 
At 7:15P.M., the Lille Communistscrossed the Grande Place and 
attacked the police. This bold·move brought on gunfire from both 
sides and ended with twenty arrests being made. The law officers 
showed no mercy as they disbanded the Communists. It was not until 
nine o'clock that some semblance of the usual calm in Lille returned. 
A patrol kept on the move all night to prevent any such column from 
. i . . 42 organ z1ng aga1n. 
Nancy, in eastern France, turned out to be another major center 
where disorder reigned for a while on February Six, for assembled at 
different points on the outskirts of Nancy, small columns moved towards 
40 , 
L'Egho de Paris, February 8, 1934. 
41 
Le Temps, February 8, 1934. 
42 
Ibid. 
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a center. The usual cries were heard as these men began uniting and 
forming one long and thick column. The rioters then getting bolder 
1hrew firecrackers at the Mobile Guards on duty on the main streets. 
This led to innumerable clashes and developed into the type of hand-
to-hand combat we have already observed in Paris. Many were wounded 
on both sides by the time order was restored. The local jails were 
filled and the police ordered everyone off the streets. The rioters 
who disobeyed were roughly treated.43 
In Lyons three thousand rioters watched six hundred young 
leaguers of the Action Francaise trying to form a column. The 
vigilant police constantly interfered with these plans and the 
formation was never realized. Some twenty arrests were made as the 
leaguers became irritated. Although numerous hit-and-run incidents 
continued in this city until 1:00 A.M., the police were always in 
command. 44 
The other major demonstrations in the provinces took place in 
Nantes and Rouen. In Nantes around 7:00 P.M. the rioters managed to 
block traffic in the Place Royale for a short time; but the police 
brought pressure to bear and sent the trouble makers either home or 
to jai1. 45 In Rouen, the Croix de Feu and the Jeunesses Patriotes 
took over the streets for a few moments. As the police charged these 
43 " L'Echo de Paris, February 71 1934. 
44te Temps, February 8, 1934. 
45 I . 
L'Echo de faris, February 7, 1934. 
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columns, the young aroix de Feu leader, M. Levet, intervened to re-
store the peaee.46 
The records on the effects of the February Six Riot in the 
provinces are incomplete. In face of this fact any conclusion reached 
on the matter can only be a tentative one. It would appear reasonable 
to aver that the provinces, like Paris, saw a minority assuming the 
leadership where there was trouble. This minority furthermore 
represented groups or different political hues. Thesedisturbanees 
in the provinces, however, never threatened the existence of French 
democratic institutions. 
If the role of the provinces on February Six is a controversial 
matter, the same cannot be said for their reaction to the Paris riots. 
The provinces almost unanimously condemned the rioters for what they 
had done. We have already seen above what answer the workers of 
Grenoble and Vizille gave. In a similar vein came the response from 
' the miners of Carmaux de Jaures. The latter announced that they were 
ready to shed their blood to preserve French democracy against the 
"fascist reacti'On11 and the "coup de force." In a manifesto, Carmaux 
' . de Jaures reminded Paris, once again, that it was not speaking for 
France on February Six. I I I I The Confederation Generale du Travail, 
France's largest labor union, also took a similar stand. From all 
directions the provinces declared their willingness to defend Repub-
lican institutions.47 
46te Temps, February 8, 1934. 
47te Eetit Parisien, February 8, 1934. 
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Thw U.N.C. sections throughout France Joined this opposition to 
Paris shown by Provincial France. The great majority of these ex-
pressed their formal disapproval to the Paris U.N.C. for the part it 
had played on February Six. The provincial Union Ftdlrale des Anciens 
Combattants affirmed its profound attachments to the Republic and 
stood ready to fight for democratic liberties. The provinces thus 
gave their approbation to Daladier's call to rally to the defense of 
French democratic institutions.48 
Doumergue Forms a "National Government" 
Gaston Doumergue, the man and the politician.-- The biting 
and sharp-witted weekly, Candide, like most ~f France's public 
opinion, was extremely enthusiastic about the man chosen to succeed 
Daladier. The reporter welcomed the leadership of Doumergue in 
these terms: 
We have complained for a long time that France has been 
governed by old men. The first time we tried a ministry 
domina ted by young men from the Chamber, you are all cogni-
zant of what followed. Even they were shocked by what they 
had done. 
Therefore, in what direction did we turn? Where else--
but towards a veteran politician. 
It is, in France, an instinctive movement. It is a 
tradition. In· moments when everything appears to be confused, 
we call upon our older men, to our sexagenarians or our 
septuagenarians. Thiers in 18'71, Clemenceau in 1917, Poincare 
in 1926, and Doumergue in February 19341 Why? · 
MM. Dormann et Salette, La participation des associations 
d'anciens combattants ~ la manifestation du 6 flvrier 19341 Cbambre des d~pute's 1 Annexe 3387 1 Documents Parlementaires (Paris, May> 17, 1934) , 
pp. 657-658. 
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Age appears .first of all as a guarantee of fairness. A man 
who is near the twilight of life has no more ambitious dreams. 
It is usually granted that he bas no other ambition except what 
is good for our country.49 
The two dominant notes after the announcement of Daladier 1 s 
resignation were: (1) a spontaneous enthusiasm for Doumergue, and 
(2) a return of hundreds of patriotic appeals advising France to keep 
faith with the Third Republic and democracy. The man who became the 
symbol~r this rallying behind democracy was Gaston Doumergue. 
Doumergue was born in southwestern France, at Aigues-Vives, on 
' August 1, 1863. His father 1 Pierre Doumergue, was a vineyard cul ti va-
tor, a Huguenot and, like his son, was conditioned to believe that the 
Third Republic had brought more religious toleration than any previous 
regimei Gaston attended the schools in nearby N1Ees, and in 1880 he 
met the qualifications needed to follow the courses at the Facultl de 
Droit in Paris. By 1885 he was a member of the N1mes bar.50 
Soon after entering the legal profession, Gaston Doumergue was 
, 
named to the Indo-China post of Hanoi by his friend Emile Jamais, 
Undersecretary of the Colonies. In 1891, Doumergue was transferred 
to Algeria. Not long afterwards he returned to Aigue-Vives, entered 
politics, won a seatin the Chamber, and went to Paris. The only 
notice he received in the press nationally was that he was the man 
nearest President Sadi Carnot when the latter was assassinated. 51 
49 Candide, February 15, 1934. 
~ . , .· . Maurice Verne, Le President Doumergue (}?aria, 1925), pp. 21-38. 
51 Pierre Lafue, Gaston Doumergue (Paris, 1933), pp. 16-32. 
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Slowly Doumergue's prestige in the Chamber grew and, in 1902, he 
became the Minister of the Colonies in the Combes Ministry. Three 
years later his gracious manners had brought him many friends, and he 
was elected the Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies. In the 
Sarrien and Clemenceau Ministries, he was the Minister of Commerce; 
while, under Briand, he became the. Minister of Public Education. 
Shortly before World War I he headed a short-lived Cabinet, and he 
had become the Radical-socialist.leader. 52 
During and after World Wa~ I his political career kept Doumergue 
busy dealing with foreign affairs and visiting· Austria, Italy, Germany, 
and Russia. The culmination of this life devoted to·,·public service 
was his election on June J, 1924 to the Presidency of the Republic. 
He stayed at the Elys'e Palace until 1931, when he retired to his 
home in Tournefeuille in Southern France. 53 
The historian Pierre Lafue then wrote the most remarkable biography 
of Doumergtie in 1933. By early 1934 this work was a best seller in 
political circles and received manY favorable reviews from the. press. 
Lafue in evaluating the importance of Doumergue in modern French 
politics advanced the theory that.the former President 
would assure the alarmed Left because of his reputation for 
impartiality and traditional respect for the constitution. And 
though he kept smiling even when our democracy was unsteady, 
he knew when he had to be firm, take up his burden, and direct 
52 Lafue, Doumergue 1 pp. JJ-98. 
53Ibid., pp. 98-128. 
the impatient and protesting Frenchmen around him towards the 
goal serving best the general welfare'. 54 . · 
3.34 
All biographies of Doumergue pointed out that he possessed three 
political qualities which in France were needed if one was to serve 
the country well: (1) he was a born compromiser; (2)· he was extremely 
tactful and just; (.3) he always upheld the ~deals of French democracy 
in everything he did. An estimate of Doumergue by an earlier 
biographer had concluded that Doumergue had brought two important 
democratic traits to the Elysee: an element of equi~ibrium and a good 
sound common sense.55 .Another biographer emphasized that "the sound 
logic backed with calmness" Doumergue brought to a delicate French 
political problem made him the distringuished President he became. 56 
It is important to keep these opinions on Doumergue in mind, for in 
our period, we will see that some contemporaries will try to make out 
that Doumergue was a "fascist dietator.n57 
Doumergue answers the call. --After Daladier, on February 7, in-
formed President Lebrun of his resignation, the President of the 
Republic decided to urge Doumergue to take up the premiership. Lafue 
had expounded the theory that this man was the only one who could solve 
France 1 s problems. The rest of France was quite aware of this belieD 
54 Lafue, Doumergue, p. 128. 
55 Verne 1 Doumergue 1 pp. 44-45. 
56 
:Etienne . de Nal~ehe, La vie et les travaux de aaston Doumergue 
(186.3-19.37) (Paris, 19.39), pp. 5-24• 
57 For this view see Werth, Which Way France? 
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• 1 58 1.n 934. Many only hoped that Doumergue could be torn away from his 
-boeks and his wife at Tournefettille to serve France again. 59 
M. Albert Lebrun with the help of the Presidents of the Senate.and 
the Chamber, several senators, ·several deputies, and a few Municipal 
Councillors was finally able to convince Doumergue on the phone that 
he should return to Paris to help sa!e his country. The former 
President had hesitated to leave the Midi, at first, because of the 
poor state of his health.6o 
M. Pierre Laval was the key man in getting Doumergue to return to 
Paris. Laval had visited President Lebrun before Daladier had formally 
resigned. Lebrun informed Laval that Doumergue had resisted all "appeals 
to serve. 11 The undaunted Laval took up the phone, was cozmected to 
. 61 
Tournefeuille, and finally persuaded the hesitating Doumergue. 
Doumergue was wildly ~celaimed by mobs as he arrived in Paris. 
Never had such a welcome been given to a French leader within the 
memory of many Frenchmen. He was seen as the "saviour of Fran~e. 1162 
On that morning of February 8, there was no other man in France whom 
the public would have accepted so easily. In the past, his permanent 
smile had won him the nickname of 11Gastounet,. 11 Alexander Werth, who 
58Jacques Fischer, Doumergue et les politicians (Paris, 1935), 
pp. 200-256. 
59 . 6 . Werth, France in Ferment, pp. 18 -187. 
60 
.Anon. , "Memorandum, n Journal des D~bats, Vol. 2086 (February 16, 
1934), 249. 
61candide, February 15, 1934.· 
62Andr$ Tardieu, Sur la pente (Paris, 1935), p. 11. 
JJ6 
was to make a complete reversal o~ his estimate of Doumergue later on, 
also felt at this time the French enthusiasm for this ex-President and, 
in his earlier work, he called him "the Cincinnatus ~ome to the 
rescue. n6J 
Forming the Cabinet.-- Doumergue decided to follow in M. Raymond 
Poincartfts footsteps and to organize a "National Union Government." 
The Cabinet once formed included every political party sitting in the 
Chamber except the Socialists, Who refused to serve, and the Communists 
--who were not asked~ The.Right and the Center applauded this action. 
The Radical-socialists, erstwhile ~riends of the· Socialists, had not 
yet recovered from the February Six shock. Th~y were willing to listen 
to anything within reason, for their very existence was at stake. So 
. 64 
they were willing to acquiesce to Doumergue•s demands. 
The bonhommie shown in getting Cabinet members struck the public•s 
fancy. For example: 
M. Germain-Martin was asked by M. Doumergue to come to the 
Foreign Affairs' office. On arrival the good Gastounet shook 
his hands and quickly stated--with his down-to-earth accent: 
liMy dear Germain, you know naturally why I have called you 
here?. You have the Finances!" 
"The Finances, Monsieur le President, the Finances but ••• 
but I have scruples •••• u 
"Oh, now, Germain ••• and I ••• you think that it pleases me to 
be back under the yoke? They told me they needed me. I need 
you. You accept. Good. Thanks, Germain. n65 
63 
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Doumergue ]ook all of February 8 for the consultations that re-
sulted in his "National Union Ministry." On February 9 1 after the 
Premier had been elected the leader of the Radical-socialists, 
Doumergue officially announced his Cabinet~ Very shrewdly the Premier 
opened two new Ministries of State--or the nature of Assistant-Premier-
ships--and gave the posts to MM. AndrtTardieu (Center Republican) and 
I .· . . . 
Edouard Herriot (Radical-socialist). Like these two last-named, most 
of the Cabinet glowed with well-known French political figures such 
. . 
as: Henry Ch~ron (a senator) in the Ministry of Justice; Albert 
Sarraut (former Premier and senator) at the Ministry of the Interior; 
Germain-Martin (Left Radical) heading the Finances; Fran3ois PiE{tri 
·(Left Republican) handling the Military Marine Affairs; A'iml Berthod 
(Radical-socialist) at home in National E~ucation; General Denam 
taking the Ministry of Air; Lucien Lamoureaux (Radical-socialist) in 
Commerce and Industry; Adrien Marquet (Neo-socialist) in the Department 
of Work; Henri Queuille (Radical-socialist) turning to Agriculture; 
Louis Barthou (Union-Democrat and senator) who was to make such a name 
, . 
in Foreign Affairs; Henri Petain in the War Department; P. E. Flandin 
(Left-Republican) taking care or Public Works; Georges Rivollet (U.N.C. 
Secretary-General) at the Pensions; Pierre Laval (Independent and 
senator) taking the Colonies; Andre Mallarm~ (Left Radical) becoming 
the P.T.T. expert; Louis Marin (Federated Republican) in Public Health; 
. 66 
and William Bertrand (Radical-socialist) going to the Merchant Ma~ine. 
66 , 6 Anon., 11Le Cabinet Doumergue,n Journal des Debate, Vol. 208 
(February 16, 1934), 251. 
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This was the 96th Ministry of the Third Republic and Dou.mergue's 
Second. It included six former premiers: Doumergue, Herriot, Tardieu, · 
Barthou, Sarraut, and Laval. Four members did not have seats in the 
Government. 
I . . 
Doumergue, Petain, Denain, and Rivollet. Rivollet's 
appointment was regarded by some as a compromise·with the "Street 
Forces." But no man raised a voice against Doumergue taking in the 
U.N.C. Secretary-General at this time. 67 
Then came a simple message from Doumergue·to the French people: 
I have been called to for.m a truce Government--one of 
appeasement and justice. 
That Government is completed. 
In its name I invite you to accomplish, as your part of 
this bargain, your duty by renouncing all agitation--and giving 
first plag~ to what will benefit all France--and above all the 
Republic. 
. 
The Communists' "Call to Actionn 
Connnunists, a threat to Douinergue?--Would Doumergue be able to 
bring order out of chaos in France?. The Communists, who had no 
Cabinet posts, hoped not, for they were aboui to present the Government 
with what became its first major threat. The Socialists, who were also 
not in the Cabinet, had hinted at dissension when they called a "pro-
test meeting" for February 8. The Communists refused t6 associate 
themselves with this 1protest meeting," but they announced that the 
·"class conscious revolutionists" would demonstrate on the Place de la 
67werth, France in Ferment, pp. 187~188. 
68
"Doumergue," Journal des D~bat§, p. 251. 
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Republique on February 9. The Socialists thereupon postponed their 
meeting to February 12--the following Monday.69 
The Communist "call to action" declared that the anti-fascist 
proletariat had enough of these "Fascist techniques" of February Six 
and this new "National Union Government"t The Communists ordered 
their adherents, therefore, not to join the protest meeting called by 
the Socialists for February 8 on the Place de la Bastille, for the 
Socialists themselves were suspect.70 
As early as February Six, L'Humanit~, the Communist news organ, 
. . 
had advised the proletariat to unite to throw out the "fascist gapgs" 
parading the streets, to overthrow the Government which protected and 
encouraged fascists, and to march against what was becoming a "social 
democracy"•-which would disunite the workers. A basic conflict was 
revealed as existing between the ideals be1.d by the S.F. I. 0. Socialists 
and the Connnunists. 71 
Because of this attitude taken by the Communists, the Socialists 
under Blum did not evan protest, for fear that the 6ommunists would 
disrupt their meeting. It was true that both the Communists and the 
Socialists saw the significance of February Six in the same light: it 
was a fascist-inspired plot; but the Communists were making it impossible, 
69 p .. , • M. de Framond, a ournee commtiniste du fevr1er et les incidents 
communistes du 12 en banlieue, Chambre des d putes, Annexe .3392, Docu-
ments Parlementaires (Paris, May 17, 19.34) 1 pp. 702-704. 
70 ·' b 9 L1Human1te, Fe ruary 1 19.34. 
71Ibid. , February 6, 19.34. 
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for the time being, to unite forces. The Socialist leaders refused to 
fight for Communist ideas; they wanted to march to preserve the 
workers' liberties which they felt were threatened at this point. 
Therefore February 9 became specifically a Conmru.nist day. It was 
organized and directed by those who preferred· L' Interna tionale to 
72 . 
La Marseillaise. Thus the Doumergue Government, sworn to uphold 
French democratic liberties, was faced with its first major challenge! 
72 Werth, France in Ferment, p. 175. 
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SCHEMATIC VIEW OF THE COMMUNIST ARC 
OF FEBRUARY 7-9, 1934 
CHAPTER XI 
FEBRUARY NINTH AND THE 11 GREAT GENERAL STRIKEn 
(Reverberations) 
The Communists Have Their Day 
Events on February 9.-- In vain did the Pr~fecture try to dis-
. ·// "" courage the Commun1sts and the Confederation Generale du Travail 
Unitaire, the pro-Communist union, from carrYing out their demon-
stration on February 9. On the day before the Communists were to 
protest-around 4:00 P~M.--M. Doriot and three other representatives 
from the Communist Party and the C.G.T.U. were received byM. Bonnefoy-
Sibour.; the Prefect of Police. Sibour bluntly stated that he could 
I 
not allow the Place de la Republiq-g:e · meeting on February 9. The 
Communists could not be shaken from their decision, and when they 
left the Prefect's office they insisted they were going ahead with· 
their plans. In the press on the morning of the ninth, the Pr~fecture 
forbade the Communist reunion. 1 
On February 91 around 7:00 P.M., between 1 1 500 and 2,000 people 
I b • were assembled on the Place de la Repu l1que. The police were there 
already covering their posts; they had taken extensive precautions for 
the evening, and they had occupied all strong points on or near the 
~. de' Framond, La .iournEfe co.!J!IINlliste du 9 fevrier et les incidents 
communistes du 12 en banlieue, Chambre des d'put~s, Annexe 3392, Docu-
ments Parlementaires (Paris, May 17, 1934), p. 704. See Figure 3 Map. 
Place de la R:publique. So carefully had these positions been assigned 
that during the night never were the police seriously menaced. This 
seven o'clock crowd was therefore quickly cleared off the Place. So 
systematically was this carried out that, even as late as 7:45P.M., 
the R~publique area was still neutralized. 2 
It was about 8:00P.M., barely two hours after Doumergue had 
completed his National Union Government, that the Communists arrived 
,. 
on the Place de la Republique and found it inaccessible. Earlier an 
estimated four thousand Communists had gathered near the Gare du 
Nord and, when organized, had moved eastward towards the Place de la 
R~publique. This column was dispersed by an ever cautious police on 
I 
the Republique. The Communists then eventually formed a vast arc 
from the north to the southeast of Paris.J 
A very thick pea-soup fog hung over Paris that evening and made 
it difficult to see clearly objects or individuals at any great dis-
tance. The raw night air also motivated the police and rioters to 
keep moving so as not to become too cold. Within the arc mentioned 
above, most of the streets converged at different angles on the 
Place de la R~publique, the center selected by the Communists for their 
major "protests against fascism" to occur. As events would have it, 
this never materialized, for the alert police had not only cordoned off 
the area, but also blocked off all subway stations leading to the danger 
3Framond, La .iourn~a communiste, p. 704. 
~arc Bernard, Le Journees ouvri~res des 9 et 12 f~vrier 1934 
(Paris, 1934) 1 p. 64. 
. ·,·· ~. 
zone. Any force hoping to get to the Republique that evening needed 
to break through strong detachments of Mobile Guards and Republican 
Guards. This proved impossible to carry out. 4 
About 8:00 P.M. barricades were mounted in the Faubourg du Temple, 
. ; 
south of the Place de la Republique. The 250 Communists gathered 
there listened to the harangues of M. Heinaff who said: "Comrades, the 
barricades are completed here. Let us go and construct others on the 
Avenue Parmentier nearby. Let us march against the bourgeoisie--
against capitalism. Let us burn and bleed everything and everyone 
in our way. 11 The police arrived at this point and, after a brief 
affray, Comrade Heinaff and the other ringleaders were incarcerated.; 
From 8:00 P.M. on, the East of Paris, which was to be the main 
area for Communist demonstrations that evening, heard strange noises, 
resounded with flying bullets, listened to cries coming from the 
wounded, spotted galloping guards hurrying through the streets, and 
was filled with trucks and cars trying to race to numerous points. To 
the extreme southeast of this vicinity, at 8:15P.M., one hundred 
Communists attempted an assault against the police ring around the 
Place de la Nation. 
. . 6 
Most of the Communists were arrested. 
Up to 9:00P.M., the police kept dispersing one small Communist 
group after another, and resisted those who balked. A major maneuver 
4 . 
Alexander Werth, France in Ferment (London, 193~), pp. 176-177. 
5 , . 
Framond, La .iournee communiste, pp. 704-705. 
6 ; ·"' 6 Bernard, Les .iournees ouvrJ.eres, p. _3. 
was also successfully carried out at this time by the law officers: 
that was the clearing of all people, crowds, and Communists on the 
key Boulevard Magenta--which connects the Gare du Nord wit~ the Place 
de la Republique. The police had jUst completed this when the Commu-
nists, realizing that their protest rally was slowly turning into a 
failure, made a combined effort to seize the Place de la Republique. 
The police behind barricades were the recipients of diverse missiles 
for a short while, but their counterattack ended in the Communists 
scurrying away in all directions. 7 
By 9:00 P.M. the center of attention became the Gare du Nord 
. I 
which is located northwest of the Place de la Republique. Near here, 
at that time, the gardiens de la paix dispersed two hundred rioters 
who had assembled at the angle where the Rue du Faubourg Saint-Denis 
and the Rue Dunkerque meet before the Gare du Nord. Out of this in-
cident came the development of a full-fledged riot during which re-
volvers opened fire from the rioters 1 side. The Brigadier-Chief Guinot 
was shot right through the head and taken while in severe pain to the 
hospital. Police then discovered gunfire coming from windows on the 
upper floors of nearby buildings. The Communists, in charge of the 
Gare du Nord area at the time, went about using hit-and-run tactics 
8 
against the law officers. 
This Gare du Nord riot was soon counterbalanced by one that 
" developed,about 9:45P.M. southeast of the Place de la Republique--
7 Framond, 
8 Ibid. 
" La Journee communiste, p. 705. 
where Boulevards Voltaire and Richard-Lenoir meet. Here the Communists 
had set up temporary barricades. As the police tried to dislodge them, 
the Communists opened fire. ~ . The Place de la Republique's police, 
which had seen a rather peaceful hour, wereealled on to send reinforce-
ments. Two vans of thirty policemen each under Brigadiers Descombes 
and Perraud rushed to the salient point. The Communists, seeing the 
extra help arriving, began to rush inside nearby buildings. Throughout 
the evening shadowy figures kept emerging from these buildings and 
9 
sending lead through the police ranks. 
Just as soon as the region southeast of the Place de la Rlpublique 
came under police control, the Communists seized the Chaumont-
Belleville area to the north. Numerous barricades had been constructed 
here. The police were sent to demolish these but could not do so. 
Just as the police vans began entering the area, sniper fire went into 
operation. Telegraph posts which had been sawed. off were thrown down 
in such a way as to fall on the buildings on the opposite side of the 
street. Thus whole streets became impassable to police trucks. The 
gardiens de la paix who tried to get through on their bicycles were 
received by buckets of water, flower pots, and furniture hurled down 
from surrounding windows. As gunfire was added to these tactics the 
10 police were forced to take cover. 
In the meantime, the gardiens de la paix at the Gare du Nord were 
9Framond 1 La .iourn'e communiste, p. 705. 
10werth, France in Ferment, p. 178. 
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still dodging bullets. When the shooting began here ~bout 9:00P.M.~ 
reinforcements had been sent for, and, by 10:00 P.M., they arrived. 
The police immediately reorganized and began converging on the Commu-
nists from all sides of the. railroad station. While carrying this 
out, Inspector Broissiat with five men, moving to close one of the 
subway entrances, was confronted by one hundred men armed with re-
volvers. The police rushing to help their colleagues felt this was 
a "state of legitimate defense 11 and fired on the men coming at them. 
With guns blazing~ the police sent the Communists running and took 
11 
the Gare du Nord. 
The Communists now concentrated on the Gare de l'Est not far 
to the southeast of the Gare du Nord. Police patrols coming in from 
the surrounding boulevards were showered with bullets. D~bris mainly 
of asphalt and stone came to welcome the incoming law-officers. While 
a continuous firing from the rioters' side went on, the gardiens de 
la paix rushed the railroad station. Brutalities took place as the 
police clashed with the rioters. A gardien de la paix had his skull 
smashed while attempting to take the main entrance of the Gare de l'Est. 
Policeman Martin received a missil€Lwhich ripped his head wide open, 
. while a bullet hit and lodged in his left thigh. Gardien Girault 
raised a left hand and caught a bullet. In spite of the serious 
. 12 
opposition given, the police took the railroad station. 
ll .· I . 
Framond, La .journee communiste, p. 705. 
12 . ~ \ Ibid.; also Bernard, Les ,journees ouvrieres, p. 67. 
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By 11:00 P.M. the Communists started to move against the symbols 
of what they termed the "opiate of the people;" namely, the churches. 
The first church chosen to be burnt was Saint Joseph's Church on 
; . Saint Maur Street near. the Republique. Inspector Desforges took an 
~rgency patrol of one van with thirty gardiens de la paix, a platoon 
of mounted guards, and managed to stop the fire menacing Saint 
Joseph's and cleared the area. 1-' 
At 11:.30 P.M. the Communists were still carrying on fights in 
half-a-dozen places in the northeastern quarter of Paris. The police, 
who had been relentlessly chasing them all evening, cheered the 
arrival of several truck loads of fresh gardiens de la paix and four 
platoons of Mobile Guards. The new arrivals formed two military 
columns and began systematically to clear all threatened points. 
The police soon had control of the east of Paris~ The rioters who 
decided to try their luck against the guards' rifles were sorry they 
did so afterwards, for these policemen did not mollycoddle their 
opponents. 14. 
By midnight, the Communist riot was completely over. The Place 
, 
de la Republique, the Gare du Nord, and the Gare de l'Est were under 
police supervision. The rioters placed under arrest numbered 1,214. 
The casualty list read: 141 police wounded including four by gunfire, 
three by knife wounds, twenty club-beaten, twenty-nine knocked down by 
1.3 . " ' ·~ Bernard, Les .iournees ouvrieres, p. 67; also L'Echo de Paris, 
February 10, 19.34. 
lL , 
'Framond, La Journee communiste, pp. 705-706. 
fists or kicks, thirty struck by missiles, one severely bitten, two 
slashed by canes, and six wounded by falls. The rioters bad to 
hospitalize sixty-four; twenty-four because of bullet wounds, eight 
from night stick blows, and the rest for various reasons. or the 
wounded rioters, four died of bullet woUiids. 15 
Thus.the Communists had their night which had kept the police 
moving all over the east of Paris most of the evening. Never had 
the revolutionists been in possession of the annoUnced assembly a~ea: 
I the Place de la Republique. Vlhat specific objective they had in 
mind it is difficult to say. What contributions these isolated 
combats made to getting rid of French fascism is even harder to 
comprehend. The main consequence of Februacy Ninth was to make all 
of France aware of the Communist meDa.ce. Many Frenc.hmen, moreover, 
were asking themselves: How long were these chaotic conditions to 
continue?--How would it all end?16 
February TWelfth: Paris and Provinces 
Call for a general strike.-- On February 81 when the Socialists 
had postponed their "protest meeting, 11 the S.F.I.O. leaders had put 
off the demonstration to Monday, February 12. On February 10, the · 
C.G.T.U. threw in their fortune with the Socialists, but added that 
they had not been influenced by the Socialist initiative. They gave 
the impression that they had the same thought in ·mind, and that they 
11rramond, La journee communiste, p. 706. 
lh ---, , . !..aurent Bonnevay, Les .fournees sanglantes de fevrier 1934 
(Paris, 1935), pp. 209-216; also Werth, France in Ferment, p. 179. 
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realized that in union there was strength. , , , tl The Confederation aenerale 
du Travail (C.G.T.), the Socialist dominated union and the largest labor 
union in France, really deserved the credit on this matter. As early 
as February 71 the C.G.T. had announced a twenty-four hour general 
strike to serve as a major protest against attempts to impose na 
fascist state" on France. The declaration revealed ·that this was made 
with the cooperation of the Ligue des Droits de l'Honune, the Socialist 
Farty, the Pupiste Conununists, and others who cared.to join, them. 17 
In its manifesto of February 7, the C.G.T. denounced the 
11 hideous fascism which had shown its face on the streets of Paris the 
night before." Although the C.G.T. was·not satisfied with the opera-
tion of the democratic r'gime of late, it pointed out that democratic 
rule had its advantages. To keep these advantages 1 which outnumbered 
the disadvantages, and to correct the faults was its goal. Because 
reactionary forces were working to destroy the Republic and to. replace 
it by a dictatorship along fascist lines, the workers who cared for 
their country were asked. to unite. Thus, the C.G.T. concluded in its 
18 
message that it was necessary to order the General Strike. 
That the General Strike organized by the C.G.T. was no rash im-
pulsive action is.made clear by plans formulated as far back as 
March 30-31, 1933, by the C.G.T.'s National Confederation Committee. 
The original motion on this subject, made by M. Jouhaux, was discussed 
and approved by a vote of the Committee. In this declaration the C.G.T. 
17 • , • \ 72 Bernard, Lea .1ournees ouvr1.ers, p. • 
18 Le Peuple, February 7, 1934. 
blamed irresponsible capitalism for bringing about the tragic world 
economic situation, and it asserted that capitalists only desired to 
keep themselves in power, even if it meant establishing a dictator-
ship to do so. In case such an extreme ~ve should be undertaken, 
the O.G.T. resolution went on, the union would favor a "General 
Strike" as a first step to counteract it. As the C.G.T. was dominated 
by the Socialists, who believed that February Six was an attempted 
"fascist coup," the Union leaders quickly accepted this fascist ex-
planation as factua1. 19 
The January Riots made a very strong ~r~ssion on the C.G.T. 
leaders, for through their official newspaper organ they published 
the following warning: 
The Administrative Committee of the C.G.T., aware of the 
dangers presented by the reactionary forces, refuses to stand 
by and watch our established liberties threatened. 
It does not believe that the need to cleanse the democratic 
~ . 
regime at this time calls for the use of war methods. It there-
fore avows that the public liberties will be defended, even if 
the C.G.T. has to call a General Strike.20 
The C.G.T., using mainly the argument that "someone had to uphold 
France 1 s democratic liberties," placed itself in direct opposition to 
any further rioting after February Six lest it led to a dictatorship. 
The organization declared that it had no desire to interfere in 
· political matters but, if any more threats to democracy were made, the 
19M. Petrus Faure, Les manifestations du 12 flvrier 1934, Chambre 
des d~put~s, Annexe 3393, Documents Parlementaires (Paris, May 17, . 
1934) 1 p. 711. 
20 Le Peuple, January 31, 1934. 
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workers and the people of Paris would align themselves in defense of 
democracy. The C.G.T.'s spokesmen added that they were interested in 
getting justice just as much as the next fellow but, it must be 
understood, French democracy could not be made to suffer. 
; ; I I 
On February 6 also the S:rmdicats Confederes de 1a. Region 
Parisienne announced that they were unanimously behind the c.G.T. 's 
"fight for democracy•" The next day, as we have seen, the C.G.T. 1s 
Co~ederation Bureau decided to call a General Strike for Monday, 
February 12. That same everiing, the C.G.T. 's representative met 
with leaders from the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, the S.F.I.O., the 
Socialist Party of France, the Socialist Republican Party, the Pro-
~etarian Unity, the Anarchist Union, the F~d~ration Ouvriere et 
Paysanne and the Associations Quvri~res de Production to discuss in 
a mass meeting the C.G.T.'s decision. All these organizations were 
so impressed b~ this meeting that they voluntarily associated them-
selves with the General Strike "to defend French democratic liber-
ties·. n22 
On February 8, the day of the Communist 11 call to action," the 
C.G.T. made an appeal to all the workers to rise up to defend democracy 
and the fundamental liberties. 
It is to affirm this unshakable faith in democracy that 
workers--all the workers~must refuse to work on Monday, 
February 12. We must show that the people's forces will not 
22 ; ' Bernard, Lea journees ouvrieres, pp. 30-31; also Faure, 
Manifestations du 12. p. 712 • 
. 23 Le Peuple, February 9, 1934. 
stand by,.as if deaf to. what is happening, when endeayors are 
being made to substitute dictatorship for democracy.2J 
What became an almost limitless number of associations now an-
swered the call. , ; / As we noted above, the Syndicate Confederes de la 
.R~gion Parisienne seconded this. Among the other groups pledging 
themselves, from all over France, to come out on February 12 for the 
defense of French democracy were: ~ , the Federations de l'Alimentation, 
1 I ·• I I . . I 1 I the Federation du Bat1ment, the F~deration des Metaux, the Federation 
I ; .. . I ' des Cuirs et Peaux, the Federation de Textile, the Federation des 
I I • · I I I Fonctionnaires, and the Federat1on Postale Confederee. Hotel, gas, 
teachers, clothing, and municipal unions also were added to this long 
list. Finally, the Connnunists and C. G. T. U. 1 a bit emba:rrassed to see 
so many workers ready to fight for democracy, threw in their lot with 
all these labor unions. Never had French labor appeared so united 
on a public question. 24 
Events in Paris on February Tw:elfth. -- Whether the "General 
Strike" in Paris on February Twelfth was a "great" or a "great great" 
strike depends on the statistics accepted as accurate on the matter. 
The claims and counterclaims made on the numbers of.strikers involved 
are controversial. It will never be possible to ascertain accurately 
what these numbers actually were. The official p9lice records and 
those coming from the Prefects' offices tend to be very conservative 
as if to try to minimize the effects of the General Strike. Some 
24 Le Peuple, February 9, 19;34. 
25 
"f • · d 12 712 71"2 1· L P 1 Faure, Man1 esta t1ons u , pp. - ..,. ; a so e eup ··e, 
February 11, 19:34. 
354 
discussions with the police and high officials on this point have led 
the writer to discover that this is sometimes done. 25 
The figures issued from the C.G.T.'s headquarters on the effee-
ti veness of the "Great General Strike," on the other hand, are also · 
questionable, for the desire was strong to show that the workers gave 
an unprecedented answer to the .call to defend democracy. A study of 
both records would seem to indicate that probably near one million 
workers struck on February 12 in Paris out of a total of approximately 
a million and a half. The following summary briefly presents the 
two main sets of figures: 
Group Striking 
Railroad 
Metropolitan Subways 
T.C.R.O. Bus 
Gas Society of Paris 
Electricity 
Water Department 
Sanitary Department 
Sewers Service 
Funeral Administration 
Post Offices, Tel. and Tel. 
Tobacco Manufacturers 
Teachers 
Metallurgy 
Chemical Plants 
Newspapers and Presses 
A ; Surete'a claims 
(IN PERCENTAGE) 
Normal traffic 
5 
so 
Important 
Partial 
100 
60 
66 
S5 
100 
Partial 
Very High 
50 
High 
General 
C.G.T. 's claims 
(IN PERCENTAGE) 
None striking 
60 
90 
so 
75 
100 
75 
75 
85 
90 
100 
so 
90 
100 
100 
or 1,400,000 workers or 1,500,000 workeiB 
Total 45% STRIKING 65% STRIKING 
*Source: Faure, Manifestations du 12, pp. 713-714. 
25 Faure, Manifestation du 12, p. 713. 
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On February 12, 1934 Paris gave the appearance of being a ghost 
city most of the day. Newspapers were not being sold as usual. The 
subways had few customers and were closed by 8:30 P.M. No surface 
transportation was available,_ for the strikers bad effectively blocked 
the bus depots located in the suburbs. The .Paris taxis were still out 
on strike. No mailmen made any deliveries. The theaters and movie 
houses, for the most part, did not even open their doors. The 
General Strike was the most important of its kind since the famous one 
of 1906.26 
The Uivil Servants or Paris were the leading followers or the 
Socialist Party in the city, and they carried the brunt of responsi-
bility for the success or failure of the General Strike in this area. 
The statistics given above indicate that nearly all the teachers, 
postal workers, telegraph and telephone operators, as well as a high 
percentage or the municipal departmental functionaries did not report 
for work. The railroads were kept running while the electricity, gas, 
and water supplies into the city were cut off. 27 
The General Strike leaders asserted afterwards that the "mass-
stay-at-home movement" had been used to indicate what discomforts a 
prolonged strike could bring, if the people did not rise up against 
the "fascist threat." Others pointed out that if the fascists did 
take over, the strikers could not carry out such a strike. Besides, 
26 Le Temps 1 February 13-141 19J4; also Werth, France in Ferment, 
p. 180. 
27 Werth, France in Ferment, p. 182. 
sabotage would be needed to shut Paris from electricity, gas, and 
water facilities. The gas reservoir plants in Paris contained an 
eight-day supply. To shut these orr would have meant dynamiting 
these reservoirs. As for water and electricity, only a few indiv-
iduals were needed to take care or the Paris branches, for dynamos and 
transmission towers did most or the work. About ninety per cent or 
the city then already had automatic telephone service, and axes would 
have had to destroy the lines to stop communication in this field. 28 
The Vincennes-National demonstration.-- Besides the General 
Strike, Paris workers were. asked to cooperate in bripging about a 
"protest meeting.against fascism" in the Cours de Vincennes--near 
the extreme east borderline or Paris. This demonstration had no 
connection with the O.G.T.'s "call to action~n M. Jouhaux, General-
Secretary or the C.G.T., in fact, had demanded that the C.G.T. mem-
bers keep away from this demonstration. 29 
The Socialist Party had ini tia t.ed the first plans to carry out 
such a "protest meeting." .In its manifesto or Sunday, February 11, 
the Socialist Party, not only announced that it was behind the C.G.T. 
General Strike, but added that the Party 
has given to all its provincial branches the necessary in-
structions for assuring the complete success or this 
proletarian mobilization. 
I I · In Paris, the Federations Socialistes de'la Seine et de 
Seine-et-Oise has summoned for Monday, at J:OO P.M., on the 
28Bernard, Les .iourn6es ouvri~res, pp. 94-95. 
29Faure1 Manifestations du 12, p. 726. 
Cours de Vincennes 1 the laborers of Paris. A column formed on 
the Cours de Vincennes will proceed to the nearby Place de la 
Nation. 
It was thirty-five years ago that a similar unity of the 
capital's ~lation took place in these areas--for the triumph 
of the Republic. 
Today it is for the defense of the Republic. 
Hence reunion on Monday. Against the grafters. Against 
the royalists and the. fascists. For the upholding of our 
liberties--for the workers' freedoms.30 
The Communists and the C.G.T.U. voted to associate themselves 
with the Socialists at Vincennes. Around 2:00P.M., not only were 
the 6ommunists organizing, but the Socialists were pleased to see the 
large numbers who began concentrating around Vincennes. By 3:00P.M., 
as planned, an immense column estimated at about thirty thousand 
followers had been formed. The Socialists headed the colunm with 
such distinguished parliamentarians as L'on Blum, Vincent Auriol, 
Paul Fabre 1 Chaussy, Marsais, Uhry 1 Pagglioli, and Graziani; while 
.the Paris Municipal Councillor~, the mayors of the suburbs,. and leading 
newspaper publishers were also marching •. Large banners expressed the 
reasons for so many men parading: "The Republic Will Not Be Murdered!", 
"Against The Fascist Dictatorship!tt and "Death Before We Accept 
Fascism! u:31 
The column proceeded in an orderly fashion towards the Place de 
Nation. As this great human mass approached this latter· point, the 
30 i . . Faure, Man festat1ons du 12, p. 727. 
31 . 
J:J2.i!L; also Bernard, Les .iourne'"es ouvri~res, pp. 85-86; and 
Le Temps, February 13-14, 1934. 
Communists and the C.G.T.U. also moved onto the large square. The 
Communist and the C.G.T.U. intellectuals harangued the crowd for a 
while because such an impressive gathering refused to show a more 
aggressive spirit. The crowd murmured and seemed impatient with the 
Communist speakers. Shouts kept the monotonous tune of the "united 
front" clamoring over the crowd. 32 
Tired of hearing the Communist speakers lamenting, the Socialists 
made it known, through their leaders, that their calm demonstration 
would not be endangered by.wild orators. The Socialists therefore 
began clearing the Place de la Nation. The Communists, on the other 
hand, continued singing and shouting, while hundreds of policemen 
arrived. The Communists ordered their followers back to Vincennes, 
.3.3 gave more speeches once there, and then disbanded. 
At the height of the demonstration a huge crowd filled the 
Place de la Nation. The C0mmunists claimed that 200,000 people had 
been there, while the Socialists asserted that 150,000 was more 
accurate. The conservative newspaper, De Temps, could not see more 
than forty thousand.J4 All agreed, however, that no uncalled-for 
incident occurred that afternoon. This meeting had been a warning to 
the "fascists" of the power the democratic forces had when they wanted 
to organize. In many ways.therefore the Vincennes-Nation demonstration 
.32 
Faure 1 Manifestations du 12 1 p. 727 • 
.33 
..Ibid • 
.34 Le Temps, February 1.3-14, 19.34. 
. '359 
was a show of strength. It was the answer to the Great February Six 
. 35 
-Riot which had been negative in attitude. 
Communist incidents in the suburbs.-- Far more serious on February 
Twelfth were the riots instigated by the Communists ~n the Paris sub-
urbs. While the day of the General Strike and the "front unique" had 
been calm in Paris, while the Socialists and the Communists in the Place 
de la Nation had behaved themselves, the agitation that developed in 
36 the suburbs degenerated at times into scenes or violence. 
The Paris suburbs in 1934 had 431,000 registered voters--of these 
138,000 were Communists and 70,000 were Socialists. This "red belt" 
around Paris presented an extremely well organized group, and the 
~anger of an invasion of Paris from these quarters w.as not treated as 
. I 
a laughing matter at the Prefecture. Fortunately for law-enforcement, 
ma.riy Communist voters were riot "aggressive Communists." On the other 
hand, since early in the-TWentieth Century, the center of Paris had 
become conservative, politically speaking~ The peace-loving·merchants 
and businessmen of the city, ror a while awaited the "Red-invasion from 
the suburbs" on February Twelfth.37 _ 
The main centers of activity in the suburbs that day were: 
Gennevilliers, northwest of Paris; Aubervilliers, northeast of Paris; 
Malakoff, southwest of Paris; Boulogne-Billancourt, aaso southwest of 
35 
Bonnevay, Les .iourn,es sa.nglantes, pp. 232-233. 
36 . 
Le Temps, February lJ-14, 19j4. 
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Paris, but further to the outskirts than Malakoff; and Montrouge, 
which is to the south. of Paris. It will be best if we analyze these 
trouble spots one at a time, instead on the hour-to-hour basis in 
the different areas.38 
From 4:00 A.M. on, four pickets were busy at work closing and 
barring the entrances to the Gennevilliers gas plant. The police, 
notified of what was going on, went to the gas plant, and dispersed 
the pickets. Around 9:30 A.M. a hundred marching men tried to enter 
a local factory, but were soon sent home by the police. At 11:00 
A.M., the rioters got hold of four large waste cans and deposited 
their contents on the main highway in such a way as to hamper the 
street cars from operating. A barricade going up afterwards was soon 
demolished by a fast-stepping police. The rioters, later identified 
as Communists, rushed into nearby buildings and began throwing stones, 
bricks, shivers, broken pieces of metal, large bolts, and a conglomera-
tion of nails in the police's direction. 
continue inter.mittentl~ for a while.39 
. • I Th1s shower of debris was to 
The Gennevilliers' rioters by late afternoon had constructed six 
barricades in the center of the community. The police assaulted the 
barricades time after time throughout the evening. The dislodgement 
of these proved difficult and, at one time, a rioter un~oaded his 
pistol on the onrushing police. In spite of the many law-officials 
38 ; Framond, La .iournee communiste 1 p. 710. 
39 , Framond, La .fournee communiste,. p. 707; also Le Temps, 
February 13-14, 1934. 
wounded, the police finally seized the coveted positions. By midnight 
40' Gennevilliers was back to normal. 
Aubervilliers can quickly be dismissed 1 for in that suburb 1 many 
workers tried to defy the General Strike and go to work as usual. 
Most of the businesses and industrial plants did open, but the workers 
were constantly threatened by the strikers on the outside. The 
police arrested many of the latter, but not until firing over their 
heads was used.4l 
In Malakoff 1 a very large crowd gathered all morning around the 
S.T.C.R.P. bus line as well as the streetcar depots. The rioters in 
one desperate attempt broke beyond the police line and smashed their 
way into nearby busses, only to be removed by an enraged police. 
While the rioters kept challenging the police around the bus depots, 
the local Communists called a mass meeting for 2:00 P.M. Once this 
mob had assembled, the police covering the main bus lines were 
systematically stoned. As the police led charge after charge against 
the rioters around 4:30P.M., about thirty shots were fired fram the 
crowd.42 
Thus began an hour long battle in Malakoff between the mob, 
Communist led, and the police. The exasperated gardiens de la paix 
finally poured gunfire through the rioters' ranks. The rioters took 
cover in nearby buildings and returned the fire of the police. It was 
f°Framond 1 La .io~ conununiste, p. 707. 
4~aure, Manifestations du 12, p. 714; also Framond, La journ~e 
communiste, pp. 707-708. 
42Le Temps, February 13-14, 1934. 
not until 5:30 P.M. that police reinforcement helped to crush -the 
opposition. Many rioters during this one-hour battle were wounded, 
and one of them was killed. The police had paid a heavy toll in 
wounded themselves, but non of them died from bullet wounds. Although 
later witnesses agreed that local Communist public officials had been 
the instigators in Malakoff, it is impossible to get any order out 
of the testimonies Qf what actually did happen during most of the 
evening. 43. 
In Boulogne-Billancourt, the Communist Party made efforts to try 
to prevent any work taking place in the Renault plants. Around 7:30 
A.M., six hundred Socialists and Communists broke into a fight over 
the matter, and th~ gardiens de la paix arrived in time to prevent 
any serious damage. The Renault people fed the workers during the 
noon hours in order to prevent any unnecessary trouble. In the after-
noon the police successfully broke up a column of 1,500 rioters who 
tried to storm the Renault plants. As these demonstrators moved to 
the construction of barricades, the police were forced to fire. A 
rioter was killed. By midnight, all was back to order. 44 
Finally, in the Montrouge region around 5:00P.M., seven hundred 
rioters were put to flight_by the local police when_attempting to 
seize the S.T.C.R.P. bus depot. All these incidents in the suburbs 
resulted in one hundred arrests; in ninety-five police wounded, none 
43 Framond, La I ,journee communiste, p. 708. 
44 Framond, La 
, 
,journee communiste, p. 709; also Le Temps, February 
13-14, 1934. 
by bullet; and in thirty-eight rioters seriously wounded, thirty-one 
by gunfire. The final count showed four rioters died, two from bullet 
45 
wounds. 
The General Strike in the provinces.-- All of France on February 
Twelfth had reacted to the C.G.T.'s "Great General Strike." The 
Prefects' statistics on the importance of this strike, as we saw for 
the Paris figures, are different than those coming from the C.G.T. 
In spite of this fact, a study of these reports leads one to conclude 
that obviously all of France had answered the "call to rise for 
democracy." Further analyses of these statistics indicate that the 
large industrial cities were more successful in cooperating than the 
smaller communities; and that, furthermore, the industrial departments 
were more vigorous than the agricultural districts.46 
Among the most successful striking centers were: Montlujon, Vichy, 
Charleville, Aix, Marseille, Sailfu-QueJ4tin, Troyes, Angoul~me 1 La 
Rochelle, Decazeville, Bourges, Tulle, Dijon, Sfl.:illt-Brieux, P~rigueillc, 
Besancon, Evreux, Brest, Ntmes, Al~s, Nice, Cannes, Toulouse, Bordeaux, 
J 
Montpellier, B~ziers, S~Malo, Rennes, ~ours, Grenoble, Saint-Cloude; 
Blois, Nantes, Saint-Nazaire, Orl~ans, Angers, Cherbourg, Reims, 
I 
Epernay, Chalone, Lorient, Denain, Lille, Roubaix, Metz, Lens, Calais, 
Cler.mont-Ferrand, Mulhouse, Belfort, Strasbourg, Lyons, Rouen, Le Havre, 
~ Argenteuil, Bezors, Versailles, Amiens, Carmeaux, Castres, Toulon, 
. 45 , 
Framond, La .iournee conununiste, pp. 709-710. 
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Avignon, Poitiers, and Sens.47 
Since it would be.of very little value to take up the above one 
by one, we shall select certain "trouble spots" and a few typical 
areas. 
~ Strikes were most important in the Departement.de Bouches-du-
"' . Rhone, especially in Marseille. The Prefect agreed with the c .. G.T. 
that the strike was almost complete in most of the industries in the 
department. In Marseille, all transport services were suspended and 
. , 
the great majority of the stores, bars, and cafes stayed closed. 
. . 
Public services did not function except in water, gas, and telephone 
and telegraph. Post offices, docks, theaters, mines, and Air-France 
were empty.48 
Rioting did develop in the afternoon in Marseille, and the 
police were stoned while trying to bring back some semblance of order. 
The Marseille police, not so patient as their Paris counterparts, re-
sorted to their pistols sooner than expected. Vandalism took place in 
many quarters of the city. During the evening, rioters speeding in a 
car sent gunfire through the police line. Intermittent series of gun-
shots were exchanged until 2::30 A.M. A bomb lighted up a sulfur plant 
during the early morning hours. The casualty list was very high in this 
49 important French port. 
, 
In contrast to the Chicago-like Marseille was the Departement du 
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Calvados--a typical agricultural center. Here both the Prefect and the 
C.G.T. figures reveal that the strike was of ver.y little importance. 
Such was the picture, as we have said, in the rural districts. Gener-
ally speaking, the highly industrialized departments, where clashes 
between the rioters and the police occurred, had difficulty in keeping 
the demonstrators calm. But, it must be added, except for a few of 
these trouble spots--such as Mulhouse where six rioters were seriously 
wounded, or in Toulon, where the assaulting police.received a bombard-
ment from broken bottles taken from a local beer plant--the General 
Strike evolved calmly all over provincial France. 50 
Effectiveness of the "Great General Strike. 11--Newspapers on the 
, 
Right, such as L'Echo de Paris, decided that the General Strike had 
not failed, but added that it had not come up to the standards de-
manded by the C.G.T. leaders. The Action Francaise facetiously termed 
,.. , 51 
the event: the "Great (Surete) General Strike." Of course, the 
Leftist organs, such as L10euvre, Le Populaire·, L'Humanite', and];& 
P~uple argued that their fondest hopes had been surpassed. 52 The 
C.G.T. agreed with the Left, as did the C.G.T.U. The February Six 
Inquiry Commission voted that: 
The General Strike of February 12, 1934, initiated by the 
Conf~d~ration ~n~rale du Travail was undoubtedly the most 
important ever organized in France by workers' syndicalism. 
This show of strength did not have economic or corporative 
50 Faure, Manifestations du. 12 1 pp. 719-727. 
51 Action Francaise, February 13, 1934. 
52 Le Peuple, February 13, 1934. 
overtones but, on the·contrary, its goal was the uniting of 
the French working class to oppose what seemed--from their 
viewpoint--the appearance of fascist elements in our country. 
The Thirteen January Riots, as well as those of February Six 
and Seven, were taken b~ the C.G.T. to be definite proofs that 
such elements existed.5J 
Omissions, Commissions, Depositions, and Union 
Doumergue sets up parliamentary connnissions to investigate.--
By February 15, 1934 France had returned to a more no~l behavior 
in its political life. Gaston "Papa" Doumergue was applauded as the 
"man who saved France." Except for a very few dissenters, the news-
papers and the Chamber were in accord with this acclamation. Every-
where in the-country there was a release of the tension that had been 
there for too long already. The atmosphere of depression and disgust 
had given way to one of hope in democratic institutions and a desire 
for political stability, in view of the country's internal and external 
challenges. Whether Gaston Doumergue had brought this about did not 
really matter. What was important was that the French people believed 
he had and so credited him. 54 
On February 15, 1934, as scheduled, Gaston Doumergue presented 
his government for approval by the Chamber. At three o'clock in the 
afternoon, the Premier entered the Chamber to be welcomed by wild 
acclamations coming from the Left, the Center, and the Right. As he 
passed by the different sections of the hemicycle, numerous deputies 
stood andapplauded. It had been quite a while since a premier had 
53 . Faure, Manifestations du 12, p. 711. 
54 Le Temps, February 16, 1934. 
received such an ovation. 55 
It was amazing to see what a change had taken place within the 
Chamber itself. Except for the usual insults given by the Communists 
to any bourgeois leader, the deputies accepted Doumergue with open 
arms. So great was the relief Doumergue· brought that, when President 
Jtdouard Moncelle introduced 11Gastounet," France's representatives 
roared their approval. When M. Arthur Ra.mette and his four Communist 
colleagues present began shouting: "Down With National Union! Down 
With The Assassins~" the Right, Center, a:r;td Left turned on them and 
warned them to quiet down--or else! M. Moncelle clearly showed that 
56 he would not stand for such rubbish from the Communists. 
The whole 6hamber was ready to submit to Doumergue's leadership. 
Many deputies expressed their shame for their past conduct. The 
Communists were the rowdies that day who felt no shame. They in-
terrupted as often as they felt was wise, but Premier Doumergue 
57 
smilingly shook orr the Communist cackling as it came his way. 
The "Saviour of France" began his short speech in a fatherly tone. 
He declared that his National Union Ministry was S:n attempt to create 
a "party politics' truce," until the present emergency was over. 
Doumergue's first request was: the Chamber must accept the responsi-
bility or investigating the significance or February Six and expose 
55 I . . . 
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those who caused it to happen. This was received with seat-shaking 
applause. 58 
Doumergue continued that his second task was to impose a much 
needed discipline so that moral order could return to Government life. 
Third, he desired rapid pass~ge of the indispensable budget. Fourth, 
Doumergue felt that foreign affairs and the internal economic situation 
were interrelated and needed to be handled with a new vigor. Before 
these two last problems could be attacked, Frenchmen had better get' 
peace inside their own homes, Doumergue added. The Premier concluded 
59 by demanding confidence on the above four-point program. 
The interpellations were then put off until later, and the 
Chamber voted. Doumergue received 402 votes of confidence as against 
125 opposed. In 1926, the much applauded Po~ar~ himself had obtained 
only .358 votes. This was one of the largest votes of confidence ever 
. • • 60 granted by the Th1rd French Republ1c. The Chamber was humble and 
obedient, for Doumergue not only obtained this overwhelming vote of 
, .. 
confidence, but he also was granted his budget and "extraordinary powers 
. ; 61 
to decree emergency acts," called the power.of decreta-lois. 
On February 16-19, 19.34, the Chamber voted the formation of two 
Committees of Inquiry. Each committee had forty-four members divided 
58 J,O.C; du 16 f~vrier, pp. 454-464. 
59 Ibid. 
60 , • \ Anon, "Le debut due M1nistere Doumergae," L'Illustration, 
Vol. 4747 (February 24, a934), 218. 
61 • 19 Werth, France 1n Ferment, p. 7. 
into proportional representation. The Stavisky Inquiry Commission be-
came known popularly as the "Thieves Committee." M. Guernut, a 
prominent Radical-socialist, became its presiding officer. The 
February Six Inquiry Commission was known also as· the "Murderers' Com-
mittee." Laurent Bonnevay, a Radical-socialist who had been in the 
62 
Chamber since 1902, became its·chairman. 
The Inquiry Commissions held daily sessions and gathered a 
mountain of dossiers. Witnesses were called, interrogated, investi-
gated, photographed, and a 11 de'position11 was ma.defrom their testimonies. 
The public, at first, made quite a lot out of the fact that these were 
not administrative committees, but rather parliamentary in nature. 
Arguments were developed later as to whether this was or was not a good 
6J 
move. 
The February Six Inquiry Commission officially was called the 
"Commission d 1 engu~te sur les evenement.s du 6 fe'vrier et .fours suivants." 
The ".iours suivants" took care of the probing into the events of 
February 7-12, 1934. M. Bonnevay was as impartial a chairman as could 
be expected under such circumstances. This February Six Inquiry 
Commission held its sessions in a room usually reserved for a~ 
briefings. A vast plan of the Place de la Concorde.was on the walls 
and, as the numerous witnesses testified, reference was made to it. 
The forty-four committeemen sat around a horseshoe table, while the 
~ . , 
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64 
secretaries and witnesses occupied the center. 
The Stavisky Inquiry Commission directed by Henri Guernut, a 
.370 
Radical-socialist like Bonnevay, also did its work around a horseshoe 
table, but an extra half table had been fitted,· at the center or the 
concave part of the horseshoe, to ~ke more room for the deputies and 
the dossiers. Chairman Guernut, his secretaries, and his stenographers 
. 65 
were placed on the extreme center of the horseshoe towards the outside 
For the rest of the year 19.34 the work and discoveries or the two 
committees continually made the headlines. The results are amazing. 
The .critics pointed to the coddling of political witnesses such as 
Chautemps. Others added that a political body could never be impartial 
or do an objective study of a political matter. Some witnesses com-
plained of being .treated roughly. The veterans, stated others, were 
66 
received too kindly. And so the debate went on. 
The present author believes that M. Bonnevay's Committee did much 
better w.ork than the Stavisky Inquiry Commission which took almost 
three times longer to finish its work. The valuable evidence gathered 
by both is a mine for the historian, provided these records are 
balanced by the other documents available on the subject. As one reads 
these proceedings at a later date, he is impressed by the impartiality 
of both chairmen. It does appear beyond doubt, however, that the 
64Robert de Beauplan, "La commission des journees sanglantes," 
L 'Illustration, Vol. 4750 (March 17, 19.34) 1 296. 
65
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political witnesses were too often dismissed at a critical point. 
Probably as fair an estimate as exists--applicable not to just the 
one but to both committees--was the evaluation made by the Journal 
I : des Debats on the significance of the February Six Inquiry Commission: 
The Committee charged with examining the events of February 
Six has completed, on its part, its modest curiosities. It has 
/ I . yesterday named a rapporteur general OM. Rucart) who has made 
very cautious de~larations to the press. Such a rapporteur, 
who must possess the best of intentions, must at the same time 
be embarrassed. Between what the Committee expects of him and 
what the public demands, there are more than just shades of 
disagreement--there are contradictions. The Committee stands 
for lenitive·conclusions. The public desires the truth and 
the exposure of those who were responsible. The investigation 
has had a confused existence--the Committee tried its best to con-
/ . found everyone and everything--but the "depositions" are there. 
And, furthermore, the essential facts are clear.67 
Doumergue as the nucleus for French unity.-- Our task does not 
; 
involve a detailed history of the Second Doumergue Ministry. But, it 
would be a serious injustice if we left our account at this point. It 
is mandatory that an estimate of Doumergue 1 s role in the "Democratic 
Crisis of 1934 in France" be brought into a sharper focus. This be-
comes a necessity, furthermore, because of the unjust accusations 
later writers made against "Gastounet." 
Premier Doumergue was rather harshly criticized by his contempo-
raries for the few accomplishments made by his Ministry. Yet when the 
records are checked, the Premier does not come out so badly •. First, 
Doumergue in his ministerial declaration had asked for parliamentary 
investigating commissions. These were voted as he demanded. Secondly, 
67Anon., "Les Commissions d'enqu~te,n Journal des D~bats, Vol. 2100 
(May 25, ~934), p. 823. 
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Doumergue wished his budget to be accepted. On February 22, by 466 
votes against 121, the Chamber did just that--and the Senate quickly 
approved. ~he proposed aggressive role in foreign affairs was under-
taken by M. Barthou which many versed on the subject feel, was doing 
very well before he was shot. Compared to what the premiers of the 
Cartel des Qauches had done, this record cannot be labelled a 
68 failure. 
·Moreover in his ~isterial address, Doumergue had referred to the 
need for the Government to bring a moral order into the administration. 
With this point in mind, on April 18 the Premier reorganized the central 
A ; I I 
administration of the Ministry of the Interior and the Surete=Generale. 
This he undertook by using the d~crets-lois granted to him by the · 
Chamber only four days before. These reforms had been inadequate--and 
Doumergue was the first to admit ~his--because of lack of funds at the 
time. 69 In November, just before his Ministry fell, the Premier was 
considering the continuation of these police reforms so as to bring 
the S~ret~ up to par with the Prifecture, improve the finances of both, 
and modernize the whole French police.70 
A paradox indeed faces the historian when he reaches the end of 
the Second Doumergue Ministry. For yea~s there had been defenders in · 
France of a stronger Constitution, but when the Premier proposed actually 
68 \ R.L., 11Les premiers actes du Ministere Doumergue," L'Illustration, 
Vol. 4748 (March 3, 1934), 261. 
69 Werth, France in Ferment, p. 258. 
70 ; ; • - ' Chambre des deputes, Journal Off~ciel de novembre 8, 1934, 15 ieme 
L~gislature, Annexe 3936 (Paris, 1934), pp. Jl-34. 
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to carry this out, his opponents said that he had ndelusions of power,n 
. . 71 
that he wanted to be a dictator, and that he was a "fascist." 
The parliamentary and constitutional reforms outlined by Premier 
Doumergue in September-November, 19:34, were essentially those already 
; 
offered by Andre Tardieu. These, Doumergue had sincerely declared, 
were urgent if authority within the democratic Government of France was 
to be restored. Here again Domergue can be seen as carrying out the 
promise he had made in his ministerial declaration along the line of 
nmoral order.n72 
On his constitutional reforms, Doumergue used the radio to appeal 
directly to the people. His "fireside chat~\" of September 24 was the 
first broadcast he devoted to this subject. The Premier told the 
French people why he desired a strong President of the Cabinet. He 
outlined the pressing need for the Premier to be able to dissolve the 
Chamber without the consent of the Senate. The Radical-socialist Party 
on October 28 opposed the giving of so much power to one man. Pierre-
Etienne Flandin later confessed that once M. Dotimergue and M. Herriot 
could not see eye to eye on constitutional reforms, Doumergue was 
finished. When the Radical-socialists left his Cabinet on November 6, 
Doumergue resigned.7:3 
To render justice, it is necessary at this point to carry out an 
71 Jean Pierre Maxence 1 Hi.stoire de dix ans: 1927-19:37 (Paris 1 
19.39), p. 28:3. 
72werth, France in Ferment, p. 250. 
7:3Pierre-Etienne Flandin, Discours (Paris, 19:37), p. 9. 
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unwelcome duty; that is, to criticize Alexander Werth's attitude 
towards Doumergue. In his work entitled France in Ferment, Werth is 
definitely more objective and reliable--here he calls Doumergue a 
11Cincinnatus come to the rescue. 11 In his later revision, almost 
three years afterwards, the English journalist can see little that 
was good in Doumergue. This work entitled Which Way France? makes 
unfounded accusations against 'the Premier. Werth, for instance, 
accuses Doumergue of being a fascist. This last conclusion he bases 
on ''a rumor" · that Doumergue once was seen meeting La Rocque. Doumergue 's 
motives are twisted by Werth who seemed to know the mind of Doumergue 
better on most suqjects·than did.the Premier •. Werth's harshness' can 
in part be traced to the journalist's affiliation with the Radical-
Socialist school of thought. Herriot was his and England's hero. In 
France in Ferment, Werth blames Doumergue, for doing nothing about con-
stitutional reforms, while in Which Way France?, he condemns him for 
attempting constitutional reforms! This matter is an important one 
because of the many American and British authorities on modern France 
who have accepted Werth's final interpretation of Doumergue as the 
correct one. The author must add that when he checked against the other 
documents, Werth's France in Ferment turned out to be a very remarkable 
and objective presentation.74 
Estimate of Doumergue's role.-- Domergue was the indispensable man 
. -
in France in 1934 if French democracy was to continue unhampered. It 
74 . Compare the following works which are based on Werth: Dennis 
Brogan, France Under The Republic (New Y0 rk11939), and Richard Walden 
Hale, Jr., Democratic France (New 1Z6Jrk, 1941). 
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is difficult to see how chaos and anarchy could have been avoided if 
he had not been available. Around him crystallized all those who 
desired a return to French democratic unity. The deputies made no 
bones about how indispensable he was. There are few objective 
reasons why Doumergue 1s foremost biographer's words could still not 
be accepted in 1934, for he wrote: 
Gaston Doumergue: Here is a republican who bas found the 
secret of how to govern the Republic; here is a sincere demo-
crat, and even a passionate one, who under the multi-party 
political system found a way to serve his country. Let us not 
say that such a task is impossible.75 
The last word on Doumergue goes to Laurent Bonnevay who, although 
a strict Radical-socialist, was not blinded by par~y affiliation 
when :m suggested Doumergue • s part in the "Democratic Crisistt with 
the following words: 
Even those who regretted the bitterness that filled 
Doumergue on November 11, and the harsh declarations he made 
as he departed from the capital, will never forget the service 
that he rendered his country and his Republic by leaving) ~11 
the night of February 7, his peaceful retreat of Tournefeuille to 
procure the benefit, if not of a durable internal peace, at least 
a long quiet truce for the French--who were on the brink of 
preci~itating themselves into the abyss of an atrocious civil 
war.7o . 
75 Pierre Lafue, Doumergue (Paris, 1933), p. 4. 
76 ·. , . 
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CHAPTER XII 
CONCLUSION ON THE DEMOCRATIC CRISIS 
What Has Been Done 
Historiograp4v of the subject.-- The historical works on the 
internal history of France in the early Thirties are extremely con-
troversial and ephemer~l. As. has been pointed out throughout this 
study, the primary and secondary works on the period 1932 through 
1934 in France came from such varied sources as memoirs, eye-witness 
reports, newspaper accounts, periodical analyses, and brochures 
written by survivors of the period. Of special importance to the re-
search scholar are the invaluable materials left by the Stavisky 
Inquiry Commission as well as the February Six Inquiry Commission. 
Generally speaking, it is correct to state that most of the mono-
graphs on the January and February Riots were written by Frenchmen 
and tend to be biased and incomplete. It is amazing to discover that 
French writers who developed the subject during and after World War 
II have made so little use of the essential records left by the 
. 1 
parliamentary commissions. 
The Anglo-American historians have neglected to give adequate 
attention to the domestic events in France in the Thirties. The 
author can paraphrase the consensus of opinions given to him by French 
1An annotated bibliography of the individual French works will 
be found at the end of this work. 
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scholars and politicians on this point as: "Americans understandably 
have given much attention to French foreign affairs in the period, but 
why have they allowed such a neglect of inte.rnal matters"? One bitter 
official added that F_rench internal affairs )Yare too confusing for 
American intellectuals to explain to the American public clearly. The 
first statement would appear to be correct, if we are to judge by the 
lack of substantial works produced by Anglo-American students on the 
11Democratic Crisis of 1934 in France." 
Two Englishmen are still the leading authorities on the inter-
pretation of .the Thirties in France to the English-speaking world; 
these are,-Alexander Werth, correspondent for the Manchester Guardian 
at that time; and Dennis Brogan, a Professor of Political Science at the 
University of Cambridge. This author has already commented at length 
on the importance of Werth. It will be recalled that the latter saw 
February Six as a fascist movement·. Brogan, on the other hand, is 
difficult to rate as·an authority, for he has included no bibliography 
to his France Under the Republic (Harpers, 1940). After careful 
scrutiny and comparison, this author discovered that Professor Brogan 
was dependent on Werth for his chapter entitled "And Knavi.sh Tricks" 
which takes up matters discussed in this work. 
Most of the historical writings by American historians on Modern 
France give but cursory attention to the events in France from 1932 to 
1934. Examples of this type are: (1)· John B. Wolf's France: 1815 to 
the Present (1940) and (2) Edward Mead Earle's Modern France (Princeton, 
1951) • In tr1:1th the only two worthwhile ana:J,yses by American historians 
on the January and February Riots of 1934 are: R. W. Hale, Jr. •s ~­
cratic France (Coward~cCann, Inc., 1941) and E. J. Knapton's France 
Since Versailles (Henry Holt, 1952). Both works devote only limited 
space to the topic, and bot~ authors were depending on Werth. It 
must be added that no major American monograph on the subject has yet 
appeared. 
Thus there has been little growth of historical perspective in 
America concerning the hectic events of January-February 1934. Yet this 
is the most written about internal development in France between the 
two wars by European scholars. In view of the paucity of material ex-
isting in the United States on the "Democratic Crisis" of 1934, the 
author has taken the liberty of going into much narrative and analysis 
--especially on the riots. At this point the author believes that 
it is essential to devote some space to the interpretations of 
February Six as seen by the European authorities in the field. This 
involves mainly a debate over terminology: a debate as to whether 
February Six was a "Civil War," a "revolution," or a "riot." 
Civil War, Revolution, or Riot? 
was it a civil war?-- The influential periodical, L'Illustration, 
assigned a whole staff of investigators to the study of the signifi-
cance of February Six on the very next day after the event occurred. 
Two weeks later the weekly published the results as seen by its re-
search department. February Six was depicted as a day when Frenchmen, 
seething with rage, became bewildered by the clamors of the rushing 
multitudes on Paris streets which had been going on since New Year's 
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Day. Unable to comprehend .what was happening, a minority of Frenchmen, 
unwittingly for the most part, organized what became virtually a 
"civil war." The battle fields were the vastPl~ce de la Concorde, 
the Left and Right Banks of the Seine, and the Paris Boulevards. On 
these fields were matched one hundred thousand Parisians against sever~ 
al thousand guards and policemen. Defense lines.were set up, assaulted, 
abandoned, and retaken. Assaults and retreats, attacks and counter-
attacks, mass battalions and tactical units and hand-to-hand fighting 
were used by both sides. Thus all the elements associated with a 
"civil war" were there. "And so," concluded L'Illustration, "for a 
long time will this vision of a night of civil war stay with us.n2 
The "civil war" was also Henri de Kerillis 1 motif in L'Echo de 
" Paris. Kerillis reported that on February Six "the Government or 
M. Daladier ~revoked a civil war in Paris." He developed this idea 
by pointing out that Frenchmen ha~ been pitted against each other 
unmercifully, for had not the Mobile Guards fired on the crowd and 
killed and wounded many of their countrymen? He saw the enemy as being 
11 the Stavisky Government, the Government of Thieves, the Government of 
Corruption, and the Government of Filth," that is by implication, the 
Daladier Government, The insurgents were the patriots, the veterans, 
and the decent people who, once aroused, fought for the cause of 
"national union." Further evidence that a civil war had occurred, 
added Kerillis, was the fact that a genuine mobilization had been 
2Anon., "La soir'e et la nuit du 6," L1Illustration, Vol. 4746. 
(February 17, 1934), 187. 
undertaken by the political leagues. The men who answered the call 
had moved against the Concorde front to challenge the enemies--the 
armed Government troops.J 
The historian, however, is confronted with very little objective 
evidence to uphold the civil war thesis. Politi.cally speaking, only 
one government existed and not two to challenge each other. Both 
sides really used no trainecLtroops; that ·is, military troops. · The 
cause defended by both groups was never clearly stated as such. The 
rioters on this last point appear to be at odds, if we accept the 
political leagues' ideas as conveying the goal in mind, for some were 
royalists, others were nationalists, a small· majority gave allegiance 
to connnu.nism, while others were vague in their doctrines. Thus 
without two governments, two armies, and two ideologies clashing it 
is difficult to take this civil war hypothesis seriously. 
It might further be brought out that a civil war usually is of 
longer duration than ·was February Six. History does not record any 
civil war of such short duration--rather is the term coup d'~tat pre-
ferred. The author discussed this su~ject personally with a Frenchman 
who had witnessed the event and who granted that maybe the· time element 
was against the civil war interpretation; but the same person argued 
that the rioters had a specific objective; namely, to take the Palais-
Bourbon. In answer-to this argument, Werth provides the speculation 
that: 
3 ; L'Echo de Paris, February 7, 1934. 
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Materially the Chamber of Deputies represents nothing, 
the invasion could only have been of 11s;Ymbolic" significance. 
But the mora~ effect of such a "symbolic" victory over the 
Republican regime would have been enormous; though it is 
difficult to see.what the consequences of that victory would 
have been.4 · 
Except for a literary approach to the subject, it is difficult 
to take this "civil war" view seriously. In addii;ion, it should be 
noted, that no major autho~ity on the Great February Six defends such 
a thesis. The author personally does not believe it is valid to so 
interpret the event under discussion'as a "civil war." 
Was it a revolution?-- ~es Scapini, the Rightist Deputy from 
Paris, became the main defender of the assertion that February Six was 
a day of revolution. Scapini expressed his "revolution theory" .thus: 
The truth is much more profound and infinitely more serious. 
Fo~ fifteen years, we have been in a state of virtual revolution. 
This revolution entered the active phase with this effusion of 
blood (on February Six~. This revolution had as its sources 
many different causes. 
According to Scapini this revolution had reached the active phase 
on February Six because of: (1) socio-economic ideas, and (2) political . 
deterioration. The key factor within the socio-economic elements was 
the "speculation parasite11 which had infected French capitalism. He 
continued that this parasitical speculation had become a sort of 
privately run institution without controls or limits. As a result 
appeared the Stavisky Scandals. But, though this was the immediate 
4Alexander Werth, France in Ferment (London, 1935), p. 160. 
5
aeorges Scapini, R~volution: oui=Querre Civile: non (Parfs, 
19.34), p. 6. \ 
382 
reason for February Six, Scapini believed the we~ess of France's 
leaders· and the paucity of intelligence in public life had made it 
impossible for them to solve France's problems. These leaders, not 
~eeing beyond their country's geographical limits had neglected and 
underestimated the international economic picture. February Six, 
Scapini felt, was a veritable revolution, for it made two changes 
inevitable: (1) the elimination of uncontrolled speculation, and 
(2) the adequate consideration by the French politicians of foreign 
6 influences. 
Another authority felt that·February Six had been more a 
0 
political revolution than anything else. Some sort of political 
upheaval had been in the making for many years, but it took February 
Six to reveal specifically that it 11was monarchism's last standn in 
France. The monarchist ideology directed by Maurras and Daudet made 
its last serious attempt to overthrow the Republic. February Six, 
continued this line of thought, revealed that botn the Right and Left 
had drifted very far aJ?art while under the Third Republic. The Great 
February Riot made both sides realize their follies had brought them 
back,·to the defense of the Republic. This was an unquestionable 
revolution because: 
.•• a fact which for me is beyond question; that is, that 
without the demonstration of February Six, all would have re-
mained in France as stagnant as it was since 1918. 
6 ' 6 Scapini, Revolution, pp. -10. 
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For the days of February sounded the knell of the old 
division of the Nineteenth Century between the Right and the 
Left. 7 
Other interpretations of the Great February Six were more 
cautious.about labelling the. event a "revolution," but suggested 
that it was an "attempted revolution," checked in its infancy ~nd for 
the time being. One historian, seeking a good parallel in France's 
own political past, commented: 
As in February, 1848, so in February 1934 Paris had been 
the scene of insurrection, extensive mob violence and bloody 
street warfare. The "famed February Revolution" brought 
defeat to the Orleanist Monarchy and ushered in the Second 
Republic. The current disorders, attended by scenes un-
paralleled since the days of the Commune in 18711 are today 
menacing the life of the Third Republic, and its early demise 
as well as the institution or one-person rule in any of 
several possible forms are subjects of daily discussion.S 
In~ limited sense, the idea of February Six as a revolution is 
acce~table. It is true, as M. Scapini stated, that speculation was 
uncontrolled in France during this period, and that most of the time 
cabinet changes only brought back the same old faces. It is also 
undeniable that on February Twelfth the Right and the Left were led 
to cooperate with each other because of the scare February Six had 
given them. The Left-Right rising to uphold democracy was further 
very obvious on the day Doumergue read his ministerial declaration 
before the Chamber. But to call the ending of a wild period of 
7Drieu la Rochelle, Chroni9ue Politigue: 1934·1942 (Paris, 1943), 
pp. 390-395. 
8Lowell Joseph Ragatz, The Background of the February Riots in 
Paris (London, 1934), p. 1. 
specUlation a revolution is stretching the meaning or the word a bit 
too much. The same holds true for the patching up or political dis-
agreements. 
To classify February Six as a major revolutionary day certainly 
would be incorrect. A revolution must result in the overthrow or 
renunciation or one government or rule, and the substitution or 
another, and it must also bring a "fundamental change." Certainly 
it is beyond doubt that the Doumergue National Government was some-
what different from the preVious ministry headed by Daladier. 
Doumergue for one thing brought older and more experienced men into 
the Cabinet. The former President or the Republic, furthermore, 
showed more authority and round public opinion supporting him. That 
Daladier was overthrown -"by the street" and not Parliament is an 
acceptable conclusion. The argument falls down on the matter or a 
"fundamental change." rr a fundamental change had occurred in the 
Third Republic, it was difficult to say what it was. Political life 
still operated within a Third Republic frame_, while the "men who 
served" were old familiar politicians to the French scene. Economi-
cally, small-scale capitalism still held sway over the nation. Re-
ligion had never been an issue. Thus, from all Viewpoints, the full 
meaning or revolution when applied to February Six is unacceptable. 
was February Six a riot?~- Since there are aspects or February 
Six which make the terms "ciVil war" and "revolution" inappropriate, 
one is forced to evaluate it as a riot, and a very serious one. 
February Six has become a landmark in modern French history, and the 
serious observer of French internal affairs can still see its reper-
cussions even tod~y. Witness, for instance, the influence it has 
bad in destroying the faith in democracy of many Frenchmen and in 
sending them to the Communist fold. The writer prefers therefore to 
call it the "Great February Riot," as have many others who have 
attempted to explain it. 
Marcel Lucain said t]:la t February Six was an "extremely serious 
riot11 because of the use of dangerous weapons and the many dead and 
wounded. Lucain wrote that never in modern ~imes had France 
witnessed so "bitter and important a riot." He expressed his horror 
at such a revolting development in his days by declaring: 
And, no matter·.how sincere Frenchmen are in desiring that 
calm should return, that reason should rule,· and that fraternal · 
amnesty should be called into being, they cannot, unless they 
are implicated or apa the tie 1 th.row a curtain of silence over 
one outstanding fact, w~tbout precedent in our histo~: 
veterans and. civilians were beaten unconscious with clubs;· they9 were subjected to gunfire by a repression that showed no mercy. 
Georges ArquEf and Yves Dautun gathered an amazing collection of 
records dealing with the Stavisky Affair and February Six. They we:re 
convinced.that their contemporaries were misinterpreting the meaning 
of these two events because they ~ere using them for their immediate 
defense. Arq~: and Dautun felt that the dispa~sionate history of the 
period could.not be written until the 1950's. ·Until then, their 
generation was sure or only one fact: February Six had been a riot.10 
9 . 
Paris-Midi, February 71 1934. 
W I ' Georges Arque et Yves Dautun, Une emeute (Paris, 1934). 
Most of the press from the Right and Left agreed that February 
11 Six was a "riot." The c.a.T. called it a "shocking riot." Figaro 
underlined that it was a "bloody riot in the Place de la Concorde and 
• 12 
was so serious as capable of bringing on a c1vil war." If the spokes-
men for the C.G.T. and the typical "Grande Presse" agreed on a riot, 
so did the Left in L'Oeuvre: 
Briefly, a night of riot. A premeditated riot, an 
organized riot. These encounters take us back to the worse 
bloody days of 1919 under Clemenceau.l3 
As we are again with a problem in semantics, let us define a riot 
as "wild and loose behavior, a tumult." Without douht February Six 
was a wild day, and the sitting of the Chamber was unquestionably a 
tumultuous one. Furthermore, the events on the Place de la Concorde 
that day took February Six out of the category of "mild demonstration." 
The "human beast activities" placed it properly under "wild and loose 
behavior," a riot. The author believes that the account, described 
in great detail in Chapters Seven and Eight above, justifies the name 
"Great February Riot11 as the proper label to tag to this momentous 
event. 
Significance in History 
Was there a "fascist plot" on February Six?-- The gravest accusa-
tion and the most accepted interpretation of the "Great February Six" 
11 Le Peuple, February 7, 1934. 
12 Figaro, February 8, 1934. 
13 L'Oeuvre, February 8, 1934. 
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was that it was a "vast fascist plot." The writer must admit· that he 
himself believed that such a plot existed as he began his research 
into the matter. Such a viewpoint had been borrowed from American 
textbooks on this period, as well as from some of the monographs on 
the Third Republic •. As pointed out in the previous chapter, the 
English journalist, Alexander Werth,played no small part in this 
evaluation. Even in his excellent France in Ferment Werth wrote: 
The man in the s.treet missed the whole point 1 and only 
the politically educated working class realized, and were 
even inclined to exaggerate, the full significance of the 
"fascdst coup." February Six was not followed by the es-
tablishment of.a fascist dictatorship; but certainly Daladier 
was driven out by Fascist methods, by 11 direct action.nl4 
This interpretation with little difficulty found many believers. 
' . ~ M. Eugene Frot and M. Edouard Daladier were the fathers of this 
view in more ways than one, for they had insisted that there occurred 
an•l:lttempted fascist coup d'ltat" on February Six against the French 
Republic. In his February Seven "appeal to calmness" address to the 
French people, Daladier had asserted that ncertain political leagues 
had declared their wish to riot and had attempted a coup de force 
against the republican regime.u15 
The Communists were the most confirmed believers in the "fascist 
plot." Their leader, M. Maurice Thorez, was inaccurate in his 
historical details, for he twisted the facts and added others to fit 
14 
Werth, France in Ferment, p. 165. 
15 ; 
MM. Jean Piot et de Nadaillac, Les decisions du governement au 
lendemain du 6 fevrier 1934 et la Journle sur la voie publique, Chambre 
des d~put<fs, Annexe 33911 Documents Parlementaires (Paris 1 May 17, 19.34), 
p. 696. 
the argument, but he was very effective and convincing. He clearly 
expressed the adopted Communist explanation when he recorded: 
The coup had been carefully prepared since February 4th. 
The Fascist leagues came to an understanding among themselves. 
La Rocque and his troops were to come up at the decisive 
moment, and a detailed plan for the siege of the Palais-
Bourbon was drawn up. With this common aim in view, each 
Fascist group launched ita manif'esto.l6 
Pierre Cot 1 a member of Daladier' s Cabinet 1 still echoed the 
Government view during World War II with: 
For on February Six, an excited mob pushed by the fascist 
organizations, the Action Fran~aise and the Croix de Feu 
notably, tried to invade the C amber of Deputies, to establish 
a provisional government, and to crush the republican ~gime. 
L6on Blum, Daladier, and I knew this to be so, and we organized 
the opposition. In the battle between fascism and democracy, 
the date of February Six is a most important one.l7 
The Communist Youth Movement in France during this period pur-
ported to be yet more specific on the "plot" by revealing that 
Chiappe was the 11 shadow mati behind this fascist plot." Their 
spokesman declared that the Communists bad always suspected this · 
questionable Prefect of Police as being a "sneaky one." Chiap~e was 
further accused by the Communist Youth of attempting to establish 
the ncapitalist fascists in power" so that they could dictate their 
policies to the nation.l8 
The C.G.T., France's largest labor union, had it published that 
16 Maurice Thorez, France Today and the People's Front (New York, 
l9J6), pp. 108-109. 
17 \ , ( Pierre Cot, Le proces de la republigue, Vol. I New York, 1944), 
4J. 
18 P. L. Damar, Chiappe, un chef de bandit (Paris, l9J6), p. JO. 
, 
the French people did not care for fascism or a Hitlerian regime. Its 
news organ announced that: "The Fascist Bands·Had Organized Riots 
19 Around The Palais-Bourbon." The Socialist Party and its press, as 
we have seen, adopted the ttfascist plot theory" and declared that: 
The coup de force by the fascists had failed. The fascist 
reaction will not be allowed here. Fascist bands composed of 
Camelots du Roi 1 Croix de Feu, and Jeunesses Patriotes have 
assaulted the police with an unheard of savagery by taking re-
course to clubs, razors, and revolvers.20 
The Socialists and the Communists kept using the "fascist plot 
theory" for many years afterwards--ft might be added to certain 
political advantage. The Great General Strike, it will be recalled· 
by the reader, was organized by the workers as a "protest against 
fascism." This fascist plot campaign resulted in all anti-fascists 
21 
uniting to form the Popular Front under Blum afterwards. 
But must history accept this fascist plot verdict as the truth? 
Was there really a fascist plot? The author believes that there 
definitely was not any such plot on February Six. Those who say the 
contrary were never able to prove it. Furthermore, the proponents of 
this interpretation of the Great February Six never worried about 
objective evidence, but relied on appeals to the emotions. They em-
phasized what might have happened if. 
But did the contemporaries all accept this fascist plot as the 
19 
Le Peuple, February 7, 1934. 
20 
Le Populaire, February 71 1934. 
21 
Le Populaire, February 13 1 1934; also Le Temps, the 1935 issues. 
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truth? The answer to this question i~ "no." Tlie conservative press 
was especially interested in removing this "fascist plot notion," 
and in its campaign we find the following excerpt: 
The truth, here it is! 
There was not, on February Six, any "plot by the Right." 
The first sittings of the Inquiry Commission--which has the 
duty of divulging all responsibilities incurred on that tragic 
day--have shown, with the evidence before them, that there 
existed no previous understanding among the numerous organiza-
tions that prepared the riot which was so savagely checked; 
and that the rioters were veterans, who had no other design 
but to protest peacefully against the imputabie scandals 
brought on by the abuses of a political clique.22 
Georges Scapini, Deputy from Paris, also refused to associate 
himself with those who believed in such a plot. Scapini pointed out 
that a fascist movement always had a leader, a Fuehrer, or a ~· 
He could recall no such person in France to fit this requirement. 
The deputy averred that puerile arguments were being offered to label 
February Six a fascist coup. 23 
Many witnesses later testified that the Inquiry Commission had 
tried to make them say such a plot existed even when they knew it was 
not true. No leaguers ever admitted that such a plot had been even 
discussed or thought of by the league leaders. The evidence is on 
their side of the argument. 24 
In Chapter Five of this work, the author has shown that the inter-
pretation of the political leagues as being the organizers of-a "fascist 
22 Le Temps, March 9, 1934. 
23 i . , 1 i ":! 2 Scap n1, Revo ut on, pp. ~-1 • 
24 Candide, March 15, 19:34. 
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plot" is erroneous. Those who say that February Six was a fascist plot 
use these leagues.to _prove their point. The leagues are all classified 
as "fascists.n This, as we have shown, is far from being true. Even 
at best we can only·credit the small leagues as having ttfascist under-
tones." Often La Rocque is selected as the "leader of February Six." 
Acquaintance with the true facts of the Great February Riot quickly 
disposes of this notion as false. The author concludes with the 
February Six Inquiry·Commdssion that no such a plot ever existed. 25 
Was it anti-republicanism and was democracy at stake?-- In a 
' conference held on February 23, 1934, M. Ybarnegaray, Deputy of the 
Basses-Pyr~les, demanded if the republic had been in danger on 
February Six. He answered this rhetorical question by admitting that 
he did not have all the facts, but added that he was already con-
vinced of one fact--THE REPUBLIC WAS THREATENED. It was threatened 
by those who were in charge of keeping it alive, for they had allowed 
conditions to become chaotic. He concluded that the true gravediggers 
within the French Republic were the men who were the slaves of partisan 
politics.26 
The February Six Inquiry Commission concluded also that on February 
Six the Republic had been in danger •. The commission went about to 
prove this point by quoting from the evidence a'n d· by digging heavily 
25 I ' 1 I . · M. Marc Rucart, Rapport General, Chambre des deputes, Annexe 
3383, Documents Parlementaires (Paris, May 17, 1934). 
26 1 ~. I Ybarnegaray, Le grand soir des honne~es geris; le 6 fevrier 
(Paris, 1934). 
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into the dossiers. The Commission recalled that during the January R~ 
this threat had grown more serious each day, because these riots were 
provoked and organized by the traditional anti-parliamentary enemies, 
the royalists. When the Solidarite' Francaise founded by M. Coty, who 
called himself a 11Bonapartist Republican," followed the royalist leaders 
into the Paris streets, Maurras' hopes for destroying the Republic went 
27 . 
up. On February 4, Maurras made no bones about his anti-republican 
intentions when he wrote: "As our friends have interpreted it for the 
past f'ew days, the cry of' 'Down With The Thieves!' was to be under-
stood as meaning 'Down W:lth 'l'he Republic!'"28 
I I In its Rapport General, the February Six Inquiry Commission, 
however, inquired: 
But is it not also true that the presidents of' the Jeunesses 
Patriotes have never hidden their sentiments in favor of' an 
authoritarian government? And was it not true that in the organi-
zation, in the administration, and in the charters of' the 
associations, it was the authoritarian system which replaced the 
democratic system?--
If' by "Republic" we mean the present type of democratic 
government, then we accuse those who tried to attack our demo-
cratic institutions, as did the rioters on February Six, of 
having placed the Republic in danger.29 
Victor Hugo once said that "the right to vote suppressed the right 
to insurreetion.n On February Six the rioters disregarded such a 
principle, for they attempted to take the Palais-Bourbon where sat the 
representatives elected by them. That same night a cry dominated all 
27 , , 
Rucart, Rapport General, p. 1.354. 
28 
Action Francaise, February 4, 19.34. 
29 , , 
Rucart, Rapport Genera~, p. 1.354. 
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the others on the Concorde; namely, "On To The Chamber!" The Inquiry 
Commission here posed two questions: (1) Wasn't the attempt to take 
the Palais-Bourbon an act against the existing r~gime? and (2) when 
voters still had means to express their opinions peacefully, was it 
correct to try to force an opinion by using street forces as the 
:30 
rioters had done on February Six? Georges Ima.nn !lad earlier 
answered these questions. as follows: "The Parisians, by marching on 
February Six to the Palais-Bourbon, de~ired to d~st~oy Parliament.":3l 
For months, through international contagion~ the idea of 
establishing a dictatorship in France had won more and more 
followers. What dictatorship was it to be? We did not know! 
What dictator? We still had not discovered him! But in spite 
of these handicaps, the campaign went on ardently in the 
nationalist press of Paris and even in numerous conservative 
provincial sheets--the campaign against the institutions and , . 
the regime~ and more particularly, against Parliament which 
was saddled with the blame for causing the world economic 
crisis.:32 
The provinces of France agreed wholeheartedly with this belief / 
that the rioters on February Six had hoped to overthrow French democracy 
and with it the Third Republic. A pastor speaking for the Angoumois 
section of France declared that on February Six the rioters had meant 
1othrow the deputies in the Seine and overthrow the Republic. Another 
pastor from Brittany, feeling the same way, averred tha.t: 
;30 1 I 
Rucart, Rapport General, p.·l:345. 
;31 I f Georges Imann, La .journee du 6 fevrier (Paris, 19:34), p. 99 and 
p. 10;3. 
~ I I Laurent Bonnevay, Les .iournees sanglantes de fevrier 1934 
(Paris, 19:35), pp. 19-20. 
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We, simple provincials and protestant democrats, we would 
never accept as professors of morality, the leaders of February 
Six. They appeared to us as truly p1aci~ in peril the precious 
liberties fought fo~ by our forefathers.3J 
Democratic Crisis · 
Significance in histoty of February Six.-- February Six ~as the 
dramatic climax of a "democratic crisis" which can be said to have 
_ become noticeable in France by 1932. The causes of the crisis can be 
taken further back than that date, of course, but it was only after 
. ~ 
the Elections of 1932 that post World War I France's democratic regime 
became seriously endangered. This first stage of the crisis can be 
termed the "latent" or ttchronic" phase. During this nchronic phase," 
there appeared in France an increase in the distrust of French demo-
cratic institutions. The specific attacks against democracy took a 
technical viewpoint for they involved the questioning of such-prosaic 
matters as the interpellations, the parliamentary questions, the con-
stant ministerial instability, the French parliamentary committee system, 
the multi-party system, the value of a limited suffrage, and the dis-
appointing results of the Elections,or 1932. 
During this "chronic phase" in the nnemocratic Crisis" most of the 
criticisms against French democracy were kept on a high intellectual 
level and tended to be constructive in tone. Only a minority of the 
voters bothered to ,understand what ~hese criticisms were. The truth 
or the matter was that many or these attacks had been under discussion 
33 
Freddy Durrlemann, '.ta. cause et le _six· r{Vri_:er (Paris, 1935), 
pp. 19-20. 
for years in intellectual circles. These criticisms by themselves 
were not potent enough to bring about the overthrow of French democracy. 
What the critics of the French democratic system called '~weaknesses" 
were also defended by pointing out that they were part of the Third 
French Republican tradition--they made politics more interesting. 
Thus this "chronic phase" was one of t~e increased intellectual exer-
cise against the."wea.knesses of French democracy." Moreover this 
movement developed into the shappening and the remolding of the 
technical arguments so they could be understood by the uninitiated. 
This first stage of the "democratic crisis" gradually entered 
into the "potential" or "acute phase"--a stage characteriz~d by many 
more emotional and polemic attacks against the d~mocracy than was 
usual. This 'iacute phase" gathered momentum as the economic crisis 
struck France after visiting most of the world. As the depression 
swept over the French population, as unemp~oyment figures increased, 
as the farmers found the markets closed, and as the Government seemed 
to be unable to keep its Treasury in good order, the "capitalist 
offensive" began. This offensive was distingUished by the vicious 
threat it made against French parliamentary institutions and the 
premiership. This "capitalist offensive" soon was assisted in its 
attacks against the occupants of the Palais-Bourbon by the royalists. 
The royalist press, seeing the opportunity to reestablish the monarchy, 
began a devastating series of attacks against the government • 
..-- While the "capitalist offensive" and the royal press weakened many 
Frenchmen'' s faith in democracy, the German menace further increased 
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French anxiet es over secur1te. The dominance of the German question 
led yet more Frenchmen to join the .royalists and to pr~ach that the 
French Government was to blame for the country's troubles. The press 
now kept itself busy trying to explain why French democracy was 
weakening. In this propaganda campaign emotional arguments and attacks 
on personalities abounded. The majority of Frenchmen may not have 
understood all the arguments as interpreted by the press, but they 
knew what the essential message communicated was: the Government was 
responsible for the "hard timesn now hitting France. 
While the intellectual attack against democratic institutions 
was becoming very dangerous to the existence of French democracy, the 
economic situation became worse. An _unhappy people now began to listen 
more attentively to their anti-parliamentary press. The newspapers 
which criticized the "sca;pegoat11 best were rewarded with higher 
circulations. The historian who studies the French periodicals and 
newspapers of this period is struck by the lack of pledges made by 
ihese public opinion media to support democracy;. And although the 
French people could not say why they were allowing their emotions to 
react positively to this anti-parliamentary attitude, they knew that: 
the government was doing little to alleviate their sufferings. This 
anti-parliamentary attitude gradually became overshadowed by a general 
atmosphere of disgust all over France with things as they were. This 
distrust became associated with the Third Republic. 
This "acute phase" ended in many Frenchmen seriously questioning 
their faith in democracy when the Stavisky Affair exploded. The 
democratic crisis then entered the third stage of its development; 
namely, the "active" or "violent phase." What had only been suspected 
before was now provided with facts and suggested lists of names of the 
"villains" responsibile for the scandals. Every new revelation was 
taken apart by the venal press to the detriment of French democratic 
life. Many more Frenchmen, e~peeially the political leaguers, joined 
actively in the movement against their democracy when the names of the 
French judges, lawyers, police, and deputies implicated with Stavisky 
were revealed. A political deterioration now occurred, as the press 
suggested that the future had yet more corruption and more thieves to 
disclose. The large headlines given the Stavisky Affair resulted in 
bringing the terrible assault against French democracy which wasr 
February Six. 
' 
Then on January 7; the Action E:ralljaise 1 s ''call to action" was 
,. 
answered by the J"anuary Riots. · It seemed from then on that no govern-
ments could do anything right. French democracy was meeting one of 
the severest tests in its history. In this 11 violent phase" of the 
"democratic crisis," it was fortunate for the Third Republic that the 
organized opponents of French democracy, the so-called political 
leagues, had no program or leader acceptable to all France. The 
Chautemps Ministry with its Dalimier and Raynaldy Affairs, its refusal 
to allow parliamentary investigation of the Stavisky Scandals, and its 
attempt to reform the press only end~d by goading the "street forces" 
into overthrowing the Government. A calmness was reached during this 
stage of the crisis when the Daladier Cabinet assumed power. 
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Daladier realized something had struck at the democratic institu-
tions in France, but he decided to stick to the old political rules 
as usual •. In his efforts to try to play the traditional parliamentary 
game, the Premier miscalculated. His mishandling or the Chiappe and 
~ . Thome-Fabre Affair brought the opponents or French democracy back on 
the streets. This time the crowd noticeably was much more numerous 
and had reached a point or extreme hate for the symbols that represented 
democratic France such as the police, the Chamber of Deputies, and even 
innocent by-standers who refused to join in the fight against the 
Government. The emotions, kept pent-up for-too long by the majority 
or the political leaguers, broke out into full expression during the 
Great February Riot. 
The rioters or February Six did not comprehend exactly what they 
hoped to accomplish that day, for they had no clear and coherent pro-
grams to follow. The "men in the street" that evening had lost faith 
in democracy, in their government leaders, and in themselves--for 
they were part or the French Republic. These men were groping for some 
leadership, but none appeared that was clear-sighted.or constructive. 
The contradictory commands they heard during the riot only created 
more confusion in their minds. As the dejected rioters returned home 
on February Six, the realization or what had happened on the Concorde 
and in Paris sobered them to race reality. This turn in attitude brought 
on the end of the "violent phase" or the "democratic crisis." By 
midnight on February Six it was obvious that the crisis was already 
losing force. 
3.99 
Soon after Colonel Simon's counteroffensive on the Concorde on 
February Six, Daladier offered his description of what the riot had 
been: he declared it a "fascist plot." The public, desiring any 
plausible version at this time, eagerly accepted this one with very 
little questioning. A bit ashamed of what they might have done to 
their democracy, if circumstances had taken only a slightly differ-
ent turn, they wanted to make amends. Except for a few die-hards, 
all of France entered into the "reac,tion" or "recuperative phase" 
of the "democratic crisis." 
As the "recuperative phase11 began, a whole day of repentance 
was ordered to "pledge oneself to the ideas or liberty and French 
democracy." The finger of accusation was pointed towards the 
"filthy fascists" who had brought French democracy to such a brink. 
Innumerable eulogies a~d pledges were now made in the name of. 
democracy, and Premier Doumergue directed the French people back to 
their former allegiance. It is questionable whether any other French 
leader could have played the role as well at the time. 
Provincial France came out or February Six with the cleaner 
conscience, and led the country in the return to the democratic faith. 
In fact, throughout 1934, the majority or Frenchmen returned as 
q~ickly as possible to accepting the Third Republic's institutions. 
And thus the "democratic crisis in France in.l934" passed away into 
French history. Its repercussions were to be felt for many years to 
come. French democracy still could not be expected to keep o~ the 
smooth road found in some of the other democratic nations, but the 
cause of liberty cQuld be thankful that it had not been completely 
destroyed during the 'hectic days that were January and February 1.9.34. 
The author, w~o believes that February Six has been neglected by 
the American students of modern French history, is convinced that 
this day in France, back in 19.34, should be considered as one of the 
most important dates in the fight for democracy to survive in our . 
world. It should be considered at least on the same level as the 
Quartre Septembre and the Seize Mai are already in the story which is 
that of the Third Republic. 34 As a threat to French democracy, the 
Great February Six Riot, when compared to the other major crises met 
by the Third Republic, was just as important and significant as had 
been the Bou1anger and the Dreyfus Affairs. It was the most serious 
crisis French democracy had to face between the two World Wars. 
Afterthoughts.-- Human .curiousity always finds it stimulating to 
speculate on the 11 ifs" of history. The author, yielding to this 
temptation, desires to raise two of these 11 iffy questions": (1) What 
would have happened if the fascist rioters of February Six had succeeded 
in overthrowing the Third Republic? and (2) what would have resulted 
ji the Communist Riot of February 9 had made France Communist? 
If the fascists had seized control of the French government on 
February Six, the whole course of European history--and perhaps of 
the world--might have been changed. This new government cou+d possibly 
have joined Hitler's Nazi Germany in an alliance against the democratic 
.~ 1i'For similar view see: Richard Walden Hale 1 Jr. , Democratic 
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world; it could have led to an alliance with Italy and Mussolini. The 
first possibility would seem the unlikely, for French-German controv-
ersies in 1934 were a strong deterrent against any such rapprochement. 
But the alternative of an alliance with Mussolini's Italy was not so 
·remote for in France, at that time, Mussolini was considered a great-
er figure than Hitler and was not looked upon disfavorably by many of 
the grand capitalists. The French role during the Italian War of 
1859 and the Unification of Italy could have been used to advantage 
to cement the relationships between the two Mediterranean powers. 
Such an Italo-French rapprochement might·have forestalled World War II 
by Fascist France and Italy bringing pressure against Nazi aggression. 
The suggested developments above would have encountered some 
almost unsurmountable obstacles: (1) Germany and France were on ex-
tremely bad terms over reparation payments and the new aggressive tone 
emanating from the Chancellor of the Third Reich; (2) the bitterness 
over Alsace-Lorraine was often brought up in the Rhenish and Saar 
presses, not to mention numerous family and private circles within 
these two provinces themselves; (3) the Italian irredentists were 
still talking about the "robbery of Savoy and Nice" by Napoleon III, 
and (4) the Paris fascists had the task of convincing and winning 
over the conservative French provinces to their ideology. This "if 
the fascists on February Six had succeeded," collapses mainly because 
of the fact that February Six was not a premeditated fascist coup 
d'ltat. Despite the extravagant press attacks on the parliamentary 
I . . 
regime, and the noisy January Riots, there was no fascist leader 
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recognized and ready to seize power on February Six. 
Our second "if" is especially intriguing to one living in the 
mid-Twentieth Century when the Communist World has become such a 
gigantic force in international affai~s·. This rtif" would assume 
that the French Communists would have been strong enough to control 
France in 1934. It .would assume that February 9 might have been a 
/ 
successful Communist coup d'etat. If this eventuality had occurred, 
would this have led to a quicker spreading of the Communist ideology 
throughout Western Europe? It might have brought a rapprochement 
between Russia and France. The democratic world would have been 
placed in a quandary then. The latter might have played the game of 
Realpolitik fully,and reluctantly made an alliance with Hitler and 
Mussolini to war against Communist France and Russia. The Red Scare 
in America had left sad memories as had the impulsive and half-
hearted.allied attempt after World war I to help the Whites to defeat 
the Reds. The anti-Bolshevik leadership being purged at that moment 
in Russia might have been strong enough to carry on a revolution from 
within successfully. In such a fight against the Stalinists the 
defection of Communist France from the Russo-French Pact could have 
brought allied success effectively and quickly. This flight into 
fantasy falls down on the inevitable truth that the French Communists 
in 1934 were extremely weak and were less ready to seize power on 
February 9, 1934 than the fascists had been three days earlier. 
The reflective historian is further tempted to inquire whether 
such an event as the "Democratic Crisis o£.1934 in France" is evidence 
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of the incurable precariousness of French democ~atic life. Comparing 
tpe alleged French and English temperaments is nothing new; but in 
modern European history the major English changes tend to be gradual 
and undramatic, w~ile the French have a penchant towards introducing 
political changes explosively and dramatically. The Britisher may 
announce a new policy in the most perfunctory manner; the Frenchman 
has to dramatize such an announcement. The English emphasize reason; 
the French underscore emotions. 
To understand France one must comprehend the heart and the mind 
of the French. To study the superficial facts of French history dis-
passionately is not enough~ It may result in gathering many isolated 
facts under numerous titles, but not necessarily in an understanding 
of the French. France prefers theory over practicability, ideals over 
prosaic facts. 
Compromising on the political plane is always a difficult matter 
in France. An Englishman will usually give in to reason; a Frenchman 
will not. Although the Frenchman can reason as skilfully as a~other 
person, he prefers to do so intellectually. At times, he sees so 
many sides that the whole becomes to him incomprehensible. He finds 
himself defending those principles to which his emotions happen to 
react most vigorously. Thus be is unpredictable; he forms many polit-
ical parties; he is a natural-born debater; be becomes stubborn when 
challenged; he is the ultra-individualist; and he admires intellectual 
radicalism. 
This intellectual radicalism clashes with the French love for 
order. The Frenchman is constantly torn between the two. This dicho-
tomy is devastating in a world which demands order and conformity. It 
creates an unstable situation--a changing political force in the key 
country of Western Europe. 
Whereas France in the past usually was able to express its 
emotional attitudes quickly and effectively, it seemed tp have lost 
that ability under the Third Republic. Even the explosive event of 
February Six did not bring about the obviously needed changes in 
France's political and administrative structure. It would appear that 
France is still far from effectively adjusted to the new world or 
science, business, and democracy, which are some of the main currents 
of Western Civilization. There is no denying the fact that France 
is lagging behind in the political and economic fields. The sinc~re 
' 
friends of France do not believe they can be honest and say otherwise. 
Destructive criticism will not help either for, unless France adapts 
to the changing world and improves the strength and effectiveness of 
its democratic structure, the free world will be that much weaker on 
the continent of Europe. 
A pessimistic archivist in France told the author that "France has 
not yet faced the fact that.it has entered a period of decline; that 
its voice in international affairs is worthless." To anyone sensitive 
to France's role in world affairs such a statement is repugnant. The 
future needs from France those contributions of which she gave so much 
in the past. The French people have a steadfast faith in their own 
destiny, and they are certain that France will not perish. No, it is 
not decadence, but rather the "pangs of adjustmenttr that France is 
going through in the Twentieth Century. Those who know and love 
406 
la belle et .ioyeuse France have confidence that France will, by her-
self, solve her problems and will keep on making those contributions 
to mankind which have to this day enriched Western Civilization. 
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E. Newspapers 
The study of the French press in 1933 and 1934 is an herculean 
task because of the vastness of the subject, the complicated indirect-
ness used by some French reporters to cover up their opinions, and the 
lack of French newspaper sources in the United States on any but a 
fragmentary sense. French newspapers within our great archives are 
scattered, terribly incomplete, and discouragingly few. Really to 
get some understanding of the French press, the historian will make 
greater and firmer strides if he devotes many hours within the peri-
odical and newspaper section of the Biblioth~que Nationale in Paris, 
where the most important journals and periodicals are easily acces-
sible. 
The following analysis of the French press is based on the atti~ 
tude taken towards internal affairs in the period 1932-1935. 
Action Francaise, 1933-1934 series. The Royalist press. 
Ami du Peuple, 1934 series. Edited by Pierre Taittinger in the period~­
leader of Jeunesses Patriotes. 
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journal d'information. 
Le Figaro, 1934 series. Ultraconservative paper of the upper 
bourgeoisie. 
Le Franciste, 1934 series. Official organ of the Francistes. 
Le Jour, 1933-1934 series. Authoritarian, nationalist view. 
Le Matin, 1933-1934 series. Journal d'information. 
Le National, 1933-1934. Jeunesses Patriotes organ. 
Le Petit Parisien, 1933-1934 series. Journal d'information. 
Le Peuple, 1933-1934 series. The C. G. T. 's organ. 
Le Populaire, 1933-1934 series. The Socialist organ. 
Le Quotidien, 1934 series. Nationalist in view. 
L'~re Nouvelle, 1934 series. Radical newspaper. 
Le Temps, 1932-1935 series. In many ways the best paper to read. 
Conservative and very dull reading. 
L'Intransigeant, 1933-1934 series. Journal d'information. 
L'Oeuvre, 1934 series. Radical-Socialist organ. 
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New York Herald Tribune (Paris Edition), 1934 series. Poor on 1934. 
Paris-Midi, 1934 series. A rightist organ. 
Paris-Soir, 1934 series. Best illustrated daily. 
Reveil du Contribuable, 1934 series. U.N.C. 's. paper. 
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. r 
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ternal matters. 
, 
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